740.00119 EAC/10–345
Memorandum of a Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), in London, and the Director of the Office of Europeom Affairs (Matthews), in Washington May 194310
Mr. Winant: I wanted to talk to you about the Surrender Instrument. I wanted to ask you if copies had been sent through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF?
Mr. Matthews: Copies of the Surrender Instrument?
Mr. Winant: Yes. My understanding is that the only copies that they have we forwarded to them from the European Advisory Commission. I wanted to ask you what had been done about the changes in the Instrument? When we added France as a fourth Power?
M. We have not received your copies yet of the original, which you said you have forwarded.
W. Months ago we sent you the original Instrument. Within the last few days we have sent you the amendments to the Instrument which add France as a fourth Power.
[Page 267]M. Yes. Well, it’s the amendments which we have not yet received, as far as the original copies are concerned.
W. I understand. This document with the amendments was worked out in the European Advisory Commission and then forwarded to our respective Governments for acceptance and action.
M. Yes. The recent amendments have not been received in the original. They will be forwarded as soon as they are received.
W. I wondered if the original document itself had ever been forwarded to SHAEF by you?
M. No, not the original. I think copies were forwarded to the JCS.
W. I see. I’m not certain that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have ever forwarded the original document to SHAEF.
M. I will be glad to look into this and see whether they have or not.
W. That document should be forwarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the amendments, to SHAEF.
M. Yes. I’ll be very glad to look into that, and see if they have been forwarded by the CCS to SHAEF.
W. That’s right. I understand that that has not been done.
M. Of course the actual original, as a government agreement, would be retained in the Department’s archives, but copies of it should have been forwarded by CCS.
W. Yes, I think that should have been done. It may have been done, but I understand it has not been done.
M. I will see if we can get them to send them right away.
W. Then the amendment to the Instrument by the addition of the word “dismemberment” was accomplished at Yalta and was entirely outside of the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission. So far as I know the Russians have never agreed to notify the French.
M. Of the change?
W. Yes. I understand that the French were informed through Caffery, by us in Paris.
M. The Russians have never agreed in the EAC to inform the French?
W. Well, they didn’t agree in that special committee. They didn’t agree in the Dismemberment Committee, where I raised the point. That is the committee which is limited to Eden, Gousev and myself.
M. But I thought the amendment to the Surrender Instrument, which contained that word “dismemberment” had been approved by the EAC with its four members.
W. I couldn’t get that, Doc. I’d like to restate what I was trying to say to you. I raised the point of informing the French in the [Page 268] special Committee on Dismemberment on April 12. That committee is composed of Eden, Gousev and myself. Each of us agreed to take the matter under consideration, but so far as I know, the Russians have never agreed to notify the French.
M. That is, they have never agreed to notify the French of the addition of the word “dismemberment”?
W. That’s right.
M. But I thought that the EAC, which now has four members, had approved the addition of the word ‘dismemberment’ in the Surrender Instrument that you have forwarded to us.
W. No, it does not. The only addition is to include the French as the fourth Power.
M. I see. It does not include the word “dismemberment”?
W. It does not include the word “dismemberment”. And I thought that there should be a clear understanding on that also. “We are now working on the proclamation, which might be used as a substitute for the Surrender Instrument. I believe it should be understood that the Surrender Instrument gives us a firmer legal base than the proclamation. I think that should be understood. If we use the proclamation with the preamble on which we have gotten agreement, I do not think you need to include the word “dismemberment”.
M. Is that acceptable to the Russians?
W. Because we reserve the right to change the status or boundaries in the preamble. It might be, if you wanted to use the Surrender Instrument, that you would want it immediately communicated to SHAEF. We have copies of it ready here, with the inclusion of the French as a fourth Power, and copies with and without the word “dismemberment”. We have, also, a plane here which could get it to SHAEF within a very short time.
M. As I understand from what you say, SHAEF has already received copies from you, but not from the CCS?
W. Yes, sir. That’s copies of the original document which we have worked out and on which there was governmental agreement some months ago. But they have received nothing, as I understand it, since, from the Governments. And they have received nothing from us since the amendment.
M. Then I should think it would be a wise precaution for you to send it to SHAEF immediately.
W. I want to be sure that the Government at home and the other Governments have approved of the inclusion of France as a fourth Power and, also, what the attitude of the Governments is in relation to the inclusion of the word “dismemberment”. Because, you see, the European Advisory Commission is simply advisory. And I would like to get authority before I take action.
[Page 269]M. Well, I can tell you that the three Governments definitely agreed at Yalta to the inclusion of France as a fourth Power and to the use of the word “dismemberment”.
W. May I talk to the Russians about informing the French of that fact and the inclusion of the word “dismemberment”?
M. Yes.
W. I think I should take that up with Gousev before we take action. Would you agree to that? M. Yes, we would agree.
W. The British would prefer today the use of—in place of the word “dismemberment”—the phrase “if necessary, dismemberment”.
M. Well, that was not the form in which it was agreed at Yalta. And I think the Russians might object to that.
W. I understand.
M. I think we had better stick by what we agreed there.
W. I wonder if you have seen my message to you, 3278 of March 29? It states the position of the Committee on Dismemberment. And the statement within that cable was agreed upon. It shows the Soviet interpretation in relation to dismemberment as stated by Gousev.
M. Yes. The background of the inclusion of “dismemberment” was to show the Germans we would have the right in dealing with the Germans to dismember if we wish to.
W. I think it is very important because in that message Gousev states to Eden that the Soviet Government understand the decision of the Crimea Conference, regarding the dismemberment of Germany, not as an obligatory plan for the dismemberment of Germany, but as a possibility for exerting pressure on Germany with the object of rendering her harmless in the event of other means proving inadequate. If you would simply include the word “dismemberment” in the particular article where it was to be placed, it is in a sense mandatory.
M. That was not the intention.
W. And its only possible qualification is in the sentence that follows. That reads, “as they deem requisite for future peace and security”.
M. That is part of the same sentence as I recall it.
W. That is right. I’d just like you to read that over in order to get a fresh judgment on it, in relation to the paragraph in the letter that Gousev wrote to Eden, which I have just quoted to you. I thought you might want to call up Mr. Stettinius and perhaps have him discuss the problem with Eden and Molotov.
M. Well, I can give you the background. That word was put in there, not as mandatory on the four Governments, but mandatory [Page 270] upon the Germans if the four Governments decided to dismember. And it was put in there by formal agreement of the three Governments. I don’t think we can go back and change that.
W. I understand. Now the question is, whether we have to include it in the proclamation. I doubt if we do.
M. I don’t think that is necessary, unless the Russians insist on it.
W. So far there has been no insistence and no mention of it.
M. Then I would not mention it. I think that’s good enough.
W. All right, Doc.11 I wanted to talk to you about one other thing. I got a message12 saying you’d like to publish summary of the control machinery in Germany.
M. That’s the War Department that wants to publish it.
W. Yes. We have just worked out a summary to be given to the other Allied governments. And Gousev has told us that his government has not yet given him freedom of action to permit that. And the rest of us feel that we should not publish a summary until we have informed, until we have given some similar document to the other Allied governments.
M. I think that is quite proper. We consulted you because the War Department felt that public opinion is becoming so strong to know what plans are with regard to Germany. And it would be advisable over here to publish something. We took the position that nothing should be published without consultation with the other parties. That is why we sent you the telegram.
W. The British, the French and ourselves are in agreement on that. Gousev has asked to delay until—delay giving a summary to the other Allied governments until he hears from his government. Then, if that’s done, and he has also asked his government when that is done to permit publication of a similar summary. And I hope to give you some word on it in the next three or four days.
M. Well, I think that would be all right, sir.
. . . . . . .
W. Just a minute, Doc. I was just talking with Mosely here. He feels that we shouldn’t put the word “dismemberment” into the surrender instrument until we have told the Russians and they have agreed to tell the French.
M. Yes. Well, I agree that they should tell the French. But the decision to include it was a formal decision by the three governments. But we should tell the French as the fourth body to the EAC.
W. The Russians haven’t as yet agreed to tell the French.
[Page 271]M. Well, I think that we should insist on that. If they want the word “dismemberment” in that we should let them inform the French of it.
W. That is the position I will take. One other thing. I thought if the question of the surrender instrument came up, or if the question of the issuance of the proclamation was to come up, I would ask Mosely to go over to SHAEF in order that he might help them, because of his knowledge of the Russian language. I believe we should have somebody there who can read the Russian text.
M. That will be quite satisfactory to us.
W. All right, Doc. Thank you ever so much.
M. Good-bye.
W. Good-bye.
- Transmitted to the Department in despatch 25876, October 3, 1945, from London, not printed. For another extract from the record of this conversation, dealing with Austrian matters, see p. 115.↩
- Beginning with this phrase, the record of the telephone conversation continues from another transcript of the same conversation filed separately under 740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–445.↩
- Telegram 3450, May 2, 1945, to London, not printed; see footnote 30, p. 279.↩