Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission ⁵⁸

[Washington,] June 1, 1946.

I didn’t take notes so this memorandum will likely omit some matters which were discussed last evening.

For a long period we discussed various aspects of the Paris negotiations, the difficulties encountered there, the attitudes of the different nations—particularly Russia—the difficulties encountered in dealing with them—all as a background for our conducting ourselves in the negotiations coming up with reference to atomic energy.

Mr. Byrnes handed me a memorandum which, he said, Dean Acheson had dictated in about a half hour.⁵⁹ Mr. Byrnes asked me to look it over in comparison with our policy statement. There wasn’t a clean-cut, sharp presentation of the reason for the Acheson rewrite, except that Mr. Byrnes wanted it put in the usual form of a State Dept. paper, in order to make it more in keeping with the practice of informing the President about contemplated national positions to be taken during the course of the negotiations. The first line of the Acheson statement is significant to me in that the document purports to be a “basis of discussion”, whereas I had thought it would purport to be a statement of policy. When put forward in its present form, it gives me the impression that we are much softer in our attitude than if the same material were to be presented as a matter of national policy. I am told that this is the diplomatic procedure in matters of this kind. I told Mr. Byrnes it would be more in support of Mr. Baruch and would put him in a stronger position—a position less likely to be traded against if Mr. Baruch would always be able to say that the statement was a definition of our position. Apparently the words have a different meaning in diplomatic procedure than I am accustomed to.

The Acheson statement was rather supposed by Mr. Byrnes to be a restatement of my ten-point memorandum of “policies for discussion May 30, 1946”.⁶⁰ (The eleventh point, the exchange of information about raw materials and the survey, was dropped from our memorandum following our evening session on May 30.) The Acheson memorandum, of which I have only one copy, attached to the original of this memorandum, wasn’t an attempt to restate my memorandum in keeping with the views of the State Dept. It really was nothing but a review of the Acheson plan. Also in a copy attached to the original I marked the items in my statement which were not included in the Acheson statement. When I pointed this out to Mr. Byrnes, he emphasized that the statement was written for form rather than content, though it was partly to inform the President.

In reporting to the President, Mr. Byrnes had told him of the meetings and he approved the idea of the penalties as laid down in our memorandum. Mr. Byrnes recommended that it be included and the President assented. Mr. Byrnes told him that there were other minor points of difference which, he thought, could be worked out in the ordinary course.

I told Mr. Byrnes that the Acheson memorandum did not have the content of my memorandum, and that I thought the best thing for me to do was to revise my statement of policies so as to make it as brief as possible, thus avoiding argument on the part of people who query why any change of wording occurs in successive drafts or handling of the idea. I had quite a discussion about the form, and I proposed that I would be glad to work with Ben Cohen⁶¹ after I once revised my statement. The purpose of working with Cohen would be to see that the form was acceptable to the State Dept. I made it very clear that I wasn’t in accord with the content of the Acheson memorandum. It isn’t too clear to me that the Acheson memorandum avoids all argument. Mr. Byrnes wants my statement in the form of conclusions without argument, and this is understood to be the usual procedure. I have not looked over the Acheson memorandum critically so as to see that it has no argument, but my impression is that it departs from the standard which Mr. Byrnes is aiming at.

I told Mr. Byrnes of my attempt to find the legislative history back of the expression, “other weapons of mass destruction”, but that I had gotten only his statement of the evening before. I told him that Gen. Groves, yesterday morning, had offered the suggestion that in the statement of crimes in connection with atomic energy, we might also work in a reference to the use of biological warfare as a crime calling for a penalty, and we might bring in the reference in an indirect way through some such statement as this. Later on in this conference we may want to consider the advisability of providing a penalty for the use of biological warfare and to set up an appropriate penalty at a proper time in our proceedings. We would not be advocating that as a part of our national policy. I have no sharp view as to whether this could be better handled as a statement of U.S. policies or as a part of Mr. Baruch’s personal talk. Mr. Byrnes reviewed the legislative history back of the expression, and in exactly the same form as I reported upon for the evening of May 30th.

The other matter which Mr. Byrnes had in mind as the difference which, he thought, could be reconciled, related to the matter of ownership of uranium ore in the ground. I had told Mr. Byrnes on Thursday night of the views we had in this matter, but apparently I had not been clear, as Mr. Byrnes said last night that he didn’t see the issue entirely in the clear.

I told Mr. Byrnes that when I first read over the Acheson Report, I felt sure there would be a flareup over the word “own” and that before I talked to any mining men and before I read over the report of the Carnegie Foundation, the report also known as the Kerr Report, I had grave concern over that approach to the problem. It will be recalled that in a previous memo in reporting this discussion, I had used the word “control” rather than “own.” Dean Acheson had replied with the word “dominion,” and I had replied in turn with the word “absolute dominion.” I don’t believe there is much difference in position, although Mr. Acheson may feel that ownership adds some safety to control measures.

When the issue was made clear to Mr. Byrnes, it was quite fully discussed. I stressed that I want the International Authority to be the only owner of ore from “birth to death” from the mine mouth on. I mentioned the characteristic of ownership which would be documented by the filing of a deed in the Court House. I mentioned that I wasn’t sure of any similar concept in other parts of the world, particularly where there were not adequate maps and surveys to serve as a basis of the deed. Mr. Byrnes thought there was some benefit of ownership, particularly if the property were posted, and some neighbor came in to operate what was known as international property. I agreed that there might be signs posted or fences put up around known deposits. There is no possible way of owning unknown deposits, and presently unknown deposits could be mined in remote parts of the world without any discovery except the kind of discovery which would be a part of the inspection function as much as a part of the owning function.

I then pointed out that the best way to control atomic energy would be to keep the uranium in the ground so there was no reason to buy a lot of stuff which would only remain in the ground if we, in the A.D.A., were not prepared to buy it. The exception to this would be if a nation decided to violate the Treaty and do it in a way to escape attention. There would be no commercial benefit to their taking such action, and it certainly would be very difficult to produce enough such material for a bomb without revealing the existence of the metallurgical plants required to convert the ore into bomb material. I stressed the point that we were entirely in accord with A.D.A. ownership, management, control, and dominion over the final material ready for bombs. In the middle of the life history of the ore above ground until final use in a bomb, we were stronger than the Acheson Report with regard to so-called safe materials in large power plants. We feel that these plants will likely require the same kind of control as for bomb material, whereas the Acheson Report, relying largely on the denaturing process and its effectiveness, was willing to allow such plants to operate under private control.

I reviewed the argument about the application of eminent domain, agreeing that it would be entirely right and acceptable to our standards and that of other capitalistic countries to use that right in producing material for national security or for war. As our purpose is to prevent war, I see nothing to be gained by setting up the right of eminent domain.

I pointed out that I can see every benefit in favor of our plan as against the Acheson plan insofar as Russia might be concerned. I would think Russia would be more likely to object to international ownership than an international inspection. I cannot conceive Russia agreeing to turn over to an international sovereignty her own State property. I think it is more likely she would consent to inspection, particularly if we can set up some machinery which will keep espionage activities outside of the inspection activities.

On the other hand, I point out that the Acheson plan will have many difficulties with the capitalistic States, particularly in connection with the mines producing uranium as by-products.

I refer to the need of purchasing the entire Rand mines and taking over a control of a large part of the international mining activities, thus destroying or seriously limiting private enterprise in the capitalistic countries. I believe that America, Canada, Britain, Belgium (probably), the Belgian Congo, the Union of South Africa would certainly object to the Acheson plan. This plan would seem to all men in the capitalistic economy as the first start to an international socialized State. Even if the Acheson plan of ownership were to gain the approval of Russia, in preference to my plan of inspection, I think the capitalistic nations would check off that aspect of the plan as being thoroughly distasteful.

I told Mr. Byrnes that I thought it would be very difficult to provide the funds with which to do the purchasing of all of the uranium mines; that I thought the burden would fall upon us to provide the capital and the operating deficits; that Congress would be adverse to large appropriations for the purpose; that other nations could only be induced with great difficulty to carry on their share of the appropriations, because many of them could not get any remote gain from the beneficial uses so far discussed. I feel the ultimate result would be that we would cut down the funds, that the Authority would have to live within its funds, and that the character of its operations would suffer with the result that they wouldn’t have even a good inspection, as a result of which the whole operation would be a failure.

We discussed at some length the difficulties of a truly international managing personnel, the problems of local labor, the difficulty of setting up such a large organization as would be necessary, and the benefits of undertaking a smaller program. Of course, I wouldn’t argue for my point of view, if I were not convinced that inspection can be as efficient to control diversions as if ownership were added to this same inspection. We discussed at some length the means of detecting diversion from mines and the fairly complete devices for locating radio-active materials, whether in the ground or on the person of anyone trying to steal such material, even if this stealing were attempted at the direction of Government.

I feel that if an International Authority tries to operate mines in various parts of the world, it will raise all sorts of questions which can only interfere with the local economy in a way which could not take place if private capital in the country were operating the mine. I did not argue the relative merits of Government operation against private operation, although I see no reason for favoring Government operation, except when it is necessary for the safety of the people or of the nation.

I pointed out that if the Authority had lots of money and were obligated to own, that there would be all sorts of difficulties in determining values and that in many places in the world, there would be low grade mines sold to the International Authority with tremendous pressure for high valuations; and I thought the bickering over the ore content in the mines and the basis of valuation would tend to break down international harmony rather than add to it. On the other side of this picture, if the International Authority doesn’t have the money and if it is the only possible purchaser of a mine, there will be charges of favoritism on the part of the International Authority toward a nation or its nationals desiring to sell their mining deposits. The fact is that we want the International Authority to have dominion. We want to rely upon punitive laws, and we believe that if we take title at the ground, we accomplish everything that is accomplished by the other plan of ownership and we do it with a lot less personnel and a lot less financial risks. With reference to the by-product mines, every one of the same complications would exist.

I agree that there ought to be dominion over the tailings. I also agree that the license given to a by-product mine should be very strict and should be made effective by inspection. I would control the maintenance of the stockpile of tailings, any movements from it, any handling of it by license, and I would make the penalties very severe. I certainly see no reason why—if a clear case is made out that the tailings are not being controlled in terms of the license or if there is any substantial reason to suspect diversion—the Authority should not clamp down, even to the extent of closing the entire mine. I believe that the complicated metallurgical processes, which are required for converting the ore along with the plants required, make it almost as easy to detect diversions at this point as at the earlier point of taking out of the ground. I think a nation which wanted to avoid detection would find it far easier to get the material in several big power plants, denature it, and prepare it for use in a bomb, than to start back with the raw ore and go through all of the processes through which the ore goes before it is ready for use in big power plants.

While I have probably missed some points of the argument insofar as this memorandum is concerned, I think I have devoted enough space to the argument last night. At the end I pointed out our policy of desiring to interfere as little as possible with the private, Governmental and State economy, with the only reason for stepping into that field being one of national safety. In other words, I feel that the International Authority should not dip any further into established local customs or rights than is absolutely necessary for national safety. I question the fairness of any plan which seizes one man’s property, even at fair compensation, in order to give it to another man for a commercial purpose. This argument has been reviewed before. If we plan to provide for ownership, we shall have to set up standards, court practice, etc., and frankly I fear that the Authority may become liable to large payments if valuations are made by national courts against the International Authority. Having seen what has happened in Washington from pressure groups, I don’t want to further the activities of such groups. In the background of all this argument, of course, is my belief that if war uses are prevented, there isn’t any possible use for the metal now in sight.

There were two other points, outside of our ten-point memorandum, which were discussed. One was the matter of personal responsibility as set up in the Nuremberg trials. Mr. Byrnes’ view is that there is now in being adequate international law to cover the matter of personal responsibility for acts of war. He sees no reason to make that as a special point of our program, though he sees no objection to a mention of it. The discussion as to modifying National Constitutions wasn’t pressed to any conclusion.

Mr. Byrnes placed great emphasis upon the desirability of a Treaty, and I placed great emphasis upon a good, effective Treaty. He emphasizes agreement more than I do, because he thinks that the making of agreements gets people into a right frame of mind which will insure the maintenance of the Treaty relationships.

We reviewed at some length the warning given and our concern over the over-selling of the denaturing plan, and we thought it would be helpful to argue for the penalty provisions even if we failed to get them, because the country would see that in our opinion the Treaty wasn’t as good as we would like. I mentioned the situation in which we would find ourselves before the Senate when the confirmation question arises, because at the same time we would not be able to press unreservedly for ratification. We would, in effect, be saying:—This is not as good as we wanted. It is as good as we can get. The Treaty does afford some protection, but the protection ranges from say three months to a year after the plan is in operation and assuming that it works up to our hopes. There, first, is the problem of the interim period during which we rely upon the incapacity of the world to produce a bomb within say five years. We will then be back to reliance upon the Treaty, with such faith as we have in its being lived up to. In order to avoid emphasizing the dangers, we should point out our belief that at the time of any discovered evasion, we would still probably have a head start over other nations because of our body of scientists, our experience, our industrial capacity, etc.

This morning, June 1, Mr. Byrnes telephoned me and we went over our conversation of last evening with reference to the difficulties between my 10 points and the Acheson memorandum, Mr. Byrnes’ statement to the President about the minor points of difference, my pointing out that the contents were entirely different, and Mr. Byrnes picking out of our conversation our general approval of the Acheson Report. He asked me to give him a memorandum which would point out the differences, with his purpose to give the memorandum to the President so that the President would be informed and would not make any slip or possibly be misled through Mr. Byrnes’ emphasis upon the minor points of difference, which could be reconciled.

We had planned to see Dean Acheson at 12:30 on Saturday, June 1st, and I arranged that if we didn’t find the time, I would cancel that engagement.

Mr. Byrnes told us he does not approve of the Acheson plan for reestablishing the Scientific Committee under the State Department. This was referred to in our memorandum.

58. This memorandum, written on the morning of June 1, describes a meeting attended by Messrs. Byrnes, Baruch, and Hancock.
59. The Acheson memorandum is a slightly revised version of the memorandum by the Board of Consultants to Mr. Baruch, of May 19, which is printed on p. 790.
60. The memorandum under reference is not printed; for a summary of its substance, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 567. A redraft dated June 4 is printed on p. 827.
61. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor, Department of State.