865.00/7–246: Telegram
The Chargé in Italy (Key) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received 12:33 p.m.]
3071. Prime Minister saw British Ambassador20 yesterday and said that he had not decided if he would accept charge of forming new government; that much would depend on his conversations with de Nicola21 after latter’s arrival in Rome this afternoon. De Gasperi said that the news coming out of Paris about Italian draft peace treaty was so discouraging that he felt he could not accept responsibility of heading govt required to sign treaty. He seemed bewildered by recent reports out of Paris, according to Charles, and said that when he had been in London last September it seemed clear all around that decision Italian Yugoslav frontier would be made along ethnic lines. Now he said there were reports about internationalization of Trieste. Charles expressed hope that De Gasperi would not refuse charge to form new govt when it was offered him and urged Prime Minister to be prepared “to swallow the bitter pill” that might be contained in treaty. British Ambassador said that he understood Nenni (Socialist)22 would be willing to accept solution involving internationalization of Trieste to which Prime Minister retorted “Nenni was welcome to job of forming a govt under those circumstances.”
In discussing Italian reaction to unjust peace terms Prime Minister said he envisaged important rightward swing toward extreme nationalism in Italy with many Communists and Socialists resigning from their parties and Uomo Qualunque group benefiting thereby. De Gasperi pointed out that in similar period after World War One Fascists were not stronger than Uomo Qualunque movement at present although he admitted that Giannini was not same calibre as Mussolini. De Gasperi added that in his conversations Saturday with Nenni and Togliatti23 the latter said that Italian Govt had made great mistake in not orienting its policy more closely with Soviet Union months ago; [Page 729] that closer and more friendly relations with USSR would have aided favorable solution of many of the treaty problems and that disappointments in that respect could be laid to Italy’s past policy of close collaboration with western powers.
I wish to emphasize that from standpoint of Italian internal politics and Italy’s future cooperation with democratic powers in post-war world, [to reach] no decisions in Paris on major issues involved would be better than Big Four agreement along lines which would dangerously weaken position of democratic and moderate elements in country if not make it impossible for them to collaborate effectively in new govt of republic (see my telegram 2970, June 21).24 The latest French proposal outlined in Delsec 648 (Paris 168, June 29 to Rome)25 is indeed a far cry from American line based on just ethnic and economic considerations and can hardly be considered even a compromise between our original position and extreme demands of Yugos support by Soviets on whose side I feel constrained to point out there has been no indication of willingness to compromise whatsoever (see my 2637, May 27).26 I feel that failure to recognize legitimate Italian ethnic and economic interests (Venezia Giulia) climaxing series of Italian disappointments in other clauses of the treaty will create national atmosphere so unhealthy that possibilities of young republic developing in normal and democratic manner will indeed be slight.
Sent Dept 3071; repeated Paris 386.
- Sir Noel Charles.↩
- Enrico de Nicola, Provisional Head of State of the Italian Republic.↩
- Pietro Nenni, Italian Vice Prime Minister and leader of the Italian Socialist Party.↩
- Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party and Italian Minister of Justice, June 1945–June 1946.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s proposal to the Council of Foreign Ministers for a settlement of the Trieste problem (740.00119 Council/6–2946). Bidault’s proposal is included in the United States Delegation Record of the Council’s 30th Meeting, June 29, 1946, p. 683.↩
- Ante, p. 449.↩