Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Nineteenth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 15, 1946, 4 p.m.¹

Paris, June 15, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

General Procedure

M. Bidault opened the meeting and stated that he was glad to have this second opportunity to extend a hearty welcome to the Foreign Ministers of three great Allied nations who had come to Paris once more to continue their discussion of the major problems of the peace settlement in Europe. When the Council had adjourned a month before, it had accomplished a certain amount of useful work and made definite progress, but almost all the essential problems connected with the peace treaties were still unsolved at that time. Since that date, the Deputies had continued to meet and had endeavored to reach further agreements.² The Deputies had carried out a substantial amount of technical work and had placed before the Foreign Ministers a number of concrete proposals. These included all the military and naval questions except the fundamental point of the disposal of the Italian fleet, and also a number of economic questions which had not previously been discussed; no further progress had been made, however, on the subject of Italian reparation. The Foreign Ministers would undoubtedly approve these decisions of the Deputies. It must be admitted, however, that on the fundamental points the Council was in the same position as it had been at the close of its discussion of those points in the middle of May. Much remained to be done before full and final agreement could be reached. The Foreign Ministers must now concentrate their efforts on reaching such agreement. As for the French Delegation, it had from the very beginning given proof of its profound conviction that the Great Powers must act together to make the peace as they had in making war. The French Delegation would spare no effort to facilitate their agreement and took the liberty of making an appeal to the other three delegations around the table to approach in the same spirit the task before them. The French Delegation remained convinced that a frank and open discussion, in a spirit of cooperation and with a feeling of responsibility, would make it possible for the four delegations to dispel misunderstanding and mistrust and to make the peace settlement which the peoples had been waiting for, not without a certain anxiety, for a long time. Finally, M. Bidault wished to emphasize the point that hope must be maintained.

Mr. Byrnes said that the United States Delegation shared the hope expressed by M. Bidault that full agreement would be reached on the peace treaties as result of the combined efforts of the Foreign Ministers. He expressed his appreciation of the welcome extended by France and wished to suggest that M. Bidault act as Chairman of the present meeting and that the chairmanship rotate in the same way as on previous occasions.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation associated itself with the wishes expressed by M. Bidault and also supported the proposal of the United States Delegation that M. Bidault act as Chairman.

Mr. Bevin thanked M. Bidault for his welcome and said that the United Kingdom Delegation reciprocated the wishes expressed. He agreed that M. Bidault should act as Chairman of the present meeting.

M. Bidault thanked his colleagues and stated that they could now begin their work. He asked the Chairman of the Deputies to make a report on the work of the Deputies during the interval between the two sessions of the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Dunn, acting as Chairman of the Deputies, made the following report:

• “1. The report on the draft treaty with Italy³ has been approved by the Deputies, subject to proofreading and to slight rearrangements of the annexes, in which the Drafting Committee is engaged, and will be distributed tomorrow to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
• “2. The draft report on the draft treaty with Rumania⁴ is being reviewed by the Drafting Committee and will be considered by the Deputies on Monday at 11:00, with a view to approving it for transmission to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
• “3. The reports on the draft treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland are in preparation and will be presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers as early as possible.”

No delegation had any observations to make on the report of the Deputies.

Agenda of the Conference

M. Bidault proposed that the Council consider the question of adopting an agenda for the meetings of the present session. It seemed to him obvious that the agenda which had been established for the first part of the session was still valid. This was, in fact, the same session which had only been adjourned for a few weeks. He reminded his colleagues that that agenda included the examination of the draft peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and examination of German questions. These were the items which were already on the agenda for the present session. Did the other delegations have any opinions or intentions on the subject of the agenda?

Mr. Byrnes agreed to the agenda as set forth by the Chairman and wished to propose that there be added to it the question of discussing a treaty with Austria.

Mr. Bevin asked whether Mr. Byrnes was referring to the Austrian question in general or to a new treaty with Austria.

Mr. Byrnes said that since the Council’s adjournment, the U.S. Delegation had circulated a proposed draft treaty with Austria.⁵ He hoped that the other delegations would agree to discuss it at this session.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would prefer to decide somewhat later the question whether the Austrian problem should be placed on the agenda. This could best be decided when the Council had before it the results of its consideration of the other questions with which it had been dealing. Should there be enough time, it could take up the Austrian question, but it must be admitted that the questions already on the agenda would require a great deal of time.

Mr. Bevin said that the U.K. Delegation would like to have the Austrian question placed on the agenda immediately.⁶ It could be taken up when the Council came to it in considering the items on the agenda. To do this would remove a great deal of misunderstanding. He thought it would be very desirable to have an agreement now that the Austrian question should be on the agenda.

M. Bidault said that he understood that the Council now had two proposals before it. One was that the question of Austria be put at the end of the agenda. The other was that that might be left open. In view of the uncertainty with regard to the language in which the subject was to be placed on the agenda, M. Bidault felt that a possibility of solving the question was offered. The U.S. Delegation had proposed that the Council examine the U.S. draft treaty proposal. It might be that the Council would have not only that proposal, but other proposals before it. Therefore it might be better to list the subject on the agenda as “Examination of Austrian Questions” just as there was already on the agenda an item listed as “Examination of German Questions”.

Mr. Byrnes said that the suggestion of the French Delegation was entirely satisfactory to him. He had proposed that the Austrian question be added at the end of the agenda. It would be discussed only after the Council had completed its discussion of other questions already on the agenda. He wished to make it clear that he did not wish to limit discussion to the draft treaty proposed by the U.S. Delegation. He was perfectly willing to discuss the proposal of any other delegation or any other question which might be raised in connection with Austria.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had no objection to the Chairman’s proposal that the Austrian question be considered after the Council had discussed the other questions on the agenda, and that it be listed as the discussion of Austrian questions and not merely the problem of a treaty with Austria.

M. Molotov then stated that he had a new proposal to make in connection with Italy. The political situation in Italy had grown extremely acute as a result of the determined action taken by Monarchist and pro-Fascist elements dissatisfied with the results of the referendum held on June 2 in which the majority of the Italian people had expressed themselves in favor of a Republic. The recent events in Naples, Taranto and other cities where scores of persons had been killed and injured as the result of demonstrations against the Republic testified to the existence of a direct threat of civil war, which was fomented by those who only recently had constituted the base of Fascism in Italy. In view of this situation he could not refrain from recalling the fact that the Allied Powers had assumed certain obligations in connection with Italy. As early as October 1943 the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had stated in the Moscow Declaration on Italy that their policy with respect to Italy would be based on the principle that Fascism with all its evil influences and consequences should be eradicated and the Italian people should be given a full opportunity to establish the government they wished.⁷ This policy was expressed also in the Armistice terms and more recently in the Protocol signed in Paris on May 16.⁸ That Protocol stated that the Italian Government undertook to guarantee, by means of free elections, the genuine expression of the will of the Italian people on the question of the form of government they preferred. Since this Protocol had been approved by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R., the responsibility of those four governments for the political situation in Italy was once again emphasized. In view of all these circumstances, the Soviet Government considered that the Allied Powers could not remain indifferent to attempts being made in Italy to unleash civil war, attempts such as were taking place at the moment by those elements who only recently had constituted the base of Faccism. It would be desirable if the Council of Foreign Ministers could be informed by those powers which had direct responsibility for the political situation in Italy and whose armed forces were stationed in that country under the Armistice terms, regarding what was being done to prevent the further development of events directed against the establishment of a Republic in Italy, which had been confirmed by the referendum expressing the genuine will of the Italian people. The Soviet Delegation accordingly requested that this question be placed on the Council’s agenda.

Mr. Bevin said he had no objection to anything going on the agenda after the discussion of the treaty with Austria had been completed.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had no objection to M. Molotov’s proposal.

M. Bidault said that in view of the general agreement on the question, it remained only for the Soviet Delegation to suggest the exact wording for the item.

M. Molotov suggested “The Political Situation in Italy” as the heading under which the question might be discussed. With regard to when it would be discussed, the Soviet Delegation would have no objection to its being taken up at a later stage if developments permitted.

M. Bidault accepted M. Molotov’s wording and his remarks concerning the place of the item on the agenda. He then said that the question of the agenda seemed to be settled as follows: The Council would take up first the five draft treaties of peace, then the examination of German questions, the examination of Austrian questions, and the political situation in Italy.

M. Molotov said that, if developments in Italy required, the Council might find it necessary to consider the political situation in Italy at an earlier date. He thought all delegations hoped that developments in Italy would not require such action by the Council.

Mr. Bevin said that he was anxious only to keep the agenda orderly. He felt that the subjects must be in an agreed order in order that it might be clear to the delegations as they went along.

M. Bidault said that the Council might consider that the order of the agenda had been established. If the Council later decided to alter that order, a new decision would have to be made in that sense. For the present the question might be considered settled.

M. Molotov said that in his view they had not yet taken a decision on the agenda. They were about to decide on the question of the order of the items and also of that on the agenda itself. He recalled the fact that the first item on the agenda was the peace treaty with Italy. The question just proposed by the Soviet Delegation had a direct bearing on the peace treaty with Italy. He thought that all delegations would agree that, if developments required that the question of the political situation in Italy be considered earlier than was at present envisaged, they could do so.

Mr. Bevin asked whether that meant that when the discussion on the treaty with Italy was going on, at any moment the Council might be prevented from completing the treaty because of some temporary political event in Italy. He thought that the Council should get on with its work on the Italian treaty with the assumption that, the new government of Italy having been democratically elected and the institutional question having been settled by the referendum, Italy would carry on, and the Council should go ahead with the completion of the peace treaty. He thought that such a course would give stability to Italy, particularly if it were known to the Italians that the Council was going ahead with the Italian peace treaty on that assumption.

M. Molotov said that undoubtedly all hoped that developments in Italy would take a well ordered course. But what would happen if the Council continued to discuss the Italian treaty while events in Italy were assuming the form of a civil war? If the Council paid no attention to those events, then an embarrassing situation would arise in connection with the examination of the peace treaty. If the course of events in Italy made it unnecessary to take up the political question earlier than was now envisaged, then the Council would proceed in accordance with the established schedule, but if events made necessary a consideration of the problem by the Council, the Soviet Delegation thought that the Council should undertake to discuss the question.

Mr. Bevin said that he did not want this question of the political situation confused with the question of the treaty. He thought that they should go on with the work on the treaty. If some event took place in Italy or anywhere else which required the attention of the Council, that question might be raised at the time by any delegation as a special question. He did not wish to agree to discuss such a question in connection with any part of the treaty.

M. Molotov had no objection to placing the three questions concerning Germany, Austria and Italy on the agenda in the order proposed. He said that there was no intention of confusing the political question with that of the peace treaty with Italy. He felt constrained to point out, however, that those two questions could not be fully separated from each other. The Soviet Delegation reserved the right to come back to the question of the political situation in Italy at a time earlier than that which was envisaged in the agenda provided that events in Italy made it necessary.

Mr. Byrnes said that according to information available to the U.S. Delegation, the democratically elected government of Italy had been upholding the decision of the Italian people in favor of a Republic. In the last few days it had seemed as if the government were in control of the situation. He himself hoped that the Council would have no further occasion to discuss this political situation. He was glad that the Soviet Delegation limited its reservation of the right to raise the question to times when the situation in Italy required that it be raised.

M. Bidault felt that there was no real difference of opinion among the four delegations. They had agreed on the place in the agenda where the item on the political situation in Italy should be included, and that each delegation had the right to ask for an urgent discuscussion of any matter should the need for it arise. Since all delegations approved these two points, it seemed that the problem of the agenda had been settled by common agreement. (All delegations agreed.) M. Bidault wished to register the fact, as a favorable augury for future work, that the Ministers had settled the question of the agenda in record time as compared with the time taken on previous occasions for the adoption of an agenda. He felt that this was not entirely in conformity with prophecies which had been made but he was in the habit of seeing prophets make mistakes even in other fields than that of diplomacy. He hoped that the prophets would continue to be wrong.

Peace Treaty With Italy

M. Bidault asked what his colleagues wished to do next.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that in view of what had just occurred, they might succeed in getting agreement on the Italian treaty that night before the Deputies got at it the next day.

M. Bidault asked whether it was desired to take up the Italian treaty immediately. To him it seemed more reasonable to allow some time for the Foreign Ministers, after their tiring journey, to collect their thoughts and their documents and perhaps to compare them with others.

Mr. Byrnes said that if the Ministers were given a chance to get their documents and thoughts together, then there would be no hope of agreement. What specifically did the Chairman propose?

M. Bidault replied that he was, of course, at the service of his colleagues, but that he had the impression that they would not achieve the most useful results if they started in immediately with their discussion of the Italian treaty. He proposed that they allow the Deputies an opportunity to hold one more meeting and look over the document which had been prepared on the Italian treaty. The Ministers could then meet on Monday afternoon to consider it.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had a proposal to make concerning the order of work. All delegations were interested in expediting the work. It was clear that the discussions had been held up by a number of accumulated questions involving considerable detail, especially the economic questions connected with the Italian peace treaty. The Soviet Delegation considered that these questions might be considered apart for the moment and that the Council should do its best to find a way to facilitate their examination. To that end it would be useful if the Council asked for the views of the Italian Government on those questions. Such a procedure might help to settle the economic matters more quickly. In the past the Council had several times decided that it was necessary to seek the views of the Italian and other governments on questions less important than these. Experience had shown that neither during the recent session of the Council nor during the period in which the Deputies had met had any progress been made in the examination of these questions. In order that their settlement not be postponed any longer, the Soviet Delegation suggested that the opinions of the Italian Government be sought. After these opinions had been heard, the questions should be referred for discussion to the committee which was already dealing with such questions.

Mr. Bevin wished to know what the Italian Government would be asked. Would they be told to state whether they were willing to pay reparation or to pay compensation to the Allies for war damage? It was a fact that Italy had entered the war and had certain obligations to pay as result of the war, but what specifically did M. Molotov have in mind? Was it proposed to submit to Italy the draft clauses which had been agreed or had been proposed just to find out what the Italian Government had to say about them? It was difficult to see how this procedure would work. For example, on the question of Allied property rights and interests, there seemed to be three proposals, British, American and Soviet, on that one subject, plus an additional reservation by the Soviet Delegation that this whole question must be discussed in connection with Italian reparation. Mr. Bevin was at a loss to see how the Ministers could discuss those items with any other government when they were still completely in disagreement on them themselves. He did not think it was a correct analogy to relate these to other questions on which the Italians had been consulted in the past. Those had been territorial questions, on which there were claims and counterclaims. This was purely a question of Allied economic claims on Italy. The two things did not seem to be at all the same.

Mr. Bevin wished to do what was possible to reach an agreement quickly, so that not a moment would be wasted. He thought that the best thing to do would be to have the Deputies draw up a paper in which the different proposals on the economic clauses were placed side by side, in order that the Ministers might see clearly what the differences were, and then try to get agreement. According to the reports submitted by the Deputies, the latter seemed to be stuck on many of these questions. On some of them they had got nowhere either because of lack of instructions or for some other reason. On some points, however, there seemed to be no big differences between the various points of view, and the Council should be able to reach agreement. For example, one of those questions was the definition of United Nations property in Italy. In the Deputies’ report there were four definitions, one submitted by each delegation. This was a point on which an agreement had to be made and it should not be impossible to reach one without having to consult Italy and ask how Italy defines United Nations property. The question of restitution of gold was another case in point. Four different opinions were given on that. But the differences in these opinions were not great. By showing a real desire to settle these questions, the Foreign Ministers ought to be able to reach agreement on them. Therefore it seemed desirable to have the Deputies submit a report showing clearly the differences on these questions. The Ministers could then apply themselves to the problem of reaching compromises on those economic questions and thus get them out of the way. He was prepared to do what he could in the interval before the next meeting to study the questions with that goal in mind. If his colleagues would do the same, he was sure that they would be able to find compromises which would settle many of the economic items.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation agreed with Mr. Bevin’s proposal that the Deputies put the economic clauses into a form in which the Foreign Ministers could consider them. For its part the Soviet Delegation was willing to find ways of reaching decisions which would be acceptable to all.

In view of the questions raised by Mr. Bevin, M. Molotov wished to make clear the Soviet Delegation’s proposal for seeking the views of the Italian Government on the economic questions. If it was acceptable to the other delegations, the Soviet Delegation was willing that the Italian Government be shown all the proposals which had been made on the economic questions by the various delegations, including the proposals on reparation. There was also another possible course: To instruct the Deputies to discuss which points among the economic clauses should be singled out as points on which the opinion of the Italian Government could be requested. That might be a helpful procedure.

Mr. Bevin said that in his view the important thing was to have a statement before them showing the differences of view on the economic clauses. Efforts should then be made to get agreement on everything possible. He thought that to bring a belligerent country into the picture at this stage would be a great mistake, and would not facilitate the Council’s work at all. Until the present, the Council had refused to consult with the Allied Nations who fought against Italy and had claims against Italy. Those nations would have to wait until the Peace Conference before they could state their views. If the Council now consulted Italy and made the Allied countries wait, he was sure that there would be a storm. On this point he knew what the reaction of the British Dominions would be. He had not said a word to them about these economic questions, but they certainly would resent Italy’s being consulted while there was still no certainty on when the Peace Conference would be held. To consult the Italians now would create a very difficult situation.

Mr. Byrnes thought that it would be better to defer at this time any action on the suggestion made by M. Molotov. Meanwhile the Deputies would make a report on the questions which had been agreed and those on which no agreement had been reached. He could see that the democratically elected government in Italy might be embarrassed if called upon now to state its views on or to agree to any particular proposals. The result might be to give great comfort to some people in Italy to whom the four powers did not wish to give any comfort, especially not at this particular moment. If the four delegations could agree among themselves on these questions, then there would be time to consider the matter of consulting Italy. There was much in what Mr. Bevin said on the point that the other Allied Nations had an interest in these economic claims. The best course seemed to be to try first to come to an agreement among the four powers as Mr. Bevin had suggested and not to consult Italy at this time.

Mr. Bevin said that he would like to see the Deputies set up a constructive report which would give a complete picture. That report might show what had been agreed and what remained unagreed with respect to territorial claims, military and naval questions and economic and financial questions. He would have no objection to taking the economic questions first, but those seemed to be the main headings under which could be grouped the questions which the Foreign Ministers had to solve.

Mr. Byrnes said that the U.S. Deputy had just handed to him a report on which the Deputies had been working.⁹ This report would be circulated the next day. At first glance it seemed to present the viewpoints of the various delegations. This appeared to be a paper which could be studied by the Ministers before their next meeting on Monday, when they would see if they could not settle some of these outstanding questions on which the Deputies had not been able to reach agreement.

Mr. Bevin said that he had been speaking only of headings which would call attention to the report of the Deputies. He was not suggesting that the whole report be revised and retyped.

Mr. Byrnes repeated that the Deputies had already done the job of which Mr. Bevin was speaking, and their final report was in the process of being typed. If it was available on Sunday, the Ministers could study it, and then on Monday try to decide some of the questions.

M. Molotov said that, with reference to his proposal to consult Italy, the Soviet Delegation had borne in mind the possibility of seeking the opinion of other governments, if necessary, as had been done in the case of territorial questions. On the questions of the Franco-Italian frontier, the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and the Austro-Italian frontier, the Council had heard the views of both parties to the dispute. In the last named case neither party had been an Allied country. This same procedure could be adopted for economic questions. The Deputies could be instructed to single out certain questions on which the views of the Italian Government might be heard. It would be useful for the Council to hear the Italian Government on those questions. Eventually at the Peace Conference, it would be necessary to show to the Italian Government all the proposals prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers. It might be advantageous to show them some such proposals before that time.

Mr. Byrnes wished to remind his Soviet friend that the Council had heard the Italians and Yugoslavs on their territorial dispute and that after hearing them was farther from agreement than before. He wished to suggest that the Council would make more progress by seeking agreement on these economic questions among the members of the Council themselves. They should see first whether they could agree. If they could not, then the situation could not be made any worse by giving the Italians a hearing, and there should be no objection to hearing them.

Mr. Bevin remarked that they might just as well call in the twenty-one Allied Nations now and let them go through the whole treaty. Then all parties would have been consulted on everything.

M. Molotov said that he only wished to continue a practice already established by the Council. After all, there had already been hearings in connection with three territorial questions. However, he had no objection to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal that the matter be postponed for the time being and that meanwhile the four delegations take steps to intensify their joint work on all economic questions, trying to obtain results in the course of that work.

M. Bidault stated that he believed the Council was in agreement on a certain number of points. The first was that at some time the Italian Government might be shown the decisions which had been taken by the Council and invited to give its views on them. He did not think it had been the Council’s practice, however, to submit texts to the Italian Government; it was just a matter of informing the Italian Government on certain points. At a later date the Deputies might consider the question of how some of these decisions might be communicated to the Italian Government and the views of the latter requested. Secondly, it seemed to be agreed that the Council should intensify its work on the Italian treaty with the goal of reaching general agreement on the points which remained unagreed. Preliminary copies of the report of the Deputies had already been received, and after certain technical errors were corrected, this report would be officially circulated on the following day. The question remained as to how the Ministers would undertake the discussion of the questions presented by this voluminous report. Was it desired to take up the economic questions first and to settle as many of them as possible, or was some other procedure preferred? M. Bidault suggested that they adopt the practice which had been used at the previous session of requesting the Deputies to examine the question of the order in which the various points should be submitted to the Ministers.

All delegations agreed to this procedure.

The next meeting was set for Monday, June 17, at 4:00 p.m.

The meeting adjourned at 6:45 p.m.

1. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
2. Between May 27 and June 15, 1946, the Deputies held twenty meetings (Nos. 53–73).
3. Reference here is to document C.F.M. (D) (46) 177, June 13, 1946, the Report by the Deputies to the Foreign Ministers on the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, not printed. The Report was, in fact, a draft peace treaty.
4. Reference here is to document C.F.M. (D) (46) 182, the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, not printed.
5. On May 29, 1946, the Secretary of State instructed that copies of a United States draft treaty with Austria be delivered to the British, Soviet, and French Governments. At the same time, the Secretary instructed that messages be delivered to Foreign Minister Molotov, Foreign Secretary Bevin, and Foreign Minister Bidault asking for their agreement to the discussion of the Austrian treaty at the forthcoming Council of Foreign Minister meetings. For the Secretary’s message to Molotov, see telegram 993, May 29, to Moscow, vol. v, p. 344. The United States draft treaty with Austria, as subsequently circulated to the Council of Foreign Ministers as C.F.M. (46) 119, June 20, 1946, is not printed.
6. The British proposals of June 5 regarding the inclusion of Austria on the Council agenda and the American reactions thereto are discussed in telegram 4807, June 18, to London, vol. v, p. 349.
7. Reference is to the Declaration Regarding Italy, included as Annex 4 to the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 759.
8. Reference here is to C.F.M. (46) 95, May 16, 1946, p. 436.
9. Presumably, the reference here is to C.F.M. (D) (46) 177, June 13, 1946, the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy prepared by the Deputies, not printed.