Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740w00119 Control (Germany)/4–3045

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, April 30, 1945.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has considered the proposals of the French Government for a French zone of occupation of Germany, together with French suggestions for participation in the occupation of Austria as set forth in your identical letters to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy of March 3, 1945.⁸⁵ The British proposal on transfer to the French of a part of the British zone, as described in Ambassador Winant’s cable to the Department of State of March 23, 1945 (Cornea 197) has also been considered. These matters have been studied in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the following comments and conclusions are concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:⁸⁶

1. While the desirability to the French of having the French zone adjacent to the French border is recognized, it is believed that the present proposal is subject to grave military objections, particularly from a logistical point of view, and it is considered that acceptance of the proposal in its present form would be highly prejudicial to the military support of the United States forces of occupation in Germany and Austria.

2. No objection is perceived to that portion of the French proposal which requests the allocation of a zone west of the Rhine but it is noted that this area is under the present protocol allocated to the British, and therefore the French request in that particular is more properly addressed to the British Government rather than the United States. In this connection it is noted that the French proposal does not define the northern boundary of the French zone west of the Rhine. Before any agreement is reached this boundary should be clearly delineated. Any extension of the French zone north of the northern boundaries of the Bezirke of Cologne and Aachen would intercept the flow of communication from the lowland ports to both the United States and British zones and would not be acceptable. The city of Cologne comprises an area on each bank of the Rhine; the portion on the east bank includes railroad facilities which are vital to both the United States and British lines of rail communications along the east bank of the Rhine. While the terms of the French proposals indicate that only that part of the city of Cologne which lies on the west bank of the Rhine is intended for inclusion in the French zone, this should be clarified and definitely limited to such portions of the city as lie on the west bank of the Rhine. Otherwise, a vital link in United States and British rail communication along the east bank of the Rhine will be intercepted.

3. As for the British proposal to include the Regierungsbezirk of Koblenz within the French zone, it is the view of the U.S. that the portion of this area which lies east of the Rhine should not be allocated to the French as the same considerations discussed with respect to Cologne apply with even greater force to the Koblenz area. In addition, the city of Koblenz is a transfer point between the British and the U.S. To put it under French control would materially increase the difficulties of an already complicated operational situation to the extent that it would probably become unworkable.

4. Initially the United States occupational forces will be supplied over lines established during the entry into Germany which will be supplemented by lines from the lowland ports (Antwerp and Rotterdam) . After the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven become operative, the main supplies for the United States forces will be routed from Bremen and Bremerhaven through the British zones via Kassel and thence to various distribution centers in the United States zone in Germany from which supplies will be distributed to troops stationed throughout Germany and Austria. Distribution of civil relief will follow the same channels. Kassel and Frankfurt am Main are key focal points in this distribution net. For the successful support of the United States forces of occupation, it is essential that these key cities remain in the United States zone since continued availability of these channels of supply is essential.

5. The French proposal for a zone in Germany east of the Rhine would allocate to the French the German provinces of Baden, Hessen and Hessen-Nassau (described in the proposal as Baden, Hessen, Hessen-Kassel and Hessen-Darmstadt) and would place under French and not United States control the key focal cities of Kassel and Frankfurt am Main, and the communications radiating therefrom to Wurttemberg and Bavaria.

6. The French proposal, incorporating as it does the area through which the Rhine flows, would deny the United States forces access to this river. Possession of ports of the Rhine system is essential to the use of the river. Coal and other bulk commodities which must be exchanged between the various areas are ordinarily transported by the Rhine river system. In view of the disrupted railway system, use of the Rhine system will be essential for support of United States occupational forces and maintenance of civilian economy in the southwestern zone.

7. The French proposal is in accord with the Yalta protocol whereby it was agreed that a zone of occupation should be allocated to France and that it would be formed out of the British and American zones. The conclusions reached with respect to the French proposal are briefly as follows:

a. Hessen and Hessen-Nassau are essential to U.S. control of the American zone for the support of its occupational forces and contain the key focal cities of Kassel and Frankfurt am Main. For logistical reasons it is imperative that there be as little interference as possible with the lines of communication between the U.S. zone and its base ports of Bremen-Bremerhaven. The necessity of dealing with the forces of two nations with different organizational structures and different languages in order to support the U.S. forces would create an extremely difficult logistical situation. If the principal administrative district for the U.S. zone were also to be in the control of the force of another country the situation would probably become unworkable.

b. The proposal to include Baden in the French zone presents problems which must be examined with respect to the four smaller geographical areas (Landeskommissarbezirke) into which Baden is divided:

(1) Konstanz and Freiburg can be released from the U.S. zone.

(2) Karlsruhe would not present any very serious problem were it to be included in the French zone.

(3) Mannheim intercepts the communications between Frankfurt am Main and Stuttgart both of which are important U.S. administrative and distribution points and contains installations essential to the U.S. zone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that for logistical reasons the occupation of this area by the French could take place only on the condition that unequivocal rights of through passage be granted the U.S. forces to the extent the commander of the U.S. forces deems necessary. If such arrangements can be effected there is no serious objection to inclusion of this area in the French zone.

c. The basic issue, in the opinion of the Department of State, is to carry out the commitment made at the Crimea Conference and to protect the long-range political interests of this government as well as the more immediate military needs.

8. There are no overriding military objections to giving to the French, with proper safeguards with regard to transit rights, the State of Baden, the State of Wurttemberg and the Province of Sigmaringen although it is militarily desirable to retain Wurttemberg and Sigmaringen since U.S. activities may, at a later date, be centered in the Munich area. However, the French may be satisfied with receiving the State of Baden only and it is recommended that the release of that area alone be proposed initially to the French. Regardless of whether or not the State of Wurttemberg and the Province of Sigmaringen, in addition to the State of Baden, are given to the French, it will be necessary to have a clear agreement with the French guaranteeing rights of passage through any part of the French zone lying contiguous to and west of the U.S. zone, particularly exclusive rights to the bridges which the American forces have built over the Rhine and the communication facilities which the American forces have built in Germany.

9. General Eisenhower has stated that the City of Frankfurt is the only location he has found in the U.S. zone that fills the requirements as the future site for his headquarters. For this reason arrangements should be made for the assurance that Frankfurt and reasonable surrounding territory will remain in the U.S. zone.

10. No military necessity or advantage is perceived in enlarging the “Greater Berlin” zone to include Potsdam but it is noted that this is a matter primarily of concern to the U.S.S.R. and requires consideration of all powers concerned.

11. The French suggestion for a mixed rather than a zonal occupation of Austria is not looked upon with favor. Mixed occupation is difficult of administration especially where differences of languages and legal concepts are involved. With occupation forces of different nationalities in the same area, an unfriendly or uncooperative population is in an ideal position to play one nationality off against the other and will be quick to take advantage of the situation. This suggestion would require submission to and acceptance by both the British and U.S.S.R. as well and could not be agreed to by the United States alone. Furthermore, it would require reopening and revising the entire theory of occupation as developed to date under the existing protocols. On the other hand no military objection is perceived to a French zone of occupation of Vorarlberg and Tirol in Austria.

12. Any occupation of Germany or Austria by the French should be subject to all of the general conditions to which the United States, United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. have already subscribed.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. Freeman Matthews

Acting Chairman

85. Not printed; this letter repeated the substance of telegram 1400, February 8, 9 p.m., from London, p. 182.
86. These comments and conclusions were contained in the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 27, 1945, not printed, which when circulated for consideration by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, became the enclosure to document SWNCC 44/1, 28 April 1945, not printed. According to SWNCC 44/2, dated 3 May 1945, not printed, by informal action on May 1, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 44/1, and the information contained in the enclosure was transmitted to the Secretary of State (EAC File).