RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: U.S.–U.S.S.R. Conversations
Memorandum by Mr. Robert W. Hartley of the United States Delegation, of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, Monday, June 4, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (5) and the Soviet Union (3).]
In opening the conversation, The Secretary said that it would be helpful if he and Ambassador Gromyko could have a frank exchange of views. He said he felt sure there was nothing in anyone’s mind at the Conference but that the proposed international organization should be a success from the very start. However, he said, certain facts in the present situation had to be squarely faced. At the Conference, the United States had taken on a great responsibility for giving leadership in launching the Conference successfully and in bringing it to a rapid and successful conclusion. The four sponsoring Governments had come to San Francisco with the understanding that they would maintain in principle the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the Yalta agreements on the voting formula in the Security Council; to that end, at the beginning of the Conference, the four had quickly arrived at the amendments which they felt strengthened those proposals and had shown great unanimity of purpose and action.
During the last two weeks, however, The Secretary stated, it was being said by many of the Delegations at the Conference that the three major powers could not work together. As an example, the difficulties at the Conference were being cited; the question was being asked: “If the three major powers could not agree at the Conference, what hope could there be for a proposed international organization which depended upon their continuing unanimity?”
The Secretary said that he felt that we were facing a critical situation; that public confidence in the United States [United Nations?] was falling, and something had to be done quickly to revive it. He [Page 1153] said that this growing feeling of uneasiness was also being reflected in the Senate of the United States and it was necessary to correct this impression if the United States were to go forward as a full participant in the world organization.
The Secretary said that he had spoken quite frankly, but that he wanted a calm discussion of the situation so that we could go forward us quickly as possible. He then asked Messrs. Dunn and Pasvolsky if they had anything to add to his opening statement.
Mr. Dunn said that he felt that the Conference had accomplished a great deal of work but, unfortunately, no one was pointing out how much had really been done so far. He said that he thought that if this large area of agreement could be emphasized more, the points yet in disagreement would fall into their proper perspective. He said that he felt it was time to bring forward the problems that yet remain and to discuss quite frankly what could be done to find solutions to them.
Mr. Pasvolsky said it was also his view that it was necessary to emphasize the great deal of work that has been done; that it might be well to reassure the public that a great area of agreement did exist, even on the question of voting procedure in the Security Council. He said he thought it might be helpful if a public statement along these lines were made; that there was no question of disagreement on the voting procedure insofar as procedural matters were concerned or on the major functions of peace and security. He said that there was a false impression abroad that the two Governments were in entire disagreement on the whole question and that he thought that some discussion should be given to the possibility of issuing a statement to the Conference outlining the points in which they found themselves in agreement.
Ambassador Gromyko said that he would like to see the text of such a statement; that personally he felt that it would be unnecessary, since the press already had the story of the points on which they were in disagreement, as well as those on which they were in agreement. The Secretary said that he wished Ambassador Gromyko to convey to his Government the fact that no one in the United States Delegation had authorized the statements currently appearing in the press and that if any member of the U.S. Delegation had given such statements to the press, it had been entirely without his authorization as chairman.
In his general reply to the Secretary’s opening statement, Ambassador Gromyko said that he agreed fully with the Secretary that neither the Conference nor the proposed world organization could be successful without the unanimity of the Big Five. He said that the [Page 1154] position of the Soviet Delegation on the question of voting procedure was the decision of the Crimea Conference, and that the Big Five were in unanimous agreement on this point with the exception of the interpretation of Chapter VIII, Section A. He said that his Delegation viewed the current attempts to interpret the Crimea decision not as an attempt to change the Crimea language but rather as a change in the spirit of the Crimea decision. He said that the position of the United States Delegation—that no veto should be allowed on the first step of the chain of events leading to enforcement measures—was not right; that such first step might ultimately lead to war, and that experience in this war had shown that complete unanimity was necessary from the first step onward. He reminded the Secretary that at the Crimea Conference, former President Roosevelt had proposed the formula for voting procedure in the Security Council, and the Soviet Government had agreed to it. He said that, in his view, if agreement could not be reached on this important point of interpretation of the Yalta, voting formula, it would have a very serious effect on the Conference.
The Secretary said that at Yalta the United States had agreed that the veto would apply on enforcement measures, but that former President Roosevelt had never agreed that the veto would apply on the question as to whether a particular case should be discussed by the Council. (At this point, the Secretary left the discussion in order to answer an important telephone call.)
Mr. Pasvolsky replied to Ambassador Gromyko by saying it was true that at times discussion of a case might lead to serious consequences, but that those occasions were rare indeed. He said that while it was perfectly true that the five permanent members of the Security Council should maintain unanimity on the measures necessary to enforce the Council’s decisions, in the U.S. Delegation’s view, the veto power should not apply on the question as to whether or not a particular matter should be discussed. He said it was the opinion of the U.S. Delegation that after the Security Council had heard and discussed the facts in a particular situation, and then decided that some sort of action should be taken—such as an investigation of the matter—then the veto should apply. He said it was absolutely necessary for the Security Council to take a look at the situation by holding a hearing, otherwise it could not operate. He asked the question: “How could any one of the five permanent members on the Council decide not to discuss a situation before they knew what the situation was?” Furthermore, he said, if the five permanent members were to agree that further discussion of the situation might aggravate it, then they ought not to do so, but that they should not refuse to give a hearing to a situation that had been brought to their attention.
[Page 1155]Ambassador Gromyko replied by pointing out that the Soviet position was that any one of the Big Five would not always use the right of veto of discussion of a particular matter. At times, he pointed out, such discussion might, however, be not only the first but the most important link in the chain of events, and it was on those occasions that the Soviet Delegation felt that the veto rule should apply.
Mr. Pasvolsky asked Ambassador Gromyko to imagine the situation in the Security Council in the future, when a nation wanted to bring a matter before the Security Council. How, he asked, could the Security Council or any one of its members refuse to discuss the situation before they had held a hearing to find out what it was all about? He said that it was the view of the U.S. Delegation that until a decision was necessary as to whether or not to investigate a particular dispute or situation, no member of the Council should have a veto power.
At this point, The Secretary rejoined the discussions and read from the minutes of the Yalta meeting the President’s statement and explanation of the formula on voting procedure.7 He emphasized the President’s statement that every nation would have the right to present its case to the Council; and that unless there was full and free discussion in the Security Council, the international organization that it was proposed to establish would be different from the one contemplated by the United States Government. He pointed out that there were two major points in the President’s voting formula, namely, unanimity among the great powers and the right of full and free discussion. He said that the President was always clear that any nation could bring its problem to the Security Council for hearing and discussion without the necessity of a vote.
The Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Gromyko that the question at issue between the two Delegations seemed to be such a little thing. Ambassador Gromyko said that if it was such a little thing, why did not the U. S. Delegation agree with the Soviet interpretation of the voting formula? Furthermore, Ambassador Gromyko added, the statement that the Secretary had read was not the Crimea decision but was in itself an interpretation of the Crimea decision.
Mr. Pasvolsky inquired as to how the Security Council would be able to vote unless it had heard a case. Ambassador Gromyko said that the Crimea decision does not prevent free discussion in the Security Council once it has been decided that such discussion should proceed; but that the first stage of discussion was often the most important link in the chain of events leading up to final enforcement action. The Secretary also inquired as to how it would be possible [Page 1156] for the Security Council to vote unless the facts had been presented to it. Ambassador Gromyko replied that it would be an exceptional and rare case in which a permanent member would use a veto to stop discussion; but that such right of veto should be exercised when necessary to save the prestige of the international organization; and that it was a power that would not be abused, as had been emphasized in the proposed Soviet interpretation.
Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that really what was involved was a procedural question of the Security Council’s operations. He stressed the fact that the Security Council must give the right of a hearing on a dispute and that any one member should not be able to prevent such a hearing. Ambassador Gromyko said that obviously the Soviet interpretation was that such a hearing should be held but that the power of veto on the first discussion of a case would be used only when that discussion would hurt the international organization. Mr. Pasvolsky inquired as to why such a statement should not be made, and to state clearly that there was an obligation on the Security Council to hold such a hearing. Ambassador Gromyko said that that constituted another approach to the problem and then reiterated his view that the decision as to whether the Security Council should discuss a case would require the unanimity of the permanent members.
The Secretary then cited an example of the type of case that might conceivably be brought to the Security Council’s attention, using as an illustration a possible dispute between Mexico and Honduras over fishing rights. In that event, Mr. Novikov said, obviously a vote would be required before the Security Council could proceed to discuss the matter. The Secretary and Mr. Pasvolsky said that such would not be their interpretation of the Crimea decision. Mr. Golunsky then replied that the vote would be necessary in order to put the matter on the agenda; therefore, the only question that would be involved would be whether it would be by a procedural vote or by a non-procedural vote. Mr. Pasvolsky said that in his understanding, no vote of any kind would be required to put a matter on the agenda of the Security Council; that again it was the same problem—how could the Security Council pass judgment on a situation without ever having had a hearing in the matter?
Ambassador Gromyko inquired as to how the Council would proceed to discuss a matter. Mr. Pasvolsky said that no vote would be required when the Council wanted to proceed. Mr. Golunsky asked what the Council would do in the event that there were several items pending before it; in other words, how would the Security Council choose as to which item it would take up first? Mr. Pasvolsky said that this choice obviously did not involve a vote as to whether or not [Page 1157] the situation was to be discussed at all, but merely as to [in] which order it would be discussed.
Ambassador Gromyko then said that in his understanding, Mr. Pasvolsky divided the Council procedure into two parts: first, a nation would bring a situation to the attention of the Security Council and the Security Council would give it a hearing; thereafter, after the hearing was closed, the Security Council would proceed to discuss the matter and vote as to whether it should deal with the matter or not. Further, he pointed out that it was his understanding of the U.S. viewpoint that in this latter decision the Security Council would act on a procedural vote. Mr. Pasvolsky said that he had been misunderstood, that such discussion could proceed with or without a vote, and that, in his view, a vote at that time was not mandatory. He said it was his understanding, of course, that a vote could be had as to whether or not such discussion should be stopped in the event that it appeared that continuing the discussion would further aggravate the situation. In such a case, he said the veto vote would obviously apply, and The Secretary agreed with him. Mr. Golunsky said that in such a veto vote, any one member of the Council could prevent the discussion from being stopped; but the U.S. Delegation was unwilling to agree that the veto of any one of the members could not prevent [could prevent?] the discussions from being started. Ambassador Gromyko said that the entire matter had narrowed down in his own mind as to a question of whether a procedural or a nonprocedural vote should govern the question as to whether the Council should discuss a matter. Mr. Pasvolsky said that that was too narrow an interpretation; that a vote on that issue could not be taken.
The Secretary said that he had always emphasized in his own, statements the necessity for a free hearing and an opportunity to discuss a situation brought before the Council. Ambassador Gromyko said that in spite of the Secretary’s statements, it was the sense of the Crimea decision that a vote would have to be taken in the Council as to whether or not a discussion should proceed. After a brief interchange, Ambassador Gromyko asked the Secretary if he could see him privately for a few minutes and they both left the room.
During their absence, discussion of the matter continued between Messrs. Golunsky and Pasvolsky. Mr. Golunsky said that if he understood the U. S. viewpoint correctly, it was that no one member of the Security Council could prevent a situation being brought to the Council’s attention but, he said, in the Soviet view, a decision was still required as to whether or not the Council should proceed to a discussion of that situation. Further, he said, it was his understanding that the U. S. viewpoint was that such discussion could [Page 1158] begin without a vote; but he could not understand how such discussion could begin without there having been a previous decision to that effect. Mr. Pasvolsky said that perhaps it would be better to attempt to detail the Council’s procedure in this situation somewhat along the following lines: (1) The Council would hold a hearing on a situation which had been brought to its attention. (2) Following the completion of that hearing, the Council would hold a discussion on the facts which had been developed during the hearing. It was the U. S. view that no vote was necessary to proceed with that discussion. (3) Following the discussion of the facts developed at the hearing, the next discussion would concern what the Council ought to do and on this discussion a vote might be necessary.
Mr. Golunsky said that in view of this newest analysis he could see only one way out; that there would have to be a separate consideration of the procedure of the Council during its hearing and then of the procedure during its discussion of the facts developed at the hearing; but that even so, this discussion would, in turn, have to be analyzed in two parts, and he did not see how that could be done. Mr. Pasvolsky said that it was clear that in order to discuss the matter further, it would be necessary to analyze in great detail the Council’s procedure before it could be clearly developed as to what the points of disagreement were between the United States and Soviet interpretations of the Crimea decision.
At this point, the Secretary and Ambassador Gromyko returned to the room. Mr. Pasvolsky said that as a result of the discussion between Mr. Golunsky and himself, it now appeared that what was necessary was to analyze carefully the Council’s procedures in taking up a particular situation and in its actions thereon; having reached agreement as to these steps and the decisions that were necessary, it would then be necessary to set forth in appropriate language the common interpretation of the two Governments on the voting decisions. Ambassador Gromyko said that in his mind it was not a question of finding appropriate language; rather he felt it was a clear difference of opinion between the two. That difference, he said, was simply whether a unanimous vote of the permanent members was necessary to decide whether the Council would undertake discussion of a particular matter.
The Secretary said that in his opinion this might be a subject on which the experts might profitably continue their discussions and accordingly suggested—and Ambassador Gromyko agreed—that Mr. Pasvolsky and Messrs. Golunsky and Novikov should continue the discussions later in the evening.8 Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the conversations ended.