740.00119 Council/6–1046: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10—10:20 a.m.]
1812. Personal for the Secretary and Matthews. In a recent conversation with Molotov I remarked that I had read his statement on the Paris Conference with “mingled feelings.”41 He replied brightly to the effect that those statements were always too long, but he had tried to make his as brief as possible. I answered that it had not been too long for me to read in great detail, and repeated that I had read it with mingled feelings but my general impression on completing it was that he had hardly done his colleagues justice. I then remarked that my impression at Paris was that the participants had been playing poker with their cards held very close to their chests but that each one knew exactly what the others held, and would it not have been better had a more frank approach to the various problems been followed. To this he replied that the Russian position had been stated very clearly and frankly. I said that possibly I was naive, but as a professional military man the importance of Montefalcone as a navy yard for the construction of war vessels had not escaped me, particularly with regard to any nation which might have rather aggressive intentions in connection with the Mediterranean. I thought it was a mistake to deviate so far from the ethnic principle of boundaries previously agreed upon in London. I then went on to say that if we were really at an impasse on the question of Trieste, a very open and frank approach to the problem might result in some hitherto unexplored alternative on which agreement could be reached. He replied that no solution would be acceptable except one favorable to the Yugoslavs whom he emphasized were our allies. I said that we admitted the fact that Yugoslavia had been our ally, although personally during the time I was participating in operations in the Mediterranean I had on [Page 481] occasion been doubtful whether Marshal Tito was devoting his major effort toward fighting the Germans, the Chetniks or ourselves, but that it was far more important to eliminate a cause of irritation between the US and the Soviet Union than to fully conciliate either Yugoslavia or Italy since to fully conciliate both seemed to be impossible. He repeated that the Russian position had been very clearly and frankly stated, the implication being that he did not intend to withdraw or compromise.
Incidentally, I have noticed a much more rigid attitude by the Foreign Office toward minor requests and questions raised by the Mission, so I judge that the honeymoon is over.