Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 66

Minutes of the Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Friday, June 8, 1945, 9:02 a.m.

San Francisco, June 8, 1945, 9:02 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (37) present at meeting.] The Secretary convened the meeting at 9:02 a.m.

Announcements

The Secretary reported that there was to be a meeting of the Executive Committee at 10:30 a.m.⁵² for the purpose of completing the agenda of the previous day.⁵³ At the previous day’s meeting, the Executive Committee had decided to recommend to the Technical Committee that it reconsider the question of expulsion, with a view toward reinserting a provision for expulsion in the Charter.

General Assembly’s Power to Consider Reports

The Secretary declared that at that morning’s meeting the Executive Committee would consider the power of the General Assembly to consider reports by the Security Council, as embodied in Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 8. The Secretary thought that there was no need for discussion of this by the Delegation because the Delegation’s position had already been made clear. However, Senator Vandenberg thought that when this matter was returned for the consideration of Committee II/2, that body would reassert its previous position that the General Assembly should be granted power to consider such reports and would adopt the phraseology which had been opposed by the Delegation. The Secretary remarked to Mr. Rockefeller that Ambassador Velloso had voted against resubmitting the question to the technical committee after he had committed himself to support the motion. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that there were quite a few of the Latin American states which had voted against the U.S. position and The Secretary thought it would be necessary for him to speak to them.

Mr. Rockefeller explained that in view of the prohibition against making clear to the smaller powers the issues which were under consideration, there had been a great deal of uncertainty among the Latin American states. As a result they had fallen prey to Mr. Evatt’s argument that any attempt to have the Steering Committee reverse the decisions of the lesser bodies was an evidence of power tactics.⁵⁴ The Secretary thought that this situation had been clarified by the decisions of the Executive Committee several days previously providing that the Steering Committee had power only to make recommendations to the technical committees. Mr. Rockefeller declared that he was somewhat concerned over Mr. Velloso’s action and he hoped that everything would move smoothly from that time on.

The Secretary declared that there was to be a meeting of the Steering Committee that afternoon⁵⁵ for the purpose of considering the decisions of the Executive Committee.

Mr. Pasvolsky returned to the question of the General Assembly. He thought that, inasmuch as this matter had been considered by two committees, Committee III/1 and Committee II/2, and since the Committee dealing with the Security Council had voted down the proposal that the General Assembly be permitted to review the reports of the Security Council, whereas Committee II/2 dealing with the General Assembly had passed the motion,⁵⁶ the matter should be referred to a joint subcommittee of the two technical committees. Mr. Sandifer declared that the matter was being referred by the Steering Committee to Committee III/1. Commander Stassen agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky’s suggestion that a joint subcommittee of the two technical committees should be appointed. Mr. Dunn reported that the Chinese had been persuaded to take the initiative in presenting this question, thus taking the load off the Delegation.

The Secretary reported that the Steering Committee meeting that afternoon would consider the morning’s decisions of the Executive Committee. At the afternoon meeting Marshal Smuts would make an appeal that the work of the technical committees be brought to an early conclusion. The Secretary declared that he was going to have a talk with Mr. Dunn to determine how to handle Mr. Evatt and the Filipinos. He also thought that he should have a talk with Mr. Rockefeller to determine what course of action should be followed with regard to the Latin American delegations.

Amendment Procedure

Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Evatt’s proposition would come before the 10:30 meeting of the subcommittee of Committee 1/2 on amendments.⁵⁷ Mr. Armstrong declared that “the bloom had been taken off the peach”. Representative Bloom moved that this statement be reconsidered. Mr. Armstrong explained that wide publicity had been given to the fact that the Delegation was willing to accept a two-thirds instead of a three-fourths vote for the calling of a special conference to revise the Charter. It had also been made known that the Delegation did not feel very strongly against the setting of a definite date or time period for such a conference. In view of the fact that the Delegation’s bargaining position was weakened by the fact that its position was known, Mr. Armstrong suggested that he should state in the Committee meeting exactly what the United States was willing to do and that he should move the appropriate amendment to the amendment proposed by the Canadians. If the United States were beaten on this matter in the subcommittee, the question could be reopened in the full committee. Mr. Pasvolsky ventured that a decision to reconsider the withdrawal provision would help somewhat in the controversy in Committee I/2. The Secretary declared that he had every confidence in Mr. Armstrong and declared that he was willing to let Mr. Armstrong use his discretion in handling the matter.

Yalta Formula Controversy

The Secretary reported, for the benefit of those members of the Delegation who had not been present at the previous day’s meeting of the Steering Committee, that his statement concerning Russian acceptance of a procedural vote for the discussion and consideration of disputes had been received very favorably in the Steering Committee meeting. The meeting had been short and there had been no controversies. A press meeting held at the end of the Steering Committee meeting had been most satisfactory also. The Secretary reported that he had reported to the President on the Russian decision, and the President had been most gratified at the outcome and had asked that his best wishes and congratulations be conveyed to each member of the Delegation. The Secretary remarked that the Steering Committee had seemed very pleased at the rapidity and frankness with which the outcome of the controversy had been made known to it. The Secretary declared that the Big Five meeting at which the Russian decision was made known had been concluded at 4:15 p.m. and the Steering Committee had been convened fifteen minutes later. The press had also seemed very pleased by the fact that a meeting was held with them at 5 p.m., just forty-five minutes after the close of the Big Five meeting. There had been, The Secretary declared, a feeling of “warmth, sympathy and confidence” evident in the meeting with the members of the press.

Final Date

The Secretary reported that he had had a conversation with the President recently. The President had indicated his desire that there be established a definite plan for concluding the Conference and that a definite date be set for the final Plenary Session. … The Secretariat, he declared, had been thinking in terms of June 20 as the final date. This, The Secretary thought, would be most difficult for the President, and The Secretary remarked that he had assured the President that every effort would be made to finish on June 16th.

… Mr. Notter observed that one absolute conditioning factor about which nothing could be done was the need for approval from Moscow for all compromises worked out between the Russian position and the position of the other nations. Mr. Dulles remarked that there were still four matters concerning which there was a conflict between the position of the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the delegations. Senator Connally declared that despite the agreement which had been reached concerning the veto power among the Big Five powers, the discussion was still not finished in Committee III/1. It would still be necessary to gain acceptance for the Four Power statement of interpretation. Mr. Wilcox remarked that the question was being referred to a subcommittee. The Secretary remarked that he had been of the impression that the matter would be referred to the full committee for its consideration inasmuch as he had declared definitely in the Steering Committee meeting on the previous day thut the decision of the Big Five should be referred to “the appropriate committee”. Mr. Sandifer observed that the subcommittee was, according to the established procedure, the appropriate body to consider this matter.

The Secretary urged that each member of the Delegation must do everything within his or her power to play down the diplomatic defeat which had been suffered by the Russians, and the victory which had been won by the United States. The Secretary urged that stress be laid on the mutual confidence and faith which had made possible an agreement between the conflicting powers. The, Secretary declared that he had been very much disturbed by the radio and news, reports he had heard which had stressed the tragic defeat which had been suffered by Russia. The element of conciliation and agreement were the items which should be stressed, The Secretary thought. Mr. MacLeish declared that that was exactly the line which the press relations officers had been following and he declared that Mr. Rockefeller had with him a statement which had been released to the press. Senator Connally observed that, in fact, the compromise had been worked out through a process of conciliation and there had actually been no decisive victory of one side over the other. The Secretary agreed with this observation by Senator Connally.

Signing the Charter

The Secretary declared that he had been thinking for some time about the procedure for signing the Charter, and added that he would like to have the opinion of the Delegation on a suggestion which he had to offer. The Secretary thought that provision should be made for each delegate of the nations represented to sign the Charter instead of having only the Chairmen of the various delegations ratify the document. Such a procedure he said would have sentimental and historical value. He urged that the Delegation accept his proposal that all the delegates be permitted to affix their signatures to the Charter. This could be done on the afternoon before the final Plenary Session. The hours from three to six o’clock could be set aside for this purpose and each Delegation could be asked to appear at ten minute intervals. Each delegation would then sign en masse. Then on the following day the signed Charter could be presented to President Truman. The Delegation agreed unanimously to this procedure.…

Title of the Organization

The Secretary asked whether there was any more urgent business. Dean Gildersleeve replied that at the previous day’s meeting of Committee I/1 the title “The United Nations” had been adopted by acclamation⁵⁸ after the French delegate had made a stirring speech. Mr. Notter remarked that Dean Gildersleeve had made the deciding speech and had done a fine job.

Procedure⁵⁹

. . . . . . .

Expulsion

Senator Connally thought that a survey would be necessary of those matters which were still open. The position of the United States Delegation on these questions should be made clear, he declared. Senator Connally reported that in the previous day’s meeting of the Executive Committee the United States position had been upheld and the question of expulsion had been submitted to the Steering Committee. This matter, Senator Connally thought, was not a vital one and the United States would probably have to concede on it. The Secretary remarked that the political officers of the Delegation would have to go into action and declared that he himself would be willing to meet with anyone whom the political officers thought should speak to him in the Penthouse. The Secretary reiterated that he was willing to speak firmly whenever the political Officers thought it was necessary.

Senator Connally said that in his opinion the United States should recede on the question of expulsion. He pointed out that the United States was secure because it had a veto over expulsion proceedings. The smaller nations, however, not having the veto, were wary of the reinsertion of a provision making expulsion possible. Representative Eaton observed that if the provision were included in the Charter making possible involuntary withdrawal, there should also be a provision for voluntary withdrawal. … Mr. Armstrong declared that that morning’s meeting of the subcommittee was likely to be important and he expressed the opinion that the matter of withdrawal should be connected with the amendment procedure. Senator Vandenberg declared that he was opposed to the establishment of any relation between withdrawal and amendment procedure. He declared that if any withdrawal clause were written at all it would be better to write a frank clause making withdrawal possible without any conditioning factors.

. . . . . . .

Representative Bloom agreed with the position established by Senator Vandenberg a few moments previously that if any provision for withdrawal were permitted it should fee a complete withdrawal clause, Senator Vandenberg declared that any clause making possible withdrawal because of the passage of an unacceptable amendment would open the door to other nations but closed it to the United States. Mr. Hackworth thought that any such clause would apply to the United States equally. Senator Vandenberg replied that the United States had a veto over amendments and therefore the situation could not possibly arise where an amendment would be passed which was unacceptable to this Government. Therefore the withdrawal provision would not apply to the United States. Furthermore Senator Vandenberg thought that any specific withdrawal clause would destroy the sense of the general statement made by Congressman Eaton for inclusion in the records of Committee I/2.⁶⁰ Mr. Dulles observed that it had been his understanding that the Delegation had agreed to settle on the inclusion of an additional statement to be added to Representative Eaton’s earlier explanation. Mr. Rockefeller agreed that this was the case but pointed out that the Russians had indicated a desire to incorporate a specific provision in the Charter. Senator Vandenberg declared once more that if any withdrawal clause were to be included in the Charter, it should be a complete withdrawal clause. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that if the United States, were to insist upon this position, it would tie up the Conference and Senator Vandenberg replied that in that case he would not include any withdrawal clause in the Charter at all. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the matter might be settled by the statement prepared by Mr. Dulles for addition to Representative Eaton’s earlier statement. Senator Vandenberg said that this was agreeable to him and the Delegation agreed to this procedure.

Mr. Rockefeller asked which committee report would be chosen as the appropriate place to include the statement under consideration. Mr. Dulles declared that it would be included in the records of Committee I/2 in which Representative Eaton’s earlier statement had been made. Mr. Armstrong declared that he hoped he would be able to ward off a specific withdrawal clause by this procedure. The Secretary observed that it would be necessary first to consult with the Russians. Senator Connally declared that he would go along with this decision, although he was doubtful as to the force and effect of a statement included in the records of Committee I/2. The Secretary declared that it seemed to be the sense of the Delegation that it would go along with this procedure. However, if it did not prove acceptable, advisers should report back to the Delegation. Representative Bloom agreed with this position, but asked whether a state which withdrew from the Organization would be able to gain readmission. The Secretary declared that such a state could be readmitted. Mr. Armstrong observed that the question would come up that morning⁶¹ and asked what course of action he should follow. Mr. Notter replied that Mr. Armstrong should have the formal report of the subcommittee held up. Mr. Dulles asked whether it would not be possible for the question to be removed from Committee 1/2 on the grounds that it was being dealt with by another committee, but Mr. Notter replied that Committee I/2 was the appropriate committee. Commander Stassen thought that Mr. Armstrong should attempt to maintain the amendment procedure, with the concession of a two-thirds vote for the calling of a revisionary convention. If a request were made for a withdrawal provision, Commander Stassen suggested that Mr. Armstrong should ask that time be permitted for study of the provision. Mr. Rockefeller agreed with this strategy and added that in this way it would be possible to hold a Big Five meeting and determine the policy of the larger powers.

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen declared that the trusteeship committee, Committee II/4, was to meet that evening⁶² for the first time in a week. Commander Stassen declared that he would not know until a few minutes before the meeting that evening whether there would be any widening in the area of agreement among the major powers. Commander Stassen declared that he had told Ambassador Gromyko what the position of the United States would be if there was no agreement before the Committee meeting. Commander Stassen declared that this position had been decided upon by the Delegation at a previous meeting. Still to be decided among the Big Five were the questions of paragraph 5 [of section B] which the Russians wanted to delete completely, the language of the Atlantic Charter, “freely expressed will of the people” in paragraph B, 2, (b), and the question of membership on the Trusteeship Council.

The Secretary suggested that Commander Stassen speak to Ambassador Gromyko before the meeting that evening. The Secretary thought that the Big Five conversations on trusteeship⁶³ should be brought to an end soon. Senator Connally was of the opinion that a great deal of personal attention should be paid to Ambassador Gromyko. The Russian Chairman, he declared, had developed an inferiority complex as a result of having to wait for instructions from Moscow on every issue. Senator Connally thought that the United States could be generous as a result of its victory with respect to voting procedure. Senator Connally thought that the United States should defer to Ambassador Gromyko whenever it could afford to do so.

Mr. Dunn asked if the Delegation would not agree to authorize Commander Stassen to tell Ambassador Gromyko “in a nice way” exactly what his position would be if agreement were not reached. Commander Stassen declared that he had already told Ambassador Gromyko the position which this Government would take. Mr. Dunn added that he had intended to set a time limit of Monday. Commander Stassen thought that it was possible that the strategy of the Delegation might fail because Ambassador Gromyko might want to make a play on the matter of self-determination even though he might be defeated.

. . . . . . .

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen presented to the Delegation The Revised United States Redraft of Section A, Paragraph 1 (taking into account the Australian revised amendment and the United Kingdom Draft Thereof), of June 5, 1945.⁶⁴ Commander Stassen reported that the French had been opposed to the adoption of this new Section A. The French had argued that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had included no provision on dependent territories and the Yalta Agreement had provided only for consideration of a trusteeship system. The present conference, for these reasons, could not consider broad principles for all dependent territories. Ambassador Naggiar had called Commander Stassen that morning to indicate the French concern over the proposed amendment. Ambassador Naggiar had expressed the fear that the Filipinos would take up this amendment and make an important issue of it.

. . . . . . .

Secretary Stettinius declared that lie wanted to interrupt the discussion to read a message which he had received from Senator Vandenberg’s “friend”, Secretary of the Interior Ickes.⁶⁵ The statement read as follows:

“I ask that you advise the United States Delegation that in my opinion it is vastly important that the United States sponsor a declaration of general policy respecting all dependent territories which will be a part of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Unless we do this and unless a declaration is an effective and progressive statement, we will prejudice our moral and political leadership in the world and particularly with the millions of dependent peoples of the world who form an increasingly important segment of world opinion and power.

“Specifically, the declaration should reiterate historic commitments to the rapid political, economic and social advancement of dependent peoples to the objective, first, self-rule and second, independence, to the assurance of their basic rights and freedom.

“I think that it is also of great importance that an effective system be provided for reporting to the Organization and to the people of the world concerning the administration of the trust which is implied in the relation of the dominant country to the dependent areas. Any substantial problems which arise from a military necessity to avoid disclosure of security information can, I am sure, be met by appropriate language and by qualifications and reservations, and should be kept to the minimum really necessary for security purposes.”

The Secretary asked Mr. Taussig whether he wanted to throw any light on this situation. He asked Mr. Taussig if Mr. Ickes knew anything about this letter which Secretary Stettinius had received. Mr. Taussig declared that Mr. Ickes knew that the message had been sent and Mr. Taussig added that a situation had developed with respect to the position of the United States Navy which Mr. Gates might be better suited to explain.

Voting Procedure

Senator Connally declared that he would like to interrupt the meeting for a moment because the subcommittee dealing with voting questions was going to meet at 11 o’clock that morning.⁶⁶ He asked whether the Delegation would favor his presenting the Four Power interpretive statement and suggesting that it would be unnecessary to answer the questionnaire in detail. Senator Connally thought that the United States should drive through at that time and avoid a long involved controversy. Senator Connally thought that the Four Power statement could be pushed through. The Secretary thought that this was an acceptable procedure and the Delegation agreed unanimously.

The Secretary remarked that he would like to add a footnote to the discussion on voting procedure. The Secretary declared that “the ball was now in our court” and it was up to the United States to show leadership from that point on, and to throw its weight around. Senator Connally declared that he intended to go beyond the presentation of the Four Power Agreement. He intended to declare firmly that the United States favored acceptance of the rest of the Yalta formula, and he declared that it was his intention to tell the small powers that the United States Considered the adoption of the wording of the Charter essential if it was to join the Organization.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that this procedure was acceptable to him. He had a brief thirty second report to make to the Delegation and Secretary Stettinius gave Mr. Pasvolsky the floor. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Big Five had held a meeting on the previous evening and had made one additional change in the Four Power statement. The third paragraph, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, had been completely unrelated to the preceding paragraph. For this reason it had been decided to add the word “further” at the beginning of the third paragraph. This would tie in the third paragraph with the preceding paragraph, dealing with matters which would be considered by procedural voting. The Russians had agreed to this suggestion. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the Four Power statement would be distributed to the members of the Committee at its meeting that morning. He suggested that Senator Connally state that this was the interpretation of the Yalta Formula which had been agreed upon, and Mr. Pasvolsky thought that there would be no more difficulty.

The Secretary declared that he would have to leave the meeting shortly inasmuch as he had three important meetings before the 10:30 session of the Executive Committee. The Secretary declared that he had given Senator Connally a copy of the Russian statement⁶⁷ explaining the Russian agreement on the veto question. The Secretary hoped that Senator Connally would read this statement to the Delegation.

Report to the President

Dr. Bowman asked the delegation to consider a question which had arisen with respect to the report which was being prepared for submission to the President. The authorship and organization of the report had been decided adequately, by that time, but there was one question which was still bothering the editorial board. It had been presumed by the board that this report was to be submitted to Congress by the President and made public. Dr. Bowman wanted to know if this was the feeling of the Delegation. Mr. Dunn agreed with Dr. Bowman that the report should be prepared in such a way that it might be made public at some future date. The Secretary declared that he too favored this procedure …

. . . . . . .

At this point Mr. Hackworth declared that he would have to leave and he wanted to report that Committee IV/1 had completed the Court Statute at 12:30 the previous evening.⁶⁸

Senator Connally urged that the Four Power interpretation and the Yalta Formula be made public soon. Secretary Stettinius declared that the question could not be made fully public soon enough for him. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that this should be delayed until after the meeting of the subcommittee. [At this point in the evening (meeting?), the Secretary, Mr. Pasvolsky, Dean Gildersleeve and Mr. Hartley left the meeting.]⁶⁹

Commander Stassen declared that he was opposed to the Delegation making an official secret report to the President. He thought that the report should be made by the State Department to the President. Senator Connally asked why the Delegation should not make this report; whether or not it should be public was a matter for the President to decide. Commander Stassen declared that the Delegation should not label any report of its own secret because of the fact that the Delegation represented the people even though it had been appointed by President Roosevelt. Senator Connally declared that this was not his interpretation. He thought the Delegation was appointed by the President and therefore was intended to serve the President and represented the people only indirectly. Commander Stassen remarked that he did not think a report could be made to the President that the latter should not be free to reveal to the people. Commander Stassen declared that he himself would not be a party to any secret reports. Dr. Bowman declared that his Committee had given a great deal of thought to just this question. The Committee agreed with Commander Stassen that no secret report should be sent to the President from the Delegation; however, any member of the Delegation, any citizen in fact, could make a secret report to the President. Dr. Bowman thought that any secret materials should be made available to the President by the Secretary of State. Dr. Bowman asked whether there would be need for a secret report. He wondered whether the entire report should not be made by the Delegation. Senator Vandenberg declared that in his opinion there should be no Delegation report at all. It should be, he thought, a report by the Secretary of State as Chairman of the Delegation. Senator Vandenberg declared that he did not want to be confronted at some time in the future by a report written by someone else to which Senator Vandenberg had become a party. Dr. Bowman agreed that this position was absolutely sound. Senator Connally thought that any report made should concern everything and that it would be impossible to submit a partial report to the President. [At this point, 10:15 a.m., Senator Vandenberg left the meeting.]⁷⁰

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen returned to the question of the revised amendment to Section A, paragraph 1. He reported that the British and French had indicated that they were not willing to accept the part of this document dealing with independence. Commander Stassen declared that he agreed with the Secretary of the Interior Ickes that a United States position should be established, but Commander Stassen pointed out that this was an international agreement and the United States position could not be written into the Charter. Representative Bloom thought that Secretary Ickes’ letter should be acknowledged and referred to the appropriate committee.

Mr. Kane remarked that if this amendment, originally presented by Australia, were to be pressed by the United States, there were a few things which the Navy thought should be taken into account. Mr. Kane declared that he was willing to leave the matter to a future meeting or to dispose of it entirely at that time. Mr. Kane ordered [opined?] that the situation was that Australia favored the amendment while the French did not. If the Delegation decided not to press the Australian amendment, the Navy would be entirely satisfied. However, the Navy favored Section A as it appeared in the working paper at that time.

Commander Stassen expressed the opinion that the Delegation should not make any decision until the disputing Departments got together and worked out an agreement. The Delegation he declared should not act as referee in an interdepartmental dispute. Mr. Kane asked whether it was Commander Stassen’s impression that any department had advanced this amendment. He had been of the opinion that it had been an Australian proposal. Commander Stassen replied that it would appear that Secretary Ickes’ message indicated a difference of opinion between the Department of Interior and the Navy Department. Admiral Hepburn agreed that the matter should be settled in Washington before the Delegation took any action.

Mr. Taussig reported that he had had a telephone call that morning from Mr. Fortas. The tatter had been discussing parts g and h of Section A, paragraph 1 with Secretary Forrestal and with Mr. McCloy. Opposition had been raised to these clauses by both Mr. McCloy and Mr. Forrestal. However, Mr. Forrestal had expressed the hope that an agreement would be possible some time during the day. Mr. Taussig remarked that the War and Navy Departments were anxious for the incorporation of some safeguard for the security rights of this country. Commander Stassen expressed his approval of Mr. Taussig’s remark, but he urged that the Delegation should not referee any dispute between the Government departments. He thought that the Delegation should wait until agreement was reached by the various departments concerned.

Russian Statement on Voting Agreement

Senator Connally read the statement of the Russian Delegation concerning the veto question, as requested by Secretary Stettinius. The statement reads as follows:

“It is time that world realizes that Soviet Union wishes this conference to be a success and that a real foundation for future security is laid in San Francisco. We have not fought together to win a war and immediately after to lose the peace. Once more we proved our sincerity by showing our good will. Our policy has never been in flexible; we know this to be a favorite opinion but it is completely without foundation. If a point is proved to us with which we disagree and we see and feel that it is based on good will and justified desires, we agree to it.

“Exactly this happened now. You have convinced us and we agreed. We shall find solutions to all remaining problems in the same spirit of good will and mutual understanding. There has never been a desire on our part to handicap this conference in any way. If there have been differences it was just as well to air them instead of suppressing them and to present outward unity torn by discord inside. After all a conference like this with a historic mission would [not?] serve its purpose had there not been differences of opinion resulting in final mutual understanding. Today we are more optimistic than ever that this conference will not only write a world charter but this charter will become the true foundation of a world of peace and security.

“We have often been accused of delaying this conference. But is it really delaying it when questions which have to be solved and which need discussions and pondering take time before they find form in a charter destined to become the foundation of lasting peace? In a year’s time or later nobody will remember if the conference lasted four or eight weeks. What will be there, however, will be the charter and the international organization of the United Nations and this will count. We never looked at our watches in San Francisco wondering how much longer this conference would last. But we knew that we would work out our charter and that nations would not leave San Francisco empty handed. And this is what counts and is going to count in the long run.”

The Delegation received this statement very favorably.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:22 a.m.

52. Doc. 860, EX/22, June 8, ibid., p. 508.
53. Doc. 859, EX/21, June 8, ibid., p. 498.
54. Doc. 806, EX/17, June 6, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 461.
55. Doc. 893, ST/14, June 9, ibid., p. 252.
56. Committee 111/1, at a meeting of May 23. 8:45 p.m., adopted the following text as a final sentence to paragraph 1, sec. B, chapter VI: “The Security Council shall submit annual, and if necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.” (Doc. 555, III/1/27, May 24, ibid., vol. 11, p. 377). At a meeting of Committee II/2, May 30, 8:35 p.m., the report of Subcommittee B on the redraft of paragraph 8, section B, chapter V was adopted (Doc. 707, II/2/36, May 31. ibid., vol. 9, p. 115). At a meeting of the Executive Committee, June 8, 10:30 a.m., the Secretary General stated that action by Committee III/3 at a meeting of May 15, 3:40 p.m., in rejecting a New Zealand amendment (Doc. 2, G/14(f), ibid., vol 3, p. 488) requiring the concurring vote of the General Assembly in decisions of the Security Council involving the application of force, was inconsistent, in principle at least, with the action taken by Committee II/2 (Doc. 355, III/3/17, May 17, ibid., vol. 12, p. 326).
57. Minutes of fourth meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, June 8, 10:30 a.m., not printed.
58. Doc. 856, 1/1/32, June 8, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p. 380.
59. See Doc. 177, ST/5, May 9, ibid., vol. 5, p. 197, and Doc. 243, ST/8, May 11, ibid., p. 222.

60. For statement made by Representative Eaton at a meeting of Committee 1/2 on May 21 (summarized in Doc. 501, 1/2/30, May 23, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 73), see minutes of executive meeting of the United States delegation, May 22, 10:50 a.m., p. 847.

    At a meeting of Subcommittee I/2/C on May 22, 3:30 p.m., Representative Eaton moved that a two-paragraph statement by the delegate of Belgium (Rolin) which offered a compromise, recognizing the right of withdrawal in principle without incorporating it in the Charter, be inserted in the report of the rapporteur; the Subcommittee agreed in principle to the insertion. (US I/2/C Doc. 1; Doc. 529, 1/2/33, May 23, ibid., pp. 87–88.)

61. Subcommittee I/2/E was expected to consider the question of the right of withdrawal on any points raised in discussing the question of voting procedure in the revision conference (US I/2/E).
62. Doc. 877, II/4/35, June 9, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 513.
63. Preliminary consultations on trusteeship by representatives of the Five Powers (April 30–June 18). The ninth meeting was held to try to reach agreement among the Five before the meeting of Committee II/4 scheduled for 8:30 p.m.
64. Neither the revised United States redraft of section A, paragraph 1 (U.S. Und. 82a), nor the Australian revised amendment (U.S. Und. 80), nor the United Kingdom draft (U.S. Und. 72) is printed; for text of Australian proposal, see Doc. 575, II/4/12(a), May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 695; also, for text adopted by the Subcommittee on June 1, see ibid., p. 707.
65. Memorandum by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of State, June 8.
66. Minutes of second meeting of Subcommittee III/1/B, June 8, not printed.
67. For text of statement, see p. 1210.
68. Doc. 864, IV/1/71, June 8, UNCIO Documents, vol. 13, p. 296.
69. Brackets appear in the original.
70. Brackets appear in the original.