C.F.M. Flies: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation 77
| Present: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Cohen | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Before and in the early part of dinner the conversation was general. Towards the latter part of dinner and from then until eleven-thirty the problems of the Conference were discussed.
The Secretary laid great emphasis on the importance of finding some solution to the Trieste problem. He pointed out that the United States had receded from its line to the French in an endeavor to reach a solution. He made it clear beyond any doubt that the United States could not agree to transfer Trieste and predominantly Italian territory to Yugoslavia. He explained all the reasons behind this: American public opinion; the feelings of a large number of Americans of Italian descent; the basic objection to putting several hundred thousand Italians under Yugoslav rule; and the possibility of repeating in reverse the mistake made in this area after the last war. He said he still believed that if the Ministers could not reach agreement on this point it would be best to refer it to the peace conference for a recommendation.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vyshinsky repeated all the Soviet arguments in favor of giving Trieste to Yugoslavia, which are that the population of the whole area was predominantly Slav, that Yugoslavia was an ally and should receive preferential treatment over Italy and that to give it (Trieste) to Yugoslavia was the only just and durable solution. They emphasized that the Slavic population was peasant, which is the permanent element in any population, whereas the Italian minorities in the cities were businessmen, traders, capitalists, etc., who had not sunk deep roots there. Furthermore, the Italian possessing classes in those cities prevented the Slav peasants from coming to the cities and improving their lot. The chief emphasis was laid, however, on the impossibility of the Soviet Union “offending” their Yugoslav ally. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government would be in a most embarrassing position if it did not meet the Yugoslav wishes in this matter. He stated that the Soviet Government could not agree to any solution which did not give Trieste to Yugoslavia. It was made clear that if Trieste went to Yugoslavia the northern part of the boundary could be easily adjusted in favor of Italy. Mr. Molotov repeated several times that the city of Trieste was the heart of the whole problem. He repeatedly expressed doubts as to the efficacy or acceptability of M. Bidault’s suggestion for an international area, stating that this would leave the problem unresolved and Trieste “suspended between Heaven and earth” and would greatly increase friction between the Italian and Yugoslav populations. He said the only real guarantee to avoid friction would be to put the city under Yugoslav sovereignty with all possible guarantees for the Italian population. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had made concessions [Page 576] in regard to the colonies and other questions and he felt that their wishes should be met in regard to Trieste in return.
The Secretary and Mr. Cohen pointed out that no concessions had been made to the United States in regard to the colonies since our basic proposal had not been accepted; and when on the general subject of concessions, the United States, for example at Potsdam, had made many concessions to the Soviet Union without demanding a quid pro quo. Mr. Cohen pointed out that although a compromise solution such as proposed by M. Bidault might be undesirable it should be weighed against the consequences of a failure to agree.
The Secretary summed up the situation by saying that the United States could not agree to transfer Trieste to Yugoslavia, and apparently the Soviet Government could not agree that it should remain to Italy. Therefore, some other solution must be sought. He said he had proposed submitting it to the peace conference and M. Bidault had come forth with a suggestion for international area, which, although he did not like, he was nevertheless prepared to study if it offered a chance of agreement. If M. Bidault’s proposal was to be studied it would of course be necessary to draw up with the utmost care the plan for the international administration and policing of the area in order to avoid agitation and disorders. He repeated that only if such a scheme offered a basis for agreement would he be prepared to consider it and again made it clear that the United States could never take the responsibility of agreeing to transfer Trieste to Yugoslavia.
In conclusion The Secretary suggested that Mr. Molotov think over the situation, as he himself would, and said that he thought it was up to Mr. Molotov to come forward with some new proposal in the face of the present deadlock.
- The conversation took place during a dinner at the Secretary of State’s suite at the Meurice Hotel in Paris, June 21, 1946, 8 p.m.↩