Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 22

Minutes of the Twenty-Second Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 16, 1945, 9:45 a.m.

San Francisco, June 16, 1945, 9:45 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of participants, including members of Delegations of the United States (17); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (3); China (2); and France (5).]

Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting at 9:45 a.m., stating that this meeting was called at the request of the United States Delegation to discuss two items prior to the convening of the meeting of the four presidents which would consider the plans for the closing proceedings of the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that most of those present were familiar with the discussions concerning amendment procedure. The United States Delegation had just reviewed the whole matter in detail. Mr. Stettinius called on Mr. Stassen to present suggestions which he said he hoped the other members of the group would find acceptable.

Mr. Stassen stated that, on the basis of the discussion in Committee I/2, two matters had arisen on which consultation seemed necessary in this group and on which the United States Delegation had formulated recommendations. The first item was the Belgian motion⁷⁵ providing for ratification of recommendations made by the general conference to review the Charter, by a two-thirds vote together with the concurring votes of the five permanent members, rather than by a majority vote together with the votes of the permanent members. This would increase the number of necessary ratifications from 28 to 34. He stated that the United States Delegation feels that, while ratification under this procedure would be more difficult, it would be well under the circumstances to go along on the Belgian amendment in view of the fact that we want above all to insure that amendments can come into force only with the agreement of the five powers.

Mr. Stassen stated that the second matter on which he would like to present a recommendation was the South African motion which had been defeated by a vote of 28 to 17 only.⁷⁶ This vote was very close to a two-thirds vote and many states had very strong sentiments about this motion. He said he thought we should not overlook this sentiment as we tried to bring the Conference to a close. Therefore, he was suggesting that the following proposal be supported by the five delegations as an addition to the text of the sponsoring governments’ amendment:

“If such a general conference has not been held before the tenth annual meeting of the General Assembly following the entry into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such a general conference shall be placed on the agenda of that meeting of the Assembly, and shall be subject to adoption by the Assembly by a simple majority vote and by the Security Council voting by a procedural vote.

Mr. Stettinius commented that in view of the fact that the five powers would have a veto on amendments and since the Assembly could in any event call a conference for the review of the Charter, he thought what we were discussing was a rather unimportant procedural question. He asked Mr. Boncour what he thought of Mr. Stassen’s proposals. Mr. Boncour indicated approval.

Ambassador Halifax said he agreed on both points. He remarked that he had sat through much of the committee discussion and in his judgment the only way to get through with general good will and speed would be to follow the line suggested by Mr. Stassen. He thought, unless some good will was created, the effort to insure our veto on amendments might not succeed or in any event we might lose important votes.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that Mr. Stassen’s proposal would mean that we made three concessions in one day: a concession on amendments, a concession on the two-thirds vote for the ratification of the Charter and the inclusion of the calling of the conference on the agenda of the tenth assembly. Ambassador Halifax indicated that half of these were made yesterday. Mr. Stassen said the proposal by Belgium was not for ratification of the Charter but for ratification of amendments only.

Ambassador Gromyko repeated that these proposals involved three concessions. He thought the concession on the Belgian motion in the draft before the committee would no doubt be welcomed. He was afraid, however, that it would create an additional difficulty in making it possible for a small group of states to block ratification.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the change in the number required for ratification was from 28 to 34. Ambassador Gromyko stated that there was a difference of six votes and that this difference might be the cause of blocking ratification of the revised charter. Mr. Dejean asked whether our policy was to facilitate amendments or to make them more difficult. Ambassador Gromyko replied that, if they were good amendments, acceptable to the five permanent members, then we would be interested in speedy ratification.

Ambassador Halifax said that the whole course of the development of opinion showed that our problem was the likelihood of the smaller powers wanting to enforce amendments on us. Therefore, he said he was glad to see Mr. Rolin making it more difficult to get amendments through. He believed that the great problem would be the desire of the smaller powers to put through amendments that we would not want.

Mr. Stettinius expressed agreement with Ambassador Halifax. Ambassador Gromyko said that the five major powers would be secure in any event because of the requirement of unanimity in the ratification of amendments.

Mr. Stassen said that unanimity had not yet been voted and that that was what we wanted to win. Since this most important problem was not yet decided he thought it might be well to make a concession and adjustment at this time. It would in any event be important not to rely on the fact that one of the major states could veto an amendment, since no one of us would like to be the only one blocking an amendment. He believed that neither the two-thirds or the majority vote was vital in ratification and that to agree to Mr. Rolin’s proposal would put us in a better place to secure the ratification of the Five Powers for every amendment.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that no one in the Technical Committee had opposed the unanimous vote of the Five Powers in the ratification of amendments.

Senator Connally indicated that he would like to address some remarks to Ambassador Gromyko and to the others present. He said that with the five permanent members in the driver’s seat these members would not be concerned with the revision of the Charter. The pressure would come from the little countries that wanted amendments. He said that, in view of the tough battle that had to be waged in connection with the veto in Committee III/1 and in view of the feeling that was evident in this battle of opposition to the veto on amendments, he believed it would be very important to accept Mr. Rolin’s proposal. Acceptance of this proposal he thought, would close the veto question, tie it up, and make it possible to go through and close the conference. Senator Connally said he wanted to urge the Ambassador to accede to this proposal and to agree upon it. He felt that if the Five States could line up on this proposal and put it over they could assure themselves the veto on the ratification vote. Ambassador Halifax indicated agreement with this position.

Mr. Boncour said he did not understand why Mr. Rolin had made this proposal which made amendments more difficult. He thought, however, that since it had been proposed that we should take advantage of it. Ambassador Koo remarked that the principal preoccupation of the Chinese Delegation as the Secretary knew was to get the veto power on amendments accepted. Those states that had been defeated in Committee III/1 were now putting their hope in the possibility of review of the Charter, and were therefore concentrating all their effort on Committee I/2. He believed that the Belgian offer provided the opportunity to get over the last hurdle. Both on psychological and substantive grounds he approved Mr. Stassen’s proposal.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether, if a concession was made on the placing of a conference for review of the Charter on the agenda of the tenth assembly, along the lines proposed by Mr. Stassen, we could not hold on to our position on the ratification of amendments and on the ratification of recommendations for a revisionary conference.

Ambassador Halifax said this would be quite possible to do, but that it seemed to him to be rather small boys’ stuff, and to have the character of horse-trading. He did not believe we would get any sort of credit for this approach. He thought that at this time we should make a big gesture which in fact would cost us nothing. We would be keeping everything that was vital. He said that we had all agreed on the point of keeping the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as inviolate as we could, but in this case we could gain a lot by giving away very little.

Mr. Stettinius said he was in accord with Ambassador Halifax’ sentiments and believed we would be giving up nothing of substance, whereas we would create tremendous goodwill both among the small and middle powers. He suggested that Mr. Stassen’s proposal be followed and that it would be a mistake to divide the issues and horse-trade on something that cost nothing.

Mr. Stassen explained that his proposal on the calling of the conference differed from the original South African proposal in that the conference would not be mandatory in the tenth year. He pointed out that the South African proposal for a mandatory conference had almost been adopted, the vote being 28 to 17, just short of two-thirds.

Senator Connally remarked that, according to this proposal, the calling of a conference would merely go on the agenda and that, since the Assembly could call a conference at any time anyway, he could not see why it was a serious concession to make.

Mr. Stettinius stated that all other questions in connection with this problem were incidental to the question of veto on amendments. He was afraid that we would jeopardize our chance if we did not take a broad and generous view of the two matters presented by Mr. Stassen.

Mr. Stassen indicated that another possible alternative would be to provide that, if such a conference has not been called before the tenth year, it would be called unless a majority of the Assembly did not wish to call it.

A draft of this proposal was then distributed:

“If such a conference has not been called prior to the tenth year after the effective date of the Organization, and unless a majority of the members have indicated during the tenth year that they do not desire such a conference to be called, the Secretary General shall call such a conference to be held at a convenient date between the tenth and twelfth year inclusive.”

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that we had already agreed to the calling of a conference by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. Mr. Stassen pointed out that this agreement had been made some time ago and did not really affect present negotiations.

Mr. Rockefeller noted that in view of the psychological situation in the Committee it might be very useful to return to the South African proposal, even if in some modified form. He thought it would please the majority of the Committee if the Big Five went back and indicated a real desire to meet the feelings of the smaller powers.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he would like to have a copy of the original South African proposal and a copy was handed to him.

Ambassador Gromyko said he wondered why Mr. Stassen’s proposed modification of the South African proposal could not provide for the calling of the conference by a two-thirds vote rather than a majority vote. Senator Connally pointed out that the two-thirds, proposal was in the present text and that we were offering the majority vote as a concession to the states that might otherwise oppose the veto on amendments. He urged that a concession be made on the unimportant matters in order to assure victory on the important ones.

Ambassador Gromyko said that, in view of the fact that there was no agreement among the Five Powers on this question, he would say that he would not speak against the proposal brought forward by Mr. Stassen and probably would refrain from voting. He indicated that he wanted it clearly understood, however, that he would prefer to have the Five adhere to the sponsoring governments’ amendment. If, however, this was not possible, then he would agree not to speak against this compromise proposal.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that this decision would make it possible to bring our consultations on this question to a close with the understanding that we could speak and act individually.

Ambassador Halifax remarked that he had been hopeful that an agreement could be reached, but that he understood the difficulty confronted by the Soviet Ambassador. He felt strongly that the present matter required some flexibility of handling and believed that the position taken by the Ambassador would be helpful in permitting such flexibility.

Ambassador Gromyko stated he wanted it fully understood that he would prefer the calling of the conference by a two-thirds vote.

Ambassador Halifax said he did not know what the others thought but that he felt that it might be well to give more thought to Mr. Stassen’s suggestion that the conference should be held unless opposed by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. He thought this proposal would meet the views of the South Africans and the New Zealanders, and that it would come to about the same thing as the other proposal, since no conference could then be forced on an unwilling Assembly. Mr. Dejean pointed out that Mr. Stassen had suggested a majority vote of the Assembly. Ambassador Halifax replied that this was satisfactory to him.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that consultations on this question be ended now and that each state vote according to its own convictions. He understood that Ambassador Gromyko did not intend to speak against the suggestion made by Mr. Stassen and would abstain from voting against it.

Senator Connally explained that our proposal meant that at the end of a ten-year period the conference would not be automatically called, but would be called only if a majority of the Assembly and seven members of the Security Council wanted it called. By this arrangement the responsibility was put upon the states to decide positively whether they wanted a conference in contrast to the other proposal which would give the states the power only to oppose the calling of a conference. Since we had the veto on the results of the conference when they came up for ratification, he thought we could afford to hold out this concession to the smaller states and that it would go a long way to ease the situation.

Ambassador Halifax agreed that on the whole Senator Connally was right that it was better to put the responsibility positively on the members of the Organization to call a conference.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether each delegation was then agreeable to freedom of action on this question. The members of the other four delegations indicated that they were agreeable.

Mr. Stassen said that a decision was still needed on Mr. Rolin’s proposal for a two-thirds vote for the ratification of amendments rather than a majority of the states other than the five permanent members on the Security Council. Ambassador Halifax said it would be his pleasure to have the Ambassador agree with the rest of the group so that they could all go along together in accepting Mr. Rolin’s proposal. If this was not possible, he said his second pleasure was to be free on this point to move as the delegations desired. He did not believe it was a point of great substance and he believed that the delegations could agree to differ on it.

Ambassador Gromyko asked, why we had to make three important concessions at one time.

Senator Connally urged that we were not taking these positions for ourselves but in order to make it possible to secure the veto that we had to have on amendments. This veto, he said, was the insides of this thing—the whole works. It was the liver, the stomach, the heart, and the lungs, and if we could not get it, the whole proposition would blow up. He pointed out that in Committee III/1 we had obtained; acceptance of the Yalta formula⁷⁷ only after the most laborious, sweaty and almost bloody fight. We were not making these proposals now for the sake of others, he said, but for ourselves. We needed to continue to hold the driver’s rein and, if we did not go along on some of these matters, we would lose the driver’s seat. Where would we be, he asked, if we did not get the veto on amendments? Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he would agree not to oppose Mr. Rolin’s proposal.

Mr. Stettinius said it would now be possible to end our consultations on this question also, with each delegation free to act on all three points as it saw fit.

Senator Connally then rose and went over to shake Ambassador Gromyko hand, commenting that he thought it would be appropriate at this time to pause in order to baptize Ambassador Gromyko.

Mr. Stettinius announced that there was still up for discussion the draft on interim arrangements and that Ambassador Gromyko also wished to discuss the question of the right of the Assembly to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations. He suggested that Mr. Dulles introduce that latter problem.

Mr. Dulles said that he understood this question was being raised on behalf of the Soviet Government which had not been satisfied with the text adopted by Committee II/2 providing that: “The General Assembly should have the right to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations.”⁷⁸ The Subcommittee that had worked on this question thought perhaps that the matter could be taken care of by the addition of a phrase in this sentence so that it would read: “The General Assembly, within the purposes and in accordance with the principles laid down in the Charter, should have the right to discuss any matter within the Sphere of international relations” Mr. Dulles stated that the United States Delegation did not wish to take the initiative in proposing this change but would support the British Delegation if they proposed it.

Mr. Stettinius added that, as Mr. Dulles stated, the United States was willing to support this proposal. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the Subcommittee decision as reported by Mr. Dulles was not in fact agreed to by the Subcommittee on which a member of the Soviet Delegation met with the representatives of the other four governments. Mr. Dulles replied that he had not been able to Stay throughout the meetings of the Subcommittee, but that Mr. Gerig had given him to understand that the proposal that he had just suggested was generally acceptable.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that there was some misunderstanding, that the proposal was not acceptable, and that it did not change the meaning of the paragraph.

Mr. Dulles remarked that, as he understood the situation, the Soviet Government felt that the right of discussion of any matter might lead to academic discussion and debate on questions that need not Come before the General Assembly. The thought was that this objection could be met if there was some requirement for relevancy between the discussion in the General Assembly and the purposes of the Organization.

Mr. Stettinius asked Ambassador Gromyko what he had in mind Ambassador Gromyko replied that his proposal was to draft the paragraph to read: “Any member of the General Assembly should have the right to discuss any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” He pointed out that mention of the purposes and principles did not meet his problem, since it would be possible to raise a question in the General Assembly which was not related to international peace and security, yet was in line with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Soviet language was the original language but that the present text had been adopted by a vote of 27 to 9. He indicated that he had not attended the Technical Committee meetings, but that Senator Vandenberg had told him that it would be impossible for the Committee to reverse itself. Practically the only opposition to the new language had come from the four sponsoring powers, France, and the two Soviet Republics. The Subcommittee had made an effort, he said, to find language that would not require the Committee to completely reverse itself.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the Committee was pretty troublesome and that already other erroneous decisions had: been corrected.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it would be bad at this late hour to go back and tell the little states that they would have to revise this paragraph. He was sure that if the Soviet Union raised this matter it would be voted down. He pointed out that what the Soviet Ambassador wanted was already written into the language as accepted by the Committee.

Ambassador Gromyko asked if the text did embody what he had in mind why his wording could not be used: “any matter affecting” or “any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Mr. Boncour said, if the Soviets preferred the text as Ambassador Gromyko had just stated it, then the French would be quite prepared to accept it.

Ambassador Halifax said he did not think there was any substantive difference in the views of the five delegations, but, having respect for the history of the work in the Committee, he was not prepared to try and force the Five Power position the rest of the Committee. While it was important for the Five Powers to work together, it was also important for them to win the confidence of the small powers. He felt that to go back on the earlier decision at this time would have a very unfortunate effect.

Mr. Boncour stated; that both Mr. Dulles’ proposal from the Subcommittee and Ambassador Gromyko’s proposal involved a reversal of the Committee so that the same objection applied in fact to both texts. He pointed out that it would be equally difficult in his view to get either of the texts accepted. Ambassador Koo suggested that there was not much difference in the two texts proposed and that if the matter was raised his Delegation would not make an objection to the change. He felt, however, that raising this question at this time would certainly delay matters.

Mr. Stettinius noted that, if one of the Five Powers asked that the decision of the Committee be changed by the Steering Committee, that power would certainly be voted down amidst disappointment and resentment. He pointed out that we were committed to the position that the General Assembly would be the town meeting of the world and that it could discuss any subject at any time. He felt it would create an adverse psychological situation to give the impression, particularly at this time, that we were watering down free discussion.

Mr. Boncour stated that the objections applied equally to both texts.

Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Boncour and stated that he was not recommending that we go back on the decision of the Committee. He believed that the Committee would deal an overwhelming defeat to any suggestion for such a change. He suggested that, in view of the effort to wind up the Conference, it might be well, if this matter was to be raised at all, not to raise it today but perhaps to let it rest awhile until the relations with the small powers improved. He did not feel that this was now the moment to discuss the question. Ambassador Gromyko asked until when he should wait. Mr. Dulles replied that, if the three questions pending in Committee I/2 could be cleared up today, then it might be possible to have a better atmosphere by Monday.⁷⁹

Ambassador Gromyko asked for what he should wait.

Mr. Stettinius replied that Mr. Dulles’ point was that to raise this question in the Steering Committee today would lead to great difficulty and would be a mistake, whereas by Monday the Committee might be more amenable to a suggestion.

Ambassador Halifax said he agreed with Mr. Dulles that it would be well not to raise this matter at this particular moment.

Mr. Hiss asked if the Ambassador wished to have the meeting of Commission II canceled in the light of the wish of the Ambassador to have a meeting of the Steering Committee before a meeting of the Commission.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that he would wait until Monday if the other powers would support him. He indicated that he attached great importance to the provision that he had suggested, because, if the Assembly could discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations, any member could raise any question regardless of its nature. The subject of immigration laws might come up for discussion. There would be certain connections between different countries affecting several countries that would come up for discussion. He said that the present provision contradicted the sovereignty of states and he wondered why we did not use precise language which clearly established that the General Assembly could discuss matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Hiss indicated that Commission II was scheduled to meet the following afternoon, and that, if Ambassador Gromyko wished, a Steering Committee could be called before the Commission meeting. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he hoped agreement could be reached among the Five on language for this paragraph, but that, if not, he did not want to see this paragraph brought up to the Commission at this time.

Mr. Stettinius stated that apparently there was to be no agreement on the language of this paragraph at this meeting.

Ambassador Halifax wondered whether it would be possible to keep the reference on this particular subject out of the Commission report and then to raise it for discussion on Monday. He thought that it might be advisable to wait for a better atmosphere in the Steering Committee.

(Senator Vandenberg entered the meeting and The Secretary briefly reviewed the course of the discussion for his benefit.)

Mr. Stettinius urged that the Soviet Ambassador not raise this question at this time but postpone it until Monday until other questions were clarified. He asked Senator Vandenberg if he wished to comment on this problem from the point of view of his experience in the Committee. Senator Vandenberg said that the limited proposal of the Ambassador had been voted down in the Committee on two occasions and that he had no idea that this limitation would be accepted by the Committee. He believed that, if Professor Webster was present, he would agree with this statement. He thought it would take an earthquake to change the point of view of the Committee and wanted to make it clear that he did not wish to be held personally responsible for doing what he believed to be impossible in the Committee. He added, however, that he had no objection to the postponement of the question until Monday.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the right of free speech in the Assembly was fundamental and that no matter what language was used in the Charter, the Assembly would still be free to discuss anything. Senator Vandenberg commented that, if a suggestion was put forward for limiting the right of discussion, it could not possibly be successfully defended before the Committee.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that he would agree to postpone discussion of this question in the Steering Committee until Monday if the others thought this advisable, commenting, however, that no one should expect a change in the Soviet position between now and then and that he could only agree to this postponement on the condition that this question be omitted from the report of the Committee to the Commission.

Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Hiss to find out whether the Commission could be postponed and also the status of the report of Committee II/2.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that in order to be sure to cover the matter of the preparatory commission there be discussion of this question at this time. He called on Mr. Sandifer to open the discussion.

The heads of the delegations had before them Interim Arrangements Concluded by the Governments Represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Document 902 EX/23, June 11, 1945.

Mr. Sandifer seated that this draft had been discussed in a meeting of the Little Five the previous day and at that time Mr. Novikov had made two suggestions for changes in the text. He wondered whether Mr. Novikov would like to present these changes to the group at this time.

Ambassador Gromyko remarked that agreement by the Soviet Government had been reached on practically the whole text, but that he would like to propose the omission of the point under paragraph 4 relating to specialize organizations (4(d)): “formulate recommendations concerning the relationship to be established between specialized inter-governmental organizations and agencies and the Organization”. Ambassador Gromyko added that Mr. Novikov had just noted there was one further change to be made: the substitution of the word “appointed” for the word “detailed” in paragraph 3.

Mr. Stettinius said the United States Delegation preferred the word “designated”.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether this meant that the government or the commission itself had the final say in the appointment or designation of the staff. Mr. Sandifer replied that presumably each government would designate officials to serve on this staff following the invitation of the commission to designate a definite number of officials. The commission would invite, he said, and the governments appoint or designate. Senator Connally agreed that in the last analysis the governments would determine what officials served on the staff.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that he would be willing to accept the word “appointed”. General agreement was expressed with this change.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether the heads of the delegations thought the psychological situation would be improved if the Soviet Delegation agreed to the two-thirds vote rather than a majority vote for the ratification of amendments and for the ratification of revisions of the Charter. Did they think this would lead to an improvement in the situation so that it might be possible to get the language with respect to the powers of the General Assembly changed? Mr. Stassen thought that if consultations were held meanwhile with the Belgians and the Australians, there might be some possible results from the Soviet Government’s taking a different position.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that what he was interested in was whether this would affect the position of the heads of the other delegations. Senator Vandenberg replied that we had supported, the Soviet Government before and that we would probably do it again.

Senator Connally questioned whether it was wise to reopen the question with respect to amendments that we had already decided.

Mr. Stettinius thought it was better to stick to the agreement to go our separate ways and he hoped that the Ambassador would then not raise this question of freedom of discussion until Monday. He did not think it would be helpful to push this matter now. Senator Connally replied that he did not believe the concession suggested by the Soviet Ambassador would gain very much for him since many governments were not vitally concerned with this particular change from a majority to a two-thirds vote.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that he would like to see unanimity among the heads of the five delegations, but that he did not think that anything would be gained by altering the previous decision taken at this meeting. He thought, however, it might improve the general atmosphere if the Soviet Ambassador in the course of the next hour found it possible to rally to the general agreement reached on the other issues.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he wanted; to make it perfectly clear that the United States would not associate itself with any move to water down the right of free discussion in the General Assembly.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that this was also his view and that in any event he hoped that the Soviet Government would not force a battle on the freedom of discussion. He was certain that the battle would be lost and in the course of it great harm would be done.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that Mr. Hiss report on his findings concerning Commission II.

Mr. Hiss stated that the paragraph under discussion was the pivotal point in the report of the rapporteur in Committee II/2. He thought that, if any attempt was made to have this paragraph deleted from the report when it went to the Commission, a bad situation would be created. Moreover, if the report went to the Commission, he did not believe discussion of this point could be avoided. He suggested that the Commission should probably be canceled and the Steering Committee held first.

Senator Vandenberg pointed out that the rapporteur’s report had been presented that morning⁸⁰ and, on the motion of the Soviet representative, it was agreed not to read it but to get each delegation to read it on their own. He said that at the next meeting of the Committee there would be a vote on the report, and that, if an effort was going to be made to stop the vote, a good reason would have to be given.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether the meeting of the Steering Committee then should not be postponed until Monday, until the atmosphere improved.

Ambassador Koo suggested that when the Committee report came up for a vote the Soviet representative might make his proposition in the Committee. If it was not adopted, then the Soviet representative could still put a statement in the Committee records. Mr. Boncour thought this was a good suggestion.

Ambassador Koo said that the Chinese Delegation would not object to the Soviet representative presenting their amendment, and that, if the Committee refused to accept the amendment, the Soviet Delegation might still get satisfaction from a statement in the records.

Ambassador Gromyko said he could not agree to this procedure. He was ready, however, to postpone the meetings of the Committee and Commission.

Senator Vandenberg pointed out that all the sponsoring governments had voted together on the original Soviet proposal but had been voted down 29 to 6. The statements in favor of the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals wording were in the record but this position had been rejected.

Ambassador Gromyko asked, if the Soviet Delegation raised this question, whether it could get the support of the other four governments. Senator Vandenberg said we would have to vote in support if the Soviet Delegation raised the matter. Ambassador Halifax agreed that we would have to stand on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals wording. He added that we would be voted down as we already had been twice defeated.⁸¹ He would prefer, if the Soviet Delegate realized that the issue was not a profitable one, that an interpretation be put in the record. While he felt this was the wiser course, if the Soviet Delegation would raise the matter again, the British Delegation would support the Soviet. Mr. Boncour preferred that a statement be made in the record, but said that, if the Soviet Delegation insisted, France would vote with them. Ambassador Koo agreed that this was also the position of the Chinese Delegation.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether the other governments would speak in favor of the Soviet position. Mr. Stettinius replied in the negative and Mr. Boncour said he would have no objection to stating his position in the meeting.

Ambassador Gromyko said that, in view the position of the other powers, he would have to ask for an Executive Committee meeting that day.

Mr. Stettinius said that this policy would risk a great deal and he Pondered why such drastic action was necessary.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that this was a very important matter and that he felt it necessary to express his views on it and get, if possible, an improvement in the language. Mr. Stettintus thought that the Executive Committee would vote down the Soviet position. Ambassador Gromyko replied that we would see whether this happened and that he would raise the matter in the Steering Committee in any event. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the end of the Conference would seriously be postponed if this question was raised first in the Executive Committee and then in the Steering Committee. He was confident that there was no hope in achieving a change along the lines desired by the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Boncour suggested that there would be no difficulty in postponing the Commission. Senator Connally saw no objection to the Soviet Delegation going before the Committee at this time on this matter and then the Executive Committee could be held Monday. Mr. Hiss suggested that the Soviets might say in the Technical Committee that they wished to refer the question to the Executive and Steering Committees.

Ambassador Gromyko remarked that he would have to raise this question in the Executive and Steering Committees before raising it in the Technical Committee. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that it was quite possible that the Executive Committee would not consider the matter except as a procedural question. Ambassador Gromyko thought it was quite possible that the Executive Committee would discuss it as a substantive matter.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the Executive Committee and the Steering Committee could be called for the following day.⁸² He would like to make it clear for the record, however, that the United States reserved its position as to what action it Would take in the Executive and in the Steering Committees. He could not pledge how the United States would speak or how it would vote. Ambassador Halifax suggested that the Executive Committee should meet at ten a.m. and the Steering Committee at eleven a.m. Ambassador Gromyko thought that an hour was too little time. Mr. Stettinius reminded Ambassador Gromyko that every effort should be made to push the Conference to a close. Ambassador Gromyko said any schedule the others wanted would be all right. Mr. Stettinius said he would call the meeting of the Executive Committee at 10:00 a.m. and the Steering Committee at 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Stettinius commented that he would like to consider again the draft on interim arrangements. He pointed out that the United States Delegation had a suggestion of a change in wording for paragraph (d) to which the Soviet Delegation had expressed objection. He suggested that this paragraph begin: “Examine the problems involved in the establishment of the relationship between the specialized organizations and…” Ambassador Halifax, Ambassador Gromyko, Ambassador Koo and Mr. Boncour indicated that this change in wording was agreeable.

Mr. Hiss said the draft on interim arrangements would now be checked with the other members of the Executive Committee to point out the two changes made at this meeting and it would then go before the Steering Committee.

Senator Connally asked whether the Soviet Government had yet received word on Chapter XII, paragraph 1. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he had not yet heard from his Government but that he expected an answer soon.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:15 a.m.

75. Doc. 1022, I/2/69, June 16, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 230.
76. Doc. 1015, I/2/68, June 16, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 220.
77. Doc. 967, III/1/48, June 14, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 518.
78. Doc. 680, II/2/34, May 30, UNCIO Documents, Vol. 9, p. 109.
79. June 18.
80. Doc. 1028, II/2/54, June 16, UNCIO Documents, vol. 9, p. 217: for provisional text of report of the Rapporteur of Committee II/2, see Doc. 1008, II/2/52, June 16, ibid., p. 196.
81. See reports of voting on two occasions, Doc. 443, II/2/19, May 19, UNCIO Documents, vol. 9, p. 60; and Doc. 686, II/2/34, May 30, ibid., pp. 109–110.
82. June 17; see Doc. 1063, EX/27, June 18, and Doc. 1061, ST/17, June 18, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, pp. 522 and 264, respectively.