893.00/10–3145: Telegram
The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 4—2:55 p.m.]
97. Would respectfully offer with reference current situation Manchuria and North China following observations which are speculative and cannot at present be supported by concrete evidence. (Telegram not sent Moscow; Department please repeat71).
From revolutionary point of view it would be favorable circumstance if sympathetic forces were in occupation adjacent area during period when revolutionaries were engaged in civil war. Such situation exists with Soviet occupation Manchuria and areas Inner Mongolia contiguous to regions held by Chinese Communists. Population settlement and communications Inner Mongolia and along Jehol border are both such, given extinction Jap garrison forces and Communist experience, that important support could readily flow to Chinese Communists from Soviet occupied zone should there be will to do so on Soviet side. Possibility maintenance military contacts with Chinese Communists located Manchuria fully obvious.
Much of war material shipped from Vladivostok by sea since termination war has been such as might be used in field. At least some shipments may have been destined for Port Arthur. Even assuming that Soviets have this early been implementing plan for building up [Page 1034] military defenses Soviet Far East, need for large amount field equipment for that use not apparent. Although Soviets at time their entry into war in Pacific area must not only have been well prepared but have known that the task immediately ahead would not be difficult, both immediately before outbreak war and after August 14 substantial quantity war material moved eastward on Transsib Railway with traffic reduced east of Irkutsk. Material observed consisted mostly of Soviet military transport and light artillery and planes but comparatively little equipment identifiable as of American origin.
In Red Army there are not only Korean nationals but probably valuable cadre of Chinese and of course many Mongols.
USSR would be in position physically to extend help to Chinese Communists if it wished to do so. Believe that in such event most help would be extended in form material aid but not personnel. However, valuable technical personnel and leadership could be given by Soviet Asiastic nationals functioning nominally as “Chinese insurgents”. Pattern would be that of Soviet intervention in Spain and Sinkiang (1934) with Red troops participating as “Partisans”. Note maintenance 1937 to 43 of distinguished RT Soviet troops72 at Hami.
Reports have been circulated, particularly from Chinese side, suggesting Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria will be completed by end of November. Vladivostok press has stated troops are currently withdrawn. Suggest, however, that should major civil war in China occur, Soviets might well feel themselves in position to argue that they should remain Manchuria while civil disorder China continued, until it became feasible relinquish control to China Government exercising acknowledged authority North China as well as elsewhere.
Legal benefits obtained by Soviets through August 14 agreements would be considered by them to continue even if National Government were (1) to fall or (2) to be limited in political jurisdiction to area, for instance, south of Lunghai line, so Soviet bona fides [in] that respect need not be questioned. By Soviet revolutionary concepts, however, there could never be reconciliation of Chinese Communists and “bourgeois” Kuomintang. Popular front concept is one used by Communists when their position is weak and not permanent element their philosophy. It is unlikely that Soviets, in reaching August 14 agreements, anticipated that with return international peace there would come era of domestic reconciliation and orderly reconstruction in China or that they felt bound by point 1 of Molotov’s73 pertinent note that to give moral support and material assistance to (Ktg [Kmt]) National Government in event future civil war, where note has reference to implementation treaty which in turn governs joint [Page 1035] actions vis-à-vis Japan during war time. Any rising tide revolution in China generally would surely be viewed with deep sympathy in USSR. Moscow estimate of that revolutionary situation would probably include belief that American opinion would not suffer extension direct U.S. support Chungking with military supplies for use in civil war, especially if it were made to appear that U.S.A. was thus “opposing will of Chinese people” and that such policy, moreover, held danger of exacerbation U.S.A.–USSR relations.
Soviet desideratum would probably be pro-Soviet Communist-led regime in control in Manchuria and North China. In China fundamental conflict between Kmg [Kmt] and Chinese Communists is evidently about to be put to issue and in such case the trend of events here tentatively outlined seems not only rendered possible but made logical by recent history.