Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Draft Statement Prepared by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission ⁶³

[Washington,] June 4, 1946.

Statement of United States Policy

The proposals in this paper, put forth as a basis of discussion, grow out of three basic conclusions:

1. It is believed that an international agreement leaving the development of atomic energy in national hands, subject to an obligation not to develop atomic energy for war purposes and relying solely on an international inspection system to detect evasions, will not provide adequate security and indeed may be a source of insecurity.

2. It is believed

(a) That a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb would not be an effective fulfillment of the directions under which the Commission is to proceed; therefore, that an international atomic development authority be set up, with adequate powers:

(b) That in addition to the greatest safeguards which can be established through a competent international authority in this field, there should be immediate and certain penalties for certain defined crimes which the Commission should set up as a part of its plan; and

(c) That penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their operation as possible, be set up for such acts as

(1) Use or possession of an atomic bomb, or possession or separation of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;

(2) The seizure of an international authority plant;

(3) Construction of a plant for building atomic bombs;

(4) The creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to or in the absence of a license to be granted by the international control body. Other offenses with other procedures and penalties will doubtless be a part of a control plan.

(d) It will be obvious that this necessarily involves an agreement for the disposal of all bombs and atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb.

(e) That the plan might also include a statement as to the employment of biological warfare and provide appropriate penalties therefor.

3. It is further believed that the aim of preventing atomic warfare can only be achieved by entrusting to an international organization

(a) Managerial control of all atomic energy activities intrinsically dangerous to world security;

(b) Power to control, inspect, and license all other activities and stages.

If an international agency is given sole responsibility for the dangerous activities, leaving the non-dangerous open to nations and their citizens and if the international agency is given and carries forward affirmative development responsibility, furthering among other things the beneficial uses of atomic energy and enabling itself to comprehend and therefore detect the misuse of atomic energy, these afford the best prospect of security.

For purposes of discussion, the following measures are proposed as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to the conclusions just stated. In this paper the proposed international agency is referred to as the Atomic Development Authority.

1. General—The Atomic Development Authority should seek to set up a thorough plan of control through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel.

It is believed that the plan of control in all its aspects must be adequate not only in concept—a combination of responsibility for developments as well as control—but in type of organization and in choice of personnel to guarantee the most effective control required to provide for the security of the nation. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. Raw Materials—The Atomic Development Authority when set up should have as one of its earliest purposes to bring under its complete dominion world supplies of uranium and thorium. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. The agency should also constantly investigate new methods for recovering these materials where they occur in small quantities so that as their recovery from such sources becomes practical, means of control can be devised.

It seems to be the minimum content of any plan that the international authority shall be given authority to license all production and shall be the sole buyer of any material from which uranium or thorium can be produced, sales to any other buyer being forbidden.

(a) On account of the character of the problem involved in mines where source materials may exist as by-products of other mining operations, all such operations must be carried on under license of the international authority. Such licenses should include every reasonable protective device to insure that source material of no matter how low a grade shall be handled, protected and disposed of only in accordance with the directions of the international authority. A license should permit the international authority to stop mining operations involving source materials except in keeping with the terms of such a license. It is assumed that if proper safeguards are established for the maintenance, protection and care of tailings, such materials may be permitted to accumulate when properly safeguarded. If our world demand should not require the normal output of this by-product uranium or thorium it is not our thought that the power should be given without restriction to the international authority to stop the entire mining operation.

(b) On the other hand, mines producing uranium or thorium not as a by-product of other mining operations, but operating under license from the international authority might be closed not only for violations of their licenses but also because of a surplus of production. It is conceivable, until world supplies are surveyed, that there may be situations in which the Authority should have power to require operation if the owners should decide not to operate such a mine—of course under proper provision for “fair compensation”.

(c) When the Atomic Development Authority finds it advantageous to own a mine producing source materials, it may buy such a mine.

(d) In the case of every mine, there should be absolute dominion and control by the international authority over the products containing source materials.

Under this plan, when ore gets to the mine mouth, or in the case of a by-product operation, when the ore starts toward the metallurgical process for the production of uranium, it is contemplated it belong to the Atomic Development Authority and be subject to its sole control thereafter.

3. Primary Production Plants—The Atomic Development Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control in all cases, and ordinarily should operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives—The Authority should be given exclusive authority to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by preserving its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to tell where the line between the intrinsically dangerous and the non-dangerous should be drawn. If it turns out at some time in the future, as a result of new discoveries, that other materials or other processes lend themselves to dangerous atomic developments, it is important that the Authority should be the first to know. At that time measures would have to be taken to extend the boundaries of safeguards.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials—The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world, with the approval of the Security Council. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Non-Dangerous Activities—Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of reasearch reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials necessary for these activities should be furnished, under lease or other suitable arrangement by the Atomic Development Authority.

It should be an essential function of the Atomic Development Authority to promote to the fullest possible extent the peacetime benefits that can be obtained from the use of atomic energy. In the field of pure science, the radiations and radioactive isotopes, produced as a consequence of atomic fission, are already being used in this country, though the supply is not yet adequate, for fundamental researches in physics and biology. In the field of applied science, these same radiations and isotopes will become available for medical and industrial utilization. And in the field of engineering, it can be regarded as quite possible that atomic energy will in the course of years provide an important supplement to other methods of power production for the national economy of all countries.

It is necessary at all times to take advantage of the opportunity for promoting decentralized and diversified national and private developments and of avoiding unnecessary concentration of functions in the Authority. It should, therefore, be a primary function of the Authority to encourage developments by nations and private enterprise in the broad field of non-dangerous activities.

7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities—The Atomic Development Authority should have power to decide what activities relating to atomic energy are dangerous or non-dangerous and to change its decisions as conditions change. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between the dangerous and the non-dangerous, it is not hard and fast. Machinery should therefore be provided to assure constant examination and re-examination of the question, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. Management and Licensing—It is believed that at the proper stage in the progress contemplated in a control plan, any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection on the part of international authority, but also that its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of the international authority. The international authority shall also have powers to license operation by others until such time as the international authority is prepared to take on the responsibilities involved in this character of operation, but with a clear understanding that the international authority will not permit any such operation if in its judgment, such operation will lessen the security of the nations.

9. Inspection Activities—By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to management by the Atomic Delevopment Authority, the difficulties of inspection are thereby reduced to manageable proportions. For if the Atomic Development Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct the dangerous activities in the field of raw materials, primary production plants, and research in explosives, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute a danger signal.

The plan does not contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection procedures covering the whole of industry. The delegation of authority for making inspections will have to be carefully drawn so that the inspection may be adequate for the needs and responsibilities of the Authority and yet not go beyond this point. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of and be incidental to its other functions. An important measure of inspection will be those associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is one of the keystones of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the agency but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority. Finally, a means should be provided to enable the international organization to make special “spot” investigations of any suspicious national or private activities.

10. Personnel—The personnel of the Atomic Development Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis, giving much weight to geographical and national distribution. Although the problem of recruitment of the high-quality personnel required for the top executive and technical positions will be difficult, it will certainly be far less difficult than the recruitment of the similarly high-quality personnel that would be necessary for any purely policing organization.

11. Negotiation Stage—The final step in the creation of the system of control is the spelling out, in comprehensive terms of the functions, responsibilities, authority, and limitations of the Atomic Development Authority. Once a Charter for the agency has been written, and adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will therefore have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the Charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the U.N. Assembly which created this Commission.

12. Disclosures—In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States must be prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of this treaty. If and when the Authority is actually created, the United States must then also be prepared to make available other information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. And as the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States must further be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the international agency.

It should require a still longer time to produce enough atomic bombs to have an important influence on the outcome of war. Thus all the nations of the world should receive well in advance of the possible time of attack by atomic weapons clear, simple, and unequivocal danger signals that would enable them to prepare all measures of protection that would be available—an opportunity which would be wholly lost to them in the event of surprise attack. This warning in time should bring into operation the plan for the “immediate and certain penalties”. Our working together here should help build a broad confidence among the peoples of the world and the plan which emerges from our work should still further advance this confidence.

As the plan goes into operation and continues, it can, moreover, create deterrents to the initiation of schemes of aggression, and it can establish patterns of cooperation among nations, the extension of which may even contribute to the solution of the problem of war itself.

14. International Control—There will be questions about the extent of control allowed to national bodies, should an international body be established and in this respect, it is believed that any control by an atomic energy authority set up by any state should be subordinate to direction and absolute dominion on the part of the international authority. It will readily be seen at this time that this is not an endorsement or disapproval of the creation of national authorities, or a definition of their jurisdiction. This problem will be before the Commission and it should deal with a clear separation of duties and responsibilities of such state authorities if such are included in any plan, with the purpose of preventing possible conflicts of jurisdiction.

63. This document is a revision of Mr. Hancock’s statement of May 30, p. 811, in view of the discussions between Byrnes and Baruch and their assistants on May 30 and 31 (Department of State Atomic Energy Files).