Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirtieth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 29, 1946, 4 p.m.⁸⁸

Paris, June 29, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Agenda

M. Bidault suggested that the Chairman of the Deputies make his report.

M. Vyshinsky stated that the Deputies had worked that morning on the Ministers’ agenda. He explained that the questions of the Danube, the Italian Fleet, Reparations, Italian-Yugoslav Frontier, Colonies, and Special Property Clauses remained outstanding. The United States representative had brought up the question of the Peace Conference and no agreed upon agenda had been reached. Each Deputy had agreed to report to his Minister and it had been suggested that the Ministers themselves decide on the agenda. The British and Soviet Deputies had then proceeded to the Finnish Treaty and had cleaned up several economic points. The outstanding articles on the Finnish Treaty had been deferred until Monday.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Ministers had gone through the agenda submitted to them on June 28 and had discussed all the questions on it with the exception of those relative to the Danube and the Finnish Treaty. He suggested that the Ministers commence their work today by discussing the Danube and the Finnish Treaty and then proceed to the question of the Peace Conference. After that subject had been discussed he suggested that the Ministers return to any questions that had been passed over, either yesterday or today.

M. Molotov stated that no decision had been reached on the Danubian question or on the Finnish Treaty. Furthermore, at the Minister’s request the questions relating to the Italian Navy and the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier had been passed over. He thought it would be advisable to discuss these matters as well as to complete their discussion on the Colonies and on Reparations. He did not object to the question of the Peace Conference being raised but suggested that a definite order be established.

Mr. Byrnes expressed the hope that his colleagues would agree to his request, namely that the Peace Conference be discussed after the Danube and the Finnish Treaties.

M. Molotov again suggested that the Ministers complete their discussion of the questions on the agenda of June 28, namely those concerning the Danube, the Finnish Treaty, the Italian Navy, the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier, Colonies and Reparations before taking up the question of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had no objection to discussing those questions. They had been discussed since last September and he was willing to discuss them one more day. However, he wished to discuss the Peace Conference today.

M. Bidault stated that as Chairman he wished to make a proposal regarding the agenda. He suggested that all the subjects mentioned by M. Molotov, together with the Peace Conference, be examined today.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had no objection to this proposal provided the Council of Foreign Ministers remained in session until the Peace Conference had been discussed.

Mr. Bevin stated that he agreed.

M. Molotov stated that according to his understanding the Danube, the Finnish Treaty, the Italian Navy, the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier and the Peace Conference would be discussed in that order. He suggested removing the Finnish Treaty and replacing it by Reparations, explaining that no important questions regarding the Finnish Treaty remained outstanding which were worthy of the Ministers’ attention.

The Ministers agreed that their agenda would consist of the Danube, Reparations, Italian Navy, Italo-Yugoslav Frontier, and the Peace Conference in that order.

The Danube

M. Bidault stated that according to his understanding the only outstanding question on the United Kingdom proposal (CFM (46)148)⁸⁹ was the words “complete equality”.

Mr. Bevin stated that he understood that there were two unsettled points, namely the words mentioned by M. Bidault and the second paragraph of the United Kingdom proposal. He suggested that the words “on terms of complete equality” be replaced by the words “in such a way as will be free and open on equal terms” and that the second paragraph be left as it was originally drafted.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation could not agree to Mr. Bevin’s proposals. He explained that as he had already stated it would be impossible to place a non-Danubian country, such as Iraq, on the same footing as a Danubian country such as Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, it was difficult to discuss this question in the present session in view of the fact that the riparian states were not represented at the Council. He suggested that the Council of Foreign Ministers adopt the second paragraph subject to the amendment he had previously proposed.⁹⁰

Mr. Bevin stated that he had made an error; according to the new British proposal the second paragraph would read, “The Four Governments will accordingly for their part act in conformity with this principle and will recommend to the riparian states of the Danube to act in accordance with it.”

M. Molotov stated that he did not object to this proposal.

Mr. Bevin stated that in such a case the only outstanding question appeared to be that concerning the words “in such a way as will be free and open on equal terms”. As two Socialist states, M. Molotov and Mr. Bevin surely believed in equality.

M. Molotov stated that the two ministers could even believe in equality between a father and a five year old son. They had equal rights. In certain cases equality between a host and a guest could even be admitted.

Mr. Bevin stated that he merely wished to put in simple language the following thought. All the riparian states would spend money in order to keep the Danube in order. They should draw up a tariff for ships from Iraq and elsewhere. These ships must pay dues but the tariffs should be equal to all, otherwise a policy of exclusion would result. There should be no discrimination on dues or charges. He asked whether it was not possible to agree that the four great Powers had adopted a policy of equality on these matters.

M. Molotov stated that he did not believe that Mr. Bevin considered it possible to require the Danubian countries to accord to non-Danubian countries the same rights they enjoyed. Czechoslovakia, for example, had commercial and military ships on the Danube. Was it possible to demand that Iraq had the right to have military ships on the Danube? This would be giving the same treatment to Iraq as to Czechoslovakia. No-one could require this. He said that the Danube should be the subject of specific study but only with the participation of the riparian states. Few of them were here. He did not believe it advisable to formulate a general statement on this question since this might lead to confusion.

Mr. Bevin stated that he wished to make it clear that it was only a question of commercial vessels and not war ships. He could not give up the principle of equal charges. He had agreed to the Soviet position that a definite article on the Danube be not included in the treaty. Since there was no guarantee of equal treatment in M. Molotov’s proposal he must return to his original request to have an article on the Danube in the treaty.

M. Molotov stated that Mr. Bevin’s amendment did not refer to charges but to equality in general. It did not correspond to Mr. Bevin’s oral remarks. If the British Delegation would draft a paragraph which formulated the principle of equal charges M. Molotov would be willing to study it.

M. Bidault stated that he felt sure that the British Delegation could find something suitable. He suggested that the controversial words might be replaced by a phrase reading “on a footing of equality as regards tariffs and conditions of commercial navigation”.⁹¹

Mr. Bevin stated if that principle were acceptable he would endeavor to work out a formula.

M. Molotov stated that he would like to see the formula and obtain the advice of his experts.

Mr. Byrnes stated that a formula along the lines proposed by M. Bidault would be acceptable to the United States Delegation.

M. Bidault stated that his formula would be circulated and that the subject of the Danube might be considered at the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Reparations

Mr. Bevin stated that he had requested several days ago information on Italian assets in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. He had received no reply. He had rough estimates of the value of such assets and it was his belief that if these assets were taken into account it would be helpful in closing the gap. Although the Council of Foreign Ministers had provided for the renunciation of claims it had not said to whom Italian assets or claims in Germany would go. Furthermore, the British figures, for which he could not vouch, concerning Italian assets in the Balkans, were higher than the United States figures. Mr. Bevin thought it advisable to have an agreed upon figure on Italian assets in the Balkans. If Italian assets in the Soviet zone in Germany, which had not been allocated to anyone, were added to Italian assets in the Balkans, the difference between this final figure and the Soviet claim for reparations might not be large.

M. Molotov stated that the question of reparations had been sufficiently clarified on a number of occasions although no definite figures had been agreed upon. It was a question of reparations for the Soviet Union in the amount of $100 million and principally the question of the sources from which this amount should be drawn. The Soviet Delegation had accepted Italian assets in the Balkans as one source. It had also been proposed that two Italian vessels, the Saturnia and the Vulcania, be used as another source. One ship had been inspected. It had been impossible to inspect the second ship since this vessel had put to sea. War plants in Italy had been suggested as a third source. The Soviet Delegation had agreed to this source. The question of reparations from current production in Italy remained outstanding. It was M. Molotov’s understanding that the Italian Government, if it were required to pay reparations, would prefer to do so out of current production. Therefore the Soviet Delegation suggested that the following decision be adopted: “Italy is liable to pay reparations to the Soviet Union over a period of six years in the amount of $100 million. In the payment of these reparations Italian foreign assets in the Balkans are to be used, as well as war plants, commercial ships and current production.”⁹² He said that if it were so desired commercial ships might be left out as it was only a question of two vessels.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had nothing to add to what he had already said on reparations.

M. Molotov inquired whether his proposal was acceptable.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Soviet proposal had been advanced a dozen times and had been frankly discussed. The United States Delegation had stated that it could not agree to it. Several sources had been mentioned and the United States Delegation had proposed that any deficit be made up by war trophies. He added that since the last time reparations had been discussed the Italian Government had informed the United States Government that it hoped that the struggling, democratic government of Italy would not be obliged to pay reparations but if it were forced to choose between plant equipment and current production it would prefer paying for reparations out of current production rather than surrendering the plants which produced.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had been placed in a difficult position. When he had suggested that Italian assets in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany be used the Soviet Delegation had refused to give any figures. It had limited itself to Italian assets in the Balkans. He had never agreed to this source. He stated that no reparations figures were being placed in the Italian treaty for any-one else except the Russians. Since many countries had suffered from Italian aggression it would be difficult to explain and defend such an action. The countries which had suffered most were Greece and Yugoslavia and yet they were left out of the treaty in so far as reparations were concerned. Although he was not denying the right of the Soviet Union to reparations he had suggested that it would be better for the four great Powers to renounce their claims thereto and that if anything be done it would be better only to take account of reparations going to Greece and Yugoslavia. If M. Molotov desired to circulate his proposal he would, of course, study it. But there was one thing which must be agreed upon, namely, the exact amount of Italian assets abroad. Mr. Bevin stated that he could not sign a blank check. As an example, he gave the value of the two Italian vessels. There was one value in New York and another value if Italian labor were used to re-fit the vessels. He was opposed to current production because he did not know how it would work out, who would pay for the raw materials, what controls would be exerted, etc.

M. Molotov said that there was no need to prove that reparations to the Soviet Union were only a small part of what had been seized by Great Britain in Italy. The Soviet Delegation had quoted figures. They valued Italian assets in the Balkans at $15 to $20 million, the two merchant vessels at $7 to $10 million, war plants at approximately $10 million, and current production over a period of 6 years at $10 to $15 million annually. Figures for Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania had also been suggested in the amount of $200 million.

M. Bidault stated that M. Molotov’s proposal would be distributed. He saw no useful purpose in continuing discussion on this question and suggested that the Italian fleet be discussed.

Italian Fleet

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had examined the various proposals and was prepared to acccept the French compromise regarding cruisers. He assumed that the French proposal regarding destroyers was acceptable.⁹³

Mr. Byrnes, stated that the limitation on the Italian Navy had apparently been determined. The Naval experts should now take up the second item on their instructions, namely, Greek and Yugoslav claims and then come to agreement on the distribution of the remaining units of the Italian Navy. He said that he was referring to the instructions issued to the Naval Experts as contained in CFM (46) 46 [CFM(D) (46) 66?] of April 27 [15?].⁹⁴

Mr. Bevin stated that he agreed.

M. Bidault stated that it was his understanding that agreement had been reached on the disposition of ships to the Italian Navy and that the question concerning the distribution of the surplus units would be decided by the Experts on the basis of directives issued to them.

Italo-Yugoslav Frontier

M. Bidault stated that the French Delegation had made a proposal on the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier which had been agreed upon in principle by the other Delegations. He now wished to make a proposal concerning the City of Trieste. Although this did not constitute the best solution he did not believe it was contrary to justice and honor. He requested that his proposal be not considered as a formal draft but rather as a general line which his colleagues might agree to in principle.

M. Bidault stated that his proposal was as follows:

• “1. Trieste and the adjoining territory would for a period of ten years be constituted an autonomous territory administered by the Four Powers with which Italy and Yugoslavia would be associated. The integrity of the territory would be assured by the Security Council of UN.
• “2. The Governor of the territory will be named by agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia; failing such agreement, by the Four Powers.
• “3. An assembly elected by universal and secret ballot will exercise legislative powers.
• “4. A Council of Government composed of six members will be named by the Four Powers, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Governor will, preside over it and it will have powers of government and administration. In particular it will insure maintenance of order and the functioning of public services.
• “5. The legislation and judicial organizations in the territory shall insure respect for the rights of the inhabitants (schools, language, public office).
• “6. The representatives of the Four Powers in the Security Council will form a control council, to which the government council will make an annual report and which will be responsible for the execution of the Statute of Trieste. Any difficulties or possible disputes will be submitted to it.
• “7. Before the expiration of the period of ten years a new examination will be made by the Four Powers with the possibility of recourse to the United Nations.”⁹⁵

M. Molotov stated that M. Bidault’s project did not at first glance appear to be satisfactory. It would affect the national feelings of the Yugoslav people and its temporary character would lead to its insecurity. The Soviet Delegation recalled certain former proposals and especially one made at a recent private meeting in which the idea of a condominium had been advanced. He believed that this recent proposal would make it possible to find a solution to this difficult question. However, the Soviet Delegation wished to acknowledge the services rendered by the French Delegation in attempting to find a solution. The Soviet Delegation was willing to consider the possibility of accepting the French proposal as a basis of discussion subject to certain amendments. For the present M. Molotov could only state certain tentative observations since he had not had an opportunity to study the text of the project. As a preliminary observation he wondered whether it would be advisable to establish a temporary regime for ten years. Would not a permanent regime be better? Furthermore, the Soviet Delegation considered acceptable the section of the project which placed the responsibility for the administration of Trieste and the adjoining territory on the Four Powers. This should be subject to an amendment to the effect that one of the Allied countries which was particularly interested in the Port of Trieste and access to the sea should be added. This country was Czechoslovakia, an Ally which had no access to the sea. That country should share in the responsibility of the Four Powers over Trieste along with Yugoslavia and Italy. For the time being M. Molotov wished to confine himself to these preliminary remarks, reserving the right to state further views after he had examined M. Bidault’s proposal.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States Delegation was not satisfied with the original French compromise on the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier but had reconciled itself to it. The United Kingdom Delegate had also agreed to this line. The United States Delegate had stated that if no final agreement could be reached on this line the matter should be left to the Peace Conference. He had listened to the French proposal which was a complicated one. He would be glad to study it but at this time he did not care to discuss it.

Mr. Bevin stated that he deeply appreciated M. Bidault’s efforts. He had been instructed to support the Italian claim to Trieste. It now appeared that a new solution had been posed, i.e., that neither Italy nor Yugoslavia have the control over the City. He would like to have the opportunity to study the French proposal and to consult with his Government. If he received authority to proceed along the lines suggested by M. Bidault then he reserved the right to make certain amendments and improvements to the French proposal. He appreciated M. Bidault’s courage in coming forward with a project on such a difficult matter. He would like to obtain a copy of the proposal and to give it careful study.

M. Bidault stated that the French Delegation was deeply appreciative of the expressions made by the other Delegations. He did not know whether his proposal would be adopted or rejected but he would distribute it immediately. He explained that the proposal was not an official document but would be in the guise of statements made by him today. It should not be taken as the final position of the French Delegation but merely as an element advanced for the purpose of bringing about agreement between the four Delegations and the entire world.

Peace Conference

M. Bidault stated that according to his recollection the Moscow Agreement had provided for a Peace Conference on May 1. The present stage of the discussions on the Peace treaties led to the hope that these treaties were in such a stage of preparation that a Peace Conference could now be discussed. He expressed the hope that a Peace Conference could be envisaged in the near future.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he proposed that the French Government, as host, be authorized to invite the 21 nations heretofore agreed upon to attend a Peace Conference in Paris on July 20. Monday was July 1. There would be sufficient time to permit the representatives of the other nations to proceed to Paris and to go over the draft peace treaties which had been prepared. At the Potsdam Conference it had been agreed to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of preparing peace treaties for presentation to the United Nations. The Council of Foreign Ministers had not assumed authority for drawing up the peace treaties for all the nations of the world. The Council of Foreign Ministers had been proposed by the United States Government to provide for an instrument to do the spade work in the drafting of the treaties and to facilitate the tasks of the governments actually concluding the peace. The Council of Foreign Ministers had now prepared draft treaties and they were in such a shape that they could be presented to a Peace Conference. Few questions were left unsettled. If these treaties were submitted to a Peace Conference next week it would be found that only three questions remained unsettled, namely the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier, Reparations and the Colonies. As to the other questions, few remained in disagreement and they were not serious matters. The Council of Foreign Ministers would have 20 days in which it could hope to settle all the questions in disagreement. If the Council of Foreign Ministers did not issue invitations now for a Peace Conference to take place on July 20 the Peace Conference could not complete its work before the Assembly of the United Nations on September 1. Therefore it might be necessary to postpone the Peace Conference until the Fall. If invitations were issued at the present time 5 weeks would be left before the Conference. It had taken the Council of Foreign Ministers from September until today to get the peace treaties in shape. The other Nations should be given 5 weeks to do what it had taken the Council of Foreign Ministers 10 months to accomplish. The Moscow Agreement did not say that the Council of Foreign Ministers should present to the Peace Conference completed texts of the peace treaties. It had said, “drafts of the treaties, when completed, should be submitted”. It had further said that the completed texts should be submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers for final examination. There was a difference between the completed texts and the drafts of the treaties. The Moscow Agreement had stated “when the preparation of all those drafts had been completed”. The same paragraph contained these words, “the Conference shall be held not later than May 1”. The United States was party to the Declaration which had been made to 21 governments that the Conference would be held on May 1 and the United States had been unhappy every day that it had not fulfilled its promise to convene a Peace Conference on that date. Even if final agreement could not be reached on two or three of the outstanding items no harm would be done in presenting them to a Conference.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not mind dictating the terms of peace to an enemy but he did not like to dictate the terms of a peace to his friends. Therefore he proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers invite the 21 nations to a Peace Conference in Paris on July 20. He expressed the hope that his colleagues would agree in order that the invitations might be sent out promptly.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had already said that it supported the Moscow decision to the effect that when the preparation of the drafts had been completed the Council of Foreign Ministers would convoke a Peace Conference. He was of the opinion that the Council of Foreign Ministers was bound to finish the drafts of the peace treaties before a Conference were convened. In May the question of a date had been considered but no decision had been reached. Now the situation was clearer since much work had been accomplished in the preparation of the treaties. The Soviet Delegation believed that it would be possible in the next few days to establish the exact date of the Conference. But at the present time the Council of Foreign Ministers had to deal with the important questions which had been discussed today. It had been decided to give consideration to certain of these questions before expressing final views. M. Molotov thought it preferable to continue this work and to come back to the convocation of the Peace Conference within the next few days. He believed that the fewer outstanding questions which were presented to the Conference the better it would be. For this reason the Ministers should endeavor to terminate their preliminary work. They would thus be more satisfactorily performing their duties to their Allies.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Moscow Agreement appeared to be sacred only when it provided for the drawing up of the draft treaties. It was not sacred when it came to the holding of the Peace Conference on May 1. At Moscow it had been said that only those governments signatory to the armistice would be included in the Council of Foreign Ministers but the Soviet Union had later agreed that France should participate in the drafting of the Balkan treaties. Mr. Byrnes was very glad to hear of this decision which he had supported at London. Only the other day the Soviet Delegation had requested that the question of Italian reparations to Yugoslavia and Greece be left to the Peace Conference. In addition it had been suggested that the question of the Bulgarian reparations to Yugoslavia and Greece be considered at the Conference. This did not violate the Moscow Agreement. However, it was now being contended that if the Council of Foreign Ministers submitted other outstanding questions in connection with the Italian treaty it would be a violation of the Moscow Agreement. Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to know who was in favor of his proposal to invite the nations of the world to a Peace Conference on July 20 and who was against this proposal. He remarked that M. Molotov had stated that he felt that agreement could be reached on this question in a few days. If it were possible to reach agreement in a few days then it would be safe to fix the date of the Conference for July 20.

Mr. Bevin said that the last time he was in Paris he had supported that date. He supported it now. He did not believe that such a decision should affect the decisions of the Ministers—they could proceed with their work but there was a great deal of discontent throughout the world because no date had been set for a Peace Conference. In England and in the Dominions it was not understood why the Ministers were unable to fix this date. If they should do so it would create good feeling in the world as well as confidence and belief that the Council of Foreign Ministers was really getting on with its work.

M. Bidault stated that he believed it would be a good political gesture to fix such a date. He felt confident that the outstanding questions would be settled by the Ministers. He reminded his colleagues that he had certain responsibilities for arranging the Conference. He hoped that the Ministers might make a decision on the Peace Conference which would bring courage to the people of Europe who had suffered so much.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered it necessary that an opportunity be given to it to think over Mr. Byrnes’ proposal as well as the French proposal on Trieste which had a direct bearing on one of the peace treaties.

Mr. Byrnes inquired as to what outstanding questions must be decided before the Peace Conference. In the Italian treaty there were three subjects of general interest, i.e., the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier, Reparations and Colonies. Must all these questions be decided before the convocation of a Peace Conference? If they are decided will a Conference be held? Having worked on the problems of a Peace Conference since last September he would like to know how long such a Conference would be vetoed.

M. Molotov stated that it was not a question of veto but one of the Ministers’ joint decisions which should be carried out. This meant that they should complete the preparation of the peace treaties. Has this been done when discussions have not been terminated on the items cited by Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. Byrnes inquired whether M. Molotov meant by this that all the three questions mentioned by him must be completed before invitations to a Peace Conference could be sent.

M. Molotov inquired whether these questions were regarded as insolvable or solvable.

Mr. Byrnes stated that they had been insolvable for 10 months. He did not know about the next few days. But he wished to remark that the same men who had made the Moscow decision were present today. If they could modify this decision, as he had shown that they had done on a number of occasions, surely these same three men could change the Moscow decision in order to have it in accord with the solemn declaration to the world that a Peace Conference would be held. He maintained that the Ministers should fix a date for such a Conference instead of leaving it vague and dependent on their work.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation did not refuse to consider this proposal but requested that it be discussed within the next few days.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether the Ministers might agree to fix the date for the Conference before they adjourn next Tuesday night.

M. Molotov refused to commit himself on any fixed date.

Mr. Byrnes said that apparently the veto was still working. There seemed to be no sense in continuing the discussion. He proposed that on Monday the Ministers commence their discussion of the German problem with the right to return to M. Bidault’s proposal regarding Trieste and any other question.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation believed it advisable to complete the discussion on the Trieste question and suggested that this be done on Monday.

Mr. Byrnes stated that any Member had the right to bring up any question. For his part he did not wish to sit around considering questions which had been discussed over and over again and which the Ministers knew in advance would either be deferred or sent back to the Deputies. He wished to make it plain, however, that if the Soviet or any other Delegation wished to bring up the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier it was at liberty to do so, but if the Ministers were not ready to discuss such a problem and if they merely deferred it they would be performing tasks that were unworthy of the four great Powers they represented.

M. Molotov suggested that on Monday the Italo-Yugoslav question be discussed and if the Ministers completed their work on this question that the German problem be taken up.

M. Bidault suggested that the Ministers’ agenda be made up of the Italo-Yugoslav situation, the Peace Conference and the German problem.

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

M. Molotov agreed.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had requested deferment of the Colonial question and it now appeared that this question was being dropped from the agenda.

M. Bidault stated that if Mr. Bevin so desired the agenda for the Monday meeting would be made up of the following items:

1. The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier

2. The Colonial Question

3. The Date of the Peace Conference

4. The German Problem.

The Ministers agreed to accept this agenda.

88. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
89. Ante, p. 629.
90. Molotov’s proposal referred to here is quoted in the United States Delegation Record of the Council’s 28th Meeting, June 27, p. 648.
91. As subsequently circulated to the Council as C.F.M.(46) 172, June 29, 1946, not printed, the French amendment quoted here read as follows: “on a footing of equality as regards commercial shipping tariffs and conditions.” (C.F.M. Files, Lot M–88, Box 2061, CFM Documents)
92. The whole of the Soviet proposal which is partially quoted here was subsequently circulated to the Council as document C.F.M. (46) 176, June 30, 1946, p. 697.
93. The French proposals referred to here were those set forth in C.F.M. (46) 121, June 22, 1946, p. 584.
94. C.F.M.(D) (46) 66, The Report of the Committee of Naval Experts, is printed on p. 58. The Council’s instructions to the Naval Experts are set forth in the Record of the Decisions of the Council’s 3rd Meeting, April 27, p. 138.

95. In connection with this French proposal, which was made available to the press, the Secretary of State received the following message from Ambassador Alan Kirk in Belgium, sent as telegram 64 from Brussels to Paris, and repeated to the Department as No. 839:

    “Spaak speculated to us today that Trieste formula advanced by Bidault Saturday might be trial balloon for similar French proposal on Ruhr and Rhineland. We advised him Bidault’s Trieste formula appeared to have little chance of adoption without drastic modifications. He expressed appreciation for renewed: assurances of American support for Belgian representation if and when German, problem might be discussed substantively.” (740.00119 Council/7–246)