Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 60

Minutes of the Sixtieth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Friday, June 1, 1945, 9 a.m.

San Francisco, June 1, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (39) present at meeting.]

The Secretary called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. The Secretary asked that his remarks be considered as having been delivered in executive session. The Secretary remarked that he had held a private talk with Ambassador Gromyko the previous day and that headway had been made. The Secretary thought that within a few days Ambassador Gromyko would present Russian positions on the outstanding questions. However, The Secretary declared, first the United States’ position must be established on these matters, and he pointed out that Monday would be June 4th and that the next week would have to be the last week of real work if the Conference were not to bog down completely. The Secretary hoped that he could hold a meeting of the Big Five that afternoon, and he stated that it was essential that the Big Five make up their minds quickly on the amendments which they were willing to accept.

The Secretary urged that the Delegation ignore the agenda for the time-being and “cut through the underbrush”. He then asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky would outline for the Delegation those items on which decisions had not been reached. The Secretary pointed out that until the Delegation fixed the position on these questions which were pending he, himself, would not be in any position to throw his weight around in attempting to bring pressure on the other members of the Big Five to establish their positions quickly.

Questions Pending

Mr. Pasvolsky declared the most important item facing the Delegation was the French regional question, Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. The question of amending procedure had been decided previously by the Delegation as had the procedure for the election of judges to the World Court and for the election of the Secretary-General. The Secretary asked what position had been reached by the Delegation with respect to the Deputy Secretaries-General. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he thought the Delegation had wanted him to maintain a negotiating position. The Delegation had favored trying to obtain approval for the proposal which he had submitted in the previous day’s meeting¹² and if it proved impossible to obtain approval of this suggestion the Delegation favored going along with the Russian position.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the question of supply of forces had been almost completely resolved satisfactorily. However, there was one matter which was still before the Big Five and that was the Russian opposition to the inclusion of any reference to “right of passage” in Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5.¹³

Transitional Arrangements

Mr. Pasvolsky presented to the Delegation a draft of Chapter XII, Transitional Arrangements. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that there had been some opposition in Committee III/3 to the draft chapter as it was prepared by the Big Four powers.¹⁴ It had been argued that the wording was not clear and that clarification was necessary. The Canadian Delegation, which had been the chief source of opposition, presented a substitute draft to the subcommittee, although this had proved unacceptable because it made substantive changes in the meaning whereas the subcommittee was empowered only to clarify the existing meaning. As a result, Mr. Hickerson had presented a draft which the Russians had declared that they could not accept.

The Secretary asked Mr. Pasvolsky whether he could not first present the picture of those questions which would require decision shortly.¹⁵ Mr. Pasvolsky replied that an amendment on the revision of treaties would probably be proposed shortly, and he was of the opinion that the United States should oppose any such move. Senator Vandenberg declared that it seemed to be a rather confused situation because Chile was opposed to such a movement while Bolivia had indicated strong support. Mr. Dulles voiced an opinion that revision of treaties was the result of the suppression of the South American proposals to sanctify regional arrangements. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that in his opinion it was essential for the United States to oppose such a move, and Senator Vandenberg agreed that this Government should stand by its commitment to the other members of the Big Five.

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that there were several matters being considered in Committee II/2 which were bothering the Russians. The chief one was the definition of the terminology “sphere of international relations”.¹⁶ Senator Vandenberg commented that the matter had been argued the previous afternoon and that the United States had voted on the side of the Russians and had been voted down “eloquently and enthusiastically”. Senator Vandenberg voiced the opinion that this measure could not be reopened with any possibility of success. Mr. Pasvolsky advanced the view that the question would undoubtedly be raised again.

At this point The Secretary asked on what issue it was that the Russians had claimed that the United States had voted against its commitments. Mr. Sandifer replied that the item referred to was Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 8 for which Senator Vandenberg had voted favorably.¹⁷ The Delegation was referred to the draft of this paragraph, approved by Committee II/2 (United States document undistributed 53¹⁸). Senator Connally asked why the Delegation could not at that time take up Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5, and Mr. Pasvolsky declared that this matter should not have been on the agenda at all. The most important item before the Delegation, in his opinion, was the French treaty question. If the United States reached a decision on that, it would be holding up no Big Five decisions and could consider its hands clean. The Secretary declared that there were several items that had been appearing on the agenda of the Delegation meetings for several days without having been considered. The Secretary urged that after the main meeting broke up a subcommittee should remain to consider items which were left over and establish the position of the Delegation. The Secretary referred specifically to the question of a preparatory commission. He asked if any of the members of the Delegation would be free to attend such a meeting and Dean Gildersleeve, Representative Bloom, Commander Stassen, and Senator Connally declared that they would be able to stay.

The Secretary then asked if there were any emergency items before the 10:30 committee meetings.

Australian Pledge Amendment

Dean Gildersleeve replied that she was having a meeting of Committee II/3 that morning. She reported that Commander Stassen and herself had met with Mr. Evatt and together with a Russian delegate had talked over with him the Australian pledge. The Russian had submitted a draft which had been accepted by the Russians and had seemed acceptable to Dean Gildersleeve and Commander Stassen. Dean Gildersleeve referred the Delegation to the document, US Gen 206, page 3, which explained the background of the new wording which read as follows:

“All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of these purposes”.

Dean Gildersleeve mentioned that this draft did not differ very much from the position taken by the Delegation. Commander Stassen said that he had found it necessary to probe into the reasons why the Australians insisted upon their draft and had finally managed to cause them to withdraw from their advanced position. Commander Stassen thought that although the new wording was ambiguous it was not too bad, and he agreed with Dean Gildersleeve that it conformed with the Delegation’s position. He remarked that the word “pledge” had been substituted for the word “undertake”, but he thought this was more than compensated for by the omission of the phrase “and to take separate action”. The Secretary asked what Dean Gildersleeve and Commander Stassen would recommend, and both Dean Gildersleeve and Commander Stassen indicated that they supported acceptance of this draft. Mr. Dulles also indicated approval. Mr. Hackworth thought that this draft was somewhat vague in view of the varying interpretations that could be placed on the words “separate action”. Mr. Eaton observed that the idea behind the whole thing was to place the burden for world economic well-being on the United States, but Mr. Hackworth thought that this country would be sufficiently protected under the draft. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that this was not an amendment which the United States should support really, but that in view of the circumstances he agreed that the Delegation ought to accept the amendment. The Secretary declared that the United States had already been committed to the full employment proposition and thought this was important in considering the original pledge draft submitted by Australia because of its relation to the full employment proposal. Representative Bloom was somewhat disturbed over the substitution of “pledge” for “undertake” but Commander Stassen said that actually the words had identical significance in this context.

The Delegation agreed unanimously to accept the new phraseology. Mr. Dunn inquired whether there was sufficient reference in the minutes of Committee II/3 to make clear the position of the United States concerning domestic jurisdiction, and it was declared the United States’ stand on this issue had been made sufficiently clear.¹⁹ The Secretary asked the Secretary of the Delegation to make certain that a note was sent to Mr. Bowman instructing him to make clear in his confidential report to the President that this Delegation was of the opinion that the domestic jurisdiction clause was applicable to the provisions of the Economic and Social Council.

Raw Materials Amendment

Dean Gildersleeve reported that in a conversation with the French representative the latter had made clear that the inclusion of a reference to raw materials in the Charter was of primary importance to the French Delegation. He declared emphatically that it would not be sufficient merely to mention in the records of the Committee that raw materials were included under the problems referred to in Chapter IX, Section A, Paragraph 1(b). Consequently he wanted to reopen the first paragraph of Chapter IX and Dean Gildersleeve referred to the Delegation a suggested wording which had been drafted for inclusion in this paragraph (US Gen. 206, page 2). The new wording, intended to follow the words “and other related problems” in paragraph B read as follows:

“including, for example, those relating to international trade, finance, raw materials, capital goods, transportation, communication, reconstruction, and traffic in narcotic and dangerous drugs.”

Dean Gildersleeve remarked that this wording had been proposed because it had been thought necessary by members of the United States Delegation to include the reference to raw materials among a number of others. Mr. Stinebower declared that the Delegation was faced with two alternatives. The first would be to recognize the principle of equal access to raw materials. This, he thought, would have no real significance and he was of the opinion that the Delegation should oppose any such proposal. However, the wording under consideration accepted no principles and merely expanded on the meaning of “related problems”. At this point The Secretary asked if there was any pressure from other nations for an inclusion of a reference to raw materials. Mr. Stinebower declared that the Belgians were pressing for such a reference and the Dutch seemed to want to turn it around so that it would work to the advantage of the producing nation. The Latin American states were also supporting this proposal and were tying raw materials to equal access to capital goods. Mr. Stinebower declared that he was in favor of accepting the wording under consideration because it would avoid log-rolling in the Committee. The wording had the advantage that it accepted no principles. It stated illustratively what the problems were with which the Organization might be concerned. The acceptance of this wording would be contingent upon French agreement to drop pressure for spelling the matter out any further. Mr. Dunn expressed the opinion that if possible this wording should be left out completely and Mr. Dulles agreed that the Organization was becoming top-heavy with economic functions; this became obvious when the Charter was viewed as a whole. Senator Vandenberg agreed with Mr. Dulles and said that the additions were being made piece by piece in such a way that the Delegation never received the full impact of the accretions. Commander Stassen urged that the impact was not so serious as Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles would make out. Dean Gildersleeve, he pointed out, had won out on a number of attempts to add additional functions to the Economic and Social Council. Commander Stassen expressed the opinion that the wording before the Delegation was not really objectionable except as it added additional unnecessary words to the Charter. Commander Stassen urged that the United States would be likely to meet defeat on the matter of principle if it were to come up and remarked that the principle had been admitted by this Government at Chapultepec. Dean Gildersleeve agreed that the United States was likely to find itself in a more difficult position and might be forced to accept a most objectionable wording if it would not take the clause under consideration. Mr. Waring announced his agreement with Commander Stassen’s interpretation. He declared that the group supporting this wording on raw materials also favored reference to reconstruction but the wording which was being considered by the Delegation was in Mr. Waring’s opinion innocuous and involved no pledge to take any action whatsoever. Senator Vandenberg wondered whether the reference to narcotics and dangerous drugs should be included in this paragraph which involved no pledge and about which there was no intention of taking any action.

Mr. Pasvolsky voiced the opinion that the new wording was “terrible”, especially the reference to reconstruction. This he said did not belong in the Charter to establish the Organization. Commander Stassen inquired whether there was not really an international problem of reconstruction. Representative Bloom urged that even if there was such a problem it should not be included in the United Nations’ Charter. Representative Bloom pointed to the difficulty which had arisen in the fight for the ratification of the UNRRA agreement as a result of the reference to reconstruction. Representative Bloom declared that reconstruction belonged much more appropriately in the UNRRA agreement than in the United Nations’ Charter. Mr. Pasvolsky asked what the situation would be if the French were to withdraw their proposal for a reference in the Charter to raw materials. Mr. Stinebower replied that if the French were to withdraw and the Latin American nations could be lined up in opposition to such a clause the pressure might collapse. However, Mr. Stinebower declared that this was not the case with respect to reconstruction. Mr. Pasvolsky asked which nations were supporting reference to reconstruction and Mr. Stinebower replied that most of the small United Nations were lined up behind the Greek proposal.²⁰ Representative Bloom asked if someone would explain the meaning of reconstruction as it might be used in the Charter. Mr. Stinebower declared that it would involve merely an obligation to study the problems concerned with reconstruction. Mr. Notter thought that it might be argued that if the proposed wording were ended with “communication” the problem of reconstruction would have been adequately covered Representative Bloom remarked that the use of the words “for example” made possible the addition to the list of any other problems which any nation might wish to have included.

The Secretary thought that it was the opinion of the Delegation that pressure should be maintained for the omission of any reference to raw materials and reconstruction such as was under discussion and that if the Delegation were to be outvoted on the issue the United States should reserve its position. Commander Stassen suggested that those members of the Delegation who were interested in the problem should appear at the meeting of Committee II/3 to help out Dean Gildersleeve because the pressure, he thought, was going to be very strong. Mr. Pasvolsky said that he would like to take up this question with the French in the meeting of the Subcommittee of Five. Mr. Rockefeller asked if this could be accomplished before the meeting of Committee II/3²¹ but Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Subcommittee could not make any decision available before the afternoon meeting. The Delegation agreed to authorize Mr. Pasvolsky to take up the matter with the French representative on the Subcommittee of Five.

Preamble

Dean Gildersleeve presented to the Delegation a draft of the Preamble to the Charter which had been approved in a Subcommittee of Committee I/1. Dean Gildersleeve declared that from a literary point of view this draft Preamble was “perfectly terrible”. She thought that this part of the Charter should be an inspiring literary piece of work and she objected very strongly to the final note of the Preamble concerning “the employment of international machinery”. This Preamble she thought would be subject to a great deal of scrutiny in this country and hence should be a presentable document. The Secretary asked whether the question of drafting involved should not be properly referred to the Coordination Committee. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that the Preamble should be shorter and simpler and should not repeat those principles which were established in later sections of the Charter. Mr. Dunn asked Dean Gildersleeve if she could explain what was the status of the draft Preamble and Dean Gildersleeve replied that it had been adopted in Subcommittee I/1A. Committee 1/1 was scheduled to consider the draft that afternoon at 1:30 and Dean Gildersleeve declared that she would like instructions from the Delegation as to what position she should take. The Secretary declared that he proposed that the matter be referred to the Coordination Committee. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Committee should list the ideas which it wanted to include in, the Preamble and not prepare a final form. However, Dean Gildersleeve pointed out that the draft, as it appeared before the Delegation, had already been adopted by the Subcommittee. Mr. Pasvolsky then asked whether the objection was to the wording or the ideas, and Dean Gildersleeve replied that it was the wording that was unsatisfactory. This, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, was a problem to be dealt with by the Coordination Committee. Mr. Notter thought that the Coordination Committee could send the document to Committee I/1 with a request to shorten it but Secretary Stettinius declared emphatically that such a step would prolong the discussion and thought that it would be inadvisable. Dean Gildersleeve wanted it made clear that as a professor of literature she was very strongly opposed to the present draft.

Amendment Procedure

Mr. Armstrong remarked that he had managed to have a postponement of the Committee which was to consider the question of a revisionary convention for the purpose of amending the Charter; however, that Committee was to meet that afternoon²² and Mr. Armstrong declared that he would like instructions from the Delegation. The Secretary remarked that there might be a meeting of the Big Five that afternoon and that in his opinion final decision by the Committee on this question should be postponed until an agreement could be worked out among the sponsoring governments and France. Mr. Armstrong declared that he would try to have the meeting of the subcommittee scheduled for that afternoon postponed.

Senator Connally remarked that postponement was not an ideal procedure because this practice was slowing down the work of the Conference. The Secretary thought that in this case the postponement was necessary despite the effect on the work of the entire Conference. Senator Connally declared that the Conference was lagging very noticeably, and he declared that of the two committees he was on neither was scheduled to meet that day and only one had met on the previous day. Secretary Stettinius declared that there could be no doubt that the “whole parade was marking time” because of the fact that the USSR was delaying the decisions needed for the continuation of the working of the Conference. Mr. Dunn remarked that it was the United States which was holding up on the French treaty question, Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. The Secretary urged that the Delegation consider this matter and settle it at the present meeting. The Secretary declared that he would speak on the matter with Ambassador Gromyko and might even declare that unless the Soviet position was made clear before that evening the United States might be forced to recede from its position of supporting the Four Power Amendments. Representative Bloom declared that in his opinion the United States would have to be firm. Commander Stassen said that Mr. Dunn’s comment concerning the French treaty was not really valid because the matter of the veto arrangements was holding up a number of committees and a number of problems were depending upon it. The French treaty question was an isolated incident. The Secretary indicated that there had been indications in a conversation with Ambassador Gromyko the previous day that the Soviet position on the veto question would be made available later in the day.

Mr. Dunn asked whether the United States Delegation was ready to present its position on the outstanding points to the Russians. This, he thought, was necessary if the Russians were to be expected to make known their position to the United States. Mr. Dunn referred first to the election of the Secretary-General and Secretary Stettinius called on Mr. Pasvolsky to present the position of the Delegation.

Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that in the final analysis this Delegation would take the same position with respect to the appointment of the Deputy Secretaries-General as it had taken with respect to the appointment of the Secretary-General. The Delegation had agreed that the Secretary-General should be elected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council acting by qualified majority vote. Representative Bloom dissented and asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky meant that the Secretary-General would have no say in the appointment of his Deputies. Commander Stassen declared that he would definitely oppose such a position and thought it was essential that the Secretary-General have some authority in the selection of his assistants. Mr. Dunn pointed to this disagreement as an example of what he meant when he had declared that the Delegation must prepare its definite position for presentation to the Soviet Delegation. The Secretary urged that the Delegation’s position on the election of the Secretary-General be established at this meeting. Senator Connally asked if it was not also a question at issue as to> whether the General Assembly would be required to accept a nomination made by the Security Council and Representative Bloom pointed out that the Belgians had taken the position that the General Assembly must elect the Secretary-General nominated by the Security Council. Representative Bloom thought that it was a ridiculous position and that the Assembly had the authority to elect or reject a nominee as it saw fit. Representative Bloom pointed out that at one time the Committee had been thinking in terms of three nominations from which the General Assembly would be required to select one candidate.

Questions Pending

The Secretary urged Mr. Pasvolsky to go down the list of questions requiring definitive positions in order that the Delegation could take its stand on these matters. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the first question facing the Delegation was the matter of voting. This he declared could not be decided further by the Delegation at this time although he thought a discussion of what acts might be considered for procedural voting might be valuable. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that as he understood the Delegation’s decision procedural voting arrangements would apply to: (1) All matters under Chapter VI, Section D; (2) discussion of disputes under Chapter VIII, Section A; (3) the convocation of a general conference for the purpose of amending the Charter; and (4) the election of the judges of the World Court. The Russians were apparently in agreement with this position of the United States Delegation on the election of judges although they had taken the position that the Committee which had voted favorably had not had the authority to consider the question. This, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, was the Delegation’s position as to what was procedural voting.

Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Delegation was willing to accept the nomination of the Secretary-General and his Deputies by a nonprocedural vote. Commander Stassen said that he had thought the Delegation had decided to accept Mr. Pasvolsky’s proposal of the previous day that the Deputy Secretaries-General should each be subject to the approval of the body that he was to serve. Mr. Pasvolsky asked if he might not explain his understanding of the situation. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the United States was committed by the Four Power amendment to the position that the Deputy Secretaries-General should be nominated by the Security Council voting under a unanimity requirement. He had asked the Delegation at a previous meeting whether it would be agreeable to the Delegation for Mr. Pasvolsky to attempt to negotiate on the basis of the formula which he had explained and the Delegation had granted this authorization. Mr. Dunn asked what the position of the Delegation should be if the other members of the Big Five insisted on a nonprocedural vote for the election of the Secretary-General and his five Deputies. Mr. Notter replied that this matter would come up in Representative Eaton’s Committee and that the Big Five would be beaten badly on a vote. Secretary Stettinius asked what the stand of the Delegation was on this matter and Mr. Hackworth said he thought the Delegation would have to stand by its commitment. Commander Stassen urged that this was an open question because of the fact that the Four Power proposal was couched in the following terms:

“The Secretary General and his Deputies should be elected on recommendation of the Security Council for a period of three years…”

This wording, Commander Stassen declared, established no procedure by which the Security Council vote should be taken. However, Mr. Sandifer remarked that this amendment to Chapter X should be read in connection with the Yalta formula on voting arrangements. Mr. Notter declared that this paragraph of Chapter X was going to be approved at the next meeting of Committee I/2²³ and that there would be no mention of Deputy Secretaries-General because of the fact that it had been beaten. Mr. Dunn reiterated that the Russian position on the various questions at issue would not become available unless the United States established its position on the same issues, including the questions of the Secretary-General and his Deputies.

Senator Connally declared that he was of the opinion that the unanimity rule should legitimately apply to the election of the Secretary-General because it would be unwise in his opinion to force a Secretary-General upon any nation to which he was not satisfactory; however, he thought the Deputies should be nominated by the Secretary-General under whom they were to function. Mr. Dunn pointed out that this Government had already agreed that the Deputies should be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and Senator Connally agreed that the United States should adhere to its commitment. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he too thought that it should adhere to its commitment but that the proposal could be improved greatly.

The Secretary asked whether it was the decision of the Delegation that this should be the final position of the United States. Commander Stassen declared that this stand had already been defeated in the Committee but Mr. Pasvolsky urged that decisions taken in the technical committees were not necessarily final on important issues.

Representative Bloom remarked that in the Four Power amendment Chapter X, Paragraph 1 there was no mention of the eligibility of the Deputy Secretaries-General for reelection. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this had been an oversight and had since been rectified. Mr. Notter reported that the Russian proposal for the nomination of the Deputy Secretaries-General according to the unanimity requirement had been defeated in the Committee. The Chairman had made an error²⁴ and the Secretary-General of the Conference had returned the question to the Committee for another vote. There would be, Mr. Notter said, a vote without any further discussion and the Russian position would be defeated once again. Representative Bloom declared it was his understanding that this matter had been submitted to the Steering Committee for decision, but Mr. Notter said he was talking about the Deputy Secretaries-General, not the Secretary-General himself. The question of the Deputies had been returned to the Committee by Secretary-General Hiss because of the mistake made by the Chairman of I/2. Mr. Hackworth urged that the Delegation consider the constitutional setup of the United States in reaching a decision on this question. He pointed to the power of the President to nominate his own Cabinet subject to the approval of the Senate. He thought that this situation was very similar to the situation which would exist under the Organization. He would prefer very much, he said, to see some such system as the United States system of nominations adopted by this Conference; however, Mr. Hackworth admitted that since the United States was committed by the Russian position it should stand by its commitment. Mr. Sandifer proposed that the Delegation stand by the Four Power position unless it was found that Mr. Pasvolsky could negotiate the acceptance of his proposal for a nomination of the Deputy Secretaries-General by the Secretary-General subject to the approval of the agency with which they were to serve. Dr. Bowman declared that this was a sound and practical suggestion although Senator Connally ventured the position that this could never be achieved. Mr. Pasvolsky admitted that he probably could not gain acceptance for his proposal but thought it was worth trying anyhow. The Secretary declared the view of the Delegation that if Mr. Pasvolsky’s proposal could not be obtained the United States should stand by the Four Power amendment.

Transitional Arrangements

The Delegation was presented with a revised draft of Chapter XII, Transitional Arrangements. Senator Connally declared that he would be satisfied with the text of this Chapter as it appeared in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The British had also been satisfied. However, the Canadians had objected to the phraseology on the grounds that it was ambiguous and had succeeded in forcing through the submission of the question to a Subcommittee.²⁵ The amendment before the Delegation had been prepared by Mr. Hickerson, and Senator Connally thought that this draft would probably be accepted. The new draft made the following changes:

1. “Until such time as the Security Council shall decide that it has at its disposal through” was substituted for “pending the coming in to force of”.

2. “Sufficient forces and facilities to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon it by this Charter, the States parties to” was substituted for “and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of”.

3. The words, “the States parties to that Declaration” were omitted, the following words, “signed at Moscow October 30, 1943”.

4. The words, “as contemplated in that Declaration” were added following the words “… and France should”.

5. “To maintain or restore” was substituted for “for the purpose of maintaining”.

Senator Connally declared that the addition of the words “and France” had been agreed to previously and constituted no problem. He explained further that the words appearing in parenthesis “under Chapter VIII, Section B”, were still under discussion. Senator Connally declared that he himself was willing to leave these words out of the paragraph, because extraordinary authority was being granted to the five major powers and he did not think that this authority should be tied so closely to the functions of the Security Council, under Chapter VIII, Section B.

Mr. Dulles voiced the opinion that the entire draft was very dangerous. He declared that the new draft would postpone, until the Security Council made a formal decision that it had “Sufficient forces and facilities” at its disposal, the transferral, automatic under the earlier draft, of authority for the maintenance of peace to the Security Council. Senator Connally asked whether the inclusion of the reference to Chapter VIII, Section B would meet this difficulty, and Mr. Dulles replied that this reference would be extraneous. Mr. Dulles remarked that the draft made it possible for permanent members of the Security Council to keep the Charter from coming into force. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the objection of the Canadians had been to the ambiguity of the phraseology, which seemed to make it necessary for all the agreements for the supply of forces to become effective before the Security Council could assume jurisdiction over the maintenance of peace. Mr. Dunn pointed out that there had been no necessity for Security Council agreement under the old wording, but Mr. Hickerson reiterated that there had been an objection to the supposed ambiguity of the original phraseology. Mr. Johnson declared that in his opinion, the old wording required a decision as to the number of the agreements which would be necessary before the Security Council could assume the additional functions provided for in this paragraph. Mr. Dunn thought that this was an erroneous conception. The entire field of interim enforcement measures was outside the scope of the Organization. To change the language and to bring this field of action under the scope of the Organization and make it subject to the decision of the Security Council, would be to change the entire idea of the paragraph. The Moscow Declaration had only declared that there would be consultation until such time as the Organization came into force. The United States, he thought, must maintain the position that the interim arrangements under the Moscow Declaration had nothing whatsoever to do with the Organization. The Russians, he declared, felt very strongly on these measures and objected to bringing the field of interim enforcement under the scope of the Organization, and making a decision of the Security Council necessary for the transfer of that function to the Security Council. Senator Connally declared that he had upheld this position and he had argued in the Committee that the powers of the Security Council were not affected in any way by this Chapter. Mr. Hickerson remarked that he, himself, had prepared this draft because the draft proposed by the Canadians²⁶ had been no good at all. The Canadian draft had made no mention of the Moscow Declaration.

Senator Connally expressed the hope that he would be able to force the acceptance of the old language, but Mr. Johnson disagreed, and replied that the United States had been beaten on that attempt when the decision was taken to submit the matter to the Subcommittee. Mr. Dunn declared that the new: wording established an additional responsibility for the United States. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that Chapter XII was designed to bridge the gap during the interim period after the war ended, until such time as the Organization would come into force. The chapter, he declared, was based on the obligations undertaken by Great Britain, Russia and the United States in the Moscow Declaration. This, he declared, was not inconsistent or in any way contrary to the Charter. As the paragraph was phrased originally, it involved only an obligation on the part of the five great powers. If the functions involved were to be tied to Chapter VIII, Section B, it would become a grant of authority, which was not what it had originally been intended to be. Mr. Pasvolsky felt that the Delegation should adhere to the original draft.

Senator Connally expressed the opinion that this interim period might last for two years or more, and that under the arrangements tremendous power would be granted to the Five Powers. Mr. Dunn added that if a member of the Security Council were to veto the assumption of jurisdiction by the Security Council, this interim period could be extended interminably. Mr. Johnson reaffirmed his earlier position that some sort of decision would have been necessary under the earlier draft. As to when the necessary number of agreements would have come into force, it would, Mr. Johnson declared, take a long time for a sufficient number of agreements to be concluded, and until that number came into force, the Security Council would have no authority. Mr. Dunn declared that the Organization would have authority but no forces at its disposal, and Senator Vandenberg declared that even without forces and facilities, the Security Council could exercise all the peaceful means at its disposal to settle any dispute. Senator Connally declared that he would be satisfied with the original text, but he had been defeated. Mr. Dunn declared emphatically, that the United States could not accept the new wording, and declared that he advised adhering to the original text. Mr. Hickerson asked whether the difficulty could not be met by qualifying the time element. Mr. Dunn declared that this Chapter was merely a recognition of the Moscow Declaration, and he thought that the United States could exercise a veto under the Moscow Declaration, just as it exercised a veto on the Security Council, but he declared that it was important to establish that the functions outlined under this Chapter were distinct from the functions of the Organization. Mr. Hickerson agreed that this was a sound interpretation. The Secretary asked whether this discussion might be postponed, inasmuch as Senator Vandenberg had to leave to attend a Committee meeting in ten minutes. Mr. Dunn remarked that even if this draft were to be accepted by the vote of the Committee, the United States still could not accept it. Mr. Hickerson thought that it was purely a drafting question.

Mr. Johnson urged that under the old draft any power could veto the transferral of the functions under this Chapter to the Organization merely by refusing to sign an agreement to supply forces to the Organization. Admiral Hepburn remarked that there was an advantage to mentioning the Moscow Declaration in the Charter, because in order to act under that Declaration, Senatorial consent would be required. A reference in the Charter would make it easier to obtain that consent.

Mr. Hackworth asked what was provided for in the Moscow Declaration and urged that the wording be maintained in this paragraph. Senator Connally declared that’ the Declaration provided that the interim arrangements should last only until the Security Council was organized. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the problem facing the Delegation was the insistence of the small powers that this Chapter could be interpreted as meaning that all the agreements for the supply of forces might have to become effective before the interim arrangements would be terminated. The problem facing the Delegation, he declared, was how it could be proved that such was not the case. Senator Connally remarked that he had stated in the Committee meeting that it would be up to the Security Council to decide how many arrangements would be necessary, and Mr. Johnson urged that the language under consideration followed out that construction. Mr. Hickerson urged that if a decision was required, as provided for in the present draft, any member of the Security Council could veto the transferral of functions from the “responsible powers” to the Security Council. Mr. Dulles declared that he was in favor of maintaining the earlier wording, even if it should remain ambiguous. The fears of the small States could be allayed by pointing out that the Five Powers would be most anxious to escape their responsibilities under this paragraph. Senator Connally thought that all reference to the special agreements should be deleted from this paragraph and that it should be broadly stated that the Security Council would assume the jurisdiction upon the coming into effect of the Organization. Mr. Hickerson expressed the opinion that such language would not be adequate because it was possible that the Organization would come into effect before the agreements for the supply of forces were concluded. In that case the Organization would have authority for enforcement, but no forces with which to implement this authority. The Secretary asked Senator Connally what his recommendation to the Delegation was. The latter declared that he had committed himself in the meeting of Committee III/3 to the original language of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.²⁷ Mr. Hickerson stated that this was acceptable to him, but he wondered how the Canadian fears would be dispelled. The Secretary remarked that the Delegation could reserve its position and take up the question again in the Steering Committee.

Mr. Dunn remarked that there would be no substantial difference if this paragraph did not appear in the Charter. The Moscow Declaration carried legal obligation without any further implementation, and the same five powers would have the final decision under the Moscow Declaration as under the Security Council, because of the veto provision. Mr. Hickerson said he agreed with this position, but thought that the vote on the matter would be lost. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the matter was being considered by a nine-man subcommittee. A two-thirds vote would be required, he said, and the Committee might reach no decision if the five major powers were to be aligned against the opposition of the other four members of the subcommittee.

The Secretary asked what the Delegation’s position was on this matter and Commander Stassen proposed that the United States position be that advanced by Senator Connally, that the original language be maintained. The Delegation agreed unanimously to this decision.

The Secretary asked what were the other questions that it was necessary for the Delegation to consider. At this point, Senator Vandenberg left the meeting and declared that he would return at 12:00 o’clock for his instruction.

French Treaty Amendment

Mr. Pasvolsky referred the Delegation to the May 23 and May 31 drafts of the Proposed Change in Sponsoring Governments’ Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.²⁸ There were, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, three alternatives open to the Delegation. It could accept either the original language of the sponsoring governments’ amendment, the French Amendment of May 23, or the latest draft, of May 31. He declared that the other four powers had been in agreement on accepting the French draft. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that there was another possibility which involved changing the words “be necessary”, to “become necessary” in the last sentence of the May 23 draft. This, he said, would take account of the time factor.

Commander Stassen declared that the May 31 draft which was before the Delegation was acceptable to him, if the Delegation was willing to accept it. He thought that the draft might be improved by including the word “all” before “the United Nations” in the end of the draft. This, he said, would have the advantage of eliminating those Nations which had fought only Japan from participation in the European sphere. Commander Stassen asserted that if all the other members of the Delegation agreed, he would accept the May 31 draft. Under no circumstance, he said, would he accept the draft of May 23. The Secretary asked whether the other four members of the Big Five would be willing to accept the May 31 draft, and Mr. Pasvolsky thought that they would. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that this draft could be simplified somewhat by rewording part of the second sentence to read, “with the exception of measures against enemy states provided for in Chapter XII, Paragraph 2 … the governments parties to the arrangement referred to above …”.

Mr. Dulles declared that he was opposed to the draft of May 31. Representative Bloom asked what was the source of Mr. Dulles’ opposition, and the latter replied that the only problem being dealt with in this amendment was the condition under which the special regime would come to an end. It was the desire of the United States, he said, to have this regime ended as soon as possible. The fewer states there were, he declared, in a position to prolong this regime, the better the situation would be. The French proposal, Mr. Dulles declared, limited the states with such power to the parties to the regional agreement. The May 31 draft enlarged this number to include all the United Nations. Commander Stassen asked where, in the May 31 draft, such a provision appeared. Mr. Dulles replied that it was embodied in the phrase “at the request of the governments having the responsibility for the taking of measures provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2”. Commander Stassen declared that this obviously was derived from Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, and asked Mr. Dulles whether his interpretation of the language of that paragraph included all the United Nations, and Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative. Commander Stassen declared that this was not his interpretation at all. [At this point the Secretary had to leave the meeting].³⁰ Representative Bloom asked that Mr. Dulles reply to Commander Stassen’s question. Commander Stassen observed that the wording “governments concerned” had been deleted from both drafts, and that “the governments responsible” involved the addition of only the United States to the list of states whose concurrence would be required. Mr. Dulles asked why the United States should want to be included in the list of nations with power to block assumption by the Security Council of the responsibilities referred to in the paragraph under discussion. Commander Stassen declared that the power granted to the United States would be the power to initiate the transferral of these functions. Commander Stassen declared that it was not intended that there should ever be complete renunciation of the regional pacts. The question was that of at what point the approval of the Security Council would be necessary for action under these agreements. The United States, he said, would favor the earliest possible assumption of the responsibility for approving such action on the part of the Security Council. For this reason, he wanted the United States to take part in the consultations by which this authority would be granted to the Security Council.

Mr. Dulles remarked that the issue concerned was the original interpretation of Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, and Commander Stassen replied that if this argument were accepted, it would be necessary to rewrite Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Mr. Dulles replied that in his interpretation, the French draft provided that if the two parties to the original agreement could decide to subject that agreement to the authority of the Security Council, and if the Security Council would agree to accept that responsibility, action under that agreement could be taken only with the approval of the Security Council. Consent was required on the “giving end”, by the parties to the regional pact only. In this way, Mr. Dulles declared, it would be possible seriatim to terminate all, the regional treaties with the consent of the parties thereto. The new draft, he said, added to the number of nations whose consent would be required. If it were possible to limit the number of nations whose consent was necessary to two, why should there be additions made to the Powers who could block transferral of power.

Commander Stassen declared that he was willing to compromise on the use of the words “parties and permanent members of the Security Council”. Commander Stassen said that he never wanted the United States to be excluded from the consultation concerning the transferral of authority to the Organization. Mr. Dulles thought that even without specific reference to the United States in any way, this country would still have to be included in the consultation, because of its interest in this transferral of power resulting from the membership of the United States on the Security Council. Mr. Dulles did not, however, want the United States “cut in” on the side which could block the transferral of power. Commander Stassen agreed that the United States would be able to participate on these decisions, as a result of its membership on the Security Council. He wanted to insure, however, that the United States would be able to initiate such actions. Mr. Dulles commented that under the earlier wording, a request for the transferral of powers could be initiated by the two parties to any regional agreement, and would require the approval of only three or four others on the Security Council; the new draft would merely add to the number of states whose approval would be required and would constitute an additional obstacle to turning over the necessary authority. Commander Stassen declared that he did not think that Mr. Dulles’ interpretation was correct, but since there was some doubt, Commander Stassen declared that he was willing to attempt wording that would clarify the situation. Commander Stassen asked the Delegation to consider, as an example, what would have been the situation if the conflict in Syria and Lebanon had occurred instead in Italy. Commander Stassen declared that under such conditions, he would not want the United States to be cut out of the decisions that would be made.

Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he was afraid that Mr. Dulles’ interpretation would not be accepted by the other four members of the Big Five. It had been clear in the discussions, he said, that the act of superseding the authority of the regional pacts would require the consent of the parties in the two categories, signatories and those having responsibility under Paragraph 2 of Chapter XII. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Big Five would not accept consent by only two powers for the Security Council’s assuming these functions. The other four were of the opinion that the consent of the parties responsible under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2 would be necessary. Commander Stassen asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky could tell the Delegation who the parties under Chapter XII would be. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that he did not know, and he explained that Chapter XII had been written as it was, because it would be impossible to give a clear picture of which powers would be responsible for enforcement action, and which powers would be willing to relinquish their special position as victors in the war and assume a position of equality with the enemy states. He pointed out further, as an example of what might result from the decisions of the United Nations that the Italian Advisory Commission³¹ had more than six members, but Commander Stassen interjected that the decision as to which states should be members of the Italian Advisory Commission had been made by two or three states. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that there was no way of telling what the situation might be after the war.

Representative Bloom asked if Commander Stassen would expand on a statement he had made earlier in the meeting concerning the application of this paragraph to Russia and Japan. Commander Stassen replied that on the termination of the war Russia might interpret the word “regional” as signifying arrangements made with respect to Japan, without ever having participated in the Pacific war. In this way, arrangements made by Russia concerning the prevention of future aggression by Japan might be interpreted as not being subject to the enforcement authority of the Security Council.

Mr. Kane asked whether he was correct in understanding that if the change were adopted, the French would interpret the phraseology as requiring both the parties to regional pacts and those powers responsible under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2 to join in the request for the Security Council to assume jurisdiction. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this request could be made by any nation. Upon receipt of such a request the Security Council would get in touch with the other powers whose consent was necessary and put pressure on all the parties concerned to agree to the transfer. Mr. Kane asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky did not think that this would require the consent of all the United Nations. Mr. Pasvolsky proposed, as an example of what he meant, a situation where one nation raised the question of transferring the authority to the Security Council. The Security Council would then ask for the positions of all the other responsible powers, perhaps twenty or more. If they did not agree immediately, the Security Council could put pressure on them to join in the request. In the end there would be either abstention from the request by some of the responsible powers or all the responsible powers would join in presenting the request to the Security Council. A procedure similar to this, Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out, had arisen with respect to the evacuation of the Rhineland. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that too much importance was being attached to the phraseology of the new paragraph, because in the final analysis the transfer of authority could not take place unless the responsible powers were willing. Mr. Armstrong asked whether it would be possible for any state to stop this transfer, and Mr. Pasvolsky declared that that depended on who took the responsibility for pressing for transfer. Mr. Armstrong thought that if the possibility were not excluded definitely in the language, it would be possible for one state to block the assumption jurisdiction by the Security Council.

Mr. Kane remarked that Mr. Pasvolsky had been holding the position that all the parties under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2 would have to join in the request for a transfer of authority to take place, in addition to the signatories of a regional pact. Now, he thought that Mr. Pasvolsky was advancing a different interpretation. Commander Stassen asked if Mr. Pasvolsky could enumerate the responsible parties. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he could not answer this question, and he remarked that with respect to Germany, there was a distinctly open question as to who would have the responsibility of making the decision to readmit Germany into the society of nations on an equal basis. The responsibility for policing Germany at this time, Mr. Pasvolsky observed, resided in all the United Nations, with a few acting in their behalf. It was still an open question as to who would be responsible for the decision to remove the restrictions. A treaty would have to be negotiated on this question. Mr. Pasvolsky thought it would make no difference what language was written in the Charter, because it was clear that the Organization had no responsibility over enemy states—that responsibility resided in the victorious nations. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that all sorts of arrangements would be possible and that enforcement action against the enemy states would not fall under the jurisdiction of the Organization. However, after the Organization takes over these functions, treaties granting freedom of action with respect to the enemy states would be inconsistent with the terms of the Charter. It was clear, he said, that the “until” clause appearing in the original Four Power Amendment covered both classes of states, those parties to regional arrangements and responsible powers under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Mr. Pasvolsky said that there was also no dispute over the fact that, even without this clause, it would be necessary for the responsible powers to agree before the Organization could take over enforcement responsibility with respect to the enemy nations. The French language and the new wording, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, said exactly the same thing. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that, since Mr. Dulles and several other members of the Delegation had found it difficult to interpret this paragraph, interpretation should be left controversial and should be left for future settlement. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Delegation should accept the simple changes in the new draft under which the United States would be protected on both sides of the picture.

Senator Connally observed that this paragraph gave unusual powers to the parties to regional arrangements. Senator Connally asked whether it was thought that a majority of the forty-nine nations would be necessary for the assumption of controlling responsibility by the Security Council. Mr. Dulles thought that unanimity of the United Nations might be necessary. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the requirement could be interpreted in a number of ways. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that nothing would be gained by accepting language which would limit the requirement to the “request” of the parties to regional arrangements, because of the fact that none of the major powers, would interpret such language as meaning that the consent of the parties was all that would be necessary. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that under this arrangement, any state could raise the question of transferring these powers to the Security Council. Senator Connally thought that if the consent of all the United Nations should be necessary, it would be just as well to throw out the entire Charter, because the United Nations would never be able to control the powers exercised under the regional arrangements. Mr. Dulles observed that the French text referred only to the signatories to regional arrangements. Termination of these agreements could be brought about by the consent of the two parties. The new wording, he thought, would make possible the participation of all the United Nations in the decision to terminate a regional pact.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the new wording only expanded on what was already implicit in Chapter XII. The question at issue was not to terminate the treaties, but to end the right to act without the approval of the Security Council. This power would no longer reside in the parties to a regional arrangement, once the Organization assumed jurisdiction. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the Organization could not assume this jurisdiction against the protest of the responsible parties under Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. Mr. Dulles thought that Chapter XII, paragraph 2 referred to the surrender terms only, and therefore did not require the consent of the parties thereto to the assumption by the Security Council of the functions under consideration in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the responsible powers under Chapter XII, “were in” and he remarked that the French, Russians and British agreed that they “were in”.

Mr. Hackworth thought that the Delegation was “talking in a circle”. He referred the Delegation to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2. He asked who had the responsibility for policing Germany and replied that this function resided in three powers. Senator Connally interposed that these three powers were acting in behalf of the United Nations, but Mr. Hackworth said that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom had a direct responsibility with respect to enforcement action against Germany. These three powers, Mr. Hackworth declared, could give up their responsibility whenever they were ready to do so. However, there were also regional arrangements for enforcement action against the enemy states. The problem was then a double-barrelled one, and Mr. Hackworth thought that both sides could block the assumption of jurisdiction by the Security Council. Admiral Hepburn voiced his agreement with Mr. Hackworth’s interpretation. Mr. Hackworth thought it was unfortunate that the bilateral agreements had been legalized in the Charter. Commander Stassen again agreed to this and thought that there was nothing that could be done about that situation.

Mr. Kane remarked that he had a somewhat different interpretation of paragraph 2 than that of Mr. Pasvolsky. Mr. Kane thought that the words “pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2” had been included in order to indicate a slight expansion of Chapter XII, paragraph 2 to add to the functions authorized thereunder. In addition to this reference in the Chapter under consideration there might also be bilateral regional arrangements. Chapter XII, paragraph 2, Mr. Kane declared, contemplated occupation of enemy territories by the powers in whom that responsibility should be vested. This function would not fall within the compass of the General International Organization and none knew how long it would last.

Mr. Kane went on to declare that when the Four Power amendments had been adopted on May 3, it had been understood that the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C$ paragraph 2 would enlarge the area under which the individual nations could act without the authorization of the Security Council. This, Mr. Kane thought, gave to these states an undesirably wide freedom of action which had, however, been politically necessary. Mr. Kane submitted that the only way in which the United States could participate in European affairs was through the operation of the Security Council. Mr. Kane thought that the Delegation must attempt to increase the possibility of the United States’ participating in enforcement action in Europe. However, the effect of the new language, in Mr. Kane’s opinion, was to reduce this possibility, inasmuch as it seemed to make necessary consent by more nations to the transferral of authority over enforcement measures against the enemy states to the Security Council. In this respect, he agreed with the opinion advanced by Mr. Dulles. As a result of the additional consents necessary, Mr. Kane thought that the freedom of individual action might be extended beyond the actual occupation period. There were two ways, Mr. Kane thought, in which the United States could use its influence to keep the situation open, by occupation of enemy territory under Chapter XII, paragraph 2 and by its membership on the Security Council. Mr. Kane declared that the military advisers of the Delegation would have to view seriously this interpretation which might have the effect of postponing indefinitely participation of the United States in enforcement action in Europe.

Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he would have to say something in reply to Mr. Kane’s statement. There never was, Mr. Pasvolsky said, any other interpretation. The present wording, he said, was not important because Chapter XII had been clearly interpreted at Dumbarton Oaks. It had been understood that Chapter XII referred, in addition to enforcement measures during the actual occupation period, to the act of bringing Germany into the family of nations. No other interpretation was possible in Mr. Pasvolsky’s view. Mr. Kane asked whether formal authority would be necessary, under Chapter XII, paragraph 2, for the transferral of the functions involved therein to the Security Council. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that such authorization was necessary and that the willingness of the Security Council to accept this responsibility would also be required. Mr. Kane remarked that under this arrangement, even if the occupation were to end in a short time, it might take years for the responsible powers to work out the necessary agreement for bringing Germany under authority of the Security Council. Mr. Dunn remarked that such an agreement might never be worked out and Mr. Pasvolsky agreed, declaring that the responsible powers might not be willing to take the chance of further German aggression. Mr. Dunn remarked that he was unable to see the basis for Mr. Kane’s interpretation that only military occupation was referred to under Chapter XII.

Commander Stassen urged that the Delegation consider a specific example of what might be a possible situation in the future. Suppose, he declared, the problem of Trieste were to arise after the occupation period were ended. Could Yugoslavia, asked Commander Stassen , block action by the Security Council? Mr. Pasvolsky declared that Yugoslavia could take such a step but that the Security Council would have no business to act anyway. Commander Stassen thought that since such a serious issue was involved no change of any nature should be made in the Charter. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the Security Council was not charged with the responsibility of keeping down the enemy states. If the responsible powers should fail to fulfill their responsibilities then the Security Council would have power to act. Commander Stassen asked whether the Security Council could block action by the responsible powers and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the Security Council could not block such action in the first instance. Commander Stassen asked whether this would be an all-inclusive situation that the Security Council could not block action by the responsible governments with respect to enemy states. Mr. Dunn replied that Chapter XII authorized such action and that the Security Council could not prevent action by the responsible powers. It was pointed out, however, that the Security Council was always empowered to act in a case where peace was endangered. In this way, the Security Council, although it could not stop action in the first instance, could intervene if it became apparent that a dangerous situation was being developed.

Mr. Dulles remarked that he was in favor of standing on the original four-power amendment without making any concessions to France. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the need for meeting the French demands was less pressing at that time than it had been three or four days previously, as a result of the political situation with respect to Syria and Lebanon. Mr. Dulles thought that he would agree to the substitution of the word “request” for “consent” but he said that he was opposed to rewriting the paragraph because of the numerous complications. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that there was a complication involved in the original wording that the Delegation had not considered. The words “states concerned”, Mr. Pasvolsky submitted, could be interpreted as including the enemy states.

Mr. Hackworth thought that under the later drafts the Security Council could take action. However, the Council could not preclude the responsible states from acting under the regional arrangements. Mr. Dunn declared that this was correct and that if the responsible powers fulfilled their responsibility adequately it would not be necessary for the Security Council to act. Mr. Dunn declared that he wanted to inject a political note into this discussion. He agreed with Mr. Dulles that the United States was not in the same position with respect to France as this Government had been prior to the eruption of the dangerous situation in Syria and Lebanon. Mr. Dunn declared that he could no longer see any need for making a concession to France, although he would favor changing the word “consent” to “request”.

Senator Connally asked whether the Delegation agreed to stand on the four-power amendment with the possible change of one word. Dean Gildersleeve and Commander Stassen were in favor of this position, but Senator Connally thought that since no other members of the Delegation were present at that time the matter should be postponed for lack of a majority. Mr. Sandifer submitted that Senator Vandenberg had expressed his approval of the position under dissension [discussion?] several times in the meetings of the Delegation and Senator Connally agreed that a majority vote had been achieved.

Mr. Hackworth thought that Chapter XII paragraph 2 might be amended to clarify the situation with respect to which states would be responsible for enforcement action against enemy states by the inclusion of the word “primary” before “responsibility” in paragraph 2. Commander Stassen however urged that the language not be changed because to put in language now would subject the paragraph to varying interpretation at a later date. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Delegation had made a mistake in taking the position it did, although he agreed to go along with the Delegation. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the wording would be ambiguous whichever draft would be adopted, and declared that under all the drafts there was room for all sorts of interpretations. Senator Connally asked whether France had agreed to the four-power wording and Mr. Dunn replied that the French had not agreed. Mr. Dunn asked whether there was any possibility of the Delegation reaching unanimity on the March 23 draft, submitted by the French. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that such unanimity was impossible. Mr. Sandifer remarked that the position the Delegation had just taken would probably involve delay in gaining Russian acceptance for returning to the old wording.

Admiral Hepburn remarked that the words “provided for” before “pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2” were out of place in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2 because of the fact that Chapter XII, paragraph 2 did not really provide for anything. Commander Stassen thought that this was not a matter of great significance. Mr. Pasvolsky said that there was nothing on this matter that could be discussed in the Subcommittee of Five and he thought that the matter would have to be taken up further by the Delegation. Mr. Dunn remarked that Senator Vandenberg would be “on the spot” in Committee III/3 because of the further delay involved. He asked whether the Subcommittee of Five had agreed to the use of the word “request”. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that Russia had not agreed to this substitution in the original four-power amendment. Russian agreement had been only to the French draft of May 23.³³ Commander Stassen remarked that there was not much chance of France being granted much freedom of action as a result of the recent developments in Syria.

Preparatory Commission

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that he had nothing much to offer on the subject of the “preparatory commission”. The discussion of this matter had been begun in the Subcommittee of Five and that body was engaged in assimilating the various drafts submitted. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he would have a report on this matter for the Delegation in the near future.

Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 8

Mr. Sandifer urged that consideration of the approved draft of Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 8 be held over until such time as Senator Vandenberg could be present for the discussion. [At this point 11:15 a.m., Mr. Pasvolsky left the meeting.]³⁴ Mr. Dunn urged that this matter would have to be settled some time and presented to the Delegation the draft of this paragraph which had been approved by Committee II/2, US Doc Und 53,³⁵ which read as follows:

“8. The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; such reports should include an account of the measures which the Security Council; has adopted or applied to maintain international peace and security.

“Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Section, the General Assembly should be empowered:

• “a) to approve or disapprove in whole or in part any report from the Security Council and to make any recommendations or observations thereon;
• “b) to submit recommendations to the Security Council with a view to ensuring complete observance of the duties of the Security Council inherent in its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

“The General Assembly should receive and consider reports from the other bodies of the Organization and may make any recommendations or observations thereon.”

Mr. Hackworth asked which members of the Delegation were in favor of the draft as it read. Mr. Sandifer remarked that this draft had been approved by Committee II/2 but that the Russians had objected to this strengthening of the Assembly in relation to the Security Council. Mr. Hackworth thought that a very serious question was raised by this draft. He asked what would happen if the General Assembly should disapprove the report submitted to it by the Security Council under part (a) of the paragraph. Mr. Dunn remarked that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals gave to the Security Council “a primary responsibility for maintaining peace” and Mr. Dunn did not think that this draft paragraph was consistent with this principle of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Mr. Armstrong asked what nations had favored this draft and where it had originated. Mr. Sandifer replied that the paragraph had been passed by Committee II/2 with only the USSR and the two Soviet Republics dissenting. The United States, he declared, had voted for the draft. The Russians, Mr. Sandifer declared, had objected particularly to part (b) of the draft paragraph. Several members of the Delegation agreed that this section was rather blatant aspersion upon the competence of the Security Council. Mr. Dunn repeated that this paragraph was not consistent with the conception of primary responsibility of the Security Council. Mr. Sandifer thought that there were two possibilities as to the course of action which the Delegation might adopt. Committee II/2 could be asked to reconsider the question or it could be referred to the Steering Committee. Mr. Dunn asked whether this Government could legally reopen the matter in view of the fact that the United States had voted for the new paragraph. Mr. Sandifer remarked that that was the reason why he had thought Senator Vandenberg should be present when this paragraph was discussed.

Mr. Hackworth declared that he was in favor of dropping parts (a) and (b) of the draft paragraph and leaving only the first and last sentence. Mr. Sandifer declared that he had with him a rough draft of a substitute paragraph which had been prepared by Mr. Cordier, one of the Technical Experts on the Delegation. Mr. Sandifer said that he had hesitated to present this draft without Senator Vandenberg being present. The new wording, to be substituted for part (b), would read as follows:

“b) to submit recommendations to the Security Council designed to facilitate observance of the duties of the Security Council inherent in its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.”

Senator Connally declared that this paragraph gave to the General Assembly the power to “cut up” anything which the Security Council might do. Mr. Armstrong remarked that the Russians were suspicious of the United States for having voted in favor of this proposal. Mr. Hackworth suggested that the question be taken under advisement by the Steering Committee and that the United States should recommend the elimination of parts (a) and (b). Mr. Hackworth said that there were no objections to the first paragraph of the draft and the last three lines. Senator Connally declared, however, that there was no quorum and remarked further that Senator Vandenberg who was not present was the United States Delegate on II/2. Mr. Hackworth suggested that a recommendation be prepared by those members of the Delegation who were present for Senator Vandenberg’s approval. Mr. Hackworth thought that the recommendation to be submitted to Senator Vandenberg should suggest referral of the question to the Steering Committee and should recommend that all except the first and last paragraphs be eliminated. Dean Gildersleeve asked why Senator Vandenberg had voted for the acceptance of this draft. Mr. Sandifer thought that Senator Vandenberg had voted in answer to questions raised by some of the other Delegations. The implications of the draft had not been clearly apparent in that form. Miss Fosdick declared, however, that Senator Vandenberg had voted for the draft in this form. Senator Connally declared that the draft had not been approved in the Delegation and thought that Senator Vandenberg should be advised of the decision of those members of the Delegation who were present.

Mr. Armstrong thought that a compromise might be achieved by cutting off the first half of part (a) and omitting all of part (b). In this way the General Assembly would be empowered to make “recommendations and observations”. Mr. Dunn remarked that the Assembly could take such action now under the last paragraph of the draft but Miss Fosdick pointed out that the last paragraph referred to other bodies of the Organization. Mr. Kane asked whether it was not inherent in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that the General Assembly could make recommendations or observations on any situation it desired. Mr. Sandifer replied that the General Assembly could make recommendations on any matter except a dispute being dealt with by the Security Council.

Mr. Dunn pointed out that the time was approaching when the Delegation would try to find out what the intentions of the USSR were with respect to a number of open questions. The Russians had contended that the United States’ support for this paragraph was contrary to the agreement among the Big Four. If any change were to be made it would be necessary to consult with the other major powers. Mr. Armstrong agreed that no proposal should be made that was not agreed upon by the other large powers. Senator Connally declared that the recommendation of those members of the Delegation who were present would be turned over to Senator Vandenberg as an “advisement”.

Trusteeship

Commander Stassen reported that the Big Five were close to reaching agreement on the outstanding issues. He remarked that there were three points which would require consideration.

The Egyptians had proposed the addition of the words “or states” to paragraph 6 of Section B of the working paper.³⁶ This addition would make possible the designation of more than one state as trustees for any specific territory. Commander Stassen declared that this was not desirable but he thought it was not worth fighting if the other major powers agreed to it. Commander Stassen declared that he would vote against the addition of these words if any other member of the Big Five was opposed to it; however, if all the other powers were agreed he would vote for it. Commander Stassen thought that the United States was protected by the fact that the designation of administering authorities would take place by means of future trusteeship arrangements to which the United States would have to be a party. In any event, Commander Stassen declared, he was not going to speak one way or the other.

Commander Stassen reported that paragraph 5 had been accepted by Committee II/4 with the proviso that the Iraqi Delegation should be given a chance to propose an amendment.³⁷ The Iraqi Delegate expressed the fear that this paragraph would freeze the status of all territories to be placed under trusteeship forever. Commander Stassen pointed out to the Iraqis that the agreements by which territories would be placed under trusteeship would supersede the status quo under paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 had included a phrase maintaining “the terms of any mandate” for the interim period until the trusteeship arrangements can come into effect, but the Egyptians had been afraid to accept a wording to which they had never agreed before.

Commander Stassen presented to the Delegation a new wording which had been prepared to meet the desires of the Arab Delegates as follows:

“5. Until such time as territories are placed under trusteeship by subsequent individual agreements made under paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 and except as may be provided in such subsequent agreements, nothing in this Chapter should be construed in and of itself to increase or diminish, prolong or terminate or alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any state or any peoples.”

Commander Stassen expressed the opinion that this new wording had exactly the same significance as the previous phraseology but that it made clear that the subsequent agreements were controlling. Mr. Kane declared that he did not want to create any unnecessary difficulty as far as the new phraseology was concerned. He said that paragraph 5 could very well be omitted. Commander Stassen declared that he would take the liberty of “throwing” Senator Byrd at Mr. Kane. Commander Stassen declared that this paragraph had been drafted after a talk with. Senator Byrd and his committee. Mr. Kane admitted that technically this paragraph would not change any rights. He went on to say that the language of the working paper had been completely acceptable. However, Mr. Kane thought that under the new phraseology which turned the paragraph around to say “until such time as territories are placed under trusteeship …” a moral commitment to place under trusteeship territories falling under categories (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 might be implied. The “until” clause seemed to give the implication that all territories under categories (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 must be submitted to the trusteeship mechanism. However, the agreement at Yalta had made no commitment concerning any specific territory. It was apparent, he said, in listening to the speeches made by the Russian Delegates and several others, that these nations looked on the two categories of territories as the first which would come up for consideration for inclusion under the trusteeship machinery. Mr. Kane thought that the language which was used in the Chapter should not provide any peg on which a specific obligation could be hung. Mr. Kane was fearful of the use of the “until” clause.

Admiral Hepburn thought that the difficulty might be obviated by using the singular, “any territory is placed”, in place of “territories are placed”. Commander Stassen thought that this was an acceptable solution and explained that he did not want any unnecessary implications and so had used the word “territories” instead of “mandates”.

Mr. Kane remarked that there seemed to be the impression among some of the Delegates that there would be no consideration of the two categories of territories outlined in paragraph 3 unless there was an intention of placing them under the trusteeship system. Senator Byrd had asked how it would be possible to avoid a moral commitment if mention was made of the categories which might be considered for inclusion under the trusteeship system. Senator Byrd had been insistent that every effort be made to avoid any such commitment.

Dr. Bowman remarked that he was in favor of the suggestion made previously by Admiral Hepburn that the singular of “territory” be used as well as the substitution of the word “may be” for “is”. Dr. Bowman thought that “is” would make for rigidity. Commander Stassen replied that the use of “may be” would raise a Russian objection that there was the implication that some territories might never be placed under trusteeship. Senator Connally asked how the subsequent agreements referred to would be concluded among the interested parties. Senator Connally asked what would happen if the interested parties were unable to agree. Under such a situation Senator Connally asked whether the power which was in possession at the time would maintain its possession. Commander Stassen replied in the affirmative and Senator Connally asked again whether, if an agreement could not be concluded, would the power in possession at the time continue to “set”. Commander Stassen replied in the affirmative again.

Mr. Kane remarked that he did not want to create a situation whereby the United States would be morally in the wrong in maintaining its possession of any territory. Senator Connally declared that although he agreed with this sentiment, he wanted to maintain control of the islands. Mr. Kane declared that he was interested in making it easy for the United States not to accept the moral commitment. Mr. Stevenson thought that the paragraph might be turned around again with the omission of the “until” clause. Mr. Dunn remarked that the words “may be” appeared in paragraph 3 and he could see no objection to the inclusion of this phraseology in paragraph 5. Mr. Dunn pointed out that there was a possibility that a conflict might develop with respect to the interpretation of the time sequence in view of the fact that the wOrd “time” appeared followed shortly thereafter by “subsequent individual agreements”. He thought some reference of the order of “subsequent to the adoption of this Charter” would clarify the situation. Mr. Kane proposed that the paragraph be started with the word “accept” and should include the expanded, explanatory wording. Mr. Kane asked whether Commander Stassen thought the Arabs would accept that. Commander Stassen replied that he did not know. Mr. Kane remarked that Lord Cranborne had a valid point when he had differentiated between the word “status” and the word “rights”. The word “rights” as it appeared in the new draft was not entirely satisfactory to Mr. Kane, but the chief difficulty was the “until” clause. Senator Connally asked what the exact difficulty was. Commander Stassen declared that there was objection chiefly on the part of the Russians that the wording of this paragraph might continue the existing status interminably. The Arabs had expressed the fear that the wording might expand the situation to which they were opposed. Commander Stassen expressed the view that if the Delegation wanted he could maintain the present wording by voting down the opposition groups. Mr. Kane thought that there was no harm in offering the Arabs the explanatory wording in the second part of the paragraph. Commander Stassen asked Mr. Kane whether he would be satisfied by the substitution of the words “may be” for “are”. Mr. Kane declared that he was still not satisfied with the “until” clause. Commander Stassen declared that he would be willing to reiterate in public statements that nothing specific was intended by the present wording. Mr. Kane expressed his agreement with this course of action but he declared that he was still afraid of the implications of the clause under discussion. Commander Stassen declared that, in view of the difficulties he would not close the discussion in Committee II/4 that afternoon. This would give the Delegation more time to study it. Mr. Hackworth asked whether the double reference to time might not cause difficulty. Commander Stassen replied this might prove to be an obstacle but he declared no vote would be taken on the paragraph that day and the Delegation could study it over night.

The third problem with respect to the Trusteeship Chapter arose in paragraph b, 2. The words “self determination” suggested by the Russians had proved objectionable to the British and French. They had countered with the proposal that the words “in accord with the freely expressed will of the people” be adopted. Senator Connally thought that either wording would weaken the position of the United States, but Commander Stassen thought that this country was protected adequately by the reference to the trusteeship arrangements. Commander Stassen declared that he would recommend getting the British and French to accept any wording which would suit the Russians. Senator Connally thought that to accept “the principle of self determination” in any form would be to invite trouble. Admiral Hepburn remarked that the Chinese had proposed an acceptable solution that “self determination” be established on an equal basis with independent and self-government as a third alternative.

Commander Stassen thought that he was faced with a situation where the Soviet Delegation had been given alternative wordings beyond which they would not have power to go. Commander Stassen thought that it would be necessary to accept some of the Russian language. The United States could not really place itself in a position of denying the principle of “self determination”, but that should not be the primary consideration. Commander Stassen thought it would be necessary to hedge it in. Senator Connally thought that the Delegation was agreed with Commander Stassen’s position providing that Commander Stassen was certain that it would be necessary. Commander Stassen replied that in his view it was essential to accept some modification in order to gain acceptance for the paragraph.

Mr. Dunn asked a procedural question. He asked whether the Russians had consulted with the other major powers before submitting their last proposal.³⁹ Commander Stassen replied that they had, and that he had made certain to “nail down” the obligation to consult among the Big Five.

Mr. Taussig reopened discussion of paragraph 5 and suggested that an attempt be made to return to the original wording “except as may be agreed upon …” Mr. Taussig asked whether there was any indication of opposition to this wording. Commander Stassen declared that it had been urged in Committee II/4 that this beginning did not have enough force to overcome the later wording and thus had the implication of freezing the existing situation.

. . . . . . .

The meeting was adjourned at 11:52 a.m.

12. See minutes of the 59th meeting of the United States delegation, May 31, p. 989. For recent Committee action on the question of Deputy Secretaries General, see Doc. 574, I/2/39, May 25; Doc. 627, I/2/44, May 26; and WD 34, I/2/40, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, pp. 106, 132, and 134, respectively.
13. See minutes of the 58th meeting of the United States delegation, May 30, p. 974.
14. Doc. 704, III/3/36, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 400.
15. For a list of questions of principle involved in proposed amendments relating to chapter V, B, 6, see Doc. 416, II/2/A/3, May 18, ibid., vol. 9, p. 346.
16. Doc. 686, II/2/34, May 30, ibid., p. 109.
17. Doc. 707, II/2/26, May 31, ibid., p. 115.
18. U.S. Doc. Und. 53 not printed; see Doc. 677, II/2/B/9, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 9, p. 416.
19. Doc. 699, II/3/40, May 30, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 139.
20. Doc. 589, II/3/29, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 77; the Greek representative presented a proposal to Subcommittee II/3/A on May 31 that provision be made in the Charter for establishing a Technical Commission to deal with reconstruction and for the Conference adopting a declaration on the importance of reconstruction problems (US II/3/A Doc. 12, May 31, not printed).
21. Doc. 747, II/3/46, June 2, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 161.
22. See Doc. 683, I/2/48, May 29, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 154; discussion of chapter XI in that Committee was postponed after that meeting as it was in the Subcommittee after the May 31 meeting.
23. Doc. 732, I/2/50, June 1, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 161.
24. Doc. 574, I/2/39, May 25, ibid., pp. 106–107.
25. Doc. 704, III/3/36, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, pp. 403–404.
26. Canadian draft, presented at the second meeting of Subcommittee III/3/A, May 31, 3:38 p.m., not printed (US III/3/A, Doc. 2, June 1).
27. Doc. 704, III/3/36, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 403.
28. Neither draft printed; see minutes of tenth Five-Power meeting, May 29, 11 a.m., p. 968, and of eleventh meeting, June 1, 9 p.m., p. 1071; also, minutes of meetings of the United States delegation, May 23, 9 a.m., p. 849, and May 31, 9:02 a.m., p. 989.
30. Brackets appear in the original.
31. The Allied Advisory Council for Italy was established in conjunction with the Allied Control Commission for Italy in accordance with an agreement reached at the Moscow Conference in October 1943; its membership included Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The first meeting of the Council was held at Algiers on November 30, 1943. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vols. i and ii , index entries under Italy.
33. See minutes of the tenth Five-Power meeting, May 29, 11 a.m., p. 968.
34. Brackets appear in the original.
35. Doc. 677, II/2/B/9, May 29, and Doc. 707, II/2/36, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 9, pp. 416 and 115, respectively.
36. Doc. 712, II/4/30, May 31, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 499.
37. Doc. 580, II/4/24, May 26, ibid., pp. 486–487.
39. See minutes of the May 29 meeting of the United States delegation, p. 954.