871.00/8–3145: Telegram
The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:25 p.m.]
626. The present moment, while the left element of the National Democratic Front Government is preparing its next move and while King Michael awaits from the three principal Allies a reply to his letter, seems opportune to reappraise the latest phase of the chronic Rumanian political crisis.
The Department was informed that the King, after the publication of the Potsdam communiqué, consulted Rumanian political leaders, the majority of whom favored the formation of a government under conditions which would permit its recognition by all of the three principal [Page 600] Allies. Acting on their advice the King asked Prime Minister Groza to resign, but Mr. Groza refused. The King then appealed to the three principal Allies, through their representatives on the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest, to lend the assistance anticipated by the Yalta Declaration for such an emergency.
The key to the solution of Rumania’s principal problem now rests with Washington, Moscow and London. Nevertheless, the rhythm of political activity in Bucharest has been accelerated rather than retarded by the subordination of the position of Bucharest. Leaders of all groups are jockeying for position. Opposition leaders are vigilant but impotent. Groza is alternatively [alternately] nervous and uncertain then boastful and pretentious. Petrescu, fighter [fighting?] for his political life, is using every trick in the bag to remain in power. Petrescu has hesitated to implement his party’s recent declaration by calling for the retirement of the Socialist ministers in the Groza government, perhaps minding a threat the Communists made against his life. The left leaders of the National Democratic Front Government are seeking by every means to consolidate their position. And with press, radio, police, courts and army directly controlled by Communist Ministers, they are able to put up a bold but shallow front, for they know that as they increase the tempo of their ballyhoo they lose support from the citizens of the country. The swing is definitely away from the National Democratic Front Government. The King is the rallying point for all opposition.
Realizing the importance of the stake, and in order to precipitate a local solution, the Rumanian Communist Ministers are trying to cloud the real issue by exaggerating out of its true proportion a relatively minor by-product of the crisis—the decision of the King not to sign the decrees presented by the Groza government. To discredit him they whisper that state employees will not be paid because the King will not sign a decree for their payment; that the Government cannot buy grain in order to increase the bread ration as the bank cannot pay out cash without a Royal decree. They even threaten that his life will not be safe if he continues to disregard the interests of the people. But in spite of pressure and threats the King has maintained his position. He feels that if he signs one he must sign all decrees. And if he signs all he will inevitably sign some that will make him appear ridiculous in the eyes of his subjects and cast doubts abroad upon the sincerity of his actions toward the Groza government.82
[Page 601]The common goal of the Rumanian Communists and Soviet officials in Rumania was never more apparent than now. The Rumanian Communists are out to discredit the King, to maintain the Groza government in power, and to conduct elections under that government. High Soviet officials, who apparently have been reporting back to Moscow a confirmation of the Moscow propaganda line for Rumania to the effect that the Groza government was solidly backed by the people, have been caught napping by recent events. They were surprised and horrified by the action of the King in calling for the resignation of the Groza government and in appealing to the three principal Allies. Pavlov has been recalled, whether or not because of his failure to keep Moscow correctly apprised I do not know, and is definitely leaving Rumania within the next few days. Susaikov said that he is going to save his own head at all costs and this probably means that he is going to close his eyes to the tactics used by the Rumanian Communists to maintain their position.
If Rumania is to be spared having a Communist regime fraudulently imposed upon her, it is essential that the three principal Allies act soon upon King Michael’s request. The Governments of the United States and England have announced their readiness to consult. The Soviets as far as is known here have given no reply. In fact, there is a growing feeling that the Soviet Government will give United States and England the same runaround that they gave us in March when we asked for consultations on the Rumanian situation. We must avoid this or pay the penalty for failing to avoid it. The penalty in Rumania will be the disastrous undermining of our moral position in this country; the abandoning of the King in an isolated and discredited position after he had acted on good faith on the basis of our own and our Allies’ statements; that continuing of a National Democratic Front Government in power, perhaps without Socialist participation, whose early action will be the confirmation of its position through fixed elections and the rapid neutralization or eradication of the influences of the Western Democracies; and, finally, the fostering of a condition that wall not be conducive to lasting peace in the Balkans. This can all be avoided if we discharge the responsibility we have taken upon ourselves and insist that our Soviet Allies discharge theirs. In securing the latter we now have the advantage of the knowledge that they know, and are aware that we know, of the weakness of their present position in Rumania.
Repeated to Moscow as 194, London as 9, and Caserta as 160.
- Telegram 628, August 31, from Bucharest, reported that General Susaikov was urging the King speedily to sign two impending decrees establishing the joint Soviet-Rumanian Bank and aviation companies. In order to avoid complicating tripartite discussions concerning Rumania, the King would welcome any observations that the Department might choose to make upon his position. (871.00/8–3145)↩