761.93/2–445
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State 11
Mr. Secretary: Reference Ambassador Hurley’s telegram No. 167 of February 4, 1945, reporting the plan of Dr. T. V. Soong to visit Moscow to discuss with Soviet officials certain matters of interest to the Chinese and Soviet Governments.
With regard to the first item of the tentative agenda, namely, the establishment of closer and more harmonious relations between China and Russia, former Vice President Wallace, with the approval of the President, stressed to Chiang Kai-shek the importance of improving Soviet-Chinese relations. Subsequently, the President in a message to [Page 854] Chiang Kai-shek commented that Soviet-Chinese conversations would be greatly facilitated if, prior thereto, the Chinese Government had reached a working arrangement with the Chinese Communists. Generalissimo Chiang and Madame Chiang, in their conversations with Mr. Wallace, suggested a tripartite conference composed of U. S. S. R. and Chinese delegates, with U. S. delegates assuming somewhat the role of mediator or “go-between” in a discussion of Soviet-Chinese problems. Mr. Wallace pointed out that the United States could not be expected to assume such a role and that an improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations might best be effected by direct conversations between representatives of the two concerned Governments.
The second item of the agenda is a suggestion that the Soviet Union enter the war in the Far East. Such a suggestion, entirely apart from doubtful wisdom of broaching the subject at all, would manifestly require very delicate handling.
The third item suggests discussion of the future of Korea and of Soviet use of a Manchurian port. It is believed that bilateral discussion between Soviet and Chinese representatives of the future position of Korea should be avoided if possible and, in any event, should be purely exploratory. The United States and the United Kingdom both have a very definite interest in the future of Korea and should be included in any discussions thereof. Furthermore, an exploratory exchange of views on the technical level in regard to various questions affecting the future of Korea are now proceeding between representatives of the British, Chinese and American Governments. Chiang Kai-shek told Mr. Wallace last summer that, in Cairo, he had informed the President of China’s willingness to make Dairen a free port provided Chinese sovereignty was fully respected.
With regard to the discussion of post-war Soviet-Chinese economic relations which constitutes the fourth item on the agenda, it is believed that exploration of this subject would be very useful, especially in view of the industrialization that has taken place in Soviet Asia during the war and of China’s need of capital goods for post-war reconstruction.
The fifth item of the agenda, which proposes discussion of a program to guarantee peace between China and the U.S.S.R. on both sides of the border, raises questions which involve Outer Mongolia, northern Manchuria and Sinkiang Province. The U.S.S.R., while recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, actually treats with Outer Mongolia as an “independent” state under Russian protection. Until two years ago Russian influence in Sinkiang Province was strong and in recent months non-Chinese elements in Sinkiang in areas bordering upon Outer Mongolia and upon Kazakistan (U.S.S.R.) have been periodically in conflict with Chinese troops. The Chinese suspect Russian support of those elements. No racial [Page 855] problems are involved in northern Manchuria but the question may arise as to the future status of the former Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway which the U.S.S.R. sold to “Manchukuo” about 10 years ago.
The degree to which Dr. Soong’s conversations in Moscow will have practical results will depend upon a number of factors. If Dr. Soong goes without fairly broad powers from Chiang Kai-shek, there is little of a concrete nature which he can accomplish. Another factor of great importance will be the state of Kuomintang-Communist relations. Little progress apparently is being made in reaching a settlement of this problem. Unless some form of settlement between the two political groups is reached prior to Soong’s visit, he may find the Russians willing to talk only in generalities. Still another factor, of course, will be the degree to which Soong can convince the Russians that the antagonism and suspicion which have characterized the attitude of the Chinese Government leaders toward the U. S. S. R. in recent years no longer exist. The Russians for their part have a deep-seated suspicion of such Chinese leaders as General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff, and many of the Chinese military commanders.
The question of Russian territorial ambitions in the Far East at China’s expense is frequently mentioned. It is believed, however, that the real question in Chinese-Russian relations is not so much “territorial” as political; that is, the Russian attitude toward the Communist-Kuomintang problem. If the Russians should decide to support the Chinese Communists there is little question but that they could perpetuate a condition of disunity and disturbance in China. At present the Russians have an agreement with China to refrain from interference in internal affairs in China but future developments may cause them to abandon that policy. Military action against the Chinese Communists by an anti-Russian Chinese Government might be one development that would cause a change in Russia’s attitude. The rapid post-war development of an anti-Russian Japan might cause the Russians to seek security in fostering a satellite Chinese regime in north China and Manchuria. These are some of the potential dangers that beset Chinese-Russian relations and which are of concern not only to China and Russia but to us and all the United Nations.
- Copy transmitted to the Ambassador in China in Department’s instruction No. 44, February 12, not printed.↩