Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/4–2345

Minutes of Third Meeting Regarding the Polish Question⁸¹

April 23, 1945, 9 p.m. to 9:35 p.m.

Principal Participants:	Mr. Stettinius
	Mr. Eden
	Mr. Molotov
	Sir Alexander Cadogan
	Mr. Dunn
	Mr. Harriman
	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
	Mr. Gromyko

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt it would be a good idea to finish with the Polish question and added that he could say nothing more than the President himself had stated this afternoon to Mr. Molotov, but he understood that Mr. Eden desired to clear up a few points.

Mr. Eden stated he would like to clear up the question of Mikolajczyk and the matter of the Curzon Line. He then asked his interpreter to read Stalin’s message to the Prime Minister and the latter’s reply regarding this question.

(Marshal Stalin’s message⁸² regarding Mikolajczyk replied to the Prime Minister’s message of April 15 which contained the text of the statement made by Mikolajczyk⁸³ in which he indicated that he fully accepted the Crimean decision. Stalin asked to have the full text of the statement and desired to have further clarification as to whether Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as the definitive frontier between the two countries. The Prime Minister replied⁸⁴ that he had given Stalin the full text of Mikolajczyk’s statement in his message of April 15 and added that Mikolajczyk agrees to the entire Crimean decision and accepted the Curzon Line as a frontier. He told Marshal Stalin that if Mikolajczyk had not accepted the Curzon Line the Prime Minister would not have sent his message containing Mikolajczyk’s statement.)

Mr. Molotov remarked that from the text of the telegram it did not appear that Mikolajczyk had said that he accepted the Curzon Line but that the Prime Minister had stated that Mikolajczyk accepted this solution, and he asked whether Mikolajczyk had made a definite declaration on this point.

Mr. Eden replied that the Prime Minister had talked to Mr. Mikolajczyk who made the statement to him, and he added that he would send Mr. Molotov the text of an article written by Mr. Mikolajczyk which appeared on April 19 and which clearly indicated that he accepted the Curzon Line.⁸⁵ Mr. Eden then added that Mr. Stettinius had told him about the statements made to Mr. Molotov by the President this afternoon to the effect that the final position of the United States Government with regard to the Polish matter was expressed in the joint message sent by the President and the Prime Minister on April 18. Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make absolutely sure what the position of the Soviet Government was in order that he might send an accurate report to the War Cabinet. He then stated that this morning Mr. Molotov had indicated that we could either accept the Yugoslav formula or consult in the first instance with the Warsaw Poles, if we wished to reach a solution of the Polish problem.

Mr. Molotov replied that we could accept either proposal.

Mr. Eden remarked that Mr. Stettinius had already explained that we could not do this, and he added that Mr. Molotov had said that the Soviet Union could not reply to the joint message until they had consulted with the Warsaw Poles. He stated that his understanding of the Soviet position was that they would consult with the Warsaw Poles and then would let us have their considered reply to the joint message so that the matter could be further discussed at San Francisco.

Mr. Molotov stated that not only should the Soviet Union consult with the Warsaw Poles but also the Commission.

Mr. Eden asked if this meant that the Commission could not do anything until they got back to Moscow.

Mr. Molotov replied that we can’t settle this without the Poles.

Mr. Eden stated that the United States and British Governments have sent a joint message to Marshal Stalin and that according to Mr. Molotov the Soviet Government could not reply until they had consulted with the Warsaw Poles, and therefore he presumed that the Soviet Government would consult with the Warsaw Poles and give us their reply in a few days.

Mr. Molotov asserted that, as Mr. Churchill had indicated at the Crimea, the Commission should work as a commission and not on an individual basis and that if the members of the Commission should start individual consultations, this would mean the breaking up of the Commission, and he asked whether Mr. Eden wished to end the Commission.

Mr. Eden replied that this was a fantastic misstatement of what he had said. He reminded Mr. Molotov that we had addressed a joint message to Moscow and we only asked for a reply. He again asked that the Soviet Union consult with the Warsaw Poles and send an answer to this message. He further stated that he could not accept that no reply be sent to the joint message until Mr. Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Molotov had returned to Moscow, as Mr. Molotov had intimated a few minutes ago.

Mr. Molotov replied that he would no longer endeavor to interpret the ideas of Mr. Eden and added that Mr. Eden was telescoping two questions which were separate and distinct. He continued that he wished to follow his own ideas and discuss the two questions, one being the question of a reply, which is the business of Marshal Stalin, and the second is the question of consultation with the Warsaw Poles. He added that he had not been instructed to discuss the correspondence between the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin, and indicated that Marshal Stalin himself would write the reply to the joint message. As regards consultation, that is a matter for the Commission to handle unless the Commission has been dissolved, which he hoped was not the case.

Mr. Eden replied that he had not mixed Stalin’s message with the question of consultation but that it was Mr. Molotov who had said that he could not give us a reply to proposal number one in the joint message without first consulting with the Warsaw Poles. He added that all he desired to have was an early reply to the joint message since until we get that we cannot make any further progress in regard to the Polish question.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had not been authorized to give an answer for Marshal Stalin who will reply to the message when he is ready.

Mr. Eden remarked that it would appear therefore that it would not be possible to make any progress either here or in San Francisco.

Mr. Molotov stated that if it was really desired to make progress, progress could be made. If it was not desired to make progress, of course there would be none.

Mr. Eden remarked that unfortunately he could not draft Marshal Stalin’s reply here.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union had indicated its position on more than one occasion and its position was based on the Crimea decision.

Mr. Eden stated that no progress would be made until we had a reply from Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Molotov assured him that Marshal Stalin would reply.

Mr. Stettinius asserted that no further progress could be made until an answer was received and urged Mr. Molotov to see that an early reply was forthcoming.

Mr. Molotov promised to do this.

[For the exchange of remarks regarding the Polish problem between the Secretary of State and Foreign Commissar Molotov during a conference held in San Francisco on April 24, 1945, see the memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 24, 1945, volume I, page 380.]

81. Meeting held at the Department of State, April 23, 1945, 9 p.m. to 9:35 p.m.
82. For Marshal Stalin’s message of April 17, 1945, to Prime Minister Churchill, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 489, or Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, document No. 428, p. 324.
83. For Prime Minister Churchill’s message of April 15 to Marshal Stalin, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, document No. 425, p. 322, For text of the Mikolajczyk public statement, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 489, or Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, p. 114.
84. For Prime Minister Churchill’s message of April 18 to Marshal Stalin, see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, document No. 429, p. 324. In his message to Marshal Stalin dated April 22, Prime Minister Churchill quoted a public statement by Mikolajczyk which appeared in his newspaper Jutro Polski on April 19 and in which Mikolajczyk accepted the Curzon Line as Poland’s eastern frontier. For Churchill’s message quoting the text of the Mikolajczyk statement, see ibid., document No. 436, p. 329.
85. See footnote 84, above.