Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of State
With reference to our telephone conversation this morning concerning the points of difference between Mr. Acheson’s draft of May 31st and my memorandum of policies for discussion of May 30th,62 I think there’s one substantial point of difference in the matter of ownership of the uranium ore in the ground as contemplated [Page 825] by Mr. Acheson and what I have chosen to call dominion or control short of ownership. I think ownership by the Atomic Development Authority should be permissive in its own decisions, but that the Authority should not be required to own all uranium in the ground. The reasons for it were discussed last night, and I would be glad to summarize my views if that seems desirable. I do not believe Mr. Acheson has made an adequate treatment of the problem of ownership with reference to mines producing uranium as a by-product.
It is my belief that there should be as little interference, as may be, with the economic plans and customs in the present private, corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved. I want us to attempt only as little as is necessary for national security. Each of us in our drafts emphasizes different points, depending upon judgments as to their importance.
I have taken some time to point out the beneficial results and our willingness to make them available to the world. I have tried to lay a foundation for understanding by pointing out that any international control is going to involve some surrender of jurisdiction.
Mr. Acheson does not include in his memorandum the penalty provision which has been so much discussed. I understand it is agreed that this matter will be included in the statement of United States policy.
The essence of our suggestions regarding penalties is that this may be a way of getting around the veto. There isn’t any use in blinking that fact. Otherwise, penalty for violation will not be immediate and certain. One can only speculate about the deterrent effect of our penalty provisions.
I think I rely a little more than Mr. Acheson upon the terms of licenses which could, if properly authorized, be well within the framework of administrative law. I see every reason to set up specific provisions as to licenses, rather than to refer the problem to this Atomic Development Authority for its decision.
I doubt that I have the same reliance upon the denaturing process which seems to be the background of the Acheson Report. I also believe that there is more uranium and thorium ore in the world than any probable demands to serve peaceful purposes. I question whether America has not oversold the possibilities of commercial power plants operating under private control. This whole problem is going to become a matter of judgment on a changing set of facts. As of today, I would want such plants operated under the Authority.
Should certain conditions be met, the best we get is an advance warning of from three months to a year—not a year or more as Mr. Acheson states—assuming a forcing nation had the will to create an [Page 826] atomic bomb. That is not enough time to marshal public opinion for a declaration of war by this country.
I treat with the point that any National Authority should be under the direction of the International Authority.
As to the virtue of operation versus policing, I don’t go as far as Mr. Acheson. I agree with his principle. I differ in the extent of its application. Of course, I am not proposing a mere policing organization.
If it can be done smoothly without creating a break in the negotiations, I think we should try to find out early what each nation has in the way of information about its uranium and thorium deposits and, that likewise, if a survey can be arranged for we might determine additional unknown resources and test the willingness of the world to accede to “complete access—free ingress and egress” for the purpose of detecting violations of the Treaty. We agree that this is not a matter of present statement of policy. In either event, it will be an essential of the Treaty and the only question is whether it is wise to take it up earlier so as to know what the raw material situation is, as it may affect the negotiation of the Treaty.
Other differences would be found on critical examination with a little more time available, but I think this memorandum summarizes the high-lights. Our differences are largely matters of choice of subjects, of manner of procedure, of taste in expression, and of emphasis except in the matters of ownership and penalties.
I understand that I am to redraft my 10-point program for submission to you at an early date.
As a matter entirely outside the two memoranda, I have mentioned the importance of the military aspects of any Treaty and the need of working closely with the military authorities to complete any plan involving national security as much as this plan does. For this reason I think clearance of the policy statements with the military is important. Shall we undertake this or will you?
As another matter outside the two memoranda, Mr. Baruch wishes the President’s approval for his writing to the Chiefs of Staff for their views upon their ability to get ready for war in the event we receive only ninety days advance notice—or even a year’s notice—of a substantial violation of the Treaty. The second point of such an inquiry would relate to the effect on military planning if the Treaty should set up a plan for retaliation or penalty in the event any foreign nation were to commit any of the serious offenses set up in the Treaty as equivalent to an act of war. If this is approved by the President, may I be so advised?
- The May 31 Acheson draft is a slightly revised version of the memorandum by the Board of Consultants to Mr. Baruch of May 19 which is printed on p. 790. The Hancock memorandum of May 30 is not printed; for a summary of its substance, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 567. A redraft dated June 4 is printed infra.↩