500.CC/6–345: Telegram
The Chairman of the United States Delegation ( Stettinius ) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received June 3—6:12 p.m.]
3. Please transmit the following message to Harriman as from me:
“A separate telegram86 is being sent answering the questions in your 1882 of June 3. In addition in order to give you a complete understanding of this problem I quote below the following text of the paper which was worked out in the sub-committee of the sponsors and presented to the delegation chairman [chairmen] for consideration:
‘Specific questions covering the voting procedure in the Security Council87 have been submitted by a subcommittee of the Conference committee on structure and procedures of the Security Council to [Page 1132] the delegations of the four governments sponsoring the conference—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China. In dealing with these questions, the four delegations desire to make the following statement of their general attitude towards the whole question of unanimity of permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council.
- 1.
- The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to the peace, removal of threats to the peace, suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote—that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, subject to the proviso that in decisions under section A and a part of section C of chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The Security Council will also be charged with many other functions. Here, too, a distinction needs to be made, in the application of the Yalta voting formula, between the decisions which will be governed by a procedural vote and the other decisions which will require a qualified vote.
- 2.
- For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire section D of chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its President; organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when the member’s interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute. It is likely that several other important decisions of the Council will also be governed by a procedural vote.
- 3.
- It is clear from paragraph 2 of section A of chapter VIII that any state may bring to the attention of the Security Council any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The Council can discuss and consider any such dispute or situation and, in deciding whether or not to discuss a particular dispute or situation, the Council should obviously operate by a procedural vote which does not require unanimity of the permanent members. It follows that no individual member of the Council can alone prevent a consideration and discussion by the Council of such dispute or situation. Nor can parties to such a dispute be prevented in this manner from receiving a hearing before the Council.
- 4.
- Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under section B, chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute.
- 5.
- To illustrate: In ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation—which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, or other means—might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the Council must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under obligation to take further steps. Similarly, the decision to make recommendations, even when all parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfill their obligations under the charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities.
- 6.
- In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of patties to a dispute under article XV of the League Covenant. Under article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute.
- 7.
- The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system, non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no “vote” [veto?]. As regards to the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity.
- 8.
- It should also be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. In other words, it would be possible for five non-permanent members as a group to exercise a “veto”. It is not to be assumed, [Page 1134] however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their “veto” power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.
- 9.
- In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore if majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members.
- 10.
- For all these reasons, the four sponsoring governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this conference as essential if an international organization is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.[’]
In Ambassador Gromyko’s reply he accepted the introductory paragraph and paragraphs 5 through 10 of this paper. The Soviet paper substitutes the following for paragraphs 1 through 4.
1. The sense of Yalta decision is quite clear and is as follows: The unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council is required on all matters, which may be submitted to a vote in the Security Council excepting purely procedural matters mentioned in section D, chapter VI and special cases provided for by paragraph 3, section C, chapter VI. Thus all the matters enumerated in section A, chapter VIII require the unanimity of permanent members provided that a member being a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
Under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire section D of chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its president; organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of it functions; invite a member of the organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that member’s interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute.
2. This is the formal aspect of this matter, which has been worked out in the course of prolonged conversations among the sponsoring governments at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, during the period between that conference and the Yalta conference and in the course of the Yalta conference itself. In these conversations the above mentioned powers were inspired by a sincere aspiration to establish an international organization capable of living, which would give [Page 1135] the greatest guarantees and possibilities to assure the suppression of any aggression and strengthening of general peace with participation of all mighty peace-loving powers. Small nations are particularly interested in the establishment of such an organization in order to maintain their independence and integrity, and the interests of these nations were fully taken into consideration in the initiative of the sponsoring powers and in their efforts to convene the Dumbarton Oaks conference and further the present San Francisco conference. They attach special importance to the normal functioning of the organization in preventing international armed conflicts by peaceful means as much as possible and by enforcement measures if necessary.
The sponsoring powers working out the Yalta voting formula of the draft charter, now under discussion, proceeded from the idea to assure the greatest possible participation of the members of the international organization not represented at the Security Council in the discussion by the Council of any question affecting the interests of a member of the organization, not a member of the Council; this is specially mentioned in the charter of the organization.
According to this provision of the charter any member of the organization may participate in the discussion of any question specially affecting the interests of this member. Moreover the Security Council should invite any state party to a dispute under consideration of the Security Council to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute. All decisions on such questions shall be taken by the Council by procedural vote without unanimity.
Therefore there are no grounds whatever to fear that the sponsoring powers, when they become permanent members of the Council, would actually use the rights conferred on them by the charter to block the discussion by the Security Council on any international dispute affecting the interests of states not members of the Council and other situations likely to endanger general peace or to block the taking of appropriate measures by the Council. Furthermore, the permanent members of the Council, when they are a party to a dispute, under Paragraph 3, section C, chapter VI shall not vote and will not influence the decision on the question, whether any matter should be discussed.
Only rare exceptional cases are possible when the permanent members of the Council, conscious of their special responsibility for the prestige of the organization, use their formal right.
3. The discussion by the Security Council of any dispute is of importance only in the case of decisions provided for by section A, chapter VIII be taken as a result of such a discussion. A discussion which wouldn’t be followed by any security action is only likely to discredit the whole organization and sometimes even to strain the relations between the parties to the dispute. On the other hand the discussion on a dispute in the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under section B, chapter VIII. Thus this chain of events begins from the very moment when the Council [Page 1136] decides to take up a dispute for consideration. It follows that a discussion on a dispute is of great political importance by itself and may entail serious consequences; therefore the question, whether a dispute should be considered, in no way can be deemed a procedural matter.”
Repeated to Moscow as No. 1213, June 3, 8 p.m.