Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁴⁷

London, 27 March 1945.

925. 1. I am extremely concerned at the deterioration of the Russian attitude since Yalta.

2. About Poland, you will have seen that Molotov in his reply to the agreed communication made to him by our Ambassadors on the 19th March,⁴⁸ and in their discussion on the 23rd March, returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with and ignored others.

He persists in his view that the Yalta Communiqué merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first. He maintains his right to veto Mikolajczyk and other Poles we may suggest and pretends that he has insufficient information about the names we have put forward long ago.

Nothing is said about our proposal that the commission should preside in an arbitral capacity over discussions among the Poles. Nothing on our point that measures in Poland affecting the future of the Polish State and action against individuals and groups likely to disturb the atmosphere should be avoided.

He ignores his offer about observers and tells us to talk to the Warsaw puppets about this. It is as plain as a pike staff that his tactics are to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power.

3. Clark Kerr’s proposal for dealing with this was to try by redrafting to build something on the four-point formula included in Molotov’s reply. We cannot see that any real progress towards getting an honest Polish settlement can possibly be made in this way.

It would merely mean that we allowed our communication to be sidetracked, negotiated on the basis of Molotov’s wholly unsatisfactory reply and wasted time finding formulae which do not decide vital points. We therefore instructed Clark Kerr that he should not proceed on this basis, and that we are discussing matters with you.

4. As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia, both Eden and I are pledged to report the fact openly to the House of Commons. There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House, the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong. All the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a set-up there on the new Roumanian model.^48a

In other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the Declaration of Liberated Europe⁴⁹ and you and we shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area.

5. Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of democracy? (You no doubt saw Vyshinsky’s⁵⁰ public explanations in Roumania of this doctrine). There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing our total failure. That alternative is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta declaration.

But I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin? I will send you our rough idea on this in my immediately following. I hope you can agree.

6. I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If we are rebuffed, it will be a very sinister sign, taken with the other Russian actions at variance with the spirit of Yalta; such as Molotov’s rude questioning of our word in the case of Crossword,⁵¹ the unsatisfactory proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the coup d’état in Roumania, the Russian refusal to allow the declaration on liberated Europe to operate, and the blocking of all progress in the EAC⁵² by the Russians.

7. What also do you make of Molotov’s withdrawal from San Francisco?⁵³ It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run out or are they trying to blackmail us? As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks⁵⁴ proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based on the conception of great power unity.

If no such unity exists on Poland, which is after all a major problem of the post war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new world organization? And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?

8. I believe, therefore, that if the success of San Francisco is not to be gravely imperilled, we must both of us now make the strongest possible appeal to Stalin about Poland and if necessary about any other derogations from the harmony of the Crimea. Only so shall we have any real chance of getting the world organization established on lines which will commend themselves to our respective public opinions.

Indeed, I am not sure that we should not mention to Stalin now the deplorable impression Molotov’s absence from San Francisco will cause.

47. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
48. Regarding the agreed communications to Molotov, see telegram 640, March 18, to Moscow, and footnote 33, p. 172.
49. For documentation concerning the efforts of the United States in behalf of the establishment of democratic government in Rumania, see pp. 464 ff.
49. For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as part V of the Communiqué issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin at the conclusion of the Crimea Conference, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 971–973.
50. Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
51. Code name for the approach by German military authorities to Allies in February and March 1945 to arrange for the surrender of German military forces in Italy. For documentation on the surrender of these forces, see vol. iii, pp. 717 ff.
52. For documentation regarding United States participation in the work of the European Advisory Commission, see ibid., pp. 1 ff.
53. For the memorandum dated March 23, 1945, by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, in which the Acting Secretary informed the President that Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador, would head the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference, see vol. i, p. 151: for further documentation regarding the attendance at the San Francisco Conference of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, see ibid., pp. 156 and 165. See also Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter; The Role of the United States 1940–1945 (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 628–630.
54. For documentation regarding conversations on international organization at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21–October 7, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 713 ff.