Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

761.93/2–445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)

Washington, February 6, 1945—8 p.m.

200. The following tentative comment is made in response to your telegram no. 167, February 4, 2 p.m.:

On the general subject of your telegram, we feel, and believe you will concur in our opinion, that, while we are at all times anxious to be helpful to the Chinese Government, we should not permit the Chinese Government to gain the impression that we are prepared to assume responsibility as “adviser” to it in its relations with the U.S.S.R. Former Vice President Wallace, with the subsequent approval of the President, indicated clearly last summer⁷ to Chiang Kai-shek, in response to a suggestion by Chiang, that the United States could not be expected to act as “mediator” between China and Russia. Furthermore the President in a message to the Generalissimo, transmitted through the Embassy as the Department’s 955 of July 14,⁸ stated that a conference between Chinese and Russian representatives would be greatly facilitated if, prior thereto, the Chinese Government had reached a working arrangement with the Chinese Communists for effective prosecution of the war against Japan. In the Department’s telegram no. 1196 of September 9, 4 p.m.,⁹ the President and the Secretary expressed views, for communication by Gauss¹⁰ to Chiang Kai-shek, with regard to the importance of reaching such a “working arrangement”.

With particular reference to the proposed agenda, we feel that the Chinese must reach their own decision with regard to what questions they should (or should not) discuss with the Russians and that we ought not take it upon ourselves to place a caveat upon or to sponsor discussion of any particular question.

You will of course readily appreciate that advance disclosure on the part of the Chinese of intention to include in their discussions with the Soviet Government item 2 of the proposed agenda might prejudice the success of the conversations. We are inclined to think that if it should be advisable at all to bring up this topic, which we seriously doubt, it should be approached very delicately and with careful preparation. We make the foregoing observations because it is not clear to us whether the proposed agenda is one which would be presented to the Soviet Government as a whole or whether it is simply for Soong’s guidance as establishing an authorized range of subjects which he might raise in his discretion when and as opportunities present themselves.

With regard to other items on the proposed agenda we have no suggestions in mind.

With reference to your final and penultimate paragraphs, we have no concrete information which runs counter to the four points mentioned by you.

We appreciate receiving your report on this matter and hope that you will keep us informed of developments. You will of course know best how to handle discussions on the subject with the Chinese in a manner which will be helpful to them and unprejudicial to our position.

Grew

7. For Vice President Wallace’s mission, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 216 ff.
8. Ibid., p. 245.
9. Ibid., p. 567.
10. Clarence E. Gauss, then Ambassador in China.