President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)56
729. Your 925 and 926. I have likewise been watching with anxiety and concern the development of Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference. I am acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present course of events not only for the immediate issues involved and our decisions at the Crimea but also for the San Francisco Conference and future world cooperation. Our peoples and indeed those of the whole world are watching with anxious hope the extent to which the decisions we reached at the Crimea are being honestly carried forward. For our part (and I know for yours) we intend to shirk no responsibility which we have assumed under those decisions. I agree with you that we should not neglect any step calculated to demonstrate to the Soviet Government the vital importance of their doing likewise. It is for this reason and because of the magnitude of the issues involved that I consider it essential to base ourselves squarely on the Crimea decisions themselves and not allow any other considerations, no matter how important, to cloud the issue at this time. I have this particularly in mind with respect to the Polish negotiations.
You will recall that the agreement on Poland at Yalta was a compromise between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should merely be “enlarged” and our contention that we should start with a clean slate and assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government. The wording of the resulting agreement reflects this compromise but if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimean decision. It by no means follows, however, and on this we must be adamant, that because of this advantage the Lublin group can in any way arrogate to itself the right to determine what Poles from the other two groups are to be brought in for consultation. For the foregoing reasons I feel strongly that we should first of all bring the matter to a head on the question that falls clearly within the Yalta agreement, namely, our right to call for consultation a group of Polish leaders that are truly representative and that it is for the Commission and the Commission alone to decide which Poles are representative. Our Ambassadors in Moscow appear to be in agreement that we should proceed on the basis of their redraft, designed to reconcile our basic instructions with the points put forward by Molotov. They will at the same [Page 190] time make it absolutely clear that we have not receded in the slightest from the other points in our instructions of March 1957 and shall revert to them at a later stage.
I do feel the other questions of procedure and the proper time for reopening the other points can be safely left to our Ambassadors. They know exactly what we think and feel on the entire question and I am personally completely confident that under no circumstances will they take any step or agree to anything which would impair the objectives we both seek. For example, I believe that if we can get Soviet agreement to the principle that the Commission and the Commission alone shall determine what Poles shall be invited for consultation and a definite list is drawn up and invitations issued then consultation with the Lublin Poles first might even afford certain advantages. They could be told how we interpret the Yalta decision and thus avoid the danger of having the question of interpretation become a matter of dispute between the Polish groups themselves. I feel subject to your approval that our Ambassadors should proceed along this line to bring our differences with Molotov into sharp focus without waiting for us to concert our messages to Stalin. Averell is ready to go ahead on this basis if we can obtain your concurrence which I earnestly hope you will give.
I agree with you, however, that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland) and my immediate following telegram will contain the text of the message I propose to send.58
I hope you will let me have your reaction as soon as possible.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.↩
- For the instructions, see telegram 640, March 18, 1 p.m., to Moscow, p. 172.↩
- Telegram 730, March 29, not printed. For text of message as sent to Marshal Stalin on April 1, with notation of changes from this draft, see p. 194.↩