Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Eighth Informal Meeting, Paris, May 16, 1946, 11 a.m.

Paris, May 16, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

Present

	U.S.S.R.
	M. Molotov [Chairman]
	M. Vyshinsky
	(Two Interpreters)
U.S.A		U.K.
Mr. Byrnes		Mr. E. Bevin
Senator Connally		Sir Oliver Harvey
Senator Vandenberg		Sir William Strang
General Clay		General Robertson
Mr. Bohlen
	France
	M. Bidault
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Hervé Alphand
	M. Courcel (Interpreter)

M. Molotov, who was presiding, asked if there were any comments on Mr. Byrnes’ proposal.⁶⁷

M. Bidault said that as to procedure he saw no objection but suggested that they should reach an agreement in principle on the Saar question here since there seemed to be no objection.

M. Molotov said he had some questions to put to Mr. Byrnes, that he was not clear as to the attitude of the United States as to the question of the Saar. He said the five points listed in the separate proposal of Mr. Byrnes⁶⁸ required some clarification in order to make a study and discussion easier.

The Secretary replied that the United States Delegation had expressed its views concerning the reasons for these five questions. They grew out of the existing situation in Germany and he had hoped that they could be referred to the Special Deputies for study and report to the Council on June 15. He said he thought the first thing was to agree, if possible, on the proposal to appoint the Special Deputies and then they could discuss what questions should be referred to them.

M. Molotov said he thought that their exchange of views would be most useful to the Special Deputies and would help them in their work.

The Secretary said he thought it was essential to begin the study of the German question and he again urged that his proposal for the Committee of Special Deputies be accepted.

M. Bidault said that he agreed with setting up a Committee of Special Deputies but he had thought that as to the questions to be submitted to them some questions regarding Germany were ripe and others were not, and rather than to submit to the Deputies all questions regarding Germany without directive it would be well to lighten their burdens by sending them first of all those questions which were ripe not only for discussion but for solution. He said he had in mind particularly the Saar.

The Secretary said that the United States would have no objection in principle to the French proposal concerning the Saar, provided France would withdraw her objection to the establishment of centralized economic agencies for Germany.

M. Molotov remarked that this was the first time he had heard these two questions linked together.

Mr. Bevin said he had made his position clear and that was that the German question as a whole should be considered. He said Mr. Byrnes’ proposal made no reference to the internationalization of industry in any zone except the British. Mr. Byrnes’ first point had dealt with the internationalization of the Ruhr and others virtually held back on the reparations program. Furthermore, only the western boundary was spoken of. He felt this was a one-sided proposition since the eastern boundaries are not finally settled. Let the Special Deputies examine all the boundaries of Germany, including those in the east where Silesia was of great importance for the economy of Central Europe. As matters now stood, each occupying country is responsible for its own zone and there is virtually no exchange between zones. Each country, therefore, is responsible for the self-contained unit which is its zone and for budgetary and financial administration. As long as that situation continues each zone must be under the authority of its Commander-in-Chief subject to mutual agreements reached in the Control Council. He felt that to single out only the British zone was unjust to England. He said the British Delegation accepts the appointment of Special Deputies but proposes that they should be given broad competence to consider all German questions and that he would have no objection to questions 2, 3, and 4 of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal being given immediate study for a report on June 15. He said he objected to questions 1 and 5 for the reasons stated. There was no indication that there would be any international control over any other parts of German industry. As to the Saar, Mr. Bevin said he was not in position to give an answer at this meeting but he had no objection to the Special Deputies studying the French proposal. He said it was important to be clear as to the economic consequences of the French proposal and its effect on the level of German industry, reparations and other questions. He said the French Government knew their attitude. As to Mr. Byrnes’ first proposal he thought that setting a fixed date of November 12 was unwise and that it would be best to leave the date for any conferences to be open for consideration at the June 15 meeting. He said he held the view that the crux of the future peace of the world lay in the German question and that mutual confidence and cooperation among the allies would be tested there. That was why Great Britain felt that the future of Germany as a whole should be considered in the interests of the security of all. It should be considered on the basis of complete reciprocity and what is given to England will be given by her. He repeated that he thought the Special Deputies should receive a broad directive to study the future of Germany with priority given to the three points of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal which he had mentioned.

The Secretary replied that the reason he had asked first for a decision on this proposal to set up the Special Deputies was because until that was done there was no point in discussing their terms of reference. He said as to the conference he wished to make clear that this did not mean the conclusion of a peace with Germany but merely an attempt to get Allied agreement on the broad lines and [of?] an eventual settlement with Germany. As to the date, he was not wedded to any particular date but thought that a definite date would have a good effect as it would show the world that the principal allies were definitely grappling with the German problem. He said as to his specific questions that they arose out of the existing situation in Germany and required answers if the reparations program was to be pushed forward. The reason he had mentioned the internationalization of the Ruhr particularly was because it was the only part of Germany for which such a solution had been proposed. He repeated the task we had given our representatives in Germany had been at best a very difficult one and he felt we should lighten their burdens as much as possible. For example, the entire economic directives under the Potsdam agreement have been based on the United States supposition that Germany was to be treated as an economic whole.

M. Bidault said there had been no favorable answer in regard to his request concerning the Saar. He said it was a long link in the chain of disappointments which France had experienced for twenty-five years in regard to the German question. He said France had one objection to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to appoint Special Deputies to get on with the German problem, which France regarded as already too long delayed. What is important he felt was the mission they were charged with and the spirit in which they would work. He saw two special problems in the proposals—one relating to the immediate execution of the Potsdam accord, and the other to long range policy toward Germany. The French Government wishes equally with the others to help the allied authorities in Berlin but M. Bidault felt it was impossible to settle immediate difficulties while fundamental decisions remained open, since in large measure these difficulties stand in the absence of decisions on certain fundamental questions. He said he felt these observations applied particularly to the first and fifth points of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal. In regard to the Ruhr, how was it possible to evaluate the consequence of a decision when that decision was left to the future. In his opinion that was putting the cart before the horse. He said it was contrary to logic to treat secondary matters first, and no directives could be given to our representatives in Berlin until there was some decision as to the future political status of Germany. He proposed to give the Special Deputies a concrete question, such as contained in the French written proposal concerning the Saar.⁶⁹ As to a conference he confessed that he had been disappointed with the fate of other dates for other conferences and that this was particularly true in regard to the German problem, which was still uncertain of solution. Also, he felt, which was perhaps more important, that by setting a date they might give to the Germans some impression of an early return to peace conditions and an end to the occupation. He knew that this was not the intention of the United States Delegation, which made it plain to M. Bidault that it was not a question of an Allied Conference setting up a German Government. But he had secured wrong interpretations that the Germans might place upon it. France was in favor of broadening the discussion and including other countries and suggested that the fixing of a date for any other conference be left until the June 15 meeting of the Ministers when they might have some report from the Special Deputies.

M. Molotov said that the discussion revealed that they were dealing with a very complicated question. He noted that the United States proposal contained general and specific questions. He did not wish to imply that specific questions were not connected with general ones but he felt it should be possible to deal with specific questions without merging them with the whole German problem. He said the French have raised separately the question of the Saar. The United States proposal on this subject had been studied and other delegations have given their views. He said he thought the United States proposal was quite correct in giving special attention to the question of the Ruhr. He again recalled that the Soviet Government had first proposed this question in July and that the French had insisted on it for several months. No one had raised the question of the internationalization of industries in other areas of Germany. The Ruhr, however, remained a special question of general interest and views should be exchanged on the Ruhr. He said the Ministers should not decline to consider any other proposals for internationalization of German industry in other areas but so far there have been none. He said the information reaching the Soviet Government had led it to believe that in actual practice measures were already being put in effect in the Ruhr either to confiscate or nationalize certain basic German industrial property. He said the Soviet Government is not sufficiently informed to determine to what extent these reported measures are actually being put into effect. As to the general question of Germany, he said the United States proposed the appointment of Special Deputies. He wished to know what was the purpose of this proposal. There had already been a number of decisions in regard to Germany, to mention Potsdam, Yalta and the Terms of Surrender. The Potsdam decisions had laid down the political and economic principles which were to govern in the first period of occupation. The Soviet Delegation thought that these principles would define the policies in regard to Germany on fundamental questions and he hoped that they contained the reply to the questions as to what is to be done with Germany. He inquired whether the United States proposal was designed to revise these basic principles, and before expressing the Soviet viewpoint further he would like to know what relation there was between the United States draft of a 25-year treaty⁷⁰ and the proposal for a peace settlement by November 12 with Germany.

The Secretary said he had no objection to answering M. Molotov’s questions. He said all he had proposed as to a plan was that work should begin in order to seek general Allied agreement as to the eventual settlement with Germany. He had merely proposed a mechanism for this. There was no question of a conference to conclude a peace with Germany, the conference being merely one of Allied powers, one of friends, to endeavor to reach common agreement. He repeated there was no question of setting up a German Government or concluding peace with any such Government at this time. He said obviously at some future date a peace settlement with Germany would be necessary and he had felt it wise to begin preparations for that time as soon as possible.

As to the connection with the 25-year treaty he said he wished to review the origins of his proposal for such a treaty. He said M. Molotov and all the others were best familiar with the origin of this proposal. He said at London M. Molotov had again spoken to him last September of the fear which Generalissimo Stalin had expressed at Yalta, namely, a third German attack through Poland, and their concern lest the United States, as after the first World War, should return home and disinterest itself in European affairs.⁷¹ At that time (last September) he had told M. Molotov that he thought the United States would be prepared to do what Wilson had been unable to achieve after the last World War, namely, enter into binding agreements to keep Germany and also Japan disarmed for an indefinite period of time. M. Molotov had said he would have to consult his government but would report this suggestion and the Secretary replied that he would of course have to consult the leaders of the Senate.

The Secretary continued that on December 24, in Moscow, he had told Generalissimo Stalin of his idea for such treaties in regard to Germany and Japan and that the Generalissimo, who had been informed of this idea, had expressed warm approval of the idea and had promised his support.⁷² Later he had discussed the subject with Mr. Bevin, who had expressed his approval.⁷³ The Secretary said he would not have taken the trouble to draft this treaty had he not felt assured in advance of the support of the Soviet Government following his discussion with Generalissimo Stalin. He had then sent the first draft of the treaty to the three Allies, which the Secretary had stated was preliminary and had asked for suggestions. He said he had therefore been disappointed and surprised at the reception which this treaty had met with in the Council and particularly from the Soviet Delegation. He said the United States Government had felt it was a great step forward and it would be a great disappointment to the Government and people of the United States if it was found to have been misunderstood.

Mr. Bevin then said that he [Molotov?] had several times made remarks concerning developments in the Ruhr. He wished to deny the implications of these remarks. Sir William Strang and General Robertson, who were in the room, had informed him that everything had been reported to the Control Council concerning the coal mines and the matter of the formation of syndicates have been announced in the press. As to the 25-year treaty, he had not consulted the Cabinet when Mr. Byrnes spoke of it because of the secrecy which had been requested, but that he could now state that after consideration, his government fully approved and Mr. Attlee⁷⁴ would make a statement today about the initiative of the United States.

M. Molotov said he would touch on the 25-year treaty in a minute but first he wished to say that the Soviet Government was not satisfied to learn from the press news of events in the Ruhr. He pointed out that the Soviet Government had already asked the British Government for more information. As to the 25–year treaty, Mr. Byrnes was right in his recollection that it had been discussed on December 24 with Generalissimo Stalin, who had given his approval in principle. He wished, however, to point out that at that time there was no draft in existence and that the Soviet Government had only received such a draft for study in February. He said since the treaty was to be concluded after a peace settlement with Germany there was plenty of time to study the question. The Soviet Government had raised a more immediate question of investigating the execution of the joint agreements already reached concerning German disarmament. This was an urgent question and he noted that the United States had accepted this suggestion and General Clay had made a proposal to that effect in Berlin. He could say that the Soviet Government agreed to this and had sent appropriate instructions to the Soviet representative to participate in the proposed four-power investigating committee.

M. Bidault said that the approval of the French Government had been sent to Mr. Byrnes in a note dated April 13, 1946 in regard to a treaty which Mr. Byrnes agreed he would circulate to the other Ministers.⁷⁵

The Secretary said he had no objection.

Mr. Bevin stated that as he had already seen it he was prepared to support the United States proposal to set up Special Deputies, but that they should be given, broad powers of reference and under those terms they could study the question as to whether the Ruhr was to be in or out of Germany. He repeated that he thought that all frontiers should be studied and remarked that there was no commitment as to the definitive eastern frontiers.

M. Molotov said he did not believe that Great Britain would go back on the Berlin decisions concerning the eastern frontiers. He repeated that the Soviet Government at that conference had raised the question of the Ruhr and had agreed to defer it because of the absence of France.

Mr. Bevin said that he did not back out of any agreements.

The Secretary then inquired whether M. Molotov could state definitely whether he agreed to the proposal to set up a Committee of Special Deputies to study German questions and then they could go on to consider its terms of reference.

M. Molotov said he had not had sufficient time to study the various proposals on Germany but they could return to them this afternoon.

Mr. Bevin, in conclusion, repeated his position that the Special Deputies should have the right to study the German question as a whole and not merely separate subjects.

The meeting adjourned.

67. Reference here is presumably to Secretary Byrnes’ proposal for the preparation of the peace settlement for Germany, included as Annex 1 to the United States Delegation Record of the Seventh Informal Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 15, 1946, 11 a.m., p. 393.
68. Reference here is presumably to Secretary Byrnes’ proposal on the German problem, included as Annex 2 to the Record of the Seventh Informal Meeting of the Council, p. 393.
69. With regard to the French proposal on the Saar, see footnote 46, p. 395.
70. Reference here is to the United States draft treaty on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany which was circulated to the Council of Foreign Ministers as C.F.M. (46) 21, April 30, 1916, p. 190.
71. Reference here is to a conversation between Secretary Byrnes and Foreign Minister Molotov at London on September 20, 1945; for a memorandum of conversation on that meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 267.
72. No official record of the substance of the discussion at Stalin’s Christmas Eve dinner for Secretary Byrnes and Foreign Secretary Bevin has been found. The dinner is briefly described in Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 117–118, and Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, pp. 336–337.
73. See the note of April 19, 1946, from Halifax to the Secretary of State, p. 82.
74. Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister.
75. Reference here presumably is to Bidault’s note of April 16, 1946, the English translation of which was contained in telegram 1788, April 15, 1946, from Paris, p. 56.