C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2061: CFM General

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Bevin ) to the Secretary of State 12

I want to congratulate you if I may on your fine broadcast speech of May 21st about our recent meetings in Paris.13 You put the issues very clearly and I am sure your remarks will do a lot of good in every [Page 453] quarter. I was particularly interested in your statement that if we cannot get agreement for calling the peace conference this summer the United States Government will feel obliged to request the General Assembly of the United Nations to make recommendations about the peace settlements under Article 14 of the Charter. As I understand your proposal, the General Assembly would not be invited to take over the actual negotiation of the peace treaties in all their details, but rather to make broad recommendations upon the main outstanding points which would then serve as directives to the governments with direct responsibilities for drawing up the treaties.

I entirely agree with you that if we have another deadlock when we meet again next month, we cannot afford to let matters drift. An indefinite continuance of the present uncertainty and frustration in Europe can only lead to disaster. If we cannot get a just and reasonable settlement by common agreement under the existing procedure as defined in the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, then we must devise an alternative method, as we cannot afford to be bound any more by a procedure that has failed.

Before I read your broadcast speech I had myself been thinking about the various alternative courses which we might pursue. One would be for you, we, and the French, and possibly the Chinese, to go ahead without waiting for Russian agreement, call the conference of 21 and by majority action to agree upon draft treaties which we would still hope to persuade the Russians and their friends to join in signing. A second course would be to cut the knot and for each of us to go ahead and make our own separate bilateral treaties with the enemy states. This would mean an open breach in the undertaking which we gave in the United Nations Declaration and elsewhere, not to make peace separately, and would have very far-reaching consequences, while at the time time it would not be possible to reach a final settlement on questions concerning frontiers, colonies, etc., which concern third parties.

A third course, which would be less drastic than either of the two previous ones, would be to accept a further delay in the conclusion of formal peace treaties, but for each of the Western states that wished to do so to proceed to solve their immediate problems with the enemy states by means of unilateral declarations of the termination of the state of war, followed by a series of bilateral ad hoc agreements with the enemy states to provide working arrangements about commerce, property, etc., in order to put an end to the worst anomalies resulting from the legal state of war. The final settlement of matters affecting third parties (including reparations) would have to be delayed, but it would be possible for the individual states to declare their intended [Page 454] policy in such matters. It would also be possible to resume full diplomatic relations with the enemy states.

I did not myself contemplate at this stage the course which you propose, of a reference to the United Nations General Assembly. Briefly, my feeling was that it would be better not to bring the United Nations organisation directly into peace-making if it could possibly be avoided, both because of the argument about its competence which was likely to arise and of the possible serious consequences to the United Nations, which is already having none too easy a passage. It seems to me that if we were going to proceed in the face of Russian opposition and have a show-down with them, it might be more expedient and easier to justify if we did so through calling a conference of the actual belligerents, rather than by remitting the proceedings to the 51 United Nations, many of whom took no part in the fighting. There is no doubt that the reference of the peace treaties to the General Assembly will provoke a first-class row with the Russians.

I feel that in our choice of methods we are up against a very difficult decision which may have incalculable consequences. I should greatly welcome a further expression of your views. I want you to know that I am entirely with you in the firm and altogether admirable stand which you took in your speech.

But, as things stand at present, I feel that it might be wise not to commit ourselves irrevocably at this moment to a course which, if it had subsequently to be put into force, would put an end to all chance of co-operation with Russia over the peace treaties, with the added risk that she would leave the United Nations organisation and retire into isolation. Might it not be better to follow an intermediate course such as I sketched out as my third alternative above, i.e. in the event of another failure at Paris, to have a standstill with time for reflection, combined with immediate steps on the part of our countries and others of like mind to declare a state of peace between ourselves and the enemy states and to settle as much as we can by bilateral agreements with the enemy states on particular subjects?

Meanwhile we must continue to hope that we may reach an agreed settlement in the next two or three months, while keeping our minds open on what to do if we have another failure.

  1. This message was transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on May 29, 1946. No reply by the Secretary to Mr. Bevin’s message has been found. On May 31, 1946, the new British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, accompanied by the British Minister, John Balfour, made his initial call on the Secretary. In the course of the conversation, this message from Bevin was discussed. The Secretary’s memorandum of the conversation records the exchange as follows:

    “Mr. Balfour inquired if the Secretary received the message from Mr. Bevin about the situation in the Council of Foreign Ministers and what to do about it.

    “The Secretary replied he had received it yesterday morning and that this whole matter would require very careful thinking by all of us. He said his objection to a separate treaty had been that if the other nations make a separate treaty with Italy then Russia would follow by submitting a treaty which she would make unreasonable and would demand that Italy sign it. She might then enforce it by use of troops. He said he thought the best plan would be to present the matter to the United Nations General Assembly under Article 14. Invitations would not have to be sent because the nations are already in the UN, the nations are interested in keeping the peace and would give the matter fair consideration, and then Russia herself would not be willing to withdraw from UN. The Trieste question could be submitted and the General Assembly could make recommendations for a settlement back to the Council. After settlement of this problem then the Council could make progress on many matters.

    “Mr. Balfour said he believed Mr. Bevin’s idea was that the Secretary expected the General Assembly to prepare for submission to the Council the draft treaties. He inquired whether the Secretary would make his ideas clear to Mr. Bevin on this point.

    “The Secretary said he would reply fully to Mr. Bevin’s message as soon as he had time to give some thought to it.

    “Mr. Balfour then said Mr. Bevin had mentioned in his message the idea of making some unilateral declaration of position and then making ad hoc economic arrangements.

    “The Secretary said certainly if we make such a declaration the Russians would make a declaration of their own and there would be no advantage achieved.” (867N.01/5–3146)

  2. The reference here is to the Secretary’s radio address of May 20; see bracketed note, p. 442.