C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Tenth Informal Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 20, 1946, 5 p.m.
Present
| France | ||
| M. Bidault (Chairman) | ||
| M. Couve de Murville | ||
| M. Courcel | ||
| Interpreter | ||
| U.S.A. | U.K. | |
| The Secretary | Mr. Bevin | |
| Senator Connally | Sir Oliver Harvey | |
| Senator Vandenberg | Mr. Jebb | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Interpreter | |
| U.S.S.R. | ||
| Mr. Molotov | ||
| Mr. Vyshinsky | ||
| Mr. Gusev | ||
| Mr. Pavlov |
M. Bidault was Chairman and said he wished to thank the Secretary for his initiative in bringing about a restricted session. He said he also understood that the discussion would be kept secret and confined to those present.
The Secretary said he wished to clear up what may have been a misunderstanding as a result of this morning’s discussion concerning [Page 558] the press. He said he intended to make it plain this morning that he could not undertake any commitment in regard to the U.S. press not to answer questions concerning the position of the U.S. at these meetings. He had learned at London that such commitments could not be successfully kept. At London he had not talked to any newspaper correspondents because of the agreement among the Ministers but nevertheless news of their deliberations had appeared in many U.S. newspapers. As a result he had suspected not only his colleagues but also members of his own delegation. He said the only way in which secrecy could be assured would be if the persons in this room were to agree not to talk with any of the members of their own delegations. He said at London some American correspondents told him that they had received their information from Paris, others from the British Foreign Office and some from Tass. He said therefore he did not wish to put himself in that position again where it might be thought that the U.S. Delegation was not carrying out a commitment. He added that he thought that distorted information would inevitably appear in the press under such circumstances.
M. Bidault said he was sure no one had had any idea of making accusations against the Secretary or any member of his Delegation and that their negotiations had reached a point where some temporary secrecy would be desirable in the interests of reaching an agreement. He then said the first item on the agenda was the question of the Italian colonies.
Italian Colonies
Mr. Bevin said that he had restudied the whole question and subject to confirmation by his government, which he was seeking, was prepared to withdraw his proposal for a united Somaliland. He said he had been anxious for a commission to study this question because he felt it might be a great economic advantage to the Somalis; but since it had produced misunderstanding he preferred to withdraw it. He asked especially that this statement be kept off the record and not allowed to get out as he had not yet received his government’s approval.
The Secretary said that on the question of the Italian colonies the U.S. had asked nothing for itself. At London it had advanced a proposal which it honestly believed would offer the best opportunity for agreement among the powers concerned. He said he did not wish to restate this proposal but merely to mention one aspect. The French representatives have had objections to the proposal to promise independence for Libya after a stated period. He said he realized the difficulties which France envisaged and he was sure that the Soviet representative, who shared our view, also understood these difficulties. He was therefore prepared to modify our original position on this [Page 559] point, and instead of promising independence at the end of ten years, to state at the end of ten years the Trusteeship Council would review the situation to ascertain whether or not Libya was in shape to receive independence. As to Italian trusteeship, the U.S. believed that this would be unwise both for Italy and for people in that area. He said the more he had thought over this matter the more certain he had become that any attempt to establish Italian trusteeship would result in disorders and violence for the control of which there would be no military force in the area. He said it would be a most awkward position if any of the four countries here were called in to help Italy versus the Arabs when on our appeal the Arabs had helped us in the war against Italy. He said he was convinced that it would be possible to select a neutral administrator for these colonies and referred to the success we had had in selecting a neutral Secretary General for the United Nations.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had tried to find a way out of these difficulties which would be acceptable to all four powers, but without success. In connection with the original Soviet proposal to place the colonies under U.N. trusteeship the Soviet Delegation had felt that there was nothing impermissible in the suggestion that the Soviet Union be entrusted with the administration of one of these territories. He said it was our common objective to ensure a long period of peace not only in Europe but in the whole world and to create economic conditions for world trade. The Soviet Union intended to participate in this trade to the extent of its ability both in the east and in the west and that was why it was considered important that there should be a port of call in the Mediterranean for Soviet merchant vessels. He said their desires on this point had received no support. The fact was that there had been many different proposals for the solution of the Italian colonies. He recalled no less than eight different proposals, which merely shows the complexity and difficulties of the problem at the present time. Mr. Byrnes had already suggested the idea of a temporary postponement for one year in order to give the four powers more time to study a permanent solution. He stated that the Soviet Delegation does not exclude this idea of a temporary postponement in view of the absence of agreement and the number of suggested solutions.
Mr. Bevin said he too recognized the complexity of this problem. He said it was hard to accept the original U.S. proposal since all these territories were not the same. For example, in regard to Eritrea he felt that the claims of Ethiopia should be considered. He said he thought in the circumstances it would be a good idea for Mr. Byrnes to renew his proposal that Italy renounce sovereignty and give the [Page 560] four powers more time to consider a final solution. He said he thought if peace treaties were concluded that would produce an atmosphere for a more thorough examination of this problem. He said there were many aspects to the question; for example, France desires certain frontier rectifications, and furthermore, he would very much like to have Egypt consulted.
M. Bidault stated that France had on several occasions given its opinion and that this was not the worst of the proposals since it had received Soviet support. He asked whether the French proposal could not be considered once more. He thanked Mr. Byrnes for taking cognizance of the major interests of France by the modification of his original proposal concerning independence. He said he thought it was highly desirable to try and reach a permanent settlement at this session if such was possible. The French Delegation for its part would do everything to facilitate a settlement since a permanent solution was much more desirable than a temporary one.
Mr. Molotov said he agreed with M. Bidault concerning the desirability of a permanent solution. The Soviet Delegation continued to support the French proposal for Italian trusteeship since they felt that this would give a certain satisfaction to the wishes of the new democratic Italy which had been left in such a difficult position as a result of the war.
The Secretary said that this was one subject where the worst critic of the Council of Foreign Ministers could not deny that they had tried very hard to find a solution. The Soviet Representatives had quite properly made mention of their change of position in the hope of reaching an agreement. The United Kingdom and French had also altered their original positions and the U.S. had done likewise at least one or two times. He said it was because of the difficulties of finding a permanent solution that he had last May suggested postponement for one year to give the four countries more time. He said as Mr. Molotov suggested he was prepared to reintroduce his proposal of May 15 in the hope of at least a temporary solution. At the request of Mr. Bevin he outlined the substance of his proposal of May 15; namely, that Italy should renounce sovereignty and that the four powers should try to reach an agreement, but if at the end of a year they have been unable to do so the entire question should be referred to the Trusteeship Council.
M. Bidault stated that he still thought the French proposal was the best policy but that that does not mean that France would not make sacrifices as others have done in order to reach an agreement. As he understood it, the question now was to reach an agreement concerning a provisional regime, leaving open all possibilities and suggestions for eventual solutions. He said that in such an important [Page 561] matter France would have to examine the details of a temporary regime before deciding.
Mr. Molotov said that obviously a permanent regime was better than a temporary one but that in the present difficulties the Soviet Government was prepared to consider a temporary regime in the expectation of agreements on other questions which he hoped would be approached in the spirit of cooperation. The Soviet Delegation was prepared, therefore, however undesirable it might be in general, to consider a temporary solution. He agreed with M. Bidault that it was necessary to examine in detail the character of this temporary regime and the language of any agreement.
M. Bidault said he agreed with Mr. Molotov that a temporary regime was unsatisfactory in principle but it was satisfactory if it helped in the achievement of general agreement on other questions. The language in an agreement on this point should be carefully drawn up and resubmitted to the Ministers for final approval. He said he thought that the present discussion was a happy augury as they appeared to partially overcome one of the greatest difficulties. He said all had made sacrifices but he would not say who had made the most.
Mr. Bevin said that if the question of a temporary regime could be studied he would like also to have his proposal for independence considered since there was still the matter of the solemn British promise to the Senussi.
M. Bidault said there appeared to be some misunderstanding. The only delay would be the final decision and they had only decided to look into the possibility of a temporary regime. He said they had the U.S. proposal concerning the one year for considering the final solution and that of course during that period all proposals, the British as well as the French and others, would be considered.
The Secretary suggested that the memorandum of the U.S. Delegation of May 15, C.F.M.(46) 89,68 should be sent to a special committee for careful redrafting.
Mr. Bevin then stated that he did not understand that there was to be a collective regime for one year but that the administration of these territories would remain as they are now; that is, France would continue to administer the parts that she now was administering, and Great Britain likewise. During this period the four governments would continue their efforts to agree on a final disposition. He said he thought it would be very difficult to draw up any special regime for a temporary period.
Mr. Molotov said he thought this was a question which should be discussed.
[Page 562]The Secretary said that it had been his idea when he originally offered the proposal that the four governments would be able to find a solution within the stated period. He was unwilling to confess that the four powers could not agree and that it would be necessary to call upon the Security Council for a solution. He said we can and we must decide this question but that if a temporary regime was set up it would look as though we had come to the conclusion in advance that they could not reach an agreement.
Mr. Molotov repeated that the consequences of an interim solution would have to be studied.
The Secretary said he was prepared to discuss anything but he did feel that a decision on a temporary regime would be just as hard to reach at this time as a permanent solution. He repeated that it would be taken as indicating that they did not expect to reach a solution within a year’s period.
M. Bidault inquired whether or not they could not refer the question of a temporary regime to the Deputies or to a special committee and the Ministers continue their search for a permanent solution. He said he admitted that he had not correctly stated the U.S. proposal since it did not provide for a provisional regime but merely for a postponement before final decision.
Mr. Bevin repeated that he thought the interim decision which might only last for a few months would involve no change in the present administration.
The Secretary said he thought they had agreed to let a special committee draft the details on the basis of the U.S. proposals of last May. He said he thought M. Bidault was indeed optimistic if he thought the Deputies could draw up an interim regime any more easily than a permanent solution.
It was agreed to appoint a special committee consisting of Mr. Cohen, Mr. Vyshinski, Mr. Couve de Murville and Mr. Jebb, who would redraft the language of the U.S. proposal.
M. Bidault repeated his hope that the temporary solution might perhaps facilitate an agreement on the final solution even at this session of the council.
Mr. Bevin thought that it would be a great mistake if the special committee began to discuss a temporary versus a permanent regime. He felt they would get nowhere and as he understood it they were only postponing final decision to give the Ministers more time. He felt this committee should only consider and report to the Ministers the proposal for the postponement of the final decision.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that the U.S. proposal is that Italy cede its rights to the four powers. This will create new circumstances which must be examined.
[Page 563]The Secretary proposed that the special committee should be authorized to redraft the language of the U.S. proposal. This was accepted.
M. Bidault then stated the next point on the agenda was that of the Dodecanese.
Dodecanese Islands
Mr. Molotov stated that as to this question the Greeks had never brought up the question before the Ministers. He said the Greek Ambassador to Moscow was now in Paris and had asked to see Mr. Vyshinsky. He suggested that the discussion on the Dodecanese be postponed until after Mr. Vyshinsky had seen the Greek Ambassador.
Mr. Bevin congratulated Mr. Molotov on his resourcefulness in postponing the discussion of the Dodecanese.
Mr. Molotov replied that if the Greek Government had empowered Mr. Bevin to represent Greece at the Council of Foreign Ministers, he would be glad to accept that but he had received no information to that effect.
It was agreed to adjourn until tomorrow at four p.m. and meet then in restricted session.