Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of an Informal Meeting Between Members of the United States and Canadian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, August 20, 1946, 3:30 p.m.³⁴

New York, August 20, 1946, 3:30 p.m.

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Present:	Mr. B. M. Baruch
	Mr. Hancock
	Mr. Eberstadt
	General McNaughton
	Mr. Ignatieff
	Mr. Jarvis
	Mr. Gordon
	Mr. Lindsay
	Mr. Arneson

Mr. Hancock stated that he had been able to get no definite time schedule on the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee. It seemed likely that its preliminary report would be somewhat delayed.³⁵ He stated that we were prepared, now that we are perfectly clear on the interpretation of the McMahon bill, to bring such men as Lilienthal and Thomas to speak before the Scientific and Technical Committee, Committee No. 2, or both.

Mr. Baruch pointed out that he has been most anxious that the pace not be forced; that we do not drive Gromyko into a corner so that a reasonable attempt to understand could not be forthcoming. He stressed the conviction that a slower educative approach was necessary and that our present emphasis on the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee was a concrete manifestation of this conviction.

General McNaughton agreed emphatically that we could not push for a break now simply because the matter has not as yet been fully explored.

Mr. Ignatieff reported on his recent conversations in Ottawa with the Undersecretary of State. Mr. Ignatieff said that the Undersecretary felt as we did that any further pursuing of the political aspects would simply bring about a deadlock or a complete breakdown of the negotiations. He felt, therefore, that we should concentrate for the present on the scientific and technical aspects of the problem. Mr. Ignatieff suggested that it would be wise strategy to allow the break if it must come between the Western World and the U.S.S.R. to occur somewhere else in the world, rather than in these particular negotiations. He urged that we must concentrate on securing the allegiance of world opinion to our plan and that every endeavor should be made to secure the support of all nations who must join in any international control which may be established if that control is to be effective.

In reply to a query from Mr. Gordon as to how the Scientific and Technical Committee report might be discussed in Committee No. 2, Mr. Ignatieff suggested that the report should be considered only an interim report and that Committee No. 2 should refer back to the S. & T. Committee requests for more detailed information.

Mr. Eberstadt [said] that he thought the S. & T. Committee report was an admirable document, one which had avoided quite successfully the ticklish political aspects of the problem. For example, while setting off danger points against points of control, the report does not say who shall exercise the control that seems necessary. He thought it was perfectly clear that even if the Soviets do eventually accept international control of atomic energy they would make every attempt to secure all the advantages they could possibly obtain by a program of delay. Yet, it must be remembered that our work is only a part of a much larger picture and that our tactics would have to be oriented to the progress of negotiations in other places, as, for example, the Paris Peace Conference. He felt that, whatever we do and however we may proceed in the negotiations, it was quite likely that we would finally come out with a 10 to 2 report. We must have patience but that patience must be tempered with the realization that we may not get a unanimous AEC report.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested three alternatives:

1. A preliminary progress report by the AEC to the Security Council—

The AEC might very well prepare a preliminary progress report as a means of summarizing negotiations to date. This might well be done at the end of General McNaughton’s chairmanship and should not contain any recommendations or hard-and-fast conclusions, but merely bring the events of the preceding 90 days together in one document. Mr. Eberstadt thought this procedure would constitute a sort of minor warning to the world and to the United Nations that time was running out and that soon the AEC would have to come to close quarters with the real points of divergence.

2. A draft convention.

The draft convention might be presented toward the end of General McNaughton’s term after the preliminary report of the S. & T. Committee had been received. Preparation of the draft convention obviously would be difficult at this stage, inasmuch as many facets of the problem had not yet been fully explored, as, for example, the matter of “stages”. This alternative would be a much sharper challenge to the Soviets and would bring the disagreements to a head more sharply.

3. Continuation of the seminar technique.

Continuation of more detailed discussion of the elements of control and of the scientific and technical facts lying behind the American proposal would, if not supplemented by more specific action, bring about increased public impatience with the progress of negotiations.

Mr. Ignatieff felt that public opinion was already resigned to the concept of two worlds. The public was thinking that a break was inevitable and was resigning itself to it. He queried whether something could be done to change this public attitude.

Mr. Eberstadt replied that he thought a statement could be in the preliminary report of the AEC to the Security Council which would help to dissipate this prejudgment which the public has been tending to make. He thought that after reviewing the record of proceedings for the past three months the report might state that the next stage of negotiations would be a reconciliation of points of view and a further analysis of the technical and scientific facts underlying the problem.

Mr. Baruch felt that General McNaughton might very well make an opening statement, as the new chairman, in which he would review the proceedings of the past two months, ending with a statement of the problem as indicated by the discussion thus far but without any specific recommendations. He went on to say that he planned to talk with Gromyko on Wednesday³⁶ in order to ascertain, if possible, just what was going on in the Soviet mind. He supported the idea of a preliminary survey of negotiations to date with stress on the fact-finding character of the next stage of negotiations and the attempt to secure a reconciliation of points of view.

General McNaughton expressed strong approval of the report of the S. & T. Commitee, pointing out that it was in reality the first official report of the Atomic Energy Commission and its subcommittees. He thought that the report was essentially sound, that it did not weaken the American view, and that it had the real merit of being a new source document to which all could refer in future discussions. In other words, while it followed the lines of the Acheson report and the Baruch Plan, it did not suffer from their disabilities in that it was not an American report but an AEC report.

Mr. Eberstadt said it was more important that we have a sound report, even if that meant a split in voting, than simply to get a unanimous vote on a report which was too weak.

Mr. Baruch pointed out that the tide of public opinion is running very strongly against the Soviets. He remarked that even many of the so-called liberal groups had commented to him that they were no longer able to support many of the actions which the Russians have recently taken. Jokingly, he commented that he was being branded a communist, since he was trying to work with Gromyko in a patient and understanding fashion. He remarked cryptically that we must be prepared one day to say: “Good Morning Death!”

Mr. Ignatieff remarked that the chief preoccupation of all nations was for security and that the concept of two worlds offered precious little in the way of security. Therefore, we must make every attempt to join these two worlds.

Mr. Eberstadt asked what the alternatives would be if a real split occurred. He pointed out the difficulties of determining what nations would have to be excluded from our world, citing, as an example, Poland. He mentioned Section 51 of the United Nations Charter, commenting that we might, at some time in the future, have to remind the Soviets of the power inherent in that Section. He pointed out the danger that was inherent in any two world alternative. If this came to pass we would be accused by public opinion of having devised a plan which was obviously unacceptable to the Soviets with the full realization that they would reject it and then having revealed our real intentions by proposing an atomic alliance against them.

General McNaughton stated that he would press for the completion of the preliminary report of the S. & T. Committee with the idea of having it presented formally to the full Atomic Energy Commission. He promised to talk to Captain Alberto about some sort of resume of the past two months of negotiations.

34. This document was drafted by Mr. Arneson and dated August 21.
35. At its 4th Meeting, July 31, Committee 2 had requested Committee 3 (the Scientific and Technical Committee) to present a report on whether effective control of atomic energy was possible and to provide an indication of the methods by which effective control could be achieved. Committee 3 completed this report by the end of August, but final action was not taken until September 26 due to reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept it. For text of the report, see AEC, I, Special Suppl., part IV.
36. August 21.