C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Second Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 2, 1946, 5 p.m.14

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M. Molotov inquired whether there was any report from the Deputies.

M. Couve de Murville stated that the Deputies had not discussed the agenda for the Council of Foreign Ministers since it had already been established. They had taken up some of the outstanding economic points on the Italian treaty and had nothing to report to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Italian-Yugoslav Frontier and Trieste

Mr. Byrnes stated that as he had said yesterday he would be glad to study the proposals submitted on this question. He had believed it wise to submit to the Peace Conference the question as to the disposition of the territories west of the French line.14a He believed that those territories should go to Italy but he did not believe that any useful purpose would be served by going over again his reasons for this belief. Since the Ministers had not been able to come to agreement on the disposition of these territories he had urged that the matter be referred to the Peace Conference. This had not been agreed to. He was now willing to agree that a certain part of the area be organized into a free state and internationalized provided that the internationalization come under the control of the United Nations Organization. He did not believe that the Council of Foreign Ministers should do more than agree to the principle of internationalization and he thought that it should leave to the Peace Conference the question of the working out of the machinery of control over the area. Yugoslavia and Italy should be invited to present their views at the Peace Conference on the internationalization [Page 716] of the zone. Their views had never been heard on this subject. Mr. Byrnes did not believe that the Council of Foreign Ministers should proceed any further without hearing the views of these two countries.

Mr. Bevin stated that the U.K. was willing to accept the principle of internationalization and of the creation of an independent state of Trieste. He wished to call attention to the necessity of coming to an agreement on the Port of Trieste and its communications so that the Port and the area might be placed aside and developed. He assumed that both Italy and Yugoslavia would be permitted to state their views on the internationalization of Trieste but he did not believe that the decision in principle to internationalize the area would satisfy either country. Mr. Bevin continued that he still felt that it would be more just to cede the area to Italy. If the U.K. Delegation had believed from the beginning that the Council of Foreign Ministers were going to agree on internationalization it would never have agreed on the French line. In order to obtain agreement it had ‘adhered to the French line. Then the question of the statutes for Trieste and the control of the zone had been raised. The proposals which had been put forward appeared to him to be a mixture of Four Power and United Nations control over the area in addition to the participation of Italy and Yugoslavia. Mr. Bevin stated that the U.K. took a strong view that the area should be under control of the United Nations especially as the integrity of Trieste was to be assured by the Security Council. The U.K. took the view that the United Nations should assume the sole responsibility for approving the statute, for appointing the governor and for the security of the Trieste area. Mr. Bevin was quite willing to accept Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion concerning the necessity of obtaining the views of the 21 nations in connection with Trieste. The U.K. attitude was that if there were to be a really international zone the responsibility for the zone must be under the United Nations. There appeared to be elements in the proposals made by M. Molotov and M. Bidault on which common ground could be reached. However, there was one fundamental point i.e., that of actual responsibility for the area. The drafting of the statutes would of course be too much for the Council of Foreign Ministers to do in one afternoon. Many countries were interested in the area and it appeared to Mr. Bevin to be advisable if the question were ventilated at the Peace Conference. It now appeared that the French line had been agreed upon, the principle of internationalization had been agreed upon and that further time was needed to study the complex question of the actual constitution for Trieste and the question of who should assume responsibility for the area.

[Page 717]

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation understood that common ground had been reached on the proposal to internationalize Trieste and its surrounding territory and on the territory itself. However no common ground had been reached on the statutes for the zone. The Soviet Delegation admitted that it was important that the two interested states, i.e. Italy and Yugoslavia should participate in the discussion of the question of Trieste. It was also necessary and important that the 21 nations should participate in this discussion and have an opportunity to express their views. The Soviet Delegation also considered it necessary that it was important for the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on the basis for the statutes for Trieste. Also it went without saying that the details of these statutes could not be worked out by the Ministers. This was a complex problem and one in which the Italians and the Yugoslavs should participate. Having adopted the decision that Trieste should be internationalized it was quite possible that the Council of Foreign Ministers would be asked how the area was to be organized. It would not be necessary to give the details on the organization of Trieste but the Council of Foreign Ministers should agree on the general principles. French and Soviet proposals had been made regarding the statutes. The observations of the other Ministers had been heard to the effect that it would probably not be difficult to reach common agreement on this matter. The Soviet Delegation was not pressing for all the six points it had suggested in its proposal for the statutes of Trieste (C.F.M.(46) 178)15 but it felt that certain basic principles should be adopted. With this in mind he wished to suggest that the following basic principles be adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers:

(1)
Trieste with its immediately adjacent territory should be formed into an autonomous district to be administered in conformity with a statute adopted by the Four Powers, acting on behalf of all the United Nations, and elaborated with the participation of Yugoslavia and Italy.
The integrity of the territory would be assured by the Security Council of the United Nations.
(2)
As a basis of the statute of the autonomous district of Trieste there should be adopted the principle of organizing the legislative and executive power on democratic lines.
(3)
The governor should be appointed by agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy and in the absence of agreement by the Four Powers.

M. Molotov stated that if this basis were adopted a satisfactory solution of the statute question might be found on the understanding that the experts would work out the details.

[Page 718]

Mr. Bevin stated that it seemed to him that under M. Molotov’s proposals the whole matter was placed in the hands of the Four Powers and not the United Nations. For example the Four Powers would appoint the governor.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had already expressed his views on this question. He could only agree to internationalization on the condition that the area was under control of the United Nations. According to his understanding M. Molotov’s proposal meant that the Four Powers would assume authority and power to act in the name of the United Nations. They were not authorized to act in that capacity. Mr. Byrnes continued that he saw no change in the proposals regarding the appointment of the governor. Everyone knew that it would be impossible for Italy and Yugoslavia to reach agreement on this matter. If they did not do so the responsibility for appointing a governor lay with the Four Powers. The governor must be appointed by the United Nations for that Organization was responsible for the integrity of Trieste. This power could not be delegated to the Four Powers. There were two proposals—either that the area be placed under the control of the Four Powers or under the United Nations. He could not support the former proposal. If Trieste were placed under the United Nations then the U.S. Delegation would support the proposal. Mr. Byrnes continued that if the United Nations administered the area it would be able to take a number of measures to stabilize conditions and to promote peace in Trieste. For example the Economic and Social Council could be of great assistance in taking measures of an economic and social character. The Four Powers could not do this. Furthermore the United Nations was responsible for the integrity of the area. The Military Council could take the necessary measures in this respect.

M. Molotov stated that the Security Council was a body of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations did not provide for United Nations military control or administration of territories not under United Nations trusteeship. The Trieste area was not under United Nations trusteeship. It had been said that it would not be possible for the Four Powers to act on behalf of the United Nations. M. Molotov referred to a U.S. proposal to the effect that the Four Powers would act on behalf of the United Nations in connection with the Italian colonies. How could the U.S. Delegation advocate such a course in one case and refuse to do so in another. M. Molotov remarked that Mr. Bevin had stated that he could not accept the statutes for Trieste which had been proposed today and yet yesterday he had said that he believed that a basis for agreement could be found on the proposals made by M. Molotov and M. Bidault. M. Molotov continued that he was not insisting that the Council of Foreign Ministers adopt a final formula today which would serve as a basis of the statutes but it was [Page 719] necessary to adopt two or three points which would make it clear what the Council of Foreign Ministers had in mind when it advocated the internationalization of Trieste.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he felt sure that M. Molotov realized that there was no analogy between the Trieste proposal and the U.S. amendment on Colonies. The U.S. amendment to the French proposal on Colonies was purely of a temporary nature and was to the effect that the Italian Government renounced its right to the Colonies to the Four Allied Powers. It renounced this right temporarily and in no case for more than one year when the United Nations entered the picture. The U.S. Delegation wished it to be clear that the Four Powers were not taking possession of the Colonies but was merely holding them as trustee. This was not the same thing as asking for the right to establish a regime of 400–500,000 people on a permanent basis.

Mr. Bevin stated that for the sake of accuracy he wished to make it clear that he had said yesterday that he had hoped that if a satisfactory boundary could be agreed upon it might be possible to agree upon a satisfactory constitution for an independent government of Trieste along the lines of M. Molotov’s proposal which had not been studied in detail. He had said precisely the same thing today. Some of the proposals made contained common ground and subject to certain amendments it was possible that agreement might be reached. But he had said that there was one fundamental point; namely, whether the control of the area should be vested in the Four Powers or the United Nations. According to his understanding M. Molotov had proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers commit itself to a principle according to which the authority of the area should be vested in the Four Powers. Mr. Bevin believed that that question should be ventilated and discussed at the Peace Conference. His government had instructed him to stand by the United Nations. He had no objection to the experts looking through the statutes between now and the Peace Conference on condition however that the fundamental principle of control be determined at the Peace Conference. The Four Powers could express their views at the Conference on this matter. In many respects this issue had arisen because of the delay in calling a Peace Conference and because of the feeling throughout the world that the Four Powers had allocated to themselves many of the rights for which the nations of the world had fought. He did not object to the Deputies studying the question of the statutes as long as the Council of Foreign Ministers was not committed to any other principle than United Nations control. He could not go any further since his government had instructed him to support this principle.

M. Bidault stated that according to his understanding the Council of Foreign Ministers had agreed upon internationalization and was [Page 720] now discussing the question of the statutes and the part to be played in their formulization by the Four Powers and by the United Nations. It was obvious that the statutes would not be drafted today. In order to reach agreement the French Delegation suggested that Article 1 of the Soviet proposal be agreed upon with the following amendment: “Trieste with its immediately adjacent territory should be formed into an autonomous district administered in conformity with a statute adopted by the Four Powers, examined by the Peace Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.

M. Bidault stated that it might be advisable to appoint a Committee to draw up the statutes. If these were agreed upon they could be submitted to the Peace Conference for consideration and discussion.

M. Molotov inquired about the appointment of the governor.

M. Bidault stated that he did not believe that there would be any great difficulty in this connection since both Italy and Yugoslavia would be very interested in the choice of a governor. He wondered whether the Council of Foreign Ministers might note the fact that at today’s meeting no objection had been raised to the principle of internationalization or to the boundary line and that the Council of Foreign Ministers had approved the Soviet draft of Article 1 as amended by the French Delegation.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not want any misunderstanding. He thought he had made it clear that he did not object to internationalization provided the statutes, the control of Trieste and the appointment of the governor be under the United Nations. If the statutes were drawn up and the governor named by any other body he would not be in favor of internationalization.

M. Molotov inquired what body Mr. Byrnes had in mind when he referred to the United Nations. The problem did not affect the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Byrnes had mentioned the Economic and Social Council. This body had nothing to do with the control of Trieste. Was the United Nations as a whole to deal with this problem? M. Molotov did not believe that it could do so for such a function had not been assigned to the United Nations by its Charter.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had in mind the Security Council. The Security Council was charged with the duty of preserving and promoting peace in the world. The situation in the Trieste area would justify action on the part of the Security Council. He had mentioned the Economic and Social Council when he had discussed various problems which would have to be considered in the Trieste area. He had said that this Council might be useful in promoting the economy of the area. For example capital would not be invested in Trieste unless the stability of the area were assured. In addition capital would leave the [Page 721] area and there would be unrest and discontent. Only the prestige of the United Nations could save the Trieste area. Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not believe that this problem could be settled this evening and suggested adjournment.

M. Molotov stated that he agreed but added that he wished to make a suggestion. The Soviet Delegation could not agree to M. Bidault’s proposal but if the other Delegations agreed to study it the Soviet Delegation would do likewise.

The meeting terminated at 8 o’clock p.m.

  1. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
  2. See footnote 9a, p. 704.
  3. Ante, p. 714.