740.0011 EW (Peace)/5–2946

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

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Dr. Evatt6 called at his request to see the Secretary.

After exchanging greetings, they discussed Mr. Molotov’s speech.7 Dr. Evatt said he thought it very disingenuous. The Secretary said his statement about treaties was not sound—that if there is no agreement there can be no peace treaties.

Dr. Evatt referred to a press conference Mr. Molotov held in London immediately following the September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at which he was asked whether the Peace Conference when it is called would have the right to amend the decisions of the Council, to which he replied to the effect that if they didn’t have such right it wouldn’t be a conference. He suggested that it might be helpful for the Secretary to look up the record of this and the Secretary said he would do so.

The Secretary told Dr. Evatt that if the 21 nations could not be given the right to make final decisions and were told they had to approve everything the Council submitted, the Peace Conference would be nothing more than a rubber stamp, which would be an insult to the other nations. But what Mr. Molotov wants is a binding agreement of the four powers to be submitted to the Peace Conference.

Dr. Evatt said he believes, contrary to the opinion of others, that Mr. Molotov is greatly influenced by public discussion and disputation; and that is why he made his recent speech. He told the Secretary he had completely out-maneuvered Molotov by making the speech he did after the Paris Conference.8

The Secretary said Mr. Molotov had recognized that his speech in the open had required him (Mr. Molotov) to make a speech in reply.

Dr. Evatt said he thought it wise to continue to press for a peace conference and that an agreed date should be insisted upon. May 1 had been agreed upon in London and it was unfair to the other nations to allow that time to pass without a peace conference.

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The Secretary mentioned three alternatives in case the next meeting of the Council breaks down: (1) No nation make an effort to restore peace; (2) One Government call a peace conference, which would not be very satisfactory because some of the 21 probably would not come; or (3) Have the General Assembly of UN consider the matter. The General Assembly could be asked to make recommendations concerning settlement of the Trieste question, after which progress could be made on other matters in the Council.

Dr. Evatt pointed out that it would be unfair to the 21 nations fighting the war to have the other members of the Security Council have an equal voice in the decisions. Also, there might be danger of getting a bloc.

To this the Secretary replied he had thought of that, but it would be better to take a chance on a bloc than to abandon efforts to get peace treaties. The Secretary told Dr. Evatt that the reason the Soviets are so insistent upon Trieste for Yugoslavia is their sudden interest in ships. Trieste has excellent ship-building and port facilities and it has labor to build these ships of the largest type. He said further that the ship-building industry was so important to Italy because it is practically the only means, except for tourist trade, of paying for imports.

Dr. Evatt then turned to the question of Japan and Australia’s participation in the Control Council. He protested that the draft treaty with Japan had not been sent to the Australian Government but to the UK Government, when it was Australia and not the UK chiefly concerned. He expressed the wish that Australia get in on the ground floor on this matter.

The Secretary explained that he was sure Dr. Evatt understood the reasons for this action because the Russians were willing to discuss this matter with the UK but if the US suggested bringing in other governments the Soviet Union would refuse to enter into a discussion of it.

Dr. Evatt pointed out that Australia had played 50 times larger part in the Pacific war than Russia had and that role in the war should be recognized. He suggested that in Pacific matters the US treat Australia as it does Canada in Western Hemisphere matters. Dr. Evatt said be believed UK interests in the Pacific would become more and more economic, whereas Australia’s political interests there are of great importance.

The Secretary told Dr. Evatt of his asking in Paris that China, which was under the Potsdam Agreement a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers, be admitted to the discussions there, but only the Soviets objected. He said he could not insist too strongly upon the admission of China since the Chinese Foreign Minister was not in Paris, but had the Minister been there he would have had to demand it.

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Dr. Evatt said he was anxious to know the US plans for Pacific bases and at some later date while he is here he would like to go over the whole matter with the military people and others concerned about the matter, particularly Admiral Nimitz.9 The Secretary said he would ask Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Searls10 to arrange a meeting and they would get in touch with Dr. Evatt.11

  1. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Secretary of State for External Affairs.
  2. Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement to the representatives of the Soviet press on the results of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was published in the Moscow newspapers on May 27, 1946.
  3. Regarding the Secretary of State’s radio address of May 20, see bracketed note, p. 442.
  4. Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, United States Chief of Navel Operations.
  5. Fred J. Searls, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
  6. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the acquisition of base rights in British Commonwealth areas and in arrangements for the defense of such areas in the Southwest Pacific, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.