Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirteenth Meeting, Paris, May 8, 1946, 11 a.m.⁷⁴

Paris, May 8, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

Reparation

M. Bidault opened the meeting and suggested that the Council consider the document on Italian Reparations (CFM (46) 53)⁷⁵ which had been submitted by the special committee set up by the Council to study that problem. He called upon M. Alphand, the Chairman of that Committee, to make a report on the Committee’s work.

M. Alphand said that the Committee of Experts, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers taken on April 26, had been guided by the Council’s instructions to take into account the proposals contained in the Soviet and United States memoranda as well as any proposals which the United Kingdom and French Delegations might wish to make, and to report back to the Council as soon as possible. In its discussions the Committee had before it the following proposals:

1. The proposal submitted by the United States Delegation on September 14, 1945 in London (CFM (45) 16)⁷⁶ and the later United States proposal submitted on May 6, 1946.⁷⁷

2. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation submitted on April 26, 1946 (CFM (46) 7).⁷⁸

3. The compromise proposal of the French Delegation submitted on May 2, 1946 (CFM (46) 20).⁷⁹

There were two essential parts of the report. The first part included statements of the general position of each Delegation. The second part dealt with sources of reparations which were discussed by the Committee and contained the remarks on this subject made by each Delegation.

M. Alphand then read the declarations made by each representative.

M. Alphand continued his exposition, pointing out that the second section of the report listed the various sources of reparations which were accepted for discussion by the Committee and also gave the conclusions of each representative with respect to these sources. There was a certain amount of agreement among the Delegations on some of the points. It was agreed that Italy must pay reparations and that this payment could only be partial. In addition certain sources were recognized as being available for reparation payments. One of these was Italian assets abroad and the other was a certain part of Italian war industry. There was no agreement on whether current production could serve as a source of reparations. The Soviet Delegation felt that this was a possible and effective source. The French Delegation believed that it could be used to a certain degree. The United States and British Delegations did not accept the principle of taking reparations from current production as they thought that this production could serve only for the reconstruction of the Italian economy. There was also disagreement on the point of fixing the total obligation. The Soviet Delegation wished to have the total amount fixed and stated in the treaty. The other Delegations did not agree to this view but the French Delegation believed that the Soviet Government’s claim, limited to 100 million dollars, could be satisfied. The French and American Delegations proposed the establishment of a special organ for controlling the execution of Italy’s reparation obligations. The Soviet and United Kingdom Delegations were opposed to that idea. M. Alphand concluded by saying that the Committee of Experts had not been able to reach an agreement on the subject assigned to it and had therefore drawn up and submitted the report which was now before the Council.

M. Bidault asked for comments on the report of the Committee.

M. Molotov proposed that it be stated that agreement had not been reached.

Mr. Byrnes did not think that anything could be added to that statement.

Mr. Bevin said that it seemed pretty obvious from the report that agreement had not been reached.

M. Bidault then said that the Council would take note of the results of the Committee’s study.

Mr. Byrnes wished to reiterate what he had said a few day ago on the subject of reparation,⁸⁰ although this point was not mentioned in the report. In the consideration of this matter it must be admitted that the Italian foreign assets represented a considerable sum of money, and that the naval vessels which were to be divided among the Allies were also of considerable value. It had been estimated by those familiar with the question that the cost to Italy for those ships was about 150 million dollars. It should also be borne in mind that in territories which Italy would cede there was property of considerable value.

M. Bidault inquired whether Mr. Byrnes’ statement was an observation of a general character or whether it constituted an amendment to the position which the United States Delegation had taken on the question of reparations. He recalled that the previous statement to which Mr. Byrnes referred had been made at a private meeting. There was no trace of it in the report of the Experts.

Mr. Byrnes did not know whether this statement had been made by the United States representative in the Committee. He was merely calling attention to the fact that, apart from reparation payments, the value of the vessels to be divided among the Allies as war booty would be approximately 150 million dollars.

M. Bidault said that the Council could take note of Mr. Byrnes’ observation. He then said that, since there was nothing further to discuss on reparations, the Council could turn to a number of minor questions on the Italian treaty which had been left in abeyance and on which agreement had not been reached.

Agenda of Conference

M. Bidault mentioned that there remained three points which the Deputies had placed before the Council. These were: The demilitarization of the Franco-Italian frontier, the demilitarization of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier, and the position of existing bilateral treaties. These were matters of comparative minor importance, and he wished to ask his colleagues whether they thought the Council should take the time to consider them. There was also another point on which the Council had to make a decision, that of the Tenda-Briga area on the Franco-Italian frontier. The report of the Commission which had investigated that area had not yet been submitted. Finally, he wished also to remind the Council that the question of Germany was on the agenda.

M. Molotov said that there was one further question, the peace treaty with Finland.

Mr. Bevin said that that had been disposed of on the previous day.⁸¹

M. Bidault recalled that in the report submitted by the Deputies it had been stated that there were no questions connected with the Finnish treaty which were put before the Foreign Ministers. The two Powers concerned with drafting that treaty seemed to have reached agreement. Faithful to France’s discreet attitude in this matter M. Bidault had not thought it necessary to refer to it.

Mr. Byrnes wished to say that the United States, not being a signatory to the armistice with Finland, was entirely willing to leave the drafting of the Finnish treaty to the British and Soviet representatives.

Mr. Bevin understood that there was only one major point in the Finnish treaty which had not been agreed. That was the question whether the Convention of 1921 as well as the Convention of 1940, both of which dealt with the Åland Islands, should be mentioned in the treaty. He thought that that could be left to the Deputies to consider. M. Molotov had no objection to having the Deputies discuss it.

M. Bidault said that the present problem to decide was whether the Council wished to spend its time on the minor questions in the Italian treaty, to revert to the various major points which had been deferred, or to proceed with the discussion on the question of Germany.

Proposal for a Report by the Deputies and for the Convocation of the Peace Conference

Mr. Byrnes stated that in his view the Council had agreed upon some matters of importance and that in others it had been unable to reach agreement. The United States Delegation had done its best to reach agreements. The only suggestion which he felt he could make now was to have the Deputies prepare a report setting forth the matters which had been agreed and those on which there was still disagreement; in the case of the latter the report would set forth the positions of the several Delegations, where that was possible, somewhat in the way in which this was done in the report on reparations which had been submitted at this meeting. That report of the Deputies could be submitted to the Peace Conference, which he suggested might be called on June 15. At the Peace Conference the other nations represented, coming to these problems with fresh minds, might help the Four Powers represented here to solve them.

M. Bidault said that there seemed to be two main points in Mr. Byrnes’ proposal. The first was that the Deputies should make a report showing the matters which had been agreed and those which had not been agreed. The second was that this report should be submitted to a Peace Conference to take place on June 15. M. Bidault was not in a position to speak on the agreements reached in Moscow by the three other governments, but he wished to recall that in those agreements the Peace Conference was set for May 1st. It was also stated, however, that it would be held after the draft treaties had been prepared. If the other three governments now thought that the preparation of the drafts had been made, the French Government would be very happy to see a conference take place at which those United Nations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement would be present.

Mr. Byrnes said that at Moscow in December, when the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union had met, it had been their expectation that the Deputies would be able to agree on the draft treaties at an early date. Certainly it had been in his own mind that the drafts would be prepared by March. For that reason the language used in the Agreement had reference to prepared drafts. When the drafting of the Moscow Agreements was taking place, the possibility had been suggested that it would be best to fix a deadline for the Conference, and it had been agreed to set May 1st as the deadline. The experience of the Foreign Ministers at the present meeting would certainly not cause them to indulge in any criticism of the Deputies for not finishing the drafts within the time expected. Certainly the date May 1st had died of its own accord. It now became necessary to set another date for the present conference. He had suggested June 15. Between now and that date the Deputies might be able to settle some of the questions which were still not agreed. After all, the Council of Foreign Ministers had been delegated to do the work of preparing the drafts to be submitted finally to the interested governments for agreement. The Council had done the best it could. It had arrived at some agreements. At the same time, it might be that the Council, being confronted with problems such as those which were now before it, was so close to those problems that it was difficult to see solutions which really were evident. They might profit by having fresh minds look at those problems. There had to be a Peace Conference sometime. It might as well be June 15. At that Conference they would listen to the recommendations of other United Nations. Then the Council would meet again and consider those recommendations. When the Foreign Ministers sat down at the table after the Peace Conference they might be able to make greater headway than at present.

M. Bidault again remarked that Mr. Byrnes’ proposal contained two points, first that the Council call upon the Deputies for a report and second that that report be submitted to a Peace Conference on June 15.

Mr. Byrnes called attention to the draft which he was circulating and which had been written hurriedly while the discussion was going on. He said that in paragraph (a), at the end of the third line, it should read, “and to report on matters on which there is no agreement”.⁸²

Mr. Bevin thought that all Delegations were anxious to devise the best means of securing final peace settlements. That was necessary for the world and for their own governments. With respect to paragraph (a) he thought that it would be valuable to see to what extent agreement had been reached on the texts of the various clauses. He reminded the Council that reports were still due from the Economic Committee,⁸³ and that he hoped to be able to see those reports soon, as he regarded them as important. He was sure that the Council could reach agreement on some of them. In any case the texts should be made available as soon as possible. The Council might thus be able to reach further agreement on some points or at least establish the principles.

In regard to paragraph (b) of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal, Mr. Bevin had no objection to the points in dispute going to the Peace Conference, where other nations could express their views. However, he could not express himself finally on the details of the proposal, such as the date of the Conference, as he had no instructions in that regard. He felt that if some of the minor points still unagreed, such as the economic questions and the Franco-Italian frontier, could be cleared up, the Council would be able to narrow down the outstanding unagreed points to three or four main items.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not wish to ask for immediate action on his proposal. He had made it in an effort to be helpful. If Mr. Bevin would prefer to have the Deputies’ report in the form of a draft treaty, showing the agreed clauses, that would be satisfactory to him. He wished, however, to suggest that it was important to have a time limit. Otherwise the discussions might drag on for too long a period.

Mr. Bevin said that his idea was to have a report immediately from the Deputies, within 24 hours.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation held the view that it was necessary for the Council to instruct the Deputies to sum up the work which had been done, in order to see what had been agreed and what had not been agreed. The Deputies should submit this report to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The proposal had been made that the Deputies prepare a document summarizing the results of the discussion of the peace treaties and submit that document to the Peace Conference. The Soviet Delegation felt that any report to the Peace Conference should be submitted not by the Deputies but by the Council of Foreign Ministers, because that would be in accordance with the Moscow decision. The Soviet Delegation abided by the basis of the Moscow decision which provided that when the preparation of the draft peace treaties had been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers would convoke a conference to consider them. The Soviet Delegation felt that that was the proper basis for the work of the Council and for the preparation for the Peace Conference. The Soviet Delegation had no objection to discussing the question of a Peace Conference or to the convening of the Conference, or to that Conference being held on June 15 or on any other date on which the Council of Foreign Ministers might agree. But the Soviet Delegation made this statement with the reservation that during the period before the Conference was convoked agreed draft peace treaties would be prepared. This was in full harmony with the Moscow decision, to which the Soviet Delegation continued to adhere as a point of departure.

Mr. Byrnes thought that his Soviet and British colleagues were in agreement that what they had sought to do at Moscow was to provide machinery for the drafting of the peace treaties. In paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement it had been provided that after the Peace Conference and taking into consideration the recommendations of the Conference the Council of Foreign Ministers would draw up the final peace treaties. For that reason he did not think it would be wise to take the position that the Council must first arrive at agreed drafts which could not be changed, since at Moscow provision had been made that other nations represented at the Peace Conference could make recommendations and that their recommendations would be taken into consideration in the final drafting of the treaties. His colleagues must be conscious of the fact that the nations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement were expecting to attend a Peace Conference and were anxious to know when it would be held. He thought that it was important that a date should be set and that those governments should be invited to attend the Conference on that date.

Mr. Byrnes agreed with what M. Molotov and Mr. Bevin had said, namely that the Deputies should report to the Council here on what items had been agreed and what items had not been agreed. With regard to the draft which the United States Delegation had just circulated, the question of whether the drafts for submission to the Peace Conference were prepared by the Deputies or by the Foreign Ministers was not important. The drafts could be prepared by the Deputies and could be reviewed by the Foreign Ministers on June 12 before the opening of the Conference on June 15. What was important, however, was that it was necessary to go ahead with the conclusion of peace treaties. It was the anniversary of V–E Day, and the world was expecting the restoration of peace. The Governments represented here could not refuse to present peace treaties for consideration and later for signature simply because the four Foreign Ministers on the Council could not agree among themselves. They must agree on drafts which contained the agreements which they had reached and present those drafts to the Peace Conference, which might itself produce agreements where the Council had failed. The Council should prepare a statement of its work showing what had been agreed and what had not been agreed. This should be presented to the Peace Conference. When it had been considered there and been sent back to the Council with recommendations, then the Council might reach agreement on the final texts of the treaties.

Mr. Byrnes said that there were several points in the Moscow Agreement. One was the date May 1st which was set for the Peace Conference. It had been impossible to make that date. But the Agreement also contained a promise to the world that there would be a Peace Conference. The signatories could not go back on that. They would have to hold the Conference. Therefore, why should they not decide now to hold it on June 15 and to invite the other governments to attend. That would give the world something to celebrate on the anniversary of V–E Day.

Mr. Bevin asked whether the word “completed” in the Moscow Agreement was now interpreted as “agreed”. He thought that that was a great strain on the language. If there had to be full agreement on the drafts, on every detail and every comma, he should have thought that the Moscow Agreement would have said so. This was the first time he had heard that every detail had to be agreed. He interpreted the Moscow decision as meaning that the Council would submit to the Peace Conference the results of its work in preparing the treaties, as completely as possible. He could not help feeling that it would be dangerous for peace and for progress if the Council took a narrow legalistic view. The spirit of the Moscow Conference was to try to get the treaties ready and hold the Peace Conference and to get the world going in the direction of peace and prosperity. The word “completed” had been put into the Moscow Agreement by the Drafting Committee. It should not be given too narrow an interpretation. It would be a mistake for the Foreign Ministers to think that they could do the whole job themselves completely. He did not accept then and could not accept now that before the Peace Conference was held the Foreign Ministers would have to agree to every word of the drafts. Before coming to Paris he had indicated that he did not want it considered that the Peace Conference was to be just a rubber stamp not able to make any amendments in the draft treaties. In the interests of peace he hoped that the Council should not by a narrow interpretation of this point hold up the peace which had already been delayed too long.

M. Bidault summed up the discussion. He wished to repeat that he had no qualifications for interpreting the spirit or the text of the Moscow Agreement. In accepting the invitation to arrange for the Peace Conference, however, the French Government had contemplated that at the Conference there would be full discussion of the treaties by all the nations represented there, and that their deliberations would be given full consideration by those governments which had the responsibility for drafting the final peace treaties. As he understood the present situation, the first point under discussion was whether it could be considered that the present Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers could consider its work terminated only after full agreement had been reached on the drafts or after it had made out a list of those questions on which agreement had been reached and those on which no agreement had been reached. Naturally the French Government was eager to welcome the other nations to a Peace Conference at Paris at any time, whatever interpretation might be placed on the task before the present session in preparing for that Conference. He wished to ask his colleagues whether they felt that this question might be given more consideration and discussed later or whether an immediate decision should be taken.

M. Molotov said that he had just received the Russian translation of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal and that he required some time to study it. He thought that a careful study of it should be made before the discussion was resumed.

Mr. Byrnes was entirely willing to give his colleagues an opportunity to study his proposal. He wished to say that he hoped they would all carefully consider the language of the Moscow decision before taking the position that there must be final agreement on all the treaties before the Peace Conference was called. He did not not think that the language of the Moscow Agreement justified that interpretation. He had no such understanding at the time the Agreement was concluded and he did not construe the language as justifying such an interpretation now. Had the three Foreign Ministers intended such interpretation, in drafting the Agreement they would have said that the Peace Conference might be called when there had been complete agreement on all the draft treaties. And if that had been their intention, they would not have been very honest in inviting the other nations to a Peace Conference, as such a Conference would then be very limited in the scope of its discussion. The actual language of the Moscow Agreement was that the Conference would be convoked “When the preparation of the drafts was completed”. There could be a draft comprising those items on which the Council had reached agreement. Having done that the Council would have complied with the language of that paragraph of the Moscow decision. Mr. Byrnes wished also to call attention to the letter which he had written to M. Bidault on January 13.⁸⁴ This letter had been approved by M. Molotov and Mr. Bevin. It certainly justified the interpretation that at the Peace Conference full opportunity would be given to France and all the other governments present to make recommendations and to have those recommendations be given full consideration. As a matter of fact, the Council had already agreed to submit two specific questions to the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov said that he could only add to what he had said before that the Soviet Delegation did not intend to go back on the decision taken at Moscow. It continued to adhere to the basis of that decision. Nor did it go back on the reply which was sent to M. Bidault interpreting the Moscow decision.

M. Bidault suggested that, in view of the present state of the discussion, the Council adjourn since the Delegations wished to reflect on the American proposal.

Mr. Bevin wished to have the proposal clarified before adjournment. He understood that according to paragraph (a) the Deputies were to prepare a report. He was not sure whether that had been agreed. If so then the only deferred item was the question of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Byrnes understood that there was general agreement that the Deputies should prepare a statement indicating what had been agreed and what had not been agreed.

M. Molotov said that a time limit should be set for the submission of that report.

Mr. Byrnes said that it could be done by the next morning.

M. Bidault considered that to be an optimistic estimate.

Mr. Bevin reminded his colleagues that some of the committees still had to make their reports. He would like to see a complete document. The Deputies could do a better job if they were given two days.

Mr. Byrnes then suggested that the report be submitted the next afternoon.

It was agreed that the Deputies should meet that afternoon to prepare their report for submission to the Foreign Ministers the next afternoon.

The meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.

74. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
75. Ante, p. 286.
76. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 179.
77. Included as item III of C.F.M. (46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
78. Ante, p. 126.
79. Included as item IV of C.F.M. (46) 53.
80. Reference here is to the Secretary’s remarks at the 2nd Informal Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 6, 1946; see the United States Delegation Record of that meeting, p. 249.
81. In reporting to the Council of Foreign Ministers on the morning of May 7, the Deputies stated that no questions with regard to the peace treaty with Finland were to be submitted to the Council for consideration. The Council approved the Report of the Deputies; see the United States Delegation Record of 11th Meeting of the Council, May 7, 11 a.m., p. 258.
82. The proposal by the United States Delegation, May 8, 1946, is printed as C.F.M. (46) 62, May 8, 1946, p. 310.
83. An Economic Committee had been established by the Deputies at the end of January 1946 to consider economic and financial clauses of the draft peace treaty for Italy.
84. The Secretary’s letter of January 13, 1946, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1946, p. 112.