860h.00/9–2745: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

505. We believe time has come for our Govt to state publicly opinion that present conditions in Yugoslavia make it impossible for elections on November 11 to express free will of the people, and that postponement is necessary until primary freedoms are found to exist.

Our policy of helping liberated countries (tangibly expressed in UNRRA) was adopted in part to prevent conditions of starvation [Page 1260] and anarchy giving rise to violence and dictatorship. We have sought to foster atmosphere of freedom in which peoples could create democratic institutions of their own choice. Yet a relatively small group of Communists, inspired and directed by Moscow, has succeeded in foisting a ruthless totalitarian police regime on the Yugoslavs. For this state of affairs we, and to a greater degree the British, are partially responsible.

Govt leaders here have already said enough to condemn the elections as fraud against democracy. They have stated that question of regime has already been decided and elections will only serve to confirm and legalize it. The regime and its chief public agency, the “National Front”, are in effect tools of Central Committee of Communist Party. Tito is an agent of Moscow. To allow this regime to consolidate its position unchallenged is to abandon all prospect for democracy in this country. To call this Yugoslavia democratic is as fraudulent as to call it federative. The federal governments have no power and all orders come from Belgrade (Moscow).

An all pervading sense of fear dominates country. It is manifest, everywhere, in private as in public life of the people. In cities regime has its committees and spies in every house and block. Its opponents live in daily fear of arrest by Ozna and punishment as “enemies of the people”. We are certain that thousands whose greatest offense is that they or their relatives do not support the National Front have been crossed off election lists. There is no sadder commentary upon the situation than remarks of people who defied Nazi military might at its peak that “perhaps Hitler was right after all”. On all sides one hears that in comparison with Ozna the Gestapo was mild institution.

In July Tito said he had army of 700,000, double the number in wartime and still growing. Each day witnesses fresh groups of ragged draftees being herded to induction centers while more labor is badly needed for farming and reconstruction. There is no justification for such army, for Yugo is not threatened by foreign aggression. Its real purpose is to serve ends of regime, as means of forcible indoctrination and reservoir of force to compel compliance with Government’s demands. We are certain that there is ample material in Department, as in War, Navy and Intelligence agencies, to support our opinion.

We here can see nothing we can do for the unfortunate people of Yugo except to use moral force to lighten tyranny of regime and prepare way for change in govt. Whether this change comes about or not, we are convinced of our obligation to make our position clear to world and to attempt to redress harm we have done by our part [Page 1261] in establishing Tito in power. We believe that whether or not other Allied Govts join with us, we owe it to ourselves and the Yugoslav people to state plainly that we do not consider conditions envisioned at Yalta and elsewhere to have been met. We must do this if high trust and hope Yugoslavs in general have come over many years to have in America is not to be lost. This valuable asset, not gained by any propaganda or deliberate act of ours, exists in spite of the covert anti-American anti-British campaign of government which calls us reactionaries and Fascists.

We realize that mere postponement of elections will not be permanent remedy and possibly will serve to allow regime to tighten its controls. Therefore we suggest that concurrently with public statement of dissatisfaction, Tito and our Allies be informed that certain conditions must be met if our friendly and cooperative interest is to be retained. We have in mind particularly following:

1.
Recognition that Tito–Subasic agreement has failed to establish democratic processes in Yugo. (We consider decision of opposition not to enter elections, Embtel 476 of Sept. 20,53 as concrete evidence of this.)
2.
A new provisional arrangement must be made under which popular political leaders can share in the govt. This can only be done if National Front is abolished, if Communist Party enters govt as party only, if normal police and juridical administrations are restored, and an army proportionate to Yugo’s world position is maintained. Further, guarantees of freedom from fear, personal freedom, liberty of press, freedom of assembly and association, and universal franchise set forth in the Tito–Subasic agreement must be given reality. Any new Govt constituted under these conditions would of course be free to review and repeal legislation passed by Tito’s hand-picked Provisional Parliament.
3.
Continued failure of Tito to cooperate in carrying out assurances given at Yalta would force us to consider withdrawing our recognition of his regime.

Finally, we are aware that action such as we recommend may bring in its wake renewed persecution of democratic elements in country who are friendly to us and look to us for aid. But we believe that with the confirmation that regime would claim from spurious election now proposed, savage treatment would be meted out to these groups anyway. On positive side, action we propose should give opportunity for new leaders to arise and with natural vigor of the people thus liberated enable the Yugoslavs to free themselves from foreign control and regain self govt. If this new govt also took form of dictatorship, it would at least be indigenous one set up in line with long standing traditions under which Yugoslav people lived before war in relative happiness.

Shantz
  1. Not printed.