Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–P 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 20

Minutes of the Twentieth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 12, 1945, 6 p.m.

San Francisco, June 12, 1945, 6 p.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (18); United Kingdom (5); Soviet Union (3); China (3); and France (6); and the International Secretariat (1).]

Mr. Stettinius said that he had invited the Presidents of the four Commissions to be present²¹ to review with the representatives of the Five Powers the question of expediting the work of the Conference and bringing it to an early close. …

. . . . . . .

… He said that a number of suggestions had been made at the afternoon meeting for expediting the Conference. He asked Marshal Smuts to summarize the suggestion he had made during the afternoon.

Marshal Smuts said that he thought by forced measures we might finish the work of the Committees and Commissions early next week. … The principal cause of further delay would be the preparation of the five-language texts. On this point he had the following suggestion to make. The Conference should not plan to sign the five-language texts on the closing day. It should sign the English and take time to get the texts in the other languages prepared in, proper form. It should be agreed to sign here in one language with the understanding that the text to be signed subsequently in the other languages would be equally authentic. If this schedule were followed he thought the Conference could close on June 23.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Hiss pointed out that under the regulations adopted on May 9 by the Steering Committee,²² a procedure along the lines suggested by Marshal Smuts had been envisaged. It was contemplated at that time that if time did not permit preparation in five languages prior to signing, the texts in other languages might be prepared and signed at a later date. He referred to the agreement to establish language panels²³ and said that if agreement were actually reached on texts before the final signing, all the texts could be signed. It was clearly understood, he said, that each of the five language texts would have equal authenticity. …

. . . . . . .

… Mr. Gromyko agreed with the desire to speed up the work of the Conference but he thought this should not be done at the expense of the quality of the Charter to be concluded. He said that he could not associate himself with the suggestion for signing in English only. He thought that it would still be possible to prepare the final document in all five texts before the day of signing. There were on the staff of the Secretary-General experts in all five languages who would be able to prepare the final text in the five languages. It would be premature at this point to take a decision not to sign all five texts. The panels could start work as soon as the texts come from the Coordination Committee. If any changes were made subsequently, the language texts could be revised.

Mr. Gromyko emphasized that he would greatly prefer signature of the final text in all five languages. If this proved impossible, a decision could be made later as to whether signature should take place in one language only, or in such languages as might have been completed on the day fixed for the final session.

Ambassador Koo said that the normal procedure would be to have the five texts signed at the same time. However, there was also circumstances in this case which might make a definite procedure necessary. He thought there was some force in Ambassador Gromyko’s suggestion that we set the date for signing and that to sign at that time such texts as were ready. He thought it was desirable to set a fixed date.

Lord Halifax said that his suggestion would be in line with that of Ambassador Koo’s, that is to fix a date for the closing of the Conference and to plan to sign at that time such texts as had been completed. He did not think that anyone could contemplate with satisfaction waiting in San Francisco for two weeks to get a final text in all five languages.

Mr. Stettinius said that of course the United States delegation would prefer that all five texts be available for signing here. However, for many reasons the Conference must be brought to a conclusion not later than June 23.

Mr. Hiss said that the principal problem was one of authentication of the final text by the delegations. He thought that it would be possible to prepare the actual texts. Language panels were being established to carry out the authentication. These delegations not having language experts would have to agree to accept certifications by the panels. If this were agreed to, the five texts might be ready. In this case the proposal of Marshal Smuts, as amended by Ambassador Koo, might be accepted. If a date were not fixed immediately for a closing and if the language panels were not accepted, authentication by the several delegations might take several weeks. Marshal Smuts suggested fixing the date of Friday, June 22, such texts as were ready to be signed at that time.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he would agree to this if this were the only practicable procedure. …

Mr. Stettinius said that it was necessary for him to leave to meet an important engagement and that he would ask Ambassador Gromyko to preside. He understood that there was general agreement on the procedure suggested by Marshal Smuts, and amended by Ambassador Koo, that the Secretary-General would study the whole procedure and present it to this group at a later date.

. . . . . . .

Ambassador Gromyko took the chair and the Presidents of the three Commissions withdrew from the meeting.

The first question under consideration was on domestic jurisdiction. Ambassador Gromyko said that the Chinese delegation had asked for a further consideration of this question and asked Ambassador Koo to make a statement.

Ambassador Koo recalled the discussion of the Five Powers at the meeting last Wednesday,²⁴ and the proposal by Lord Halifax. At that time the Chinese delegation had reserved its position. He recalled also that at that meeting M. Boncour had not been favorably impressed with the suggestion to modify the Four-Power Amendment. The only item in question was the last clause of the Four-Power Amendment, which provided that the domestic jurisdiction principle should not prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, Section B, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Ambassador Koo said he understood that Lord Halifax’s suggestion was to add the underscored words “enforcement measures”. Ambassador Gromyko thought the British proposal was to delete the clause and that the suggestion for the addition of the words came from the Australian delegation. Ambassador Koo said that it was the view of his delegation that the proposed addition would further enlarge the scope of the domestic jurisdiction exception. His delegation was very much concerned about the effect of this upon the enforcement action of the Council under Chapter VIII. They were concerned particularly as to whether the term “enforcement measures” had referenda only to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Chapter VIII, B. They were afraid that the exception as proposed would break the chain of the enforcement action. Also they feared that the Council might be thrown into enforcement action without sufficient opportunity for prior consideration of a situation. The Ambassador feared that the proposed change might shake the whole foundation of the security action under Chapter VIII, B.

Mr. Dulles said with regard to Ambassador Koo’s question, that Section B involved two sets of measures—first, the determination of threats to or breaches of the peace; second, recommendation of measures to be taken. Under the Australian proposal it would not be possible for the Council to make recommendations in matters of domestic jurisdiction. The intention of the provision as redrafted was to preclude recommendations on matters of domestic jurisdiction. The position of the United States delegation has been that it does not feel strongly on this matter. We have told the Australian delegation that we would not sponsor the proposed change, but that if other members of the Big Five support it, we would accept the change.

M. Boncour said that this was a very delicate point. The provision with the proposed change might protect states against intervention in cases in which internal conditions threaten the peace. It was always a problem to balance the independence of states against necessary intervention to enforce the peace. He thought the proposed limitation was an unhappy one and might impair the effectiveness of security action. Lord Cranborne said that the British delegation would support the change proposed by Australia both on the merits and because of the United Kingdom’s special relations with Australia. His delegation found its position extremely difficult because of the Four-Power Amendment. Nevertheless, it would not be possible for the United Kingdom delegation to vote against the Australian proposal.

Ambassador Gromyko said that his delegation had studied the proposed change and had decided that the change would not be of great importance. They would not object to the inclusion of the words “enforcement measures” in the last clause of the domestic jurisdiction paragraph.

Ambassador Koo reiterated the concern of his delegation with regard to the effect of the proposed change upon the action of the Security Council. They feared that the amended provision would limit the Council to action in matters which have developed into a threat to or breach of the peace. There was danger that it might limit the power of the Council to determine the existence of threads to or breaches of the peace.

Mr. Dulles thought that the interpretation given to the provision by Ambassador Koo was possible and that it was not one generally accepted. He said the general fear of those supporting the proposed change was that a recommendation by the Council might extend to domestic questions involving such matters as immigration or tariff policy.

Lord Cranborne pointed out that there was clearly a difference of views on this question and asked whether this was not a case where we might vote as we wish. M. Boncour suggested that in view of the delicate position of the British delegation, that delegation be left free to vote as it pleased. Lord Cranborne suggested that all delegations be free.

Ambassador Gromyko said that it looked as though there was not agreement among the Five Powers and that therefore the only thing to do was to allow each delegation to act independently. Freedom of action was accordingly agreed upon.

Ambassador Koo said that he fully appreciated the delicate position of the United Kingdom delegation. He would like to reserve the position of his delegation and, if it saw fit, to explain its point of view when this matter came up for consideration in the technical committee.

There was general agreement that the five delegations should be free to act independently.

21. The presidents of Commissions I, II, and IV were present: Mr. Rolin (Belgium), Field Marshal Smuts (South Africa), and Mr. Parra-Perez (Venezuela), respectively. The president of Commission III was not present.
22. Doc. 177, ST/5, May 9 UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 197.
23. WD 222, CO/98, June 8, ibid., vol. 18, p. 651; approved by the Coordination Committee on June 11, WD 288, CO/116, June 13, ibid., vol. 17 p. 77; for lists of persons on the panels, see Doc. 1014, EX–SEC/17, June 15, ibid., vol. 2, p. 625.
24. Minutes of the sixteenth Five-Power meeting, June 6, 4:40 p.m., p. 1176.