860C.01/3–845: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
537. The following instructions have been shown to the British Embassy here for transmission to London. It is expected that Clark Kerr will receive instructions along the same general lines. Please communicate to Mr. Molotov in the manner and at the time you deem best the following views of the United States Government in connection with the current negotiations on the Polish question:
“The United States Government is concerned at the difficulties which the Moscow Commission has encountered in its first efforts to carry out the terms of the Crimean decision on Poland. It is felt that a clear statement of the understanding of this Government not only as to the intent and purpose of the decision but also the role of the Commission itself would be of value in overcoming these difficulties which appear to be in large measure a question of interpretation.
The decision on Poland reached by the three heads of Government in the Crimea was based on the common declared policy of the three countries to facilitate in every way possible the emergence after this war of a strong, independent, and democratic Poland with the free and unfettered right of the Polish people to choose for themselves the Government and institutions under which they are to live. This common objective was seriously prejudiced by the fact that there was a divergence in the policies of the United States and the United [Page 151] Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other as to what constituted the governmental authority of Poland. In addition the dangers to Allied unity inherent in such a situation were fully recognized by the three heads of Government at the Crimea. The problem confronting the three Governments at the Crimean Conference was thus related to the question of the provisional governmental authority of Poland during the interim period pending the establishment of conditions which would permit the holding of free elections inside Poland. The Crimean decision in the first place was designed to afford a practical solution of the problem of the provisional authority of Poland. The discussions in the Crimea made it obvious that neither the United States Government nor the British Government considered the provisional governmental authority now functioning in Poland as sufficiently representative to consider according it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. The Soviet Government for its part made it equally clear that it would not consider recognizing in that capacity the Polish Government in London. In the circumstances the only solution was the one reached, namely, that the three Governments would agree to assist in the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity ‘which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland’. This new Government of national unity was to be made broadly representative of democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the existing provisional authority functioning in Poland with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad. An essential feature of the Crimean decision was that this new provisional government should be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three larger powers. In order to facilitate the formation of this interim government the Commission in Moscow was created. It would appear obvious that the Commission could not discharge responsibility placed upon it nor could the basic objectives as set forth above of the Crimean decision be achieved if any one of the three groups of Polish democratic elements from which the reorganized government is to emerge were permitted to dictate to the Commission which individuals from the other two groups were to be invited to Moscow for consultation. It would, therefore, appear logical that in the discharge of its responsibilities the Commission in Moscow should as a first step reach a mutual agreement as to what Polish representatives should be invited to come to Moscow to consult on the formation of the new provisional government of national unity. Agreement on such a list would, of course, not involve any commitment on the actual composition or basis of the new Provisional Government.
In the opinion of the United States Government, as an essential condition for the successful negotiations in Moscow for the formation of the new Provisional Government as well as for the eventual carrying out by that new government of its pledge of the ‘holding of free and unfettered elections’ as provided in the communiqué, there should be the maximum amount of political tranquility inside Poland during the period of negotiations. The United States Government, therefore, suggests that the Commission request the rival political groups to adopt a political truce in Poland and to refrain reciprocally from [Page 152] any activities or actions which might hamper the unity of all democratic Polish elements both within and without Poland. The United States Government believes that if in the first stage the Commission would adopt as a basis the considerations suggested above, the negotiations would begin in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Crimean decision. The execution of the agreement on Poland reached by the three heads of Government at the Crimea will be watched by the entire world as an indication of the reality of the unity there so successfully established between the three principal Allies.”