C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation
| Present: | The Secretary | Mr. Molotov |
| Mr. Cohen | Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov |
Subject: Trieste
The Secretary said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov to talk over the subject of Trieste. He said he had received a letter from de Gasperi,17 as he assumed Mr. Molotov had, also, and he had also seen that morning Mr. Kardelj. He therefore knew that both the Italians and Yugoslavs were opposed to the idea of internationalization. But in any case they should be heard on that point. He therefore wished to suggest to Mr. Molotov that they should adopt the French line as the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and then leave to the Peace Conference to decide what area if any on the Italian side should be internationalized. This would have the advantage of having the recommendation on this subject come from 21 nations and also Italy and Yugoslavia would have full opportunity at the Peace Conference to present their views. He said he agreed with Mr. Molotov that any international solution should be on a permanent and not on a temporary basis but he felt that the question was so important that it would be better to have it come from [Page 723] 21 nations rather than from only four. It was essential that a really good international plan of administration be worked out if the idea was to be adopted and their experts could be working between now and the conference on such a plan. He said that would take time and indeed it had taken us more than a year to draw up the Charter of the United Nations. He said in any case any international area should be under UN and the government should be a direct appointee of the United Nations. He repeated his suggestion to leave the question of internationalization also for the Peace Conference to consider.
Mr. Molotov said yesterday he had agreed to a new concession when he saw it was impossible to reach agreement on what he thought was a better decision. He had accepted M. Bidault’s proposal as to the frontier and as to the internationalization of Trieste and its adjacent territory. He had believed that this would provide a basis for agreement. He said he had read de Gasperi’s message but had not personally seen Kardelj on the subject of M. Bidault’s suggestion but he had heard that the Yugolavs were very displeased with the idea. Nevertheless he felt that agreement could be reached on that basis. He could not agree, however, to postpone the question of internationalization until the Peace Conference or for later decision since he felt that would be very dangerous and would inflame passions in the area as well as in Italy and Yugoslavia. He said they had already heard the views of both the Italians and the Yugoslavs and they would again be heard at the Peace Conference, but he thought it important that the Ministers should reach a definite decision before the Conference.
The Secretary pointed out that they had never heard the Yugoslavs or Italians on the specific point of internationalization.
Mr. Molotov said however they all knew that both parties were against it.
The Secretary said there had been several suggestions concerning the administration of this area, one from the French Delegation and one from the Soviet Delegation. He said it was obvious from its very nature that any such settlement would be very complicated and could not be done in a hurry. He said he wondered whether they had the right to attempt to settle the lives of many thousands of people by themselves. He remarked that he felt that if this issue could be disposed of it would be comparatively easy to settle the other questions.
Mr. Molotov stated that he did not know what Mr. Byrnes wanted. The Soviet Delegation accepted the frontier line which Mr. Byrnes desired, if not formally at least in substance, and had agreed to Trieste being internationalized. He repeated that it would be very dangerous to leave this latter question open and that the Ministers must decide it and not give a demonstration of their ineffectiveness. To leave it open would give impetus to passions and feelings which were already running [Page 724] very high. The question must be decided now and it could then be possible for the Peace Conference to hear the views of the other 21 nations. Amendments or amplifications might be necessary in regard to any decision they took here but the question must be basically decided now.
The Secretary replied that at least they had agreed what territory would go to Yugoslavia and the only question was what should happen to the area on the Italian side. Should it go to Italy or should it be internationalized? He again suggested that this question should be left to the Peace Conference.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Delegation had accepted the French line only because it was coupled with the suggestion for an international zone. He could not accept one without the other; and if the internationalization was not accepted then the Soviet agreement to the French line could not be maintained and the whole question would be reopened. He said he did not understand Mr. Byrnes since he had understood at their dinner that Mr. Byrnes had said that if they could agree on the internationalization of Trieste all other questions could be settled in 24 hours. The Soviet Delegation had met Mr. Byrnes’ view on this point and other matters were still not settled.
The Secretary said he was very sorry if there had been any misunderstanding since, as he recalled it very clearly, he had told Mr. Molotov that he had not even studied M. Bidault’s suggestion for internationalization since it appeared to be unacceptable to Mr. Molotov. He had only promised to study it. He said he was very clear in his mind that he had merely stated that if the question of Trieste was settled he foresaw no difficulties in a speedy settlement of the other questions. He said subsequently Mr. Molotov had made his proposals including the one for dual sovereignty, which he had felt was entirely unworkable.
Mr. Molotov said that in any case the question of giving Trieste to Italy had not been raised at the dinner by the Secretary but that the issue had been a search for a compromise. He had not expected that the Secretary would reject a compromise on Trieste.
The Secretary replied that Mr. Molotov was correct. He had said he would study any compromise, and he does not reject in principle the idea of internationalization, but he did not wish to put the United States in a position of having agreed to any plan for internationalization until the parties directly concerned have been heard. That is why he proposed that the matter should be left open for further study and recommendation from the Peace Conference.
Mr. Molotov said he did not insist upon all details being worked out now but merely that a certain basis be accepted for the administration of the area along the lines of French and Soviet proposals. It is, of [Page 725] course, possible that the American and British Delegations will have some suggestions which they could study.
The Secretary repeated that he did not reject the idea in principle but could only agree on the acceptability of the general idea of internationalization.
Mr. Molotov repeated that all he was asking was that they should agree on territory that should be internationalized and on certain basic principles and then leave the rest to the experts. In all he had in mind agreement on only five or six basic points.
The Secretary stated that he thought it would do no harm to let the 21 nations and the two countries directly concerned express their views before making a final decision. He said he felt they could settle all other points and leave this one for the conference to decide. They would then submit agreed drafts of treaties with this one question open but with an expression of an opinion from the Ministers in favor of the general idea of internationalization.
Mr. Molotov said that we should accept the idea of the internationalization of Trieste and the area proposed by M. Bidault and set forth a few basic principles.
The Secretary said he wished it to be clear that he could consider no proposal for internationalization that was not under the United Nations. He said he could not agree to accept the right of the Four Powers to assume this right for themselves.
Mr. Molotov asked the Secretary whether he would not agree that the Four Powers should have the direct responsibility for this area acting in the name of the United Nations.
The Secretary replied that he could not accept that but that the responsibility would have to be that of the United Nations organization if a genuine international administration was to be set up.
Mr. Molotov in conclusion stated that he felt that to postpone this question and refer it to the Peace Conference would cause great friction and set big powers off against little powers.
The Secretary answered that he had not found that there was more friction between big and little powers than there was among the big powers themselves.