Moscow Embassy Files: Telegram37

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris

top secret

185. Personal for Matthews from Smith. While I have nothing specific on which to base the following statements, nevertheless as the result of conversations with Soviet officials and others I have the impression that while the Soviet delegation is very pessimistic about the [Page 528] outcome of the Paris Conference, they are quite as anxious as we are to avoid a complete break-up, and that it may become of great importance in connection with irreconciliable questions such as Trieste to find some formula which will allow the Soviets more time to make the changes of position which with them are the essential preliminary to any compromise. Such formulas would not necessarily be ones which we expected to offer even slight hopes of definitive success, providing they are sufficiently reasonable on the surface to serve this interim purpose.38

On the other hand, I would view with great reserve any report that the Soviets are already preparing to recede at this time from their former intransigent attitude.

I know you realize better than anyone the pattern which our friends follow in these negotiations. I repeat that the above is based on no specific information, but only on the local atmosphere and my conviction that the important thing is to allow the Soviets sufficient time for an orderly change of position.

Smith
  1. Moscow Embassy 1946 Files, Lot F–96, Acc. No. 59 A 543, Part VI, Box 367, File—500 Foreign Ministers Meetings—Paris.
  2. Telegram 2003, June 25, 1946, from Moscow, retransmitted as telegram 3100, Secdel 350, June 26, 1946, to Paris, added the following views of Ambassador Smith on this same subject:

    “There is becoming apparent an increasing Soviet tendency to pose as defender of Italian sovereignty and independence against the imperialistic designs of British and US. It is probable that Soviet press will shortly begin to sound a note of increasing appreciation of Italian contribution to the victory over Germany and of growing Italian democracy. It seems to me that this trend, given time to develop, may preface a less rigid attitude on Trieste as indicated in my last message to you.” (761.65/6–2546)