Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.0011 EW/5–445

The Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador in Canada (Atherton)

Washington, May 4, 1945.

Dear Ray: Qver many months Mike Pearson¹³ with Escott Reid¹⁴ following up has been endeavoring to secure a modification of the surrender instrument for Germany and related documents so that the military contribution of Canada to the victory might receive greater recognition. As you can imagine, Canadian pride is deeply involved and no doubt there has been considerable feeling in high government circles in Ottawa. I gather, furthermore, that as the matter has developed we have acquired most of the responsibility in Canadian eyes for what they still consider to be a highly unsatisfactory situation.

Aside from one exchange of letters with Jimmy Dunn, the Canadian conception of our position has, I believe, been gained almost entirely through the British representative on the EAC. In other words, I fear that this is one more situation in which one school at Ottawa can complain that again we are driving Canada into the arms of the British and the other school can again say that their view is right that Canada should line up with the British on matters of this kind.

At this eleventh hour Strang has suddenly introduced into the EAC negotiations an amendment whereby all the allies contributing militarily to the victory would authorize signature of the surrender proclamation by the four member powers of EAC. It has been clearly evident that he is speaking on behalf of the dominions and India. No doubt the Canadians are pushing him more than anyone.

I should doubt if Strang had any hope of his amendment succeeding, but obviously it puts the British in an enviable position vis-à-vis the dominions and is likely to put us in an unenviable position especially as the French went along and the Russians simply referred the amendment to Moscow.

We have a good and sound position on this matter. I believe it should not be filtered through to the Canadians by the British alone and I am, therefore, seeking approval of this letter to you so that you may record in the proper quarters in Ottawa the reasons for our position and our sympathy for that of Canada. I am writing to you rather than to Jack¹⁵ at San Francisco¹⁶ where he could speak to the Prime Minister¹⁷ and to Norman,¹⁸ because I believe that while the gesture to Canada is important we do not want to open up a separate channel through which the Canadians could press again for a modification of our stand.

In response to Strang’s amendment, we have told Ambassador Winant that (1) we approve letting the Canadians and the others contributing military forces see the text of the surrender instrument and the proclamation based on it, (2) we agree to invite their adherence, and (3) we would not object to more specific acknowledgment in the proclamation of the other powers contributing military force to the defeat of Germany.

We have, however, a very practical objection to amending the text so that the four powers on EAC would be acting with the authority of the other powers. Such a position would imply that in all future decisions we would have to have the concurrence of the other powers. The task of military government shared by four powers is complex and difficult enough without adding a requirement for the concurrence of four or five additional powers. It seems to us that any reasonable person would agree that an already difficult and thorny task would be made well nigh impossible and we should doubt whether many who realize the difficulties and who do not have to be involved would really wish to be except for prestige reasons.

I think it would be most helpful if you would emphasize the three numbered points above as a mark of our appreciation of the Canadian position and our desire to give them the recognition to which they are rightly entitled. A word from you, with your knowledge of the background and understanding of how our position might appear to the Canadians in the absence of direct word from us, should be of definite advantage.

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons

13. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
14. First Secretary in the Canadian Embassy.
15. Presumably John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.
16. For documentation regarding the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, April 25 to June 26, 1945, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
17. Canadian Prime Minister, President of the Privy Council, and Secretary of State for External Affairs, William Mackenzie King who served as Chairman of his country’s delegation to the San Francisco Conference.
18. Presumably Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and a senior adviser to his country’s delegation to the San Francisco Conference.