Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Twenty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 28, 1946, 4 p.m.⁷⁵

Paris, June 28, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Agenda

Mr. Byrnes requested Mr. Jebb to make a report for the Deputies.

Mr. Jebb stated that the Deputies had gone through the peace treaties in order to pick out the outstanding points. These were included in CFM (46)166, June 28, which the Deputies regarded as the agenda for the C.F.M. meeting of today.⁷⁶ The Deputies considered that the first section of this document, i.e., articles of general application to the five treaties, might be considered first by the Ministers, since settlement of these points would affect all the treaties. With respect to Finland, Mr. Jebb stated that there were nine outstanding; articles in the Finnish treaty. Four of these articles (Treaty Commission, Arbitration, Compensation for United Nations Property, Transport and Shipping) were included in the section on “articles of general application to the five treaties.” The remaining five articles depended” on what was decided in respect to the Rumanian treaty.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the U.S. Delegation was willing to accept Mr. Jebb’s report and the agenda and was willing to consider the; agenda in the order set forth in the CFM(46) 166, June 28.

The Ministers agreed to accept the agenda proposed by the Deputies.

Treaty Commission

Mr. Byrnes stated that according to his understanding the U.S., U.K. and French Delegations had submitted a proposal on this matter. The Soviet Delegation had submitted their proposal. The Soviet proposal stated that the four Ambassadors in Italy would supervise, when necessary, the fulfillment of the Italian treaty. The U.S.-U.K.-French proposal gave fuller powers to the Ambassadors to represent the Allied and associated powers in the execution of the treaty. The Ambassadors had the right to appoint committees and to give technical advice to the Italian Government. He inquired whether agreement might not be reached on this article.⁷⁷

Mr. Molotov stated that the U.S., U.K. and French proposal consisted of three paragraphs. He did not object to the first two and suggested that the exact wording be agreed upon by the drafting committee. With respect to the third paragraph⁷⁸ the Soviet Delegation suggested that instead of committees, the C.F.M. provide for conditions under hich the four Ambassadors would be authorized to instruct experts to study certain questions. He did not wish to set up the Committees mentioned in the U.S.-U.K.-French proposal.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that paragraph 3 be deleted since under paragraph 1 the Ambassadors had the right to appoint persons and to supervise their work. There was no need to spell out their rights in a second article.

Mr. Bidault stated that he did not know whether full agreement had been reached on the fourth paragraph. If it were agreed to delete paragraph 3 it might be useful to include paragraph 4.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he understood it had been agreed to include paragraph 4.

The Ministers agreed to include paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of article 76 contained in C.F.M. (46) 150 in the Italian treaty.

Method of Settling Disputes

Mr. Byrnes referred to the U.K. proposal as contained in CFM (46) 115⁷⁹ and explained that this proposal was based on the original U.K. and Soviet proposals. According to his information the Deputies had been unable to reach agreement on the U.K. proposal. The difference was that the U.K. proposal provided for conciliation to be undertaken by an equal number of representatives of the United Nations Governments concerned and of the Italian Government. The four Delegations had agreed to that point. However, according to the U.K. proposal if no agreement were reached within three months after the dispute had been referred to the conciliation commission, either government might require the addition of a third member to the commission and failing agreement on selection of this member the President of the International Court of Justice would be requested to make the appointment. Mr. Byrnes stated that this proposal seemed very fair to him. It provided for conciliation in advance and for a final solution of the dispute if this conciliation failed. He believed that it was important to provide for the settlement of disputes since feelings would be embittered if such disputes were permitted to endure.

Mr. Molotov stated that the appointment of an arbitrator was not the function of the International Court of Justice. The Court was a judicial body and under its charter it was called upon to intervene only in those cases where parties to a dispute decided to appeal to it. The Soviet Delegation believed that settlement of disputes should be as follows: If a third party were required such an arbitrator might be appointed by the four Ambassadors. This would be adequate and all that would be needed. He made it clear that he was referring to the Italian treaty.

Mr. Byrnes called attention to the fact that it was not the Court but the President of the Court who would select the arbitrator. He stated that if it were not desired to have the President select an arbitrator some other way might easily be found to settle this question. He objected to the four Ambassadors taking over this function for they might take as long to come to agreement as the C.F.M. had in finding agreeable language. This would be unfortunate when disputes arose. He would agree to the Ambassadors if it were said that three out of four of them would make the decision. He would also agree to give this task to the Secretary General of the United Nations. He did not consider that it was important who chose the arbitrator as long as a disinterested person was chosen. He would agree to the four Ambassadors if he were sure of expeditious action.

Mr. Molotov said that he must point out that the Foreign Ministers were instructing the four Ambassadors to assume a serious function. He felt sure that they would be successful in this field if their action were concerted. He saw no reason why the Foreign Ministers should not agree in delegating this function to the Ambassadors. He stated that it would be undesirable to charge the Secretary General of the United Nations with this function as it would divert his attention to secondary questions. The Secretary General had many more important questions to deal with.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was anxious to see that expeditious action be assured. If one Ambassador held out against the others there would be no solution. He was particularly anxious to obtain finality. He did not mind who made the appointment—the most important matter was to find an impartial person. This was the usual practice in most questions of arbitration. If no agreement were reached by the parties to a dispute some independent person should be appointed as arbitrator.

Mr. Molotov stated that an arbitrator would be necessary in a number of cases. The normal procedure was for the two parties to a dispute to agree on an arbitrator. There was no need for interference on the part of a third party. He admitted that in some cases the President of the International Court or the Secretary General of the United Nations might possibly be required to appoint such an arbitrator. In other cases the two parties to a dispute might come to agreement If it were necesary for the C.F.M. to provide for a special procedure he believed that the four Ambassadors should be designated to appoint an arbitrator. They have very important functions to perform in the execution of the treaties and he felt sure that they could come to agreement on this question.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the appointment of the Ambassadors for this function presented certain difficulties. For example, if the United States and Italy have a dispute and are unable to agree on an arbitrator, the four Ambassadors would be called upon to appoint such an arbitrator. Italy was not represented on the Council of the Ambassadors. The United States would therefore have the right to pick its own judge in a case. This would not be fair to Italy. He would accept Mr. Molotov’s proposal if it were agreed that three out of four Ambassadors could name the arbitrators. If it were not acceptable to name the Secretary General, the President of the General Assembly might be given the task of appointing an arbitrator. The President is a man in which all had great confidence. There would be few cases referred to him. But by giving him this task finality would be assured in making decisions.

Mr. Molotov stated that since the Presidents of the General Assembly rotated, cases might be deferred until a suitable President was in office.

Mr. Bidault stated that he wished to make a proposal which was somewhat longer but which might simplify the procedure. Would it not be possible to say that whenever an arbitrator were needed, the four Ambassadors would be responsible to nominate him. If they were not able to agree within one month, then the President of the International Court would do so in conformity with the provisions contained in the U.K. proposal.

Mr. Bevin stated that such a procedure would be satisfactory to him. According to it, it would be mandatory upon the Ambassadors to appoint an arbitrator within one month and if they were unable to do so the President of the International Court should be requested to make the appointment.

Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Mr. Molotov stated that this proposal did not differ from the original proposal.

Mr. Bidault explained that it brought in the four Ambassadors. It also kept in the principle of conciliation and only retained one point of the original U.K. proposal, i.e., the International Court. It was a compromise.

Mr. Molotov stated that the difficulties must be taken into account which might arise for small countries. If the four Ambassadors reached agreement on an arbitrator there would be a guarantee that a just decision would be reached for such small countries.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not see how the four Ambassadors would be more just to small countries than the President of the International Court.

Under Mr. Bidault’s proposal, if the Ambassadors were able to come to agreement, the matter would never be referred to the International Court. It was only if no agreement was reached by the Ambassadors that the International Court would be brought in. Mr. Bidault had proposed that the two interested parties endeavor to come to agreement. If they were unable to do so after a period of three months the case would be referred to the Ambassadors. If the Ambassadors were unable to reach an agreement after one month then someone should obviously step in to settle the matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that the drawback of Mr. Bidault’s proposal was that it might induce the Ambassadors not to come to agreement.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had nothing to say after Mr. Molotov’s last remarks and suggested that the Ministers proceed to the next item.

Compensation for United Nations Property

Mr. Byrnes inquired whether any useful purpose would be gained in a further discussion of this matter. He had no statement to make.

Mr. Bidault stated that the difficulty for France was that there was a practical connection between this question and the question of reparations. The French had been very liberal with respect to reparation claims.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to suggest an amendment to the Soviet proposal to the effect that it would be necessary to agree either on a certain global form or on a percentage of a possible compensation. He wished now to propose that “compensation should be made in the amount of one-third of the ascertained damage.”

The Ministers had no comment to make on Mr. Molotov’s proposal and it was agreed to pass on to the next item.

Transport and Shipping

Mr. Bevin stated that it was difficult for him to understand why the other Ministers desired a deletion of this article.⁸⁰ His position was untenable since the trade union men in England would say that he had agreed to the deletion of international conventions that protected them.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the U.S. position was that it could not revise multilateral international treaties by requiring Italy to adhere to them. Furthermore, an international treaty would not be cancelled by the deletion of this article from the Italian treaty. The U.S. Delegation assumed that nations interested in such treaties would provide for their revision either in the economic and social council of the United Nations or otherwise. The U.S. Delegation would not object if this question should be referred to the peace conference where the nations would consider what steps might be necessary with respect to multilateral international treaties. It also felt that if four out of approximately one hundred multilateral treaties were specified in the Italian treaty this would indicate that there was no interest in the other treaties and that the nations signing the peace treaty with Italy had a special interest in these four treaties and not in the others.

Mr. Molotov stated that some of the multilateral treaties were not distinguished by their good merits. Others were obsolete. If the British trade unions were called upon for their opinions he felt sure that they would ask for amendments to certain of these treaties. In addition the majority of such treaties had not been signed by the Soviet Union or the U.S. How could it be demanded that other countries adhere to certain treaties of which the Soviet Union and the United States were not a party.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was prepared to withdraw the article. However, he assumed that the treaties in question were in force so far as Italy was concerned until they were revised. If these treaties were replaced by new ones under the economic and social council no one would be happier than Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States, like Great Britain, was greatly interested in the treaties mentioned in paragraph (c) and (d). He continued that the C.F.M. was not cancelling certain international conventions because it had not included them in the Italian treaty.

It was agreed to delete the article on transport and shipping from the Italian treaty.

Rumanian Assets in the United Nations

Mr. Bevin stated that at the last session Mr. Molotov had circulated a draft on this subject.⁸¹ Mr. Bevin had promised to examine it and to state his opinion thereon at the present session. He had found this draft to be slightly different from the agreed-upon text for Italy. Consequently, he was circulating a document on this subject. He was not asking for a discussion of this matter today.

Mr. Byrnes stated that there appeared to be very little difference between the Soviet and the original U.S. proposal and suggested that the Ministers come to agreement on this matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was willing to accept Mr. Bevin’s proposal.

The Ministers agreed to accept the U.K. proposal on Rumanian assets in the United Nations.

Italo–Yugoslav Frontier

Mr. Bidault stated that the French Delegation desired several hours more to consider this matter and suggested that it be postponed.

The Ministers agreed to defer discussion on this question.

Italian Colonies

Mr. Byrnes explained that this matter had been referred to a Committee. The Committee had not come to agreement but was prepared to make a report to the C.F.M. in order that the Ministers might discuss this question. Although the Ministers had agreed in principle on the disposition of the Colonies the Committee could not agree upon how the Colonies should be handled after Italy had renounced sovereignty.

Mr. Bevin stated that there were two important aspects of this question. The first point was the question of the vesting of the sovereignty of the Colonies in the four powers. This would be prejudicial to a final settlement. He explained that the U.K. wished to follow the example of what was done in connection with Turkey after the last war when Turkish territories were not vested anywhere. The U.K. was ready to leave this question in abeyance and suggested that no final determination be made as to the ultimate disposition of the Colonies. If the sovereignty of the Italian Colonies were vested in the four powers this would in fact be the same as establishing a four-power trusteeship. Other countries such as Abyssinia and Egypt were interested in these Colonies. Mr. Bevin stated that it would be most inadvisable to predetermine the vesting of sovereignty. He had agreed to the renunciation of sovereignty by Italy. However, it was possible that Italy would come back into the picture.

The second question was one of administration. These territories had been captured from the enemy. The Red Sea area had been occupied before certain other nations had come into the war. They had been and were at the present time under military occupation and nothing of a civilian character was being done pending final disposal. Mr. Bevin stated that he could not agree to the establishment of a Council or Advisory Commission in the Colonies during the period of military occupation and pending final disposal of the Colonies. He had agreed to the same principle at the Potsdam Conference regarding Polish administration in areas of Germany formerly occupied by the Red Army. He had accepted this principle and never questioned the wisdom of it. The British Government should be trusted in the same way that it had trusted other governments in the carrying out of the administration of areas occupied by its forces until final disposition of these areas had been agreed upon. These were two fundamental points in the opinion of the British Government. Although it wished to come to agreement on this question, it asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to respect its position and to take into consideration what it was doing in the Colonies. He explained that what he was saying regarding the U.K. rights applied to France which was occupying a part of the Italian Colonies. The U.K. Delegation had submitted a draft which dealt with these two fundamental points. The U.K. Delegation had also suggested an article for the treaty concerning the Colonies but in order to agree on this article agreement must also be reached on a declaration which would be made on how the colonial situation would be handled.

Mr. Molotov stated that the comparison between Poland and the Colonies was inappropriate. The decision which had been adopted in connection with the Polish question and the Polish frontiers was one matter, The colonial question was another. It would be inconvenient to compare them. The Soviet Delegation, as well as the other Delegations, took a very serious view on the colonial question. It had adopted as a basis the U.S. proposal to the effect that Italy renounced sovereignty of its African Colonies in favor of the four powers. The British had agreed to this proposal. He could not understand why there should be any objection to mentioning this proposal in the declaration. It should be mentioned. But if it were correct to say that sovereignty was to be vested in the four powers for the period of one year, as had been agreed upon, there must be some reflection of this statement. The Soviet Government admitted that there need be no change in the existing administration which had been established by the British military authorities. However, on the other hand, since the question of sovereignty had come up the Soviet Delegation believed that an Advisory Council should be established consisting of representatives of the four powers which would determine the final disposition of the Colonies. Local representatives might be included in the Advisory Council but it might be advisable to do without them for one year. The C.F.M. was called upon to make final disposal of the Colonies within the period of one year. It was consequently desirable to become familiar with the situation on the spot. An Advisory Council could be helpful in this respect. Representatives of the four powers could study the colonial question on the spot and the four powers would consequently be better prepared to solve the question of the final disposition of the Colonies. Mr. Molotov recalled that two weeks ago the British Delegation had proposed that a Commission be sent to Libya to study the situation on the spot. The British Delegation, by making this proposal, had admitted that representatives of the C.F.M. should familiarize themselves with the Colonial situation in order to make a better decision on this question. Since there was not sufficient time the project had been abandoned. Now the Ministers had one year to study this question. Mr. Molotov contended that it would be most advisable to have an Advisory Council in Africa. Such a body would not restrict the authority of the British Command in the area and there would be no change in the administration. The Advisory Council would only render assistance to the administrative authorities and in addition it would provide for better preparation in the settlement of Colonial questions.

Mr. Bevin stated that the British Deputy had proposed an investigation of the Colonial question in order to obtain the views of the local population in order that the Council might be better advised on the disposal of the Italian Colonies. He could not see why an Advisory Council should be set up for administrative purposes. If the question of the final disposition of the Colonies were left in abeyance he would not object to the sending of a Commission to Africa to study the disposal of the Colonies and to submit a report thereon to the C.F.M. The Commission should hear the views of all the states which had an interest in this question. It should also take into account all the proposals which had been placed before the C.F.M. including those proposals regarding the independence of the Colonies.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the Soviet Union had had experience in connection with Advisory Councils and mentioned the Advisory Council for Italy. He suggested that the body be called an Advisory Commission and not an Advisory Council. Its functions might be defined more specifically. It should not only be a Commission to study the Colonial question but also an Advisory Commission since the four powers were assuming great responsibility in the transfer of sovereignty of the Italian Colonies. He believed that the functions of the Commission could be defined in such a way as to find common agreement.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had a great responsibility in acting on behalf of his Government. He must state that he could not agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that it might be advisable to refer the matter back to the Colonial Committee.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be better, in doing so, to give certain directions to the Committee. Perhaps his and Mr. Bevin’s proposals might be combined. It might be possible to set up an “Advisory and Study Commission.” The Committee might be instructed to discuss the question on this basis.

Mr. Bevin stated that he could not accept anything that would interfere, even by implication, in the administration of the Colonies by a Commission.

At Mr. Bevin’s suggestion the Ministers then agreed to defer discussion of this question.

Italian Fleet

Mr. Byrnes explained that the U.S. and U.K. had submitted one proposal on the disposition of the Italian fleet, the Soviet Union had submitted a second proposal and the French Delegation had submitted a third in which certain aspects of the U.S.–U.K. and the Soviet Union proposals had been combined. The United States Delegation had been willing to accept the French compromise. It was willing at the present time to accept it.⁸²

Mr. Bevin stated that he would accept the French compromise.

Mr. Molotov stated that his naval representatives were not present. He suggested that the Deputies discuss this question.

Mr. Byrnes stated that no useful purpose would be served by the Deputies discussing the naval question. It must be decided by the Ministers. If Mr. Molotov did not desire to discuss it the question could be deferred.

Mr. Molotov recalled that he had made a proposal that the Italian Government be warned regarding its responsibility for damage inflicted on the Italian fleet. He wondered whether his proposal had been acceptable in principle.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was advised that the British Ambassador in Rome and the British Naval Commander in Chief in Italy had warned the Italian Government in this connection. He doubted that there was any further need for such a warning.

Mr. Molotov suggested that a declaration be made to this effect on the part of the four Ministers to the Italian Government. This would confirm what the British representatives in Italy had already done.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the Italian navy was under the operational direction of the British Command in Italy. It was not under the control of the C.F.M. The Italian vessels were war booty under the direction of the British Government and the British Government was responsible for them. These vessels were just like ships of the Rumanian navy which had been captured by the Soviet Union and which were under the control of Soviet officers. Mr. Byrnes would not like to issue a declaration to Rumania not to scuttle the Rumanian navy. The Rumanian ships were war booty under the control of the Soviet Government. If the British Commander in Italy had made a statement to the Italian Government and if he were satisfied, Mr. Byrnes was entirely satisfied.

Mr. Bevin stated that the British Government had taken the necessary steps and he hoped that nothing would take place. He could not accept the authority of the C.F.M. over the Italian ships. These ships were prizes of war—war booty—and it would be improper for the C.F.M. to intervene.

Mr. Molotov inquired why this question was on the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes stated that it was on the agenda since the C.F.M. had before it the problem of limitation of Italian armaments. Agreement had been reached on limitation of the Italian army and now the C.F.M. was trying to reach agreement on the limitation of the Italian navy. That was why the question was on the agenda.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was satisfied with the exchange of views that had taken place.

Reparations

Mr. Byrnes stated that if any useful purpose would be served by discussing this matter he would be glad to go into it.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was tired of setting forth the Soviet views on its modest demands for Italian reparations.

Peace Treaty With Rumania⁸³
(Compensation—Article 24)

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had been informed that no agreement had been reached on certain proposals of the U.K. Delegation.

Mr. Bevin explained that the proposals dealt with the return of certain types of property, especially ships and oil properties. It had also requested the repeal of the petroleum law of 1942 since this law was prejudicial to United Nations interests. The U.K. proposal also dealt with the question of insurance. He noted that the United States and Soviet Delegations believed that the general provision in Article 24 of the Rumanian treaty was sufficient to restore all United Nations rights in Rumania. Furthermore, Article 4 provided for the repeal of discriminatory legislation. However, the British Economic Advisers had informed him that these articles were not sufficiently specific and that more detailed provisions regarding compensation should be set forth in the Rumanian treaty. The British proposal also contained a clause regarding compensation in foreign currency since certain objects of replacement must be purchased abroad.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the general provision for the return of United Nations property in Rumania was sufficiently binding and that there was no need to single out individual items such as ships, furniture, etc. Agreement had been reached that this general provision should be included in the Rumanian as in the Italian treaty. He believed that this treaty provision was adequate and that there was no need to include an article which would specify special categories.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation saw no reason for a special article.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was willing to postpone discussion of this question. He could not agree, however, to the withdrawal of Article 24 since he did not believe that the British oil position in Rumania was adequately covered by the treaty. He suggested that since this question was not a fundamental matter it be referred to the peace conference. He wished an occasion again to discuss it.

It was agreed to defer discussion of this question.

Peace Conference

Mr. Byrnes stated that he desired to bring up the subject of a peace conference at the next meeting. He wished that this might be placed on the C.F.M. agenda for June 29.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed that the question might be discussed on the condition that the Ministers had terminated their discussion on the other items of the agenda. He said that he was referring to the agenda of June 28 and also to the questions which had been postponed.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to make it clear that he would bring up the question of the peace conference on June 29 regardless of what other subjects were discussed. He had stated several days ago that he would bring up this question but there had been no firm agreement that he might do so. He inquired whether there was any objection to the understanding that he would bring up the subject of a peace conference after items IV and V (the Danube and the Peace Treaty with Finland) had been discussed. He wished to give notice that he was going to bring up this matter. He requested that the Deputies be informed that the agenda for June 29 include the question of a peace conference after the Danube and the Finnish treaty had been discussed. If the agenda did not include this subject he would object to it.

The meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m.

75. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.

76. The agenda suggested by the Deputies in C.F.M.(46) 166, June 28, 1946, read as follows:

    • “I. Articles of general application to the five treaties:
      • —Treaty Commission;
      • —Method of settling disputes (arbitration);
      • —Compensation for United Nations’ property;
      • —Transport and shipping.
    • II. Peace Treaty with Italy:
      • —Italo-Yugoslav frontier;
      • —Italian Colonies;
      • —Italian fleet;
      • —Reparation.
    • III. Peace Treaty with Roumania:
      • —Compensation (Article 24); see also C.F.M.(46)157 para. C.
    • IV. Danube
    • V. Peace Treaty with Finland.”

77. The Council had under consideration at this point document C.F.M(46) 150, June 26, 1946, the Report of the Drafting Committee to the Deputies, not printed. In particular, the Council was considering that portion of the Report regarding the proposed article in the Draft Treaty with Italy on the Treaty Commission. The Drafting Committee’s report set forth a U.S.-U.K.-French proposal consisting of three paragraphs, a Soviet proposal consisting of a single paragraph, and a further single article already agreed upon by all delegations. The first two paragraphs of the U.S.-U.K.-French proposal together with the already agreed-upon paragraph were those which were in the subsequently agreed-upon article 75 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy; see vol. iv, p. 35, for the text. The Soviet proposal, which was not adopted, read as follows:

    “Supervision of the fulfillment by Italy of the obligations set out in Articles . . . . . of the present Treaty and the verification of such fulfillment, where necessary, win be exercised by the Ambassadors of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States in Italy, acting by agreement.”

78. The third paragraph of the U.S.-U.K.-French proposal read as follows:

    “The four Ambassadors shall be authorized to set up Committees of naval, military, air, economic, legal and other experts to act in their name and to be responsible to them for the fulfillment of the tasks devolving on them under the present Treaty.”

79. Not printed.
80. Under consideration at this point was article 34 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, C.F.M.(D) (46) 182. The text of that article is quoted in footnote 51, p. 656.
81. The Soviet proposal referred to here is included in the United States Delegation Record of the Council’s 28th Meeting, June 27, p. 648.
82. The proposals under reference are those set forth in C.F.M. (46) 121, June 22, 1946, p. 584.
83. C.F.M. (D) (46) 182, June 15, 1946, not printed.