Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves), to Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

secret

Washington, August 16, 1946.

Dear Mr. Hancock: I am inclosing two copies of the memorandum on stages which we have been working on and discussing over the past several weeks.

These are for your files.

Sincerely yours,

L. R. Groves

Major General, USA

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for Discussion With the United States Delegation

Subject: Stages of Transition to Full Control by the Atomic Development Authority

The proposals put forward by the United States for the establishment of the ADA envision a series of progressive stages so designed as to furnish safeguards against breach of faith by any nation or nations. This is particularly important in view of the reliance now placed by the United States on the atom bomb as a counter balance to the enormous military establishment maintained by Russia. In the event of a breakdown in international cooperation, security, not only for the United States, but for the world, will be impossible if the military strength of this country, and this means the atomic bomb, is seriously impaired. While it is essential that our timing be such as to avoid an impasse, yet it is vital that we come to grips at the outset with troublesome political problems which are inherent in the proposed step-by-step evolution of an internationally controlled agency.

The spelling out of a comprehensive plan in terms of the functions, the responsibilities and the authority of a control agency will entail lengthy discussions to bring about a reasonable understanding of the proposals advocated. Yet such discussions should not require any material change in the special position of the United States. The information essential to this understanding has already been disclosed. A large body of additional scientific information will probably be published in the near future with the approval of the Manhattan District. Accordingly, an outline of proposed stages may be limited to that which will follow after a treaty or charter has been ratified by the necessary nations.

Recognizing that the preparation of a timetable or scheduling of steps is dependent on negotiation and the requirement of agreement, the initial importance of any consideration of stages lies in the formulation of a plan which provides a basis for agreement and at the same time affords the security desired. The rights and obligations of the signatory powers will have to be most carefully defined. The problem of the participation of countries not now represented, and therefore without voice in the Atomic Energy Commission, cannot be postponed indefinitely. These countries must accept the plan before the initial stages are put into effect.

In the following outline an attempt is made to spell out a suitable sequence of events or stages. It will be evident that certain of the proposed stages leave little room for compromise. Where the authority or powers of ADA must be firmly fixed, comment is made outlining the reasons for this position.

First Stage: Unrestricted Survey by ADA of World Resources of Raw Materials in the Ground.

a. Establishment of complete access to all sections of the world by ADA representatives with the requirement that all countries will cooperate in facilitating their travel and work.

Note: ADA engineers, geologists, and surveyors must be able to inspect thoroughly all known mines and occurrences which they think are of interest and to explore all sections of the world to locate undisclosed or unknown deposits. They must be able to acquire such samples and make such assays as they desire.

b. Establishment of means for carrying forward development work and for setting up research facilities to determine new or improved methods of extraction and concentration particularly in the field of low-grade ores.

Note: This will assist in determining a safe cut-off percent. The failure to achieve this stage in practice will mean that any cooperative effort will fail.

Second Stage: Interchange of Information on Deposits of Raw Materials.

a. Disclosure by all countries of complete information on deposits of raw materials within the jurisdiction of each country. This would include the furnishing of all desired information concerning geological occurrences, specimens, prospects, assays, ores and residues.

b. Review of such data and other published information by ADA geologists, mining engineers, and surveyors.

c. Development of additional information as required by ADA.

d. Establishment of facilities for sampling and assaying and for obtaining samples or specimens by ADA representatives.

e. Organization and maintenance of inspection of known and newly discovered sources.

Note: This system should be progressively expanded as subsequent stages are undertaken.

f. Disclosure by all countries of current and past production figures of worked deposits.

Third Stage: Establishment and Maintenance of Control Over Deposits of Uranium and Thorium and Other Materials Vital to an Atomic Energy Program and Over Facilities Used for Their Extraction and Concentration.

a. Establishment of control over mines.

Note: The form of control will depend on the type of occurrence and the amount of the estimated reserves. It will also be greatly influenced by whether the materials occur in conjunction with other products of value and in such case whether they are the primary or the by-product. The form of control might be mere inspection; licensing of production with ADA control or ownership of tailings; exclusive purchasing plus inspection; or outright ownership.

b. Establishment of control over facilities used for extraction and concentration of uranium and thorium.

Note: Form of control may vary as in the control over mines. With full accomplishment of this stage some curtailment of U.S. operations in the atomic energy field will be inescapable.

Fourth Stage: Establishment and Maintenance of Control Over Any Facilities Devoted Exclusively to the Refining or Processing of Uranium or Thorium.

[Note:] The form of control may vary as in the control over mines. The possibility of illicit operations by industries in allied fields will be greatly reduced by rigid controls over the ore itself. The obligations of participating countries must be clearly defined.

Fifth Stage: Establishment of Research Facilities Under ADA.

a. Furnishing by U.S. of scientific and technical information essential to peacetime uses.

b. Establishment of ADA research facilities to carry on development work in the field of “safe” activities.

c. Establishment under ADA control and supervision of small nuclear reactors and similar scientific research tools within the several States.

Note: Such piles would be designed, constructed, and operated as determined by ADA.

Note: Once this stage is initiated the U.S. will be under great pressure to furnish active materials in increasing quantities of enriched active materials of varying concentrations. This stage will require broad discretion and authority on the part of the U.S. government authorities to deal with private interests and governmental agencies.

Sixth Stage: Disclosure by U.S. of Scientific and Technical Information Including Data Dealing With Design, Construction and Operation of Large Scale Production Plants.

a. Disclosure of all data essential to “safe” operations.

b. Disclosure of all data essential to “dangerous” operations up to but not including the atomic bomb itself.

Seventh Stage: International Ownership and Operation of Primary Production Plants.

a. Turning over to ADA by the U.S. of its primary production plants, (and by any other country having such plants).

b. Construction and operation of similar plants in such places as might be provided for under the convention or by later agreement.

Note: Scientific and technical advances will determine the technical and economic desirability of duplicating U.S. plants or the feasibility of adopting new methods.

Eighth Stage: Turning Over to ADA by U.S. and by All Other Countries of All Scientific and Technical Data in Their Possession Concerning Atomic Weapons.

Ninth Stage: Destruction or Turning Over by U.S. of All Stocks of Bombs. Turning Over by U.S. of All Stocks of Material for Peaceful Endeavors (and by Any Other Country Having Such Stocks). The ADA Assumes Exclusive Control Over All Dangerous Activities.

Assuming that the ADA will develop into an effective operating agency and that there would be full and effective cooperation by the important participating countries the following timetable would seem to be reasonable. It must never be forgotten that the degree of completion of each stage must govern the rate of progress rather than any calendar.

Stage	Possible Time of Starting Stage, Measured in Months from the Starting of the First Stage
First	0
Second	18 to 24
Third	24 to 30
Fourth	30 to 38
Fifth	32 to 44
Sixth	33 to 50
Seventh	42 to 60
Eighth	48 to 66
Ninth	50 to 72

For the purpose of discussing this problem within the Commission itself when an appropriate occasion arises a paper should be prepared using this document as a basis. The paper, however, should be more general in its approach. The introductory remarks could well be expanded while the detailed schedule should be replaced with a discussion of the gradual evolution and development of the ADA as envisaged by the U.S.