Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–2445

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)

London, February 24, 1945.

Dear Jack: I was glad to have your letter of January 19³⁰ and I am sorry my reply has been delayed by the pressure of work here and by the President’s summons to meet him for several days in the Mediterranean.³¹

I often wish that we were nearer geographically so that we could work together even more closely on these matters that are of so much concern to us all in trying to deal with the German problem so that our children and grandchildren will not have to face the ordeal of battle again. I am delighted to hear that you are coming to London, but I wish your visit were to be sooner rather than later.

I appreciate your good work in helping to get final clearance in Washington for the Agreement on Control Machinery and on Zones of Occupation. Now that all three Agreements have been approved by all three Governments, we have a common basis for working out joint policy toward Germany, without which the Allies cannot operate effectively in controlling Germany and maintaining Allied harmony in the post-war period.

My concern has always been, as you know, to see that the Allies have as firm and as clear agreements as possible in regard to the treatment of Germany. Without such agreements many frictions and conflicts might arise between the occupying forces, and such conflicts could hardly fail to have a profound influence on Allied harmony, which in turn is the necessary basis for our policy in other parts of the world and in our efforts to establish a security organization. I think the emphasis throughout should be on the attempt to achieve unit [unity?] of action. Unless our people who go into Germany feel deeply this need and sincerely make every effort to accomplish it, they will, unconsciously, be working against its accomplishment.

I do not think it is wise to stress continually what we all know, that in the absence of tripartite or quadripartite agreement the commander-in-chief in his zone will have a free hand. I am frankly worried because I find that some of our officers who are now planning for, and will later participate in, military government in Germany seem to feel that agreement on uniform policies is to be avoided because it would “tie their hands” in their zone. I wish the approach could be toward cooperation among the occupying Allies in those fields that call for joint agreement in the handling of Germany.

I do not agree with your simile of the Articles of Confederation. That marked a weak beginning and established an inadequate authority. Under the Articles the country lacked the power to make war, to put down rebellion, to tax and to regulate inter-state commerce. We should not go into Germany weak for lack of combined control but strong in an effective coordinated authority. That does not mean that the residue of power will not lie within the zones but that in those matters affecting Germany as a whole we will have firm agreement among the occupying Allies.

The necessity for reaching prior agreements among the occupying Powers on a governmental level is due to the fact that neither the Russians, the British, nor the French are willing to delegate final political authority to generals in the field. The President can do this because he is not only Chief of State but also, under the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. It is contrary to French and British constitutional practice to do this. Stalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration of this, where prior agreement was not reached, is the authority given by Stalin to Vyshinsky³² in supervising and modifying the execution of the Armistice terms which were being carried out by the military in Rumania.³³ This concept of authority has been made very clear by Gousev in the European Advisory Commission. Also our experience in dealing with the Russians in Rumania, Bulgaria and elsewhere has shown that it is easier to get agreement before occupation than afterwards.³⁴

If our approach to the occupation of Germany were on a unilateral basis, the President, as Chief Magistrate and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, could delegate political and military authority to the commanding general, as was done at the end of the Spanish War. In the present situation, we will have an Allied occupation of an enemy country, involving not only the control of Germany but the inter-relationship of the four occupying Allies. Under the Unconditional Surrender of Germany the Allies will be taking over control of Germany for themselves and “in the interest of the United Nations”. Since we have insisted in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers are “acting in the interest of the United Nations”, we have taken on a quasi-trusteeship obligation toward other United Nations which we will fail to discharge unless we get agreement on matters which deeply affect the interests of all European Allies. For example, we must agree on provisions for the freezing of property until such time as equitable arrangements can be made to protect the rights of our Allies to restitution and reparation.

Independent operation of each zone would not in itself help to promote a policy of ultimate decentralization which, like other matters affecting Germany as a whole, must be worked out by agreement among the victorious Powers after an orderly control is established. The effective operation of Allied Control over Germany requires each commander-in-chief, as a member of the Control Council, to participate actively in negotiating and formulating joint policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of prior governmental agreements and of further instructions from his Government, and, as commander over his zone, to execute and enforce those policies in that zone. As the Commander-in-Chief will also sit on the Control Council, in which decisions are reached by unanimous approval, there should not be danger of unsolicited intervention in his zone.

I realize there has been constant criticism in the Civil Affairs Division with respect to “detailing” in our directives. If you will read carefully the Naval Special Order³⁵ which was negotiated in Moscow, you will find there an insistence on detail that goes far beyond anything we have attempted in the E.A.C. draft political directives. Or take for example the comments in the memorandum³⁶ transmitting the Prisoners of War Directive, in which you criticize “unnecessary detail” in our directive. The record will show that in clearing and forwarding the revised directive³⁷ you have simply lopped off the two standard introductory paragraphs and that the remainder of the directive is more detailed than the original draft³⁸ sent from here.

Again, in the revised 1067, Article 1 of the Political Directive lists fourteen categories of persons who must be searched out, arrested and held. The final paragraph of that same Article places on the commander-in-chief detailed responsibility for reporting failure to arrest any one of several million persons comprised in these categories and for reporting to the Control Council his recommendation and reasons therefor in each case. This places an exacting obligation on the commanding general without regard to practical obstacles and without leaving any degree of discretion to him—an obligation which is far more binding in its detail than any which we felt wise to write into our draft directives.

I wonder if you realize how closely my advisers have worked with the operational and planning Army officers who are actually going to do some of these jobs in Germany. Those officers look at the problem from a very practical viewpoint. We are also in daily contact with the representatives of the three occupying Powers and the positions taken by them under instructions from their Governments.

In a letter to General Meyer, dated December 16, 1944,³⁹ General Hilldring states:

“I am aware of Mr. Winant’s agreement with Strang and if he would abandon the British long terms in favor of our short term instrument, we would agree to include the subject matter forming the basis of the long terms in proclamations and general orders to be issued to the Germans after the signing of the Surrender Instrument. To this we have no objection, although the Joint Chiefs have never been advised of the existence of such an agreement.”

I am glad that General Hilldring admits the validity of this agreement, which we and the Russians made as a basis for securing British acceptance of our short military Instrument of Surrender. The instruction which directed me to enter into this agreement (dated February 12, 1944)⁴⁰ was approved in a signed memorandum by General Hilldring and was transmitted to me with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. My acceptance of this commitment, upon express instructions of our Government, was reported by me in Cornea 38 of March 10, 1944.⁴¹ The State and War Departments acknowledged and confirmed this commitment in Eacom 13 of March 16, 1944.⁴²

The remaining paragraphs of General Hilldring’s letter, however, go on to argue that there is no necessity for meeting this clear commitment. The consequences of repudiating such a commitment would inevitably lead to undermining the basis of Allied cooperation and unity.

The action taken at the Crimea Conference, which confirmed the acceptance of the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, of the Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, has given us a firm basis for action which should make our work easier in the weeks ahead.

I have always tried to work with you. My problem has been to get on with a job in which the time factor is an important element. Therefore I have pressed to get clearance on those things which I thought were of vital concern in protecting our interests and in safeguarding Allied unity.

I look forward to seeing you. I am sure we will find ourselves in agreement on the basic approach to the question of how best to assure continued Allied cooperation in the handling of Germany.

Sincerely,

John Gilbert Winant

30. Not found in Department files.
31. Ambassador Winant conferred with President Roosevelt at Alexandria, Egypt, following the Presidents return from the Crimea Conference.
32. Audrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
33. For documentation regarding the Allied armistice with Rumania, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 133 ff.
34. For documentation regarding the Allied armistice with Bulgaria, see ibid., vol. iii, pp. 300 ff.
35. Draft Special Naval Orders to the German Naval authorities were prepared by the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (British Adm. Bertram Ramsey), in consultation with the British Admiralty, for the purpose of setting forth the specific action to be required of the German Navy in the SHAEF theater immediately following surrender. United States naval authorities approved the orders and in October, 1944, following negotiations between U.S., U.K. and Soviet naval officials in Moscow, the Soviet naval authorities concurred in the Orders, subject to such minor technical changes as might be required. The Special Naval Orders were formally circulated in the European Advisory Commission by the United Kingdom Delegation as E.A.C. (45)4, dated 15 January 1945, not printed. United Kingdom and U.S. naval authorities regarded the tripartite agreement on the Orders as “firm” and decided to issue them immediately upon the German surrender. For a brief description of the naval orders issued to the German naval authorities at the May 7, 1945, surrender at Reims, see Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, in the official Army history United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 500–501.
36. The memorandum printed on p. 409.
37. Ante, p. 410.
38. Not printed.
39. Not found in Department files. Brig. Gen. Vincent Meyer was Chief Military Adviser to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant).
40. Telegram 3735, February 12, 1944, to London, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 167.
41. Ibid., p. 197.
42. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 199.