RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 16

Minutes of the Sixteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 6, 1945, 4:40 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (22); United Kingdom (5); Soviet Union (5); China (5); and France (6).]

The Secretary called the meeting to order at 4:40 p.m. and said that Ambassador Gromyko had two items to bring before the group.

[Page 1177]

Ambassador Gromyko said that in the last meeting40 he had informed the heads of delegations that he wished to communicate with his government on the suggested change in the sponsoring governments’ amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. He wished now to inform the heads of delegations that the latest formula which was discussed as a compromise with the previous French proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. He proposed that the language of the sponsoring governments’ amendment, which had been agreed upon previously by the four sponsoring governments, be retained with the one change of the words “by consent” to “on request”. In other words, he said, his delegation favored the change of words suggested at one of the earlier meetings when this matter was being considered, a change suggested by the American Delegation.41 He indicated that he believed the change of that one phrase expressed the main idea of the French Delegation.

Mr. Dejean questioned why the draft of the French amendment of May 23, 194542 was not accepted. Was there an important reason for not accepting this formula? He pointed out that this formula had been accepted by all but the American Delegation.

Senator Vandenberg stated that the draft to which Mr. Dejean referred could not be accepted by the American Delegation.

Mr. Dejean said he would then like to suggest another formula which he believed might be acceptable to the United States. This formula would read (beginning at the end of the second sentence) until such time as the Organization may, on request of the governments parties to the arrangements referred to above, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by a state now at war with the United Nations”. He pointed out that all the delegations were in agreement on the change of the words “by consent” to “on request”.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Dejean’s final comment was correct and that, therefore, it was proposed that only that one change be made.

Mr. Dejean said he would like to see the phrase “governments concerned” changed to read “governments parties to the arrangements referred to above”.

Mr. Stettinius said it was impossible for the United States Delegation to modify its position on this point. He hoped that an understanding could be reached since everyone was willing to change to the words “on request”, which meant that we were 99% on the way to agreement. He wondered how this matter could be settled without referring the question back again to the governments.

[Page 1178]

Mr. Dejean indicated that he was not quite clear what was meant by the phrase “governments concerned”. He suggested it could mean Germany and Japan, since from one point of view they were the first nations to be concerned and were certainly interested parties.

Mr. Stettinius replied that this interpretation was not a possible one and that in any event our interpretation of the phrase could be included in the minutes of the committee discussions. He said it was clear that the phrase meant the governments’ standing guard over the enemy nations. Mr. Dejean agreed that the interpretation that he had suggested was a bad one but thought it was also a possible one. He wondered whether, even with agreement on a text, there might not be two interpretations.

Mr. Stettinius said he was very anxious to get on with the work of the Conference and hoped that this matter could be handled in a spirit of conciliation. He was convinced that the members of the group meant exactly the same thing and that it was a matter of having the committee agree upon an interpretation in its report to the commission.

Senator Vandenberg felt the point could be taken care of by an interpretation of the phrase “governments concerned”. He suggested however that perhaps the phrase “United Nations concerned” would be helpful.

Mr. Stettinius said he would do anything in a spirit of conciliation to amend the language to meet Mr. Boncour. He did feel however that it was unwise to start rephrasing the language as this would necessitate its referral back to the governments. He indicated that the matter, which had already dragged on too long, must be settled today. Mr. Dejean said he would like to hear from the heads of the other delegations. Mr. Soong said his position was the same as that of the United States.

Ambassador Gromyko said he had made his proposal. The French proposal to add the words suggested in the May 23, 1945 draft was acceptable to him if the French did not like the suggestion he had offered at this meeting. He said his Government was willing to accept the change suggested earlier if the French could not agree to his present suggestion. Mr. Stettinius said that we could consider in the spirit of conciliation the words “on request of the United Nations concerned” rather than “parties to the arrangements”. Ambassador Gromyko said that we had been looking for more precise language when we had adopted the phrase “governments parties to the treaties”. He did not think we should now make this language more imprecise.

Ambassador Halifax said he had another suggestion which he was not sure would commend itself. Mr. Dejean had suggested the phrase “on request of the governments parties to the arrangements [Page 1179] referred to above”. This however the American Delegation did not like as it would prejudice the earlier words referring to Chapter XII, paragraph 2. Ambassador Halifax wondered whether the phrasing “pursuant to arrangements under Chapter XII, paragraph 2” could not be added and then it would be possible to say simply “on request of the governments parties to those arrangements”. Ambassador Halifax felt that this matter should be settled now.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether the phrase “on the request of the United Nations concerned” would not be acceptable.

Ambassador Gromyko questioned whether this was not too broad. It would mean that the request would have to issue from a very large number of countries.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that everyone was willing to change the word “consent” to “request”. The American Delegation was also willing to fully protect the French position by an interpretative note. He thought it was probably not possible to reach agreement on anything more. Many days had already been spent on this matter and we were holding up the Committee which had to finish its work. Ambassador Halifax thought we were very close to an agreement. He felt that it would probably be best to change only this one phrase in the text “by consent” to “on request”. When this change was brought forward in the Committee the appropriate persons could declare what was implied. Mr. Stettinius indicated that this solution would be agreeable to the British, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Ambassador Gromyko said it was agreeable to him but he wondered whether this would satisfy the French. He questioned what the official interpretation would be. Mr. Stettinius thought this could be presented in the Committee.

Mr. Dejean said he was interested in speeding the work of the Conference and, if this solution of the problem was acceptable to all four governments, it would be acceptable to the French. He said however, that he would like the interpretation of the Soviet, the British, and the French included in the Committee report.

Mr. Stettinius said he wished to express his appreciation for the spirit of cooperation and conciliation shown by Mr. Boncour and Mr. Dejean. He said he hoped that it could now be agreed to bring to a conclusion the consultations on this question. He added that he would like to see language in the Committee report that all the Five could agree to.

Senator Vandenberg commented that we were right where we started. The crucial problem was the interpretation.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this group agree on the language before it, that is, the substitution of the words “on request” for “by consent” in paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII. Then the experts [Page 1180] of the Five Delegations could meet to discuss a satisfactory interpretation for the final report. This procedure would not hold up the work of the Technical Committee. He wondered whether it was agreeable. Ambassador Gromyko pointed out that, while we might agree on the language of the Chapter, we might give a different interpretation. He asked what other interpretation there could be than the one so often given. We were talking in this paragraph about regional arrangements and parties to a treaty like the French-Soviet treaty. The governments concerned were certainly the parties to those treaties. What other interpretation was there. Mr. Stassen indicated that the phrase “governments concerned” referred back not merely to the regional arrangements but also the measures provided under Chapter XII, paragraph 2. Mr. Boncour suggested that what we had in mind was the signatory states of the treaties. He wondered what possible objection there could be to this interpretation. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether it was in fact the signatory states alone, or also the states responsible for action against enemy states under Chapter XII, paragraph 2. Mr. Boncour said that “on request of the government concerned” could mean only the parties to treaties. Ambassador Halifax asked why we could not say explicitly what we meant, which was “may on request of the governments concerned in the business of Chapter XII, paragraph 2 or in regional arrangements referred to above”. Mr. Boncour asked why we could not say “signatory states”. He objected to referring also to measures under Chapter XII, paragraph 2.

Ambassador Halifax pointed out that Mr. Stassen wanted to cover and include the states responsible for measures against enemy states under Chapter XII. Therefore, he had proposed a wording which would include reference to the states involved under Chapter XII. Mr. Stassen said that this was not his individual position but rather the position of the United States Delegation. He thought that, if an interpretation was worked out in detail, it could be agreed upon among the five delegations. He thought, however, that it would be important to agree upon an interpretation if the words “governments concerned” were used in the text, in order to avoid confusion.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the phrase ‘“governments concerned” includes the governments signatory to the regional arrangements and those involved under paragraph 2, Chapter XII. Mr. Boncour indicated that the French Delegation believed that only the signatories of the special agreements were involved—parties to such treaties as the French-Soviet alliance. It was they alone, he said, that would be in a position to appreciate when the Security Council should take over the responsibilities under those treaties. The parties to the [Page 1181] arrangements under Chapter XII should not have a say in this matter. Mr. Boncour asked whether this was Ambassador Gromyko’s view also. Ambassador Gromyko agreed that only the parties to the agreements would decide when the Security Council would take over the responsibilities provided for in those agreements.

Mr. Stettinius referred to paragraph 2 of Chapter XII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and read as follows:

“2. No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the governments having responsibility for such action.”

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the second half of the sentence of paragraph 2, Chapter VIII, Section C related only to the states parties to treaties—to regional arrangements and not to the states under Chapter XII which were covered by the first half of the sentence.

Mr. Boncour said that, as he understood the draft, the signatories to the treaties would themselves be the judges of whether or not the Security Council was able to preserve international peace and security.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that he thought it was agreed that the final judgment as to the capacities of the Council would rest on both the powers referred to in Chapter XII and on the signatories to the agreements. He did not think that either of these groups could be ignored.

Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Pasvolsky for a statement of the steps leading up to the present position.

Mr. Pasvolsky explained that the problem of interpreting this paragraph first arose in connection with the question of treaty arrangements directed against the renewal of aggression by enemy states. As a result of the provisions of paragraph 2, Chapter XII, it is obvious that the Security Council cannot be charged with the responsibility for the prevention of aggression by enemy states or for the control of enemy states without the agreement of the governments having responsibility for such action as a result of the present war. If the question of these regional treaty arrangements had never arisen, the situation would still be that the Organization could not take over the functions placed outside its jurisdiction by the provisions of Chapter XII, except upon agreement between the governments concerned under Chapter XII and the Organization. When the question of treaty arrangements came up it was apparent that in addition to the arrangements under Chapter XII for preventing aggression by enemy states, certain states were desirous of entering into special treaties for the same purpose. We agreed to the exception of these treaties from the general rule that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without [Page 1182] the authority of the Security Council. The American Delegation considered this exception sympathetically, in particular because the functions involved in these arrangements were not in the hands of the Organization.

It was perfectly clear, however, from the language finally agreed upon for paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII that the parties to these regional arrangements were not alone in a position to decide the time when the Organization would take over the functions relating to the prevention of further aggression by the enemy states. We are willing to agree that these functions cannot be transferred to the Organization without the consent of the parties to the regional arrangements. This does not mean, however, that these parties alone can be the judge of the time when these functions should be transferred to the Organization. Therefore, it is our view that the phrase “governments concerned” includes both the parties to regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of enemy states and also includes the governments responsible for action in relation to enemy states under paragraph 2, Chapter XII.

Mr. Boncour asked whether this interpretation meant that the decision implied in the last sentence of paragraph 2 would not be made on the request of the states signatory to the treaties. Ambassador Halifax, Mr. Stettinius , and Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that there would have to be the request but that in addition there was the vote in the Council in which any one of the permanent members would have a veto. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the French would actually be protected in two directions: They would be among the states having to join in the request to the Security Council. Also they would have a veto on the action of the Security Council. Mr. Dejean said that the interpretation given by Mr. Pasvolsky was satisfactory. Mr. Stettinius asked whether the interpretation was generally acceptable. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he now understood that the phrase “governments concerned” related to the governments involved under Chapter XII and parties to regional arrangements. This, he said, was agreeable to him. Ambassador Halifax also expressed agreement with the interpretation.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that the next item to be discussed was the calling of a conference for the review of the Charter. He said Ambassador Gromyko had asked to have this question put on the agenda.

Ambassador Gromyko said that this matter had been discussed at the last Committee meeting43 and that he would like Mr. Armstrong to inform the group of developments since that time. Mr. Armstrong [Page 1183] explained that nothing had happened. The Committee had met on other matters. There had been no meeting of the Subcommittee which was expecting the heads of the five delegations to make up their minds before it met again. Mr. Armstrong stated that the proposal under discussion in this group was a dual one. (Copies of Chapter XI, Amendments, Paragraph 3, June 3, 194544 were distributed). Mr. Armstrong said that the first proposal was to change the vote of the General Assembly for calling the conference from “three-fourths” to “two-thirds”. It was also proposed to add to paragraph 3 the sentence: “If such a general conference has not been held before the tenth annual meeting of the Assembly following the entry into force of the Charter, the proposal to call such a general conference shall be placed on the agenda of that meeting of the Assembly.” This provision, he said, would not bind anyone to anything. It would merely indicate our willingness to hold a conference at about the tenth year if the general feeling favored such a conference. This, he said, was definitely preferable as an alternative to the setting of a specific date.

Mr. Stettinius remarked that the four delegations had agreed to the addition of this provision but that Ambassador Gromyko had asked for further time to consider it:

Mr. Armstrong stated that at an informal meeting among the representatives of the five governments setting on Committee I/2 it had been agreed that this matter was worthy of discussion among the Big Five.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what had happened in the Technical Committee. Senator Connally indicated that Mr. Evatt still had in the background his proposal that a conference should be held definitely in the fifth year. To prevent a vote on this proposal we had been attempting to work out a harmless compromise. Mr. Armstrong noted that under our proposal the Assembly would be free to decide whether or not it wanted a conference.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that, if it was necessary to get approval of the sponsoring governments’ amendment in other respects, he was ready to agree to the change in the vote from “three-fourths” to “two-thirds”. However, this agreement would be on condition that all the five delegations favored the sponsoring governments’ amendment for ratification of the recommendations of the conference, that is, that ratification would require the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

Mr. Armstrong stated that the problem of ratification was not in question as far as the unanimity of the permanent members went. Mr. Armstrong added that the sentence being suggested for paragraph 3 was relatively innocuous. In discussions with Mr Zarapkin [Page 1184] it had been felt that this kind of provision might be better than nothing and might perhaps carry the day.

Ambassador Gromyko thought it was better not to mention putting the general conference on the agenda of the tenth meeting of the Assembly. He felt this procedure tended to give the Organization a temporary character and would encourage states to regard the present charter as temporary. Mr. Armstrong stated that, if this was the view of the Soviet Delegation, then all that could be done was to fight the matter out without this provision and take the consequences.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the five representatives would have to do the best they could on the Technical Committee. Mr. Soong agreed. Mr. Stettinius indicated that agreement had been reached on the change of the vote from “three-fourths” to “two-thirds”. While the American Delegation preferred the inclusion of the additional sentence, it now appeared that the last sentence would have to be dropped and the vote taken on the paragraph with only the one change.

Senator Vandenberg said that the additional sentence, in his view, worked in just the opposite way from the one Ambassador Gromyko had suggested. If it was certain that a conference for the review of the Charter would be held at some time probably very few amendments would be put up and states would withhold amendments in the hope of securing their consideration at the conference. If the states did not feel that such a conference would be held, it is possible that there would be a flood of amendments during the first years. Senator Connally pointed out that the additional sentence would not make mandatory the calling of the conference; it would merely mean that the conference would be put on the agenda of the tenth meeting of the Assembly. Since the calling of the conference could be put on the agenda at any time anyway, he did not feel anything very serious or important was involved in the addition of this provision. Mr. Stettinius agreed with Senator Connally, but suggested that, since the Soviet Ambassador could not accept our view, we should proceed on the basis of doing the best we could without proposing this additional sentence.

Mr. Armstrong said we would make a statement in the Subcommittee that we were prepared to concede on the vote for the calling of the conference.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that the procedure for handling this matter be decided upon later. Ambassador Halifax thought there was little chance of holding off an adverse vote if we offered only one concession. The second concession meant nothing in practice but might make just the necessary difference in the vote. Ambassador Halifax said he would greatly prefer to go before the Technical Committee with [Page 1185] the two concessions. He added that the addition of this provision might actually mean the putting off of a general conference and in his view did not alter the situation for the worse, Ambassador Gromyko said that the public as a whole would tend to interpret the Charter as a temporary affair. Ambassador Halifax thought the situation would be worse if a conference was held in five years. Ambassador Gromyko said that the Soviet proposal was not to make any mention of the time for holding the conference. Mr. Stettinius said we might be voted down but that all we could do was to fight off a defeat.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he wished to bring forward a new proposal and put it on the agenda for discussion. Mr. Stettinius said that, if there was no further discussion of the previous matter, and since the Ambassador did not feel able to accept the second concession, it might be best to proceed to a discussion of other matters.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Delegation desired to include in the Charter a provision for withdrawal. He pointed out that there would be amendments to the Charter and quite possible certain countries would not wish to accept them. In such a case he felt that the countries should have a right to withdraw. Ambassador Gromyko noted that the Soviet Constitution provided for withdrawal from the Soviet Union, and that he wanted to mention this as one example of a provision for withdrawal.

Senator Vandenberg asked the Ambassador whether he had a text to propose. The Ambassador replied in the negative. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the delegations might study this matter and place it on the agenda of the next meeting. He asked if there was to be more discussion on this point. No further discussion was indicated.

Ambassador Halifax said he would like to present the matter of domestic jurisdiction. Some people were greatly concerned over the wording of the sponsoring governments’ amendment for paragraph 7, Chapter II. Some of those concerned had been in touch with the American Delegation. He thought it would help to be informed of the view of the American Delegation on the suggestion made by the Australians that paragraph 7 of Chapter II be amended.

Mr. Stettinius called on Mr. Dulles to present the proposed amendment. Mr. Dulles stated that the United States was agreeable to the amendment for paragraph 7, Chapter II, suggested by the Australian Government. He understood this amendment to involve the addition of the phrase “of enforcement measures under” following the word “application” in paragraph 7. The entire paragraph would then read: “Nothing contained in this Charter shall authorize the Organization to intervene in matters which are essentially within the [Page 1186] domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under this Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VIII, Section B.” Mr. Dulles explained that the United States was agreeable to this amendment on the assumption that it would be agreeable to the other four delegations.

Ambassador Halifax said the new wording would be agreeable to the British Delegation also, if agreeable to the other four delegations. He said he would like to say a word on this matter. He had no doubt that those who criticized the sponsoring governments’ amendment were fully appreciative of the importance of this whole provision. He felt it was important, if possible, to meet the criticism. After giving the question some thought he had reached the conclusion that it might be better to leave out the words—“but this principle shall not prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, Section B”. If the words “enforcement measures” were inserted, it might appear that we were excluding the Security Council from any action but enforcement. We might get into the position where we would bar the Security Council from any action with respect to a situation, until it could take enforcement action. If the whole sentence was left out, it could be argued that the Security Council retained all its powers with respect to a situation that potentially threatened the peace. Ambassador Halifax said he thought the argument could be sustained, if these two lines were omitted that once a matter became a threat to international peace and security it would cease to be essentially within domestic jurisdiction. The Security Council would have its full powers the moment a matter threatened international peace and security. Ambassador Halifax said he would prefer this method to the introduction of words which might be interpreted to disbar the Security Council from anything but enforcement action.

Mr. Stettinius said he was sorry to have to ask to be excused from the meeting but he had a very important engagement awaiting him. He suggested that Ambassador Gromyko preside in his absence. Before leaving he indicated that he hoped he would be permitted to make a brief statement to the press to the effect that agreement had been reached among the Five on the French amendment, and that the question of voting procedure had not been discussed.

Mr. Dejean said that he shared the opinion of Ambassador Halifax that it was not satisfactory to include the words in paragraph 7, Chapter II, “enforcement arrangements under”. He favored keeping the paragraph as it stood. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that this whole question of domestic jurisdiction had been discussed at Dumbarton Oaks where it had been agreed that a provision should be included in the Charter. It had been decided then that there [Page 1187] might be such an internal transformation in a state as to involve a danger to the maintenance of international peace and security. Whereas such a situation would arise originally within the domestic jurisdiction of a, state, if there was a danger to the maintenance of peace, then the Security Council should be free to take the necessary measures to maintain international peace. Although the causes might be internal, he said, they might involve a threat to the peace.

Mr. Dejean repeated that he preferred not to add the words “enforcement measures under”. Ambassador Halifax asked if he would be willing to omit the two lines altogether. Mr. Dejean asked if Ambassador Halifax did not think it was dangerous to omit those two lines. He pointed out that Mr. Boncour believed those two lines very important. Ambassador Halifax explained that with the two lines left out the Security Council could still decide when a matter ceased to be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. When a situation threatened the peace it would cease to, be essentially within domestic jurisdiction and all powers would revert to the Security Council.

Mr. Dulles said he would like to make the position of the United States Delegation quite clear. The Delegation prefers the language as it stands. Some of the British Dominions, however, are worried that, if the second sentence of paragraph 7 is left as stands, the Security Council could make recommendations under Section B dealing with such questions as immigration. Mr. Dulles said he had told Ambassador Halifax and Lord Cranborne that, if the Australians were agreeable to the inclusion of the words “enforcement measures under”, provided the other four delegations were also agreeable we would go along faith this change. He said he saw now that Ambassador Halifax did not agree with this change. He added that the Australians took the position that, even after the Council had found that a threat to the peace existed, it should not make recommendations with respect to domestic matters.

Ambassador Halifax said he would like to add that there was a case to be made for the addition of the words “enforcement arrangements under”, if, by the addition of those words, the whole matter could be settled. If this proved to be the situation he would associate himself with the position of the United States Delegation.

Mr. Soong said that the matter had been brought to his attention for the first time at this meeting and that he would have to take time to consider it.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Delegation would like to have the text as it stood without change. He preferred to stand on the sponsoring governments’ amendment. Mr. Dulles agreed that [Page 1188] this was also the first choice of the American Delegation. Mr. Dejean also expressed a preference for the four-power formula.

Lord Cranborne stated that the Australians preferred omitting the final sentence. Mr. Dulles questioned whether they would prefer the omission if they heard Ambassador Halifax’ definition of the result, namely, that by dropping out this sentence the Security Council still would have full powers under Chapter VIII, Section B to take action in the event that a situation threatened the peace. Lord Cranborne suggested that Mr. Evatt had been agreeable to either compromise and had been willing to accept the addition of the words “enforcement measures under”.

Ambassador Halifax stated that this matter was likely to be raised in the Technical Committee the following day, and that the British Delegation found itself in a difficult position. In loyalty to the four power amendment, it would be difficult to vote against Australia. On this question the British Delegation felt in great sympathy with Australia. In view of the fact that the Chinese had asked for further time to study, and since time was not available to reach agreement, he questioned whether we should try to agree on this matter; He wondered whether it would be possible for the British Delegation, without damage to the general cooperation, to have liberty of voting on this question. Ambassador Gromyko suggested that Australia had voted against the British on a number of occasions. Ambassador Halifax said that most of the proposals made by Australia were not vital to her, but that on this particular question all parties in Australia were agreed. Ambassador Gromyko said that, if we stood on this amendment by Australia, it would mean that we were shifting from the four-power amendment. He thought this was extremely undesirable.

Ambassador Halifax noted that it was always possible to abstain although on this question he would not like to do it very much. Ambassador Gromyko asked what we should do. Would we have agreement among the three powers or could we have agreement among the four powers? Mr. Boncour thought it would be difficult to take agreed action on this matter. He was in favor of the paragraph as it stood and said he saw danger in omitting the last two lines.

Ambassador Halifax said he could only repeat that he found himself in a position of great difficulty. He thought the other members of the group would agree that his Delegation had done its utmost to preserve unanimity on as many points as possible. He did not feel, however, that the United Kingdom could vote against Australia on a matter of such vital concern to Australia. He added that he was most reluctant to depart from an agreed position with the other [Page 1189] powers, and that he would consider the British position with Lord Cranborne and maybe some solution could be found. Perhaps abstention would be possible although he would find it difficult to abstain.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether paragraph 7 should be defended as an amendment of the sponsoring governments and France or as an amendment of four governments in another combination. Ambassador Halifax stated that this was an amendment agreed to by the four governments. However, the United Kingdom Delegate would have to say that a difficulty with the amendment had come to light so that, while his Government had joined in putting forward the amendment, he felt bound to reserve his position on it or to abstain or to take some action of this type.

Ambassador Gromyko asked whether Ambassador Halifax would defend the Australian amendment. Ambassador Halifax said he would have to be quite frank. He might say that, on closer examination of the four-power amendment and in view of the points made by Australia, he would not wish to oppose the Australian amendment. Ambassador Gromyko asked what should be done then as a result of this situation.

Ambassador Halifax said there was nothing to be done but to note the differences in the positions of the five governments and, if the United Kingdom voted differently from the other four governments, he hoped the United Kingdom would not be judged harshly. Senator Connally said he did not think we could hold the Ambassador to the four-power amendment, but he hoped that this would not be a precedent. The Ambassador was in a peculiar position on this matter and we would not interpret his position as a breach of good faith. Senator Connally said that Ambassador Halifax had been frank and open in the presentation of his position. Ambassador Gromyko stated that the issue was then closed and the consultations on this matter ended. Mr. Soong said he would also like to reserve his position on this whole question.

Ambassador Gromyko adjourned the meeting at 6:45 p.m.

  1. Five-Power Meeting, June 4, noon; for minutes of meeting, see p. 1145.
  2. See minutes of the twelfth Five-Power meeting, June 2, 10 a.m., p. 1094.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Committee I/2 agreed on May 29 that a special subcommittee I/2/E of 15 members be appointed to consider the proposed amendments and to report to the Committee (Doc. 683, I/2/48, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 154); record of meetings not printed.
  5. Not printed.