C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Tenth Meeting, Paris, May 4, 1946, 5 p.m.22
Record of the Fourth Meeting
Mr. Bevin, in asking his colleagues for observations on the record of the fourth meeting, noted that item no. 5 had not been agreed by the Secretaries. The statement that “The U.S. Delegation announced the tabling of a draft treaty on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and asked that this paper be placed on the agenda”, and that after an exchange of views the question was deferred, had apparently not been agreed to by the Soviet Delegation.
M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation has made an amendment.
Mr. Beven said that he had seen no amendment.
M. Molotov suggested referring the item back to the Secretariat.
Mr. Bevin asked whether the remainder of the record of the fourth meeting was approved.
Mr. Byrnes said the item in question was a part of the record of that meeting. He was willing to have it referred to the Secretariat but would object to any amendment which would change the record of what actually occurred at that meeting. He could not agree to approve only a partial record.
Mr. Bevin said that the Council might adjourn adoption of the record and that it would be brought up again.
M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation was interested in insuring the accuracy of the record.
Mr. Brynes said that the U.S. Delegation had the same purpose. He felt that all Delegations would agree that the record should state what actually took place.
It was agreed to postpone the adoption of the record.
Italian-Yugoslav Frontier
Mr. Bevin said that discussion might be resumed at this point on the Italian-Yugoslav frontier.
Mr. Brynes said that at the meeting in the morning he had discussed the work of the experts and their attempt to follow the directions of the [Page 238] Council given at the London meeting in September. These directions were that they should report on the line which was in the main the ethnic line, but the Committee was not restricted entirely to that language. There were also economic and geographic factors to be taken into consideration. Mr. Byrnes had said this morning and would repeat now that it was very important that the coal mine at Albona should be included in Italian territory because it represented three-fourths of the coal taken from the soil of Italy. However, the lines recommended by the British and French experts seemed to give a better balance from the point of view of the ethnic factor, and that was, after all, the more important consideration. He was willing, if the Soviet Delegation should also be willing, to have the experts draw a line in the general vicinity of the lines drawn by the French and British experts, balancing on each side the number of Yugoslavs and the number of Italians who would be left under alien rule. He thought that the experts could get together on a compromise line which would run through Istria somewhere in the neighborhood of the British and French lines. If the experts should reach agreement on such a line, Yugoslavia should be required to compensate Italy for the equipment in the coal mine area by agreeing to furnish a certain amount of coal equivalent to fair compensation. He understood that the equipment in question was modern and of great value.
M. Molotov said, with reference to the Albona coal, that he had information showing that the position of Italy was not so bad as Mr. Byrnes had indicated. Italy had a great quantity of brown coal, and the Arsa coal made up only about 10%, not 75%, of the total coal production of Italy. It was evident that this question called for further study.
M. Molotov said that the Council must first decide the principal question, the question of Trieste. Trieste was the head of a living body. Of course it was necessary to see that the Italian minority which would remain in Trieste and the Julian March enjoyed equal rights with the Yugoslav population. But the question with which the Council was faced now was how to deal with Trieste itself. This was the decisive point for determining the disposition of the whole territory and must be settled. It seemed to him that the Council was compelled to support the claim of the Allied Nation, Yugoslavia. No matter from what aspect the problem of Trieste was considered, there was only one decision possible if this question was to be finally settled. From the geographical viewpoint, the question should certainly be decided in favor of Yugoslavia. Considering the basic population of the Julian March, the only possible solution was to give Trieste to Yugoslavia despite the fact that the city itself had an Italian majority. M. Molotov said he could cite several examples of similar cases where [Page 239] cities were predominantly populated by one nationality and the surrounding areas by another, and that such questions were decided on the basis of the national character of the whole area, not that of the city itself. Looking at the economic aspect of the problem, which in the case of Trieste was extremely important, there could be no doubt that only if Trieste became part of Yugoslavia and if the question was settled in conjunction with the whole territory of the Julian March could the economic future of Trieste be assured. Otherwise the economic life of Trieste would decline as it did during the twenty-five years of Italian rule. Trieste was the principal question before the Council and should be settled.
M. Molotov continued by citing an example. It had been stated in the Commission’s report and at the present meeting that the traffic through the port of Trieste had not attained the 1913 level during the whole period of Italian rule. There was in this part of the Adriatic another port, Venice, which was a purely Italian city. Venice had increased its traffic in the same period (1913–1938) from 2,660,000 tons to 4,770,000 tons. It was clear that Italy was interested in increasing the importance of Venice and was not interested in developing the port of Trieste. It seemed logical to expect that Italy would devote itself in the future to the development of the port of Venice, as there was every reason for that; but Trieste was the only port which Yugoslavia would have, and it would develop rapidly should it be incorporated in Yugoslavia, to the advantage both of Yugoslavia and of the neighboring countries. The transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia was the obvious thing to do. This was the principal question which the Council should settle. The remaining points could be settled in a comparatively short time.
M. Bidault said he would like to emphasize that the French Commissioner in preparing his line had very clearly been guided by the decision taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on September 19, 1945. He had not gone beyond the instructions to report on a line which would be in the main the ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule. The Commission had been asked to report on a line, but, alas, there were several lines which had been reported. M. Bidault would be the last man in the world to claim that the French line was perfect. Perfection was impossible in human endeavor. But he thought that the Council should examine the matter objectively, on the basis of the 1910 census and of the September decision of the Council, and that it would then be found that the French line conformed more closely than any of the others to the instructions given by the Council. In other words, he would not hesitate to affirm that even the imperfect line which the French expert had proposed left a minimum of Yugoslavs in Italy and of Italians in Yugoslavia. He agreed [Page 240] that in the area between Trieste and Monfalcone, especially around the village of Duino, the population was predominantly Slovene. He thought the total was a few thousand inhabitants. He agreed also that in the south of Istria there was a certain number of towns like Parenzo, Rovigno and Pola, and even several towns in central Istria, which were predominantly Italian. Thus, since it was impossible to find a line which would put all the Italians on one side and all the Yugoslavs on the other, the French Delegation had decided to recommend a line which put the least number of each nationality on the wrong side of the line. Of course there would always be minorities, but the main question was to find out whether, geographically and ethnically, the compensation was equitable.
M. Bidault quite agreed that the essential question was that of Trieste. It was important from the point of view of prestige and was certainly important from the economic viewpoint. In the present circumstances he did not think it opportune to take into consideration the first factor. As for the second, the French Delegation thought it indispensable to provide free access to the port of Trieste for all nations under some form of control which would not be that of Italy but would be that of the interested nations themselves. M. Bidault thought that he had shown clearly that there was just compensation, from the ethnic point of view, on both sides of the French line, and from the economic point of view as well. With reference to political compensation, if it did exist, he did not think that should be examined within the narrow framework of the present consideration of the problem before the Council.
Mr. Bevin said that the U.K. Delegation had re-examined the whole question since the morning meeting but could not add very much to what had been said then. The United Kingdom recognized that the trade of Trieste depended not merely on nearby Yugoslav territory but on a wide area of Europe, including northern Italy. Also, Trieste must have a large maritime trade. It did not depend entirely on the territory surrounding it but on world trade. That was what had induced the British Government to suggest that the port itself should have an international regime. The port should be open and free to all. Such a solution for the port and for shipping was bound to improve the industries of Trieste and to serve the industries in areas to the east, to the north, and to the west. Mr. Bevin had been impressed by the fact that 75% of the cargo trade of Trieste was trans-shipment trade. It did not have its origin or its destination in the immediate locality. Therefore, he could not see how it could be argued that Trieste was the head of Venezia Giulia. It seemed to him that it was the mouth for a whole area of Europe. Therefore, they were driven back to the ethnic consideration, and on that aspect he felt that a [Page 241] strong case could be made out in favor of the line suggested by the British Commissioner.
Mr. Byrnes wished to call attention to the fact that Trieste, according to his information, had its first written charter in Italian in the year 1472 and had been Italian ever since. He also reiterated the statement that Fiume would be able to take care of the trade of Yugoslavia and much more besides. He agreed that the city of Trieste was the principal point before the Council, but he could not see how they could afford to take a city in which three out of every four inhabitants were Italian, a city which had been Italian since 1472, and hand it over to Yugoslavia.
M. Molotov did not know how they would be able to explain to Yugoslavia why it should not have Trieste. He said that if one looked at any ethnic map it was evident that no matter what lines were drawn by the four experts, the areas to the north of Trieste—except for a very narrow Italian-populated region which was none the less interrupted by several Slav-populated districts—and to the east of Trieste and to the south of Trieste had a Slavic population; and to the west was the sea. In spite of all these facts, the Council still hesitated to decide this question in favor of Yugoslavia. How would they be able to explain this refusal to the Yugoslavs? The territory around Trieste was Slav. In accordance with common sense it must be given to Yugoslavia.
M. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes had given some historic information dating from the 15th Century, but one had to bear in mind the fact that Italy did not exist in the 15th Century as a state; it was united only in the 19th Century. Probably Mr. Byrnes had in mind the Venetian Republic of the 15th Century. Chi the other hand, it was well known that as far back as 1810 Napoleon had formed the Illyrian Provinces, in which he included the towns of Trieste, Gorizia and Gradisca. In all of these provinces the Slavic language was used. Napoleon considered these provinces to be Slav, although it is known that Napoleon was not a Yugoslav himself. The Council must consider the question of Trieste both from the economic and from the political point of view. In regard to the economic aspect, the port of Trieste should be made a free port. The decision which had been adopted on this point at London could not be regarded as anything but correct and expedient. With regard to the political aspect, the question arose whether the Council was willing to meet the just demands of Yugoslavia or whether it preferred to put off the settlement until some later time, because under all conditions Trieste could not be kept away from Yugoslavia for a long time. Taking into account the special services rendered by Yugoslavia as an ally, the Council must decide this question now. This would help to promote good and [Page 242] friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Italy and would further the cause of peace in the best interests of all peace-loving nations. The question of Trieste awaited settlement by the Council in favor of Yugoslavia.
Mr. Bevin remarked that all the arguments had been heard and asked what was the next step. It seemed clear from the discussion that some Delegations desired to leave Trieste in Italy, with its port under an international regime in accordance with the London decision, and that M. Molotov wanted it given to Yugoslavia.
M. Molotov said that no such decision was adopted in London.
Mr. Bevin said that he had not said that.
M. Molotov wished to see it clearly stated what was decided in London.
Mr. Bevin said that his reference to the London decision concerned only the port.
M. Molotov said that it was clear that no decision had been made in London regarding the disposition of the city of Trieste.
Mr. Bevin then said that discussion of the question of the port would have to await the report of the special committee to be discussed at an early meeting. The London decision on that point had been that the Deputies were “to report on an international regime which will assure that the port and transit facilities of Trieste will be available for use on equal terms by all international trade and by Yugoslavia, Italy and the states of Central Europe as is customary in other free ports of the world”.
M. Molotov returned to the question of the disposition of Trieste. He recalled that he had made a suggestion that this question might be settled in conjunction with other questions relating to Italy. He wondered if it might not be possible to meet the wishes of Yugoslavia in the question of Trieste and in return to meet the wishes of Italy in other questions to a greater extent, including the question of the colonies and that of reparations.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would like to see if agreement might not be possible on the basis of a new approach to the frontier question. He noted that in the area to the east of the American line the majority of the population was Slav and that there seemed to be no question that that area should go to Yugoslavia. The disagreement was over the area to the west of the American line and to the east of the Soviet line. In subscribing to the Atlantic Charter the Four Powers represented at the table had all agreed that there should be no territorial changes which did not accord with the freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned. He therefore proposed that there be a plebiscite in the area between the American line and the Soviet line. It was contended [Page 243] by some that a majority in that area favored Italy and by others that a majority favored Yugoslavia. Why should they not vote so that it could be determined what they did want? The plebiscite would be conducted under the supervision of the four States represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers, and both Italian and Yugoslav troops would be kept out of the area. As the situation now stood, the four Delegations differed in their views regarding what the people inhabiting that area preferred. Declarations had been made time after time that the people’s will should prevail. Now might be the time to let the people say what they did want.
M. Molotov asked whether it was intended to hold a plebiscite in the whole of the Julian March.
Mr. Byrnes replied in the negative. He said that it was agreed that there was no dispute about the area to the east of the American line. The people there wanted to be in Yugoslavia, and that was regarded as settled.
M. Molotov said that usually a plebiscite was held in the whole of an area; otherwise the results to be derived from it might produce a very bizarre picture. One piece might go to Italy and another to Yugoslavia, and a map showing the results of the plebiscite might look like a chess board.
M. Molotov gave an example which he thought might throw some light on the subject of Trieste. As was known, the Soviet Union had had to settle with the Polish Government the question of the Western Ukraine. In the center of the Ukraine is the city of Lwow. This city had a predominantly Polish population, while the population of the surrounding countryside was overwhelmingly Ukrainian. If a plebiscite had been taken separately in Lwow and in the surrounding districts, it would have resulted in a strange picture. The population around Lwow would have voted for the Ukraine, whereas Lwow itself, in view of its Polish majority, would have voted for Poland. That would have seemed to require Ukrainian sovereignty all around Lwow and Polish sovereignty in the city itself. M. Molotov said that his colleagues knew well that the Polish and Soviet Governments had succeeded in settling this question in a friendly spirit and in accordance with the interests of the population which was in its majority Ukrainian. Perhaps the same course might be followed in the case of Trieste; thus the whole of the Julian March might be considered, in order to find out whether its population wished to remain in Yugoslavia or be under Italy.
Mr. Byrnes remembered the discussion regarding Lwow. The Poles had wanted to rectify the frontier in that area. There had been a lengthy discussion, and our Soviet friends had had their way; [Page 244] Lwow had been given not to Poland but to the Ukraine. He hoped that, having had his way in that case, his Soviet friend might in this case be easier to get along with.
M. Molotov said that it had not been a question of the wish of the Soviet Government but of that of the Ukranian population.
Mr. Byrnes said that he understood that it was the wish of the Ukranian population but that their wishes had not been hurt by the advocacy of the Soviet Government. On the contrary, he thought that the support of the Soviet Government had been very helpful.
Mr. Byrnes was not troubled by the fear that a plebiscite might make the map look like a chess board. The important thing was the will of the population in this area. What they were discussing was whether or not the people between the American and Soviet lines would prefer to be in Italy or in Yugoslavia, whether they preferred the line suggested by the Soviet Government or the line suggested by the U.S. Government. There was no issue in the rest of the area and he saw no purpose in submitting the question to the population there. Mr. Byrnes put this proposal for a plebiscite before his colleagues because it was the only suggestion which he could make in the hope of bringing about an agreement.
Mr. Bevin remarked that this proposal did not seem to be acceptable. He said that he had some sympathy with M. Molotov’s view in this case. To organize a plebiscite in an area like Venezia Giulia would be extremely difficult.
M. Bidault said that the essential difficulty which seemed to have arisen in the consideration of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was that M. Molotov considered that the Julian March formed a single whole, whereas Mr. Byrnes thought that there was no need to hold a vote in the area where there was no dispute among the four Delegations, i.e., the area to the east of the American line. The French Delegation had no objection to a consultation of the whole population of the Julian March. There were questions at issue in the whole area. However, if there was no agreement on the conditions of the plebiscite or the manner in which it would be interpreted, there would be no purpose in proposing to widen its scope to the whole area. To clarify what he had said, M. Bidault emphasized that there was a mixed population in parts of the Julian March outside the area proposed by Mr. Byrnes as a plebiscite area. The question arose whether it was desired that the plebiscite should decide the disposition of the area as a single block or whether data based on voting in local areas should guide the final decision. According to the decision on that point the question of extending or limiting the plebiscite area would be particularly important. It was the French point of view that historical rights should [Page 245] never be given precedence over the desires of the local population. If local results of voting were used as the basis of decision, the question was whether they should be interpreted in the same spirit as the Council’s instructions to the Commission, i.e., with the purpose of leaving a minimum under alien rule. In regard to the question of compensation, M. Bidault thought that was a matter to be examined at a later stage and in a more restricted circle. It might be examined in connection with the wider range of problems before the four Foreign Ministers.
Mr. Bevin said that he had to confess that the idea of a plebiscite seemed to him to be contrary to the London decision and changed the whole situation. He then referred to M. Bidault’s suggestion that they talk over the whole Italian question in a smaller meeting.
M. Bidault said that in taking up M. Molotov’s remark regarding compensation and the political aspects of the question of Trieste, he had suggested a discussion which might go beyond the Italian question, whereas M. Molotov had said that the question of Trieste might be taken up in connection with other matters concerning Italy.
Mr. Bevin said it was difficult for him to see, where there was a straight case and the situation seemed clear, where at a previous Conference it had already been decided to take into account ethnic considerations, how they could settle the question by bargaining away these people’s lives in exchange for something else.
Mr. Byrnes wanted to say that after the last war this whole peninsula had been transferred without regard to the creation of a minority problem. There had been great dissatisfaction with this settlement. The world did not wish to see that situation duplicated. Therefore, at London the Council had taken the correct position that so far as possible the main principle should be the ethnic line. If this whole disputed area were left as a block, there was bound to be a serious minority problem in view of the ethnic complexion of the population, and therefore there would result only a continuation of a dangerous situation. These facts necessitated the division of the area. Because of the location of the principal Italian-inhabited cities it was possible to diminish appreciably the size of minorites subjected to alien rule.
Mr. Byrnes thought that the proper thing to do would be to ask the people in the disputed area to express their views. They were the people who were intimately concerned. Mr. Byrnes realized that this was a new proposal requiring thought and he did not ask for action on it at this meeting. He wondered if his colleagues wished to have another more restricted meeting on Sunday.
[Page 246]It was agreed that a smaller meeting should be held on May 5 at 4:00 p.m. in the office of M. Bidault.23
The meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m.