Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of a Meeting Between the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee, New York, August 22, 1946, 3 p.m.³⁷

New York, August 22, 1946, 3 p.m.

confidential

Present:	Mr. Baruch	Admiral Turner
	Mr. Hancock	General Kenney
	Mr. Eberstadt	Lt. Gen. Ridgway
	Mr. Searls	Lt. Gen. Haislip
	Dr. Tolman	Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer
	Mr. Gordon	Maj. Gen. Groves
	Dr. Fleming	Brig. Gen. Kibler
	Mr. Johnson	Brig. Gen. Cabell
	Mr. Lindsay	Colonel Gilmer
	Mr. Howard	Colonel Harris
	Mr. Arneson

In welcoming the United States Members of the Military Staff Committee to the meeting, Mr. Hancock stressed our desire to have any views they might wish to make at any time. He said that we were open to suggestions and observations of whatever sort they would care to make on any occasion. This meeting was called primarily to cast up a number of problems on which we thought the Military Staff Committee would be especially well qualified to make recommendations. Taking up the points raised by the memorandum distributed to the group the discussion that ensued was as follows:

A. Relations of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council on security matters

Mr. Hancock suggested that the Military Staff Committee might attempt to formulate a precise meaning of Paragraph 2(b) of the Resolution of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, which states that any matters affecting security the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission and that on security matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.

B. Other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction

Pointing out that the terms of reference of the AEC included recommendations for the elimination from national armaments not only of atomic weapons but of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, Mr. Hancock asked for the views of the Military on this point.

General Ridgway felt strongly that we should not attempt to expand the scope of our work at this time to include other weapons. General Kenney strongly concurred in this view, as did General Groves. General Groves expressed the view that the problem would become hopelessly complicated if effort were made to expand the terms of reference at this time. He thought that we should keep the “other weapons” in mind and plan to recommend at a later stage that negotiations be started on them. Admiral Turner pointed out that if the terms of reference were expanded at this time we would be faced with a very difficult job of definition, that, in fact, the term “weapons of mass destruction” was as vague as the term aggression which the United Nations has carefully avoided trying to define.

Mr. Hancock expressed concern about the fact that there is no known means of effective control over biological warfare and that an attempt to include BW in our work might play into the hands of Gromyko, inasmuch as all we could propose for BW would be a mere convention. Mr. Searls said that the problem was further complicated by the fact that the Commission might very well end up with a split report.

C. Stages

Referring to the U.S. proposal which recommends that the establishment of an ADA should proceed by stages, Mr. Hancock enquired whether the Military had any concern about this phase of our proposal. No criticism was raised. He stated that we were anxious to get the views of the Military on this as quickly as possible, since we would probably have to be prepared to make some presentation to the Commission on this question within the next three or four weeks.

Mr. Baruch pointed out that both Senators Connally and Vandenburg had been most emphatic on the need to proceed by stages and that the stages idea was deeply embedded in the Acheson-Lilienthal report.

General Groves differentiated two different concepts on stages as follows:

(1) the stages relating to the progressive inclusion of other weapons after the atomic bomb had been handled, and

(2) a sort of stages-within-stages concept in which control over a given weapon would proceed step by step. He reported that Secretary Byrnes had assured and reassured him on several occasions that it was the Secretary’s intention that the problem of atomic energy and the establishment of an international control body should proceed stage by stage.

Admiral Turner pointed out that there was some confusion between the idea of stages in the establishment of the ADA and the idea of having the work of the AEC proceed by separate stages. The original tri-partite statement (Truman, Attlee, King) called for the establishment of an International Authority by separate stages. On the other hand the Resolution of the General Assembly stated that the work of the Commission should proceed by stages. When Senator Vandenburg saw the Resolution he insisted on a clarification. On his return from London Secretary Byrnes did clarify the meaning of this concept, insisting that the establishment of an International Authority should be by separate stages so devised as to assure a balance of security among the participating nations.

1. Destruction of the bombs.

Admiral Turner pointed out that we have made no definite commitment to destroy our stocks of atomic bombs. We have simply stated that we propose that existing stocks of bombs should be disposed of at a late stage in the establishment of the ADA “pursuant to the terms of the treaty”. There seems to be a general feeling in the public mind that the United States has agreed to destroy the bombs once an ADA has been established and is in effective operation. Admiral Turner felt that this opinion might be dangerous and there might be some occasion to clarify this at a later date. He felt that before we give any definite commitment on this point we should seek a final opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Hancock stated that our thinking had not completely jelled on the question whether there should be any atomic bombs anywhere in the world or not. He did indicate, however, that the problem would seem to be an easier one if there were no bombs anywhere in the world. That, of course, raised the question of how a violator would be dealt with if no bombs existed. Mr. Baruch considered this a question on which we wanted help from the Military people.

General Ridgway remarked that it was his understanding that our position was that bombs would be disposed of only after actual proof of good faith on the part of all nations had been demonstrated through every stage of the establishment of the ADA. This he thought was the only sound position that could be taken on the matter. Mr. Hancock pointed out this difficulty however: the decision as to when bombs should be disposed of could not be made in our discretion alone. It is probable that some formula would be written into the treaty which would leave that decision to the ADA itself. In any event the treaty would have to state very specifically just what conditions had to be met and who would decide that those conditions had been met.

General Kenney suggested that the Military Staff Committee should be the organ to check on whether specified conditions actually had been reached. This would have the merit of retaining the veto, in the sense that the Military Staff Committee reports to the Security Council. Mr. Eberstadt thought that General Kenney’s suggestion was a very good one, at least on certain types of conditions. General Groves pointed out that the stages will probably have to overlap in order to avoid undue delay. Even in providing for overlap he found that a minimum of five years was required. The overlap feature might complicate this matter of certification and make it more difficult for the Military Staff Committee to check. He suggested that the Military Staff Committee would probably have to take the testimony of the ADA as first evidence that a particular stage had been met. This was so because many technical considerations were involved which only the ADA would really be in a position to understand. Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that giving this kind of function to the Military Staff Committee would tie in very nicely with their general responsibility for recommendations on disarmament.

Mr. Hancock asked whether this question of Military Staff Committee participation in the stages picture could be raised formally with the military. In reply Admiral Turner said he thought that the question should be raised by us directly with the Government. He thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would need a specific request in writing in order to consider the question. Mr. Hancock replied that much discussion would be needed on this point and said he was not sure that it should be raised formally at the moment. He hoped that the Military Staff people would think about this question.

Mr. Baruch remarked that we had been depending on General Groves to keep the Chiefs of Staff fully informed of our operations and likewise to keep us informed of questions that the Joint Chiefs had on their minds.

2. Alternative plans.

General Groves felt that if we were unable to get a unanimous report through the Security Council the alternative would be nothing at all. Mr. Eberstadt felt very strongly that we should not even contemplate an alternative plan at this stage. He felt that there was grave danger inherent in any situation that might lead to our proposing an alternative plan simply because many would think that we had purposely put forward an original plan which was obviously unacceptable, and that what we were really trying to do was to come out with an atomic alliance against Russia.

Mr. Hancock said that it is not our job to consider alternative plans but that this question was one with which the Military Staff Committee should be very much concerned. General Groves remarked that the Military Staff Committee might inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Delegation has no alternative plan in mind.

Mr. Searls remarked that we were obliged to report a plan, even if that plan could not be unanimously agreed to. Mr. Eberstadt insisted that this plan must be fully adequate and must be one which would necessarily provide that all nations must join in.

Mr. Baruch stated that we would be interested in another plan only if it were stronger and better than the one we have already put forward.

General Groves stressed the need of conducting the negotiations in such a fashion as to make it perfectly clear to the world that the plan we sponsor is a fair and reasonable plan which has been worked out openly and patiently. It must be clear that Russia had been given every possible chance to understand and to accept. He thought this sort of procedure was essential whether we felt that the Russians would accept it or not. Then in the event that the plan is rejected by the Russians we could be sure of the support of the world and especially the support of American scientists on any course of action we might then find necessary.

Mr. Hancock explained that he had carefully avoided using the word compromise in reply to Gromyko’s accusation that we were offering a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. This was a bit of tight rope-walking with the view in mind of not falling into Gromyko’s trap, while at the same time, avoiding any implication that we were willing to compromise. He stated categorically that we have no intention whatever of compromising the basic principles of our plan. In fact, our plan represents the minimum that is required to bring about an effective, workable system of control. He pointed out that there were, of course, certain aspects of the plan that had not yet been elaborated and that in these cases we would want to accommodate the views of other delegations as far as this was possible without compromising our basic requirements.

D. Strategic balance

Mr. Eberstadt expressed the view that the ADA could not be given unlimited power to decide the location of plants and the general question of strategic balance. He thought that the ADA might be required to confer with the Military Staff Committee on this kind of question and, indeed, to secure approval from the Military Staff Committee on its proposals. General Kenney thought that the ADA might be required to secure at least recommendations from the Military Staff Committee. General Groves felt that the Military Staff Committee might be given the same power on the question of location of plants as on the question of stages. He did not feel that the Military Staff Committee should be empowered to pass on location of all ADA installations but primarily on the location of large plants. In response to a question from Admiral Turner, General Groves said he thought the Military Staff Committee’s power should extend to the physical location of individual large plants.

Admiral Turner thought that the question of locating plants would not be very difficult, inasmuch as the Big Five are not only strong militarily, but are the chief industrial powers and that primary production plants would logically be placed in their respective territories. Mr. Eberstadt, however, pointed out that there would be considerable pressure from backward countries to have power plants located in their territory.

E. Destruction of Atomic Bombs

Mr. Hancock stated that this was one of the most difficult of problems on which to arrive at a sound decision and that he was anxious to have views of the Military men present.

General Kenney thought that the United States should retain a stockpile of bombs to be held in trust and available to the Military Staff Committee force on call from the Security Council. Mr. Eberstadt posed two alternatives: (1) a quota of bombs to be turned over to a common pool, or (2) to have no bombs in existence. He did not think that the proposal that the U.S. keep a stock of bombs as its contribution to the Military Staff Committee force would be an acceptable one to other nations. He felt that if bombs were to remain in existence they would have to be possessed physically by the United Nations force. He felt, furthermore, that not to have any bombs was more in accord with the overall objectives of the United Nations. General Lemnitzer remarked that while it might be much easier to get agreement on a treaty which provided there would be no bombs, he felt that the absence of bombs in the hands of an international body would put a premium on a nation’s getting atomic bombs and using them.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested that the stages concept might be a useful one to consider here. A formula might be devised looking toward a period when bombs would finally be destroyed, but that a series of stages leading up to this final objective might provide first, for a period of trusteeship by the U.S., later possession of bombs by the United Nations force and so on to final destruction. He pointed out that calculated risks must be taken all the way along in this problem. Risks cannot be avoided. We must simply try to make them as balanced as possible. Mr. Searls expressed full agreement with this idea. Mr. Gordon pointed out that one of the more serious aspects of this question was the fact that with bombs existing in the world, the warning period would be very short, while, if all bombs were destroyed and possession of them made illegal, nations would have a considerably longer period of warning.

Admiral Turner pointed out this difficulty: in an atomic age a premium will be put on speed of reprisal for any violation of the treaty. If atomic bombs remain in existence reprisal could be much quicker and more effective.

There was some discussion of a point raised by General Cabell that bomb components might well be distributed among several powers in such a way that no one nation could use them. These components could be called in by the Security Council for use, if this were necessary. Among the objections raised to this idea were the following:

1. Big Power veto.

2. Loss of instantaneous use of the weapon which would in turn negate the purpose of having bombs available at all. This objection would apply even if it were provided that the bombs could be called into use by a simple majority vote of the Security Council.

F. Other uses of atomic energy

General Kenney asked if atomic energy were prohibited for use in bombs, could it be used to make other weapons more effective. Dr. Tolman replied that in the present state of the art, the use of atomic energy for ship propulsion seemed to offer some real possibilities. General Kenney then asked whether such a possibility was prohibited. Mr. Eberstadt’s view was that such use would be prohibited, inasmuch as the terms of reference speak of atomic weapons, rather than merely atomic bombs. He said this was not an easy question to answer but that it was his impression that this interpretation was correct. He cited the fact that Gromyko always refers to atomic weapons and not to atomic bombs.

Admiral Turner expressed the view that it would be absurd to encourage the utilization of atomic power for freighters, while prohibiting its use for warships. Dr. Tolman pointed out, however, that there was far less likelihood of, or need for, use of atomic power in freighters than in warships. Mr. Hancock pointed out that there would be real danger in allowing battleships to employ atomic power plants, inasmuch as these power plants could manufacture fissionable material.

On the question of the use of radio-active materials as a kind of weapon for war, Dr. Tolman felt that this possibility did not now seem feasible and could not be until a satisfactory method of dispersing the material by fine sprays had been worked out.

G. Commercial Problems

Mr. Hancock raised the question about providing some sort of quota system on raw materials to prevent on the one hand, hoarding of fissionable materials by any one nation, and on the other hand, the depletion of supply in another country. General Groves pointed out that the value of uranium and thorium is so great in a national security sense that there would be tremendous pressure to search out all possible sources of supply. There would also be great pressure to increase technical mining efficiency so as to get at the low-grade deposits. He stated that it was within the realm of possibility that one day a method would be devised for recovering uranium from the ocean.

H. Inspection

There was some general discussion about the question of opening industrial plants and military reservations to inspection by an International Authority. General Groves felt that it would not be difficult to hide any of the Oak Ridge processes in some of our larger industrial plants. Admiral Turner thought that we should be willing to open up all of our industrial plants to inspection, provided reciprocal concessions were received from other countries. He recognized that the chief difficulty with this idea had to do with preservation of trade secrets in industry.

I. The moral issue of using the bomb

Mr. Hancock mentioned that he was somewhat concerned that pressure would be built up in this country condemning the use, and continued manufacture, of the atomic bomb. He queried whether we should not take steps in the near future to ward off this sort of public opinion development. General Groves felt that it would be quite unwise to have this question debated but thought that it might be wise to do whatever could be done privately to head off this kind of development.

In closing the meeting, Mr. Hancock said that we might have to be ready with specific proposals on stages within a period of three or four weeks. He hoped that the Military Staff Committee members would give us the benefit of their views on this question as soon as possible. He reiterated that the Military Staff Committee members should feel free to talk with us at any time on any problem on which they might care to express their views.

37. This document was drafted by Mr. Arneson and dated August 23.