860h.01/7–545: Telegram
The Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters
646. The Brit Embassy has repeatedly brought up the question of General Mihajlovic with a view to determining a joint policy for recommendations to SACMED,9 preferably for the “rescue and honorable detention” of Mihajlovic. While the earlier Brit recommendations have in part been overtaken by events, it may shortly be necessary to take a position regarding Mihajlovic. We have therefore informed the Embassy (1) that we have never had any information indicating that Mihajlovic wanted to give himself up for purposes of his own security; (2) that we would not agree to having an American military group, or a joint Anglo-American mission, sent into Yugoslavia to rescue him from the Partisans; (3) that if he joins up with Allied armies we think that he and any followers having the semblance of armed forces should be immobilized, moved to the rear, and held according to the program proposed for any dissident Yugoslavs as set forth in our no. 424 May 2; (4) that as regards notification, since factors of military security would not now be involved, we see no reason why, if Mihajlovic enters Allied lines, the fact should not be made public at once by a general announcement rather than a special and separate communication to Marshal Tito. If the Brit consider [Page 1243] it desirable for their Ambassador at Belgrade to make such a communication, we would be willing to supply Patterson with instructions for guidance in replying to any inquiry the Yugoslav authorities may make of him.
We suppose that if Mihajlovic gets through to Allied forces the Yugoslavs will at once demand that he be turned over as a war criminal. Pending the adoption of definite procedures for handling war criminal cases, our position as regards Mihajlovic is as follows:
The complexity of the Mihajlovic case arises from the fact that during a large part of the war he was acclaimed as an Allied general; that the Govt which he served terminated his functions as Minister of War but left his military status in considerable ambiguity; and that during the last 18 months he has been a controversial figure on the political plane, repudiated by the faction which then gained the ascendancy and which controls the Govt now accepted as the Provisional Govt of Yugoslavia. For some months before the cessation of hostilities he had been in effect immobilized as a military leader, largely, as we think, on political grounds. As regards his military operations in the last year the reports have been so contradictory that final judgment should be reserved.
Since Marshal Tito and his Govt have publicly proclaimed the verdict as well as the “trial” if Mihajlovic falls into their hands, his case should be considered from the point of view of the general instability in Yugoslavia in this interim period. We think therefore that in no circumstances should he be turned over to the Yugoslav authorities as the situation now stands. Later, and depending on the war crimes procedures which may be adopted, it might be necessary to review this position. We could reasonably hold, however, that in view of the political character of the case, he should not be returned to Yugoslavia until there is satisfactory evidence that the present provisional Govt has fulfilled its obligation to set up a representative administration and has relaxed the rigid controls under which democratic freedoms are now denied to the Yugoslav people though the military justification therefore no longer exists.
We consider the question to be one transcending Mihajlovic personally, in that the Nationalist movement is a major political element entitled to a voice in determining the future of Yugoslavia. There is a clear obligation under the Yalta formula to prevent the elimination of such groups or leaders or at least to determine the procedures for examining the evidence upon which the charges against Mihajlovic are allegedly based.
Sent to Caserta; repeated to Belgrade.
- Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.↩