Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

760C.61/4–2345

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State ⁷⁹

[Washington,] April 23, 1945.

Participants:	The President
	The Secretary of State
	Mr. Molotov Ambassador Harriman
	Ambassador Gromyko
	Admiral Leahy
	Mr. Pavlov
	Mr. Bohlen

After greeting Mr. Molotov the President said that he had been sorry to learn that no progress had been made towards a solution of the Polish question. Mr. Molotov said that he also regretted that. The President then stated that the proposals contained in the joint message from himself and the Prime Minister were eminently fair and reasonable and that we go as far as we can to meet the desires of the Soviet Government as expressed in the message which Marshal Stalin sent on April 7. He emphasized that the United States Government could not agree to be a party to the formation of a Polish Government which was not representative of all Polish democratic elements. He added that the United States Government was deeply disappointed that the Soviet Government had not found it possible to carry out the consultation with representatives of the Polish Government other than those who were not officials of the Warsaw regime. He said that the United States Government is determined together with other members of the United Nations to go ahead with plans for the world organization no matter what difficulties or differences may arise with regard to other matters. He felt nevertheless that the failure of the three principal allies who had borne the brunt of the war to carry out the Crimea decision with regard to Poland will cast serious doubt upon our unity of purpose in regard to postwar collaboration. He mentioned that in his last message to Marshal Stalin on April 1 President Roosevelt had made it plain that no policy in the United States whether foreign or domestic could succeed unless it enjoyed public confidence and support. He said that this applied of necessity to economic collaboration as well as political. The President added that legislative appropriation was required for any economic measures in the foreign field and that he could not hope to get these measures through Congress unless there was public support for them. He concluded by expressing the sincere hope that the Soviet Government would keep these factors in mind in considering the request that the British and American proposals in the joint message from himself and the Prime Minister on Poland be accepted and that Mr. Molotov be authorized to continue the discussions in San Francisco on that basis. He then handed to Mr. Molotov with the request that it be transmitted immediately to Marshal Stalin the attached message.

Mr. Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. Mr. Molotov said that he hoped he expressed the views of the Soviet Government in stating that they wished to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain as before. The President said he agreed; otherwise, they would not be talking today. Mr. Molotov continued that he had been authorized to set forth the point of view of the Soviet Government. The basis of collaboration had been established and that although inevitable difficulties had arisen the three Governments had been able to find a common language and that on this basis they had been settling these differences. He said the three Governments had dealt as equal parties and there had been no case where one or two of the three had attempted to impose their will on another. He said this was the basis of cooperation and the only one acceptable to the Soviet Government.

The President agreed and said that all we were asking was that the Soviet Government carry out the Crimean decision on Poland.

Mr. Molotov said that as an advocate of the Crimean decisions his Government stood by them and that it was a matter of honor for them; that his Government felt that the good base which existed was the result of former work and offered even brighter prospects for the future. He said that the Soviet Government was convinced that all difficulties could be overcome.

The President replied with great firmness that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only remained for Marshal Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word.

Mr. Molotov replied that Marshal Stalin in his message of April 7 had given his views on the agreement and he personally could not understand why if the three Governments could reach an agreement on the question of the composition of the Yugoslav Government the same formula could not be applied in the case of Poland. The President replied sharply that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only required carrying out by the Soviet Government. Mr. Molotov said that his Government supported the Crimean decisions and then said that he could not agree that an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered as a violation by the Soviet Government. He added that surely the Polish question involving a neighboring country was of very great interest to the Soviet Government.

The President repeated that as he had said last night the United States Government was prepared to carry out loyally all the agreements reached at the Crimea and he only asked that the Soviet Government do the same. The President said that he desired the friendship of the Soviet Government, but that he felt it could only be on the basis of mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one way street. In conclusion he arose and handed to Mr. Molotov the press release⁸⁰ which he stated he intended to release to the press this evening. Mr. Molotov read the release and thanked the President for the information.

Charles E. Bohlen

[Annex]

President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)

[Washington, April 23, 1945.]

There was an agreement at Yalta in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new Government of National Unity in Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad.

In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimean decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders are invited to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The United States and British Governments have gone as far as they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the Crimean decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal Stalin on April 18th.

The United States Government earnestly requests that the Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. And that Mr. Molotov continue the conversations with the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden in San Francisco on that basis.

The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three Governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.

79. See also the accounts of this meeting in Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 412–413, and Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 79–80.

    At the direction of President Truman, an outline of the points made by the President was sent on the same day to the British Embassy for Mr. Eden.

80. For text of the press release regarding consultations with the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued by the White House on April 23, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 802.