860C.01/3–345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:40 p.m.]
618. ReEmbs 610, March 2, 4 p.m. I am naturally concerned over the present prospect of the protracted nature of the work of (Polco)92 the Commission on Poland. In this connection I wish to refer to Schoenfeld’s telegram to Moscow, No. 68, February 24, 10 p.m., sent to Department as Poles 25, in which he advises that Mikolajczyk has made five conditions to his acceptance of the invitation by the Commission to come to Moscow for consultation. If condition 2 is accepted, namely, that he will not leave England before being advised that representatives from within Poland have already arrived in Moscow it is obvious that our discussions will be considerably delayed. It may be necessary to invite a few from within Poland in the first instance and add additional invitations at a later date. In any event it is going to be extremely difficult to obtain Molotov’s approval to the inviting of Mikolajczyk for the reasons stated by Marshal Stalin at Yalta and because of his subsequent unfortunate statement to the press and doubly so if Mikolajczyk makes conditions and shows reluctance as to his coming.
It seems to me that if Mikolajczyk sincerely wishes to cooperate with the decisions taken at the Crimea he should agree to come without making conditions. Although it may be natural for him to request us to give him information on whom he may expect to meet in Moscow we should not agree that his acceptance is conditioned on his approval of the other conferees.
It goes without saying that it is the obligation of the Commission to arrange for free communications between the representatives from London and from Poland throughout the discussions. On the other [Page 140] hand it is extremely insulting not only to the Soviet Government but to the British and American Governments as well that he should even raise the question of a guarantee of unhindered departure from Moscow. We can, however, not guarantee him the right to enter Poland as that will be between him and the new Polish Government. When it comes to the question of free communications with colleagues inside Poland, this is an impossible thing to guarantee. Physical communications in Poland are very bad and at best impossibly slow. It seems to me his condition No. 5 regarding the attitude of the British and United States Governments, concerning the recognition of the Polish Government to be formed in Poland, the political guarantee and the economic and financial assistance and the future of Polish armed forces abroad, the termination of the Polish Government in London, et cetera, are matters that are either difficult to deal with at this time or should be developed in the course of the consultations in Moscow.
To sum up, I am pessimistic about getting the approval of Molotov to inviting Mikolajczyk unless he shows a disposition to cooperate in implementing the Crimean decisions.
I therefore recommend that this question be taken up with the British Foreign Office and every attempt be made by the British and ourselves to bring Mikolajczyk into a realistic and cooperative frame of mind. I feel that if necessary it should be pointed out to him that if he approaches these negotiations suspicious not only of the Russians but also of the British and ourselves we can not invite him to Moscow and that the reasons for his being excluded will be publicly stated at the time other Poles are invited from London.93
Sent to Department as 618, repeated to London as 91.
- Telegram 465, March 2, 1945, 2 p.m., to Moscow requested that the code word Polco be inserted within the first paragraph of telegrams relating to discussions on formation of a Polish provisional government (860C.01/3–245).↩
- Telegram 510, March 5, to Moscow, stated that the Department concurred in the views set forth in this telegram regarding the conditions laid down by Mikolajczyk for his acceptance of an invitation to Moscow, but felt it would not be advisable to discuss the matter with Mikolaczjyk until the Commission had determined the list of Poles to be invited for consultation in the first instance (860C.01/3–545).↩