RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 67

Minutes of the Sixty-Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Saturday, June 9, 1945, 9:02 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (32) present at meeting.]

In the absence of Secretary Stettinius, Senator Connally convened the meeting at 9:02 a.m.

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen declared that he had some good news to report on the question of trusteeship. Agreement had been reached the previous [Page 1223] day77 on the important outstanding items which had been under consideration by Committee II/4. The Big Five had reached agreement on the questions of membership on the Trusteeship Council, paragraph 5, and the use of the language of the Atlantic Charter with respect to self-determination. In the meeting ending at 6:30 p.m. all three of these questions had been considered, and had then been approved by Committee II/4 in the 8 o’clock meeting the same evening.78

Commander Stassen observed that the only matters which might still require consideration were the Australian amendment to Section A, paragraph 1 and a possible Philippine demand that some questions be reopened. There was also the possibility of an Egyptian amendment. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he had been at the previous night’s meeting of II/4 and thought that Commander Stassen had done a splendid job. Commander Stassen declared that he had been told before the meeting by two Latin American representatives that they wanted to help him on pushing through the Big Five agreements. The Commander declared that he had been most surprised.

Preamble

Dean Gildersleeve reported that personally she was in a difficult situation with respect to the Preamble. Someone had submitted to the press a draft which had been agreed upon by Committee I/179 and had attributed it to Marshal Smuts and Dean Gildersleeve. Dean Gildersleeve declared that, as a professor of English, she protested against having this draft attributed to her. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the Coordination Committee had decided to discuss the Preamble after it had completed its business with respect to the other matters on the agenda. Mr. Pasvolsky assured Dean Gildersleeve that the Preamble would be revised.

[Here follows discussion of a question of procedure.]

Soviet Proposal for a Withdrawal Provision

Senator Vandenberg reported to the Delegation that Lord Halifax had called him that morning and had indicated that, after studying the Russian proposal that provision be included in the Charter for withdrawal, the British had decided that they would prefer the addition of a sentence making clear the right of a State to withdraw from the Organization if an amendment were passed which it could not [Page 1224] accept. Lord Halifax declared that the British would prefer such a course of action to the addition of a statement making this position clear in the report of Commission I. The British, Lord Halifax had declared, were opposed to a general withdrawal provision, but Lord Halifax had indicated that the British understood why the United States could not accept a partial withdrawal provision.

Mr. Dulles asked whether it was thought that the Latin American States would accept a provision for total withdrawal, and Mr. Rockefeller replied in the affirmative. Mr. Dulles said that he could not understand why Ambassador Gromyko could press for such a clause. Mr. Armstrong declared that Ambassador Gromyko’s position had been to support having a clause linking withdrawal to amendments but that he had announced that he would accept a general withdrawal provision. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he was also unable to understand the motives underlying this Russian position, but he was certain that there was something behind it. Mr. Hickerson remarked that the Russians were probably favoring a complete withdrawal clause because it was the popular position to take at that time in view of the probably strong support which such a proposal would gain. Mr. Armstrong felt that the Russians were willing to support a general withdrawal clause because the smaller states would have more to gain than the United States. Senator Vanderberg thought that the Delegation should be prepared with a position if Ambassador Gromyko were to stand pat on a position opposing the inclusion of a statement in the report of the Commission and were to support instead a clause similar to that in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Senator Connally observed that to oppose any such proposal by the Russians would have the effect of neutralizing any statement which might be incorporated in the report of the Commission. Dr. Bowman agreed with Senator Vandenberg that the United States should prepare an answer in view of the fact that this Government would undoubtedly have to meet the argument that internal decay would result if too many States were desirous of withdrawing from the Organization and were not able to do so.

Mr. Hackworth thought that there was another consideration. If such a statement were to be included in the report of the Commission, Mr. Hackworth observed, it would not be much different in practical effect from incorporating the wording in the Charter itself. Incorporation of an interpretative statement in the Commission’s report would not stop much short of actual phraseology in the Charter, Mr. Hackworth thought. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that there was an important difference between the two procedures. If a clause, similar to the withdrawal provision in the Covenant of the League of Nations, were to be incorporated in the Charter, it would make [Page 1225] possible withdrawal by any nation at any time it wanted. The intention had been originally to make possible withdrawal from the Organization only on adequate grounds. As a result of the interpretative statement which Representative Eaton had incorporated in the records of Committee I/2,80 there was no right of withdrawal unless the Organization should fail to fulfill its functions adequately. If the Organization were to become an instrument of oppression or were to fail in its function of preserving peace, then a state should have the right to withdraw. This intention, however, which had been embodied in Congressman Eaton’s statement could not be phrased in League language suitable for inclusion in the Charter. Mr. Hackworth thought that there was a question raised by this condition imposed by Mr. Dulles. Mr. Hackworth wanted to know who would be authorized to decide when a state had just grounds to withdraw from the Organization. Mr. Dulles did not think that this question was really relevant. The great difference was a psychological one, Mr. Dulles declared. Mr. Hickerson remarked that Mr. Dulles’ position fell short of the demands of the small states for a complete withdrawal clause, in view of their objections to the amendment procedure which was to be subject to the veto power of the major powers.

Mr. Dulles observed that Mr. Rockefeller had made certain that the Latin American Governments would accept a withdrawal clause which was tied to the question of amendment, by which a state could withdraw from the Organization, if an amendment, to which a member state could not adhere, were passed in accordance with the constitutional processes established for the Organization. Mr. Armstrong declared that it had been his impression that a number of the Latin American countries had not been in favor of a universal withdrawal clause. Mr. Rockefeller remarked that Ecuador for one had reversed its position because of the major powers’ insistence on retention of the veto over the ratification of amendments.

Commander Stassen expressed the opinion that the matters of withdrawal, expulsion and suspension, and amendment procedure constituted one complete picture, and Commander Stassen thought that these interrelated items should be considered as part of a whole. Commander Stassen thought that the Delegation should write in a qualified withdrawal clause; urge maintenance of the veto over ratification of amendment; and set no date for a revisionary convention. Commander Stassen declared that he had given considerable thought to this question of a revisionary convention, and he was opposed to setting a date because the drive for a special date was spearheaded by those nations which seemed to think that the Charter was inadequate. [Page 1226] Commander Stassen thought that it would be impossible to attempt to force through an amendment procedure whereby the permanent members of the Security Council would have the power of veto or to press for inclusion of provisions for expulsion and suspension in the Charter, unless provision were made for withdrawal. Commander Stassen thought that a clause permitting withdrawal if the Organization should fail in its functions should be included in the Charter. Mr. Dulles agreed that the right to withdraw should be qualified by a reference to the inability of the Organization to perform its functions adequately or to a situation whereby the Organization should become an oppressive agency. Commander Stassen declared that he could see no real difference between the inclusion of such a provision in the report of the Commission or in the Charter itself. Commander Stassen reported that it was his understanding that Representative Eaton’s statement for inclusion in the record of Committee I/281 had been defeated.

Senator Connally was of the opinion that the Delegation would not be facing the issues if it were to favor inclusion of an interpretative statement in the report. Senator Connally said that his personal opinion was that there should be a specific provision in the Charter for the right of withdrawal. Any member, Senator Connally declared, should have the right to withdraw from the Organization, if it so desired. Senator Connally pointed out that if a nation did not want to belong to the Organization, it could not be of much assistance in carrying out the functions of the Organization. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that as a result of the discussion the previous evening there seemed to be a strong case for including in the Charter a general provision for withdrawal. Senator Vandenberg announced that he was also in favor of Senator Connally’s position and declared that he had supported a general withdrawal clause since the preliminary conversations held in Washington. The situation, Senator Vandenberg thought, would be indefensible without such a provision. Senator Connally asked who would be the responsible authority to determine when extraordinary circumstances existed which would make possible withdrawal from the Organization. Mr. Hackworth thought that the Organization would suffer in prestige if any nation were to withdraw.

Senator Vandenberg declared that, if he wanted to defeat the Organization, he could think of no better phraseology to criticize than the two paragraphs proposed by Senator Rolin for inclusion in the report of Commission I. These two paragraphs read as follows: [Page 1227]

“The Commission adopts the opinion of the inviting powers that the faculty of withdrawal of the members should neither be provided for nor regulated. Should the Organization fulfill its functions in the spirit of the Charter, it would be inadmissible that its authority could be weakened by some members deserting the ideal which inspired them when they signed the Charter, or even mocked by aggressor or would-be aggressor states.

“It is obvious, however, that withdrawals or some other forms of dissolution of the Organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice. On account of this risk, inherent to all human enterprises, the Committee abstains from inserting in the Charter a formal clause forbidding withdrawals.”

Senator Vandenberg declared that failure to include a provision for withdrawal in the Charter of the Organization was a confession of instability and would be an indication that the sponsoring governments were afraid to allow the Organization to be composed of free agents. Mr. Hackworth declared that he too favored the adoption of a general withdrawal clause, and he asked the members of Congress present at the meeting how Congress would react if faced by a defective piece of legislation. Mr. Hackworth wondered if Congress would cover up by making a statement in the report of the committee involved. Senator Connally declared that any statement included in the report of Commission I recognizing the right of a state to withdraw under certain circumstances would not have any legal validity. Mr. Dulles pointed out, however, that there was no prohibition of this right in the Charter. Senator Connally thought that nevertheless there should be included in the Charter a provision permitting a State to withdraw. Senator Connally was of the opinion that it would be impossible to force a State to do anything which it did not want to do.

Senator Vandenberg attempted to point out how ridiculous it would be to attempt to meet this problem by including a statement in the report of the Commission. Senator Vandenberg demonstrated for the delegation what might occur if, at a public meeting, someone were to ask whether the United States were free to withdraw from the Organization. Senator Vandenberg declared that he could only answer by referring to the two paragraphs proposed by Senator Rolin, and he read these two paragraphs to the Delegation with a great display of emotion and with an outburst of histrionics. The Delegation greeted Senator Vandenberg’s exhibition with applause.

Senator Connally pointed out that at the previous night’s meeting Senator Vandenberg had urged that the Russians accept Senator Rolin’s statement. Dean Gildersleeve observed that everyone on [Page 1228] the Delegation seemed to be in favor of accepting a general withdrawal clause, and Mr. Hackworth remarked that there seemed to have been an overnight reversal of opinion. Senator Connally pointed out that in the League of Nations there had been two provisions for withdrawal, one connected with the amendment procedure and the other a straight withdrawal clause providing for only two years’ notice.82 Mr. Dulles noted that Germany, Japan and Bolivia, among others, had withdrawn from the League. Russia had been expelled. Senator Connally declared that the matter of withdrawal was a fundamental issue, and he thought that the Delegation should meet it squarely by proposing a general withdrawal clause. Dr. Bowman declared that he was in agreement with this position and supported explicit mention of the right of withdrawal in the Charter of the Organization.

Mr. Armstrong declared that he thought there were two points which should be made. The first was that the five power position had been that there should not be a withdrawal clause. For this reason, the United States would be on the right side of the argument if it were to stand on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The second point that Mr. Armstrong wanted to make was that the British were opposed to a general withdrawal clause. Mr. Armstrong observed that the Russian position involved a change in the previously accepted stand of the five major powers. Furthermore, Mr. Armstrong declared, Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles had argued strongly against a withdrawal provision at the previous night’s meeting. Senator Vandenberg pointed out, however, that he had argued against a limited withdrawal and not against a general clause. Representative Eaton thought that to attach a withdrawal provision to the question of amendment would be a “complete flop.” Representative Eaton agreed with Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg that the issue should be faced squarely and that a plain withdrawal clause should be included. The only question, Representative Eaton thought, was how this should be accomplished, inasmuch as there appeared to be division among the major powers.

Mr. Pasvolsky observed that his position had steadfastly been one of opposition to the withdrawal clause. In his opinion it was not a good idea because it would weaken the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky had favored the solution provided by the addition of the statement, concerning the right of any State to withdraw if it could not accept an amendment, to the statement that had already been incorporated in the record of Committee I/2 by Representative Eaton. [Page 1229] Mr. Pasvolsky thought, however, that the statement suggested by Senator Rolin was “a monstrosity”. Rather than accept this monstrosity, Mr. Pasvolsky said he would favor a withdrawal clause, but Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that it would be impossible for the Delegation to support such an amendment without obtaining the authorization of the President. Mr. Dulles remarked that the President had stated his position as opposing United States support of a general withdrawal clause in a message which he had sent to the Secretary.83 Senator Connally said that in any event the Delegation would have to wait for the Secretary before it could make any final decision. Commander Stassen declared that the other questions which were related, such as amendment, should be considered also. Commander Stassen thought that an over-all agreement should be obtained among the small powers. Mr. Pasvolsky urged, however, that the United States could not join the Organization unless it had the power to control amendments. Mr. Armstrong declared that he had made a statement to that effect in the meeting of Committee I/2.84 Mr. Evatt had seemed surprised and as a result had asked for a postponement of the subcommittee meeting in order that he might devote further study to the situation. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that Mr. Evatt could not have been surprised because he had been informed of this position of the United States several times. Commander Stassen declared that there was a most peculiar situation in that subcommittee. This committee was composed exclusively of all those States which had proposed critical amendments, plus the major powers.85 Commander Stassen pointed out that on the question of representation of the permanent members of [on] the Trusteeship Council, Australia and Egypt had been opposed; but when Commander Stassen had used strong tactics the measure had been carried by a [Page 1230] vote of 32 to 5.86 Mr. Dulles agreed with Commander Stassen’s remarks concerning the composition of the subcommittee and urged that the matter be brought before the full committee as soon as possible. Mr. Armstrong agreed and thought that, in addition, every effort should be made to have the heads of delegations attend the meeting of the full committee which was to consider withdrawal and amendments. In this way better consideration of the matter could be insured. Commander Stassen agreed that the senior delegate of each delegation should be present at this meeting. Senator Connally asked Mr. Dulles to consider a possible situation which might arise out of the adoption of the statement to be included in the report of the Commission. Senator Connally thought that some country might in the future plead extraordinary conditions as a justification for its withdrawal from the Organization. Senator Connally asked what would be the situation if the Organization were to disagree with the position of such a government. Mr. Dulles declared that under the circumstances outlined by Senator Connally the nation in question could withdraw from the Organization unless the other members were prepared to use force to keep it in the Organization. Senator Connally pointed out that this had been the situation with respect to the United States Constitution, and Mr. Dulles thought it might be the wisest course in the long run. Senator Connally pointed out that this was not made clear in the statement to be added to the Committee report.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the real problem was not whether a state had the right to withdraw from the Organization. Mr. Dulles was correct in his interpretation, Mr. Pasvolsky thought. The important matter, in Mr. Pasvolsky’s opinion, was the terms or conditions under which a state might withdraw. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the proposed Organization differed from the League of Nations in a number of respects, and for this reason it could not be [Page 1231] assumed that the same provision for withdrawal would be acceptable with respect to the present Organization as had been adequate for the League of Nations. For example, Mr. Pasvolsky urged, the United Nations Organization would have the authority to take action with respect to non-members of the Organization. This had not been the case with respect to the League of Nations. Therefore, the inducement to withdraw from the proposed Organization would not be so great as it was under the League of Nations. Under the League a nation could withdraw from the Organization and would by that action remove itself from the authority of the League in all matters. Under the proposed Charter, non-members of the Organization might be in a less advantageous position than had been the case under the League. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he favored an addition to Representative Eaton’s statement in the record of Committee I/2. In this way, the terms and conditions governing withdrawal from the Organization would have to be settled according to the circumstances attendant upon each situation as it might arise.

Mr. Hackworth asked what would be the solution if the right of a state to withdraw were denied by the Organisation and that state were then to declare that it would not cooperate with the Organization in its operations. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that in such cases the state concerned should be suspended or expelled from the Organization but should not be permitted to withdraw of its own volition. Mr. Hackworth remarked that the state would still be out of the Organization. Mr. Hackworth observed that, if no provision were made for withdrawal, the result might be to close the door to a number of nations with respect to joining the Organization. Mr. Hackworth agreed faith Mr. Pasvolsky’s interpretation that some functions of the Organization, especially peaceful settlement, would apply to all nations regardless of their status as members of the Organization. Mr. Armstrong remarked that he had been asked at one time by a Norwegian Delegate whether he could explain the advantage which a small state would derive from joining the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that a small state would be able to participate in the decisions of the Organization. Mr. Armstrong remarked that the reply to that was that the small states could participate in the discussions but not in the decisions. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that this was not accurate, in as much as the small states would participate in the decisions taken by the General Assembly. Furthermore, he declared they would be able to participate in a revisionary convention to amend the Charter. Mr. Hackworth added that there was always the possibility that a small state would receive a seat on the Security Council.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested a procedure for the Delegation to follow. He thought that an attempt should be made to draft a withdrawal [Page 1232] clause. This clause should then be submitted to the Secretary for approval. The Secretary, he declared, would have to have a specific proposal to place before the President in order to get the President’s decision on the matter. It would be for the Delegation, Mr. Pasvolsky thought, to make up its mind as to whether or not it wanted to adopt the League phraseology or whether it wanted to frame something new. Mr. Pasvolsky reiterated that the important matter was the terms or conditions under which a state might withdraw from the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that, if there were to be a specific clause in the Charter of the Organization, these terms must be stated specifically. However, if it were decided to make an interpretative statement in the record of Committee I/2 or in the report of Commission I, these terms should be left indefinite for future decision. Senator Vandenberg expressed the opinion that the Delegation would be starting “a six weeks’ dog fight” if an attempt were made to spell out the terms and conditions of withdrawal. He thought that the League language should be adopted. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that even the simple language of the Covenant established some conditions for withdrawal. Mr. Pasvolsky implied that lack of specific conditions was a condition in itself. Mr. Pasvolsky said the question for the Delegation to decide was whether the conditions of the Covenant were adequate for the new Organization. Representative Bloom observed that the League Covenant provided that a state could withdraw from the League of Nations two years after filing notice of its intention to withdraw, provided that it had fulfilled its obligations under the Covenant. Congressman Bloom thought that the Delegation should decide whether or not it wanted a clause providing for withdrawal from the Organization and then Mr. Pasvolsky could prepare a draft for consideration. Mr. Armstrong asked whether such a proposal would be “put forward” by this Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the clause drafted would be one which the United States was willing to support, Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the United States should avoid making any proposal itself. Senator Vandenberg thought that such a clause should be part of a total settlement, and Commander Stassen agreed that the Delegation should present a three or four point program. Mr. Pasvolsky outlined the four points which should be included in such a program as follows: (1) Voting, (2) Amendment, (3) Withdrawal, and (4) Expulsion. The Delegation agreed with this interpretation. Representative Bloom stated that he approved of this program on the basis which Commander Stassen had proposed, that withdrawal should be part of a broad program. The Delegation authorized Mr. Pasvolsky to draft a withdrawal provision.

Mr. Sandifer declared that the original intention had been to satisfy the demands of the smaller powers. Mr. Sandifer added that it was [Page 1233] his understanding that some of these nations were opposed to a general withdrawal clause. Mr. Notter observed, however, that the smaller nations had switched their positions. Mr. Dulles remarked that a few weeks previously he had circulated a draft withdrawal clause,87 and he called the attention of the Delegation to this fact. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Mr. Sandifer should be responsible for preparing the draft clause, and it was agreed that Mr. Sandifer should work in cooperation with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Armstrong in the preparation of such a clause.

Mr. Armstrong declared that the focus of opposition would be the question of a revisionary convention. The small states seem to favor very strongly that a revisionary conference should have the right to fix its own rules of procedure, including the method of ratification. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the United States would have to oppose any such suggestion. Senator Vandenberg declared that he could not believe that there would be any further opposition if the United States were to declare emphatically that it could not accept such a provision. Commander Stassen urged that it was essential that the Australian and Belgian insurrection be brought to an end. Commander Stassen declared that representatives of these two governments had been saying, unofficially, in cloakrooms and similar meeting places, that the Charter was inadequate and that their governments could not join the Organization unless adequate provision were made for revision. Commander Stassen told the Delegation that he had told these gentlemen that if they were unable to accept the Charter they should not remain in San Francisco, rather than spoil it for everyone else. Furthermore, Commander Stassen declared these two delegations were circulating misrepresentations of the Charter. Commander Stassen thought that it was important to hit these two governments hard, and in order to do this he thought that a complete program would be necessary. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that a provision for withdrawal would weaken the Organization. Senator Vandenberg remarked that he was not so sure of that.

Mr. Rockefeller thought that it would be helpful if the Delegation could give him some indication of the points on which it would want the Latin American delegates to withdraw. If he had such an indication, Mr. Rockefeller thought that he and Mr. Hickerson and the other political officers could work on the smaller countries over the weekend.

Mr. Notter thought that the point made earlier in the meeting that discussion of this question should be undertaken in the full committee, rather than in the sub-committee, should be examined by the Delegation. Mr. Notter pointed out that there was no possibility [Page 1234] of convincing any of the other delegates on the sub-committee, and added that if this question were considered there first, it would be necessary to repeat the same arguments in the full committee. Representative Bloom wondered whether it would be possible to bring the Latin American countries into line, and Mr. Rockefeller said he thought this could be accomplished. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that this Government had not presented any proposal to the Latin Americans, and hence, had not been able to force them to recede from their position. Senator Vandenberg agreed that if a proposal were made which would meet some of the Latin American objections, the Latin Americans would come over. Mr. Armstrong asked Mr. Rockefeller whether, in the latter’s opinion, a clause making provision for withdrawal from the Organization would satisfy the Latin Americans. Mr. Rockefeller said that this would depend upon the remainder of the program offered them.

Commander Stassen declared that he thought the Delegation should suppose [support?] the following program:

1.
Support the insertion of a provision for withdrawal.
2.
Support the reinsertion of provisions on expulsion and suspension.
3.
Stand firm on a non-procedural vote for the ratification of amendments.
4.
Support the provision which would place the question of calling a revisionary conference on the agenda of the General Assembly during the tenth year after the coming into effect of the Charter.

Commander Stassen thought that if agreement could be obtained among the major powers on such a program, it would be possible to wind up the business in short order. Mr. Rockefeller indicated his agreement with this position and declared that, although there would probably be some opposition, he was certain it could be handled. Mr. Hickerson thought that the question could not be settled over the week-end because of the need for obtaining the President’s approval. He agreed with Mr. Rockefeller that a good deal of the opposition arose out of the inability of this Government to offer a program thus far. He thought that until such a program could be agreed upon, this Government should just make it clear that the United States could not join the Organization unless it were able to control the amendments which might be passed. He agreed that Commander Stassen’s proposal was a good one. Mr. Rockefeller asked whether the Delegation accepted Commander Stassen’s four points. Commander Stassen declared that final acceptance could not be achieved at that time, and Senator Connally agreed that this was true, in view of the Secretary’s absence.

[Page 1235]

Mr. Sandifer referred to Commander Stassen’s earlier statement and reported that Representative Eaton’s statement, to be added to the record of Committee I/2, had been approved by that Committee on May 23rd. However, it had not been approved, as yet, in the Rapporteur’s report for Commission I. Senator Connally thought that if a withdrawal clause were not inserted in the Charter, but were included in a committee report, the ultimate effect would be the same. Since this was true, Senator Connally could see no reason why it should not be formally incorporated in the Charter, to give legality to the right to withdraw. Mr. Hackworth agreed that if this matter were settled by reference to the right of withdrawal in a committee report, it would be declared that the Conference was too weak to face the issue and had to resort to innuendo. Mr. Dulles declared that the essence of the matter would not be the report; the important fact was that the Charter was silent on the issue. Mr. Dulles pointed out to the Delegation that the United States Constitution also was silent on the matter of withdrawal. He asked the Delegation whether it considered the Constitution to be a pusillanimous document for this reason.

Public Attendance at General Assembly Meetings

. . . . . . .

Withdrawal

Mr. Sandifer asked if Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Dulles and the other members of the Delegation would cooperate with him in drafting a clause on withdrawal. Mr. Rockefeller asked what position he should take in facing the Latin American Governments, and Mr. Hickerson suggested that Mr. Rockefeller should stress that the United States could not join the Organization unless it had a veto power over amendment procedure.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:10 a.m.

  1. At the ninth Five-Power preliminary consultative meeting on trusteeship, June 8, 5:30 p.m.; minutes of meeting not printed.
  2. See Doc. 877, II/4/35, June 9, UNCIO Documents, vol 10, p. 513.
  3. For draft preamble, see Doe. WD 62, I/1/A/18, May 31 (ibid., vol. 6, p. 694); for report of rapporteur, Subcommittee I/1/A, to Committee I/1, June 5, see Doc. 785, I/1/28, June 5 (ibid., p. 358); and for report on consideration of the preamble by Committee I/1, June 5, 8:30 p.m., see Doc. 817, I/1/31, June 6 (ibid., p. 365).
  4. For text of statement, see minutes of meeting of the United States delegation (executive session), May 22, 10:50 a.m., p. 847.
  5. For text of recommendation of the snbcommittee (May 23) as adopted by Committee I/2, see Doc. 606, I/2/43, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 122.
  6. Art. 1(3) and Art. 26(2) of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
  7. Text of the President’s message to the Secretary of State not found in Department files. The delegation’s attitude that there should be no explicit provision in the Charter either prohibiting the right of withdrawal or providing for voluntary withdrawal was first set forth in a statement by Representative Eaton to Committee I/2 on May 21; for text, see Conference Series No. 71: Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945 (Department of State publication No. 2349), p. 47.
  8. At the June 8 meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, in course of discussion of a Mexican proposal concerning the method of voting in the revision conference and the way in which amendments adopted by it would enter into force, Mr. Armstrong stated that if there were any possibility that a revision conference were to change the responsibility of the major powers, and if a proposal for a revision conference which permitted such a change were to be placed in the Charter, it would prevent ratification by the United States (US I/2/E, Doc. 5, June 8, 3:30 p.m.). The Canadian delegate (Pearson) proposed that no vote be taken on the proposal under discussion because of the statement of the United States delegation and because this question was so closely tied to withdrawal; it was agreed that the Subcommittee proceed with the discussion of withdrawal at its next meeting.
  9. Doc. 683, 1/2/48, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 156.
  10. For text of paragraph B, 11 of the working paper (Doc. 323) considered at the June 8 meeting of Committee see Doc. 877, II/4/35, June 9, ibid., vol. 10, p. 516. The Australian delegate raised objection to the automatic inclusion of the members of the Security Council on the Trusteeship Council; the Egyptian delegate expressed fear of the “encroachment” of the Security Council on ordinary trusteeship questions. The Soviet Union had objected to the original wording of paragraph 11, providing for a Trusteeship Council divided equally between representatives of administering powers and those elected by the General Assembly, leaving it to chance whether the permanent members of the Security Council should also be members of the Trusteeship Council. Commander Stassen argued at the June 8 meeting that the permanent members of the Security Council resembled the administering states in that they were interested parties and that the peoples of the trust territories would be better protected if, half the seats on the trusteeship Council were held by elected members The Egyptian proposal to amend paragraph 11 of section B(c) to read “… so that the total number of representatives is equally divided between elected and non-elected states” was lost 31–8; the remainder of the amendment proposed by Commander Stassen was passed unanimously, and paragraph 11, as amended, was adopted 38–2 (Doc. 877, II/4/35, June 9, ibid., p. 517).
  11. For text of Mr. Dulles’ draft statement, see minutes of the meeting of the United States delegation, June 1, 6:04 p.m., p. 1056.