Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fourteenth Meeting, Paris, May 9, 1946, 6 p.m.⁹⁰

Paris, May 9, 1946, 6 p.m.

secret

Records of Earlier Meetings

The records of the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th meetings of the Council were approved.

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Bevin then called upon M. Vyshinsky, Chairman of the meeting of the Deputies of that morning, to present the Deputies’ report.

M. Vyshinsky stated that at meetings on the previous day and in the morning the Deputies had prepared reports on the five peace treaties in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Those reports had been distributed and were now before the Council.⁹¹ At the meeting of that morning the Deputies had not only completed the task of summing up the work which had been done to date, lifting the questions which had been agreed and those which were still under discussion, but had also been able to take up a number of points which until then were still unagreed and had reached agreement on 19 such points. Seven of these questions concerned the treaty with Italy, three the treaty with Bulgaria, three the treaty with Rumania, four the treaty with Hungary and two the treaty with Finland. There was one circumstance which had been helpful. That was the fact that the articles on certain subjects, such as war criminals, the position of existing treaties, and certain economic and military articles, were similar for more than one treaty. Despite the agreements reached on a number of these questions, it was unfortunately true that a large number of questions still remained to be agreed. These questions were under discussion by the Council of Foreign Ministers, by the Deputies, or by appropriate committees. This was true in the case of all the economic questions, on most of which no reports had yet been submitted by the experts. It applied also to certain military and naval clauses. Among the questions still outstanding mention should be made of reparations, the Italian colonies, the Italian-Yugoslav frontier and Trieste, the Danube, and a number of other questions connected with boundaries and, particularly, that of the demilitarization of the Franco-Italian and Yugoslav-Italian frontiers. M. Vyshinsky said that he could conclude his report with the remark that the Deputies had agreed that, should the Council desire to hear a more detailed report on the individual treaties, Mr. Jebb, who had presided over the meeting of the Deputies yesterday, would undertake to give further information.

Mr. Bevin said that the Council was indebted to the Deputies for the speed and comprehensiveness with which they had concluded the task assigned to them. The report should considerably facilitate the work of the Council. He felt that, instead of asking Mr. Jebb to make a further report now, the Council might consult him when it was taking up particular items of the different treaties. He then asked whether the Council wished him to call attention to the various outstanding items and see if there was anything more to be said with a view to reaching a settlement.

Procedure for the Preparation of the Peace Treaties and for the Holding of a Peace Conference

Mr. Byrnes had no objection to going through the list of questions not yet agreed if his colleagues desired, but he wished to say that the request which the Council had made of the Deputies to present a report showing what matters had been agreed and what matters remained unagreed had been made in connection with his suggestion that such a report should be examined and then turned over to the Deputies to consider and elaborate in the period between now and June 15, at which time the Peace Conference would convene.

Mr. Bevin said that the report before the Council was not a report for the Peace Conference. It was merely a report setting out those questions on which differences existed. He understood that the Council would need a more elaborate report to submit to the Peace Conference.

Mr. Byrnes said that, when the request had been made of the Deputies at the previous meeting to make a report, this had been done solely in order that, when the Council discussed the American proposal, it would have before it such a report as had now been prepared. His proposal did contemplate a more complete report for submission to the Peace Conference. It contemplated that the Deputies should continue at work. At the meeting this morning the Deputies had reached some agreements. In the days immediately ahead they might reach agreement on other points. Then on June 12 the Foreign Ministers could meet to examine the complete report, which would then be presented to the Peace Conference. He wished to add only the remark that the experience of the Deputies that morning caused him to believe that when the Deputies presented their report to the Foreign Ministers three days before the Peace Conference, the Foreign Ministers might be able to settle the remaining questions and thus present to the Peace Conference a report which would enable that conference to act with dispatch on the peace treaties.

Mr. Bevin asked what it was proposed that the Council do with the report before it. Should they go on with the discussion which had begun the day before on the subject of calling a Peace Conference on a certain date? As there seemed to be no objections, that subject was then opened for discussion.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation believed that, subject to certain amendments, the proposal which Mr. Byrnes had circulated the day before could be accepted.⁹² M. Molotov then read and circulated the following proposed amendments to the American proposal:

[Here follows the text of C.F.M. (46) 63, May 9, 1946, page 321.]

The Council then adjourned for 10 minutes to study the Soviet proposal.

When the Council reconvened, Mr. Byrnes said that he would like to ask M. Molotov a question concerning his suggested amendment of paragraph b). The draft contained the following clause: “on the understanding that agreement will be reached on the proposed Peace Treaties.” Mr. Byrnes presumed that that clause was intended to mean that the draft treaties would be agreed upon as far as possible.

M. Molotov said that it meant that agreement would be reached on fundamental questions.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would assume that an effort would be made by all to reach agreement as far as possible on all questions. He was afraid, however, that if it was left as worded in the Soviet text, there would be disagreement on what constituted fundamental questions. The Council should assume that all delegations in good faith would make every effort to reach agreement by the date on which the Foreign Ministers would be called upon to meet to consider the report of the Deputies. But they ought to have it clearly understood that if by any chance they failed to agree, that failure to agree would not prevent the other governments which would be present at the Peace Conference from going ahead to consider the peace treaties. There would certainly be the hope that after the Council of Foreign Ministers had received the recommendations of those other governments, when it met to consider them after the Peace Conference and to draft the final treaties, the four governments could get together. Therefore, he suggested that the words “as far as possible” be added after the words “agreed upon”.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation based itself on the decisions of the Moscow Conference. At that time the three Foreign Ministers had agreed that those governments which were to prepare the peace treaties for the Peace Conference should complete their work before the Conference was convoked. It went without saying that it was possible to complete their preparation only if there were draft treaties. But if there were to be draft treaties, then the Council must reach agreement on the texts and submit them to the Peace Conference. The Soviet Delegation still hoped, just as it had hoped in Moscow, that it would be possible to reach agreement. But the reservation just suggested by the United States Delegation emasculated the decision of the Moscow Conference and was therefore unacceptable to the Soviet Delegation. The decision of the Moscow Conference said that after the Peace Conference had been held and had submitted its recommendations the states signatory to the respective armistice agreements would consider those recommendations and would submit final texts of the peace treaties. How could one conceive of the presentation of final texts if those governments were not able to reach agreement on the fundamental questions when they were elaborating the draft treaties? M. Molotov wished to ask for an explanation as to how the delegations which admitted that a Peace Conference might begin with uncompleted draft peace treaties believed that the Peace Conference would be terminated, and how, after the Peace Conference, they envisaged the question of what peace treaties would be signed and who would sign them.

Mr. Byrnes thought that most of the questions which M. Molotov had raised were answered by the letter which he had written to M. Bidault on January 12, 1946. This letter had been approved by M. Molotov, Mr. Bevin and himself. In that letter, in the name of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, he had advised M. Bidault that “as broad and thorough a discussion as possible shall take place at the forthcoming conference,” and that the “final drafts of the treaties will be made only after the fullest consideration has been given to the recommendations of the conference; we have no doubt that no final treaty would be concluded which arbitrarily rejected the recommendations of the conference.” That letter had been given to the press, and the twenty-one governments which had been advised by the Moscow decision that they would be invited were relying on that procedure. After informing those governments that no final treaties would be made without taking full account of their views, the Council could not insist on having a final treaty completed before the Conference even took place. It would not be right to present complete treaties to the Conference. The letter from which he had just quoted an excerpt had been written shortly after the Moscow Conference when all three Foreign Ministers had had more clearly in mind than at present what had actually been agreed upon. The nations which had been mentioned in the Moscow Agreement as those which would be invited to the Peace Conference were the nations which had actively waged war in Europe. Eleven of them had been active at the front with American troops. The other ten had also taken an active part in the war against Italy. They were entitled to participate in making peace just as much as the four governments represented at this table.

Mr. Byrnes asked his colleagues to suppose that when they met on June 15th they still did not agree. As he understood M. Molotov’s proposal, there would be no peace conference and no treaties just because the four governments did not agree in every particular. He submitted that they ought to accept the amendment he had just suggested and say that the Council of Foreign Ministers should agree as far as possible. After all, the purpose of the Council of Foreign Ministers was to facilitate the work of the Peace Conference and not to obstruct it. Therefore, they should do the best they could to prepare treaties, agreeing to as many things as they could. They should then submit the results of their work to the Peace Conference, where the twenty-one nations represented there might make recommendations which would be better than anything the Council itself had prepared. Then when the Council met after the Peace Conference it might reach agreement on the final treaties.

M. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes had not replied to the question which he had put. M. Molotov had not raised the question of recommendations. He had no doubt that the four governments represented on the Council would admit the right of the Peace Conference to submit recommendations. He was sure that all recognized that right. At the previous meeting he had stated that the Soviet Delegation continued to abide by the basis of the Moscow decisions and of the letter which Mr. Byrnes had written to M. Bidault. He confirmed the statement that the Soviet Delegation fully agreed to the Moscow decisions and to that letter. All were in agreement that the Council should consider most carefully all the recommendations which the Peace Conference might submit. They assumed the obligations to do so. But that was a point which gave rise to no doubt and was not at all obscure. It was not the point now in question. He wished to repeat the question which he had just asked Mr. Byrnes. Let it be assumed, as it had been by Mr. Byrnes, that the Council should come to the Peace Conference without agreed draft treaties, that is with various drafts. The Peace Conference would make certain recommendations. But as was well known, the conclusion and signature of the peace treaties was not to be decided by a majority vote of the nations at the Peace Conference. And after the Peace Conference, according to what was stated in the Moscow Agreement, the Council was called upon to submit the final texts of peace treaties. The question thus arose what final texts would be submitted. Would they be agreed texts or would there be several drafts for each separate enemy country? The question was what texts would be signed and who would sign them? Was it to be understood that there would be one draft peace treaty proposed by the United States Delegation and supported by some other delegation, and another draft peace treaty submitted by the Soviet Delegation and supported by other delegations? Would the Peace Conference discuss such drafts? Would the Peace Conference attempt itself to draft the final peace treaties? If so, then it was highly probable that when the treaties were completed there would be not one peace treaty for each enemy country but two or more treaties. The members of the Peace Conference would have a choice. Some might choose one treaty and some another. Was that the objective which the Council had in view? Or was it their desire to have, in the case of Italy for example, a single peace treaty? What was the meaning of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal?

Mr. Byrnes said that, so far as the United States was concerned, it was certainly hoped and desired that there be complete agreement on all the treaties before the Peace Conference met. It was his thought that between now and the date of the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Deputies would attempt to reconcile the differences, and that when the Foreign Ministers met they would receive reports from the Deputies and would do all in their power to reach agreement in order that a single series of treaties could be presented to the Peace Conference. The difference between the United States and Soviet Delegations, as he saw it, was that the Soviet Delegation held the view that when the Foreign Ministers met a few days before the Peace Conference to consider the report of the Deputies, unless agreement was reached on all questions which any one delegation considered fundamental, then there would be no Peace Conference and the world would continue in a state of war. According to M. Molotov’s view, when the Council met just prior to the Peace Conference, any one delegation which would not agree to a proposal which was satisfactory to the other three delegations might prevent the holding of a Peace Conference of any kind at any time. The American position was that if, when the date for the opening of the Peace Conference arrived there were one or two or three questions on which no agreement had been reached, the Council would make a report to the Peace Conference of all matters which had been agreed and would call attention to the several matters on which there was no agreement. Under the terms of the Moscow Agreement the twenty-one nations would then submit their recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers on how those several questions in dispute should be decided. There was no reason to assume that they would submit four or five different recommendations. They themselves would adopt their own procedure. But it must be assumed that they would submit recommendations on those questions which the Council had informed them that it had been unable to settle. After the Peace Conference the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet again and would have before it the recommendations on the various treaties submitted by the Peace Conference. There would be no reason to assume that the Council would not, as was said in the letter to M. Bidault, fully consider those recommendations; it could be assumed that the Council would not arbitrarily reject them. Thus there was no reason to believe that there would not in the end be agreed final texts of the treaties.

Mr. Bevin said that it was difficult to say what was to be done. As he understood the situation, according to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal, if a subject had not been agreed in the stages of preparation, it could be referred to the Peace Conference as an unagreed item. But in the final peace treaty there had to be agreement. Was that the correct interpretation of the American proposal? Mr. Byrnes replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Bevin then said that the point at issue was whether they would hold up the Peace Conference because they did not have agreement on the first drafts. He asked whether it would be possible to get agreement at this meeting to the proposition that before the Peace Conference the first drafts might not be entirely agreed, on the understanding that the final treaties which had to be signed (and this he understood to be M. Molotov’s point) must be agreed. Would they reach agreement on that proposal? Mr. Byrnes agreed.

Mr. Bevin thought that on that basis they might be able to make some progress.

M. Molotov pointed out that he had not received a reply to his question but said he was not going to press for a reply. He wished to make it quite clear that in upholding the Moscow decision concerning the preparation of the peace treaties and the convocation of the Peace Conference the Soviet Government was defending the policy of joint action and concerted effort. He thought that in taking that position he was acting in the interests of the common cause and in the interests of good preparation for the Peace Conference. On being asked what would happen if the Deputies failed to reach agreement on some points before June 5, he would reply that it was the task of the Council of Foreign Ministers to become familiar with the questions in disagreement. In that way they might arrive at the point where they could see how these questions were to be decided. The Soviet Delegation still hoped that the work of the Deputies and of the Foreign Ministers would produce positive results. If they failed, it would be necessary to see what was the nature of the disagreements. Then each government member of the Council would have to decide what was to be done about the Peace Conference and about the peace treaties which, according to the Moscow decision, were to be submitted for signature after the Peace Conference.

Mr. Bevin did not think that the Council could carry the discussion any further at the present meeting. He hoped that his colleagues would study before the next meeting the suggestions which he had made. He was as anxious as M. Molotov to preserve unity. It might be useful to think the matter over before discussing it further. Mr. Bevin then suggested that the Council should take the trouble to look through the items in the Deputies’ reports to see if any further progress could be made. He considered that it was very important to do this. He had read through the reports and felt that in certain places the area of difference might be further reduced. He wished to suggest that, if the treaties were going to be referred to the Deputies again, the latter ought to know whether the existing differences would be final differences. If the reports could be studied tonight, the Council might go through them in the morning and make a final check up. He recalled that the Council had from time to time deferred subjects because of disagreement on them. Before terminating this session of the Council he thought that there should be another review of the points at issue. Also there was a number of reports still to come in from the Deputies and from committees which the Council had not yet seen.

M. Bidault remarked that he had had nothing to say in the course of the present discussion, and that his silence perhaps had some merit. He was wondering, however, whether it might not be possible to reduce the area of difference between the texts of the American proposal and the Soviet amendment. He thought that this might deserve close examination. He had understood Mr. Bevin to say that he did not think that the Council had fully exhausted its examination of the questions still in dispute concerning the peace treaties. M. Bidault also thought that, in the light of the reports submitted by the Deputies, the Council could at its next meeting form a clearer idea of the possibilities of agreement still remaining before it. In his opinion, those possibilities were not negligible.

The meeting adjourned at 8:20 p.m.

90. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
91. The reports by the Deputies to the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the drafting of the treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania, which are referred to here, are not printed. The reports were not assigned C.F.M. document numbers.
92. Reference here is to the United States Delegation Proposal, C.F.M. (46) 62, May 8, 1946, p. 310.