Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 10

Minutes of the Tenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, May 29, 1945, 11 a.m.

San Francisco, May 29, 1945, 11 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (16); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (3); China (3); and France (5); and the International Secretariat (1).]

The Secretary of State opened the meeting at 11:10 a.m., stating that it had been called to consider the French modification of the Four-Power amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2.⁶⁸ However, before taking up the main business of the meeting he desired to take up a problem affecting the work of the Conference. Although the end of committee work by Saturday night had been set as a target, the proceedings were dragging in the committees and action to speed them up was necessary. It was a mistake to think that the fault was entirely with the middle or small powers. Some of the responsibility for the delay was with the big powers, since several of the technical committees were waiting for them to speak. There was need for a frank discussion of the problem. Perhaps a deadline could be established for committee work and if it was not completed in time, all unfinished work would go direct to the Steering Committee. A suggestion along this line could come from a middle or small country. However, for this to be done it was necessary first to discuss when the delegations represented at this meeting could end their discussion on major pending problems.

Lord Halifax said he had not had time to think the matter through but was wondering to what extent the delay was due to the five powers or to the committees. Also he doubted that the transfer of the work to the Steering Committee would expedite matters since it would create a bottle-neck and a concentration of the work in that Committee which could very well outweigh the advantage of a good chairman. Mr. Paul-Boncour agreed with the Chairman but also with Lord Halifax. He thought that the responsibility for delay lay both in the Five Powers and in dilatory tactics in the committees.

At the request of the Chairman, Mr. Hiss reported that the work of seven out of the twelve committees was being held up by discussions among the Big Five. This was true of all four committees of Commission III; a decision taken by II/1had been reopened at the request of the United States; the work of 1/2 was delayed because of procedural discussions opened by the Five Powers. Mr. Hiss recommended that the latter agree with the Chairman of Committee 1/2 on issues which could come to a vote. If the issues were lost then the matter could be referred to the Steering Committee. Mr. Hiss thought that an agreement could be reached today, perhaps after the meeting, on the questions which could be voted upon arid mentioned specifically expulsion and the Secretary General and the Deputies. Lord Halifax thought that none of the Five Powers were responsible for the delay in 1/2 but that nevertheless he Would impress on the British representatives on that Committee to get in touch with the representatives of the other great powers so that the work could be expedited.

Mr. Hiss continued with his summary of the status of committee work. He said that Committee II/3 was bogged down because of a United States effort to change a decision on full employment and that of II/4 was held up by consultations among the Big Five in respect to several trusteeship issues. Lord Halifax said that in this Committee there was a clear road except for waiting to hear from the Russian Government on certain questions and also because of points raised by the Delegation of Iran [Iraq]. The Chairman said that Commander Stassen had reported good progress and that he expected considerable accomplishment at today’s meeting.

Mr. Hiss continued saying that Five Power consultations were holding up the work of all four committees of Commission III. Senator Connally referred to the discussions on the voting formula in III/1 and The Chair said that here the Conference was waiting to hear from the Russian Government. Ambassador Gromyko said that there were also certain discussions with the United States Government and Lord Halifax recalled that the voting formula had been remitted to the Committee of Experts, which had agreed on a recommendation and that we were merely now waiting for confirmation from the governments. He said that the Government of Great Britain was prepared to approve the recommendation of the experts and that he understood that the American Delegation was in the same position. Ambassador Gromyko said that he was ready to discuss whether a given question should be procedural or not but was waiting for instructions on the recommendation with respect to question 19. (This was a reference to the recommendation in the Draft II of May 28.⁶⁹)

Senator Connally said that there was no inclination to change the Yalta formula with respect to action. The only issue was whether the submission of a complaint brought by any state before the Security Council should be subject to the veto. That was the limit of the proposed recommendation of the Committee of Five. He saw no reason why any state should be deprived of the opportunity of submitting a complaint and discussing it since any action would require unanimity among the permanent members. This did not involve any real change in Yalta. He thought the Five Powers would be outvoted if they insisted on any other interpretation of the Yalta formula. He did not feel that a real concession was being made and looked upon the recommendation of the Committee of Experts as a simple clarification. The Chairman agreed that the recommendation involved no real change in the Yalta formula.

(At this point The Chair declared a brief recess to permit photographers to take still pictures of the meeting.)

Ambassador Gromyko inquired if the United States was ready to vote on the decision of whether an issue is procedural or substantive. He said that at the last meeting the Delegation was not ready to take a position. Sir Alexander Cadogan remarked that he understood the officials were ready to vote on the whole problem; that the issue raised by Ambassador Gromyko is part of the whole agreement; that it is not possible to proceed until the Russian Delegation hears from Moscow. He stressed that the two questions raised in the document II of May 28 are tied together.

At the Chairman’s request Mr. Pasvolsky made a statement in which he said that the Committee of Experts had agreed Sunday on a new draft of paragraph 3 in the document dated May 28. It also worked out a statement to take care of possible specific questions as well as a statement on question 19. After reading the first two paragraphs of Document II of May 28, Mr. Pasvolsky said that this was an attempt to segregate out the issues on which the procedural vote would apply as against those requiring a qualified vote. He thought that an additional statement as in paragraph 2 of the document would take care of situations which might arise in so far as they could not be foreseen. The United States Delegation was prepared to accept this solution with [the] understanding that the question raised in the first part of the document can be worked out satisfactorily. Under this approach, there would be a statement in the text of the Charter on the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council specified in the Charter and a statement on the procedure to be followed in the future to determine whether or not a given question should be treated as procedural or substantive. He did not see in this any departure from the Yalta formula and considered it a simple way of dealing with the problem. Ambassador Koo understood that the Five Powers would approve the three documents as a unit.

Ambassador Gromyko agreed with the desired speeding up of the work of the Conference but not if it was going to impair the quality of the work. He thought that the transfer of some of the work of the technical committees to the Steering Committee would create additional difficulties. He thought perhaps other devices could be used to expedite the work, such as the strict application of the decisions of the Steering Committee with respect to parliamentary procedure, particularly on the length of speeches. He mentioned examples of the “chaos” brought about in some of the committees through a complete disregard of these rules.

The Chair agreed with Ambassador Gromyko and recalled that the Five Powers had previously discussed this question in great detail and that it had been agreed that the Secretary General would take the necessary measures to see that the rules were applied. He thought, however, that the issue before the present meeting was as to the time the Five Powers should take to adopt decisions. Ambassador Gromyko thought that in the long run time would be saved if the Five Powers first reached complete agreement on principal points. The Chair inquired as to how much time this should take. Ambassador Gromyko did not know.

The Chair stated that the Five Powers would consequently wait to be notified by the Russian Delegation when it had heard from Moscow, and that the meeting would now take up the question raised by the French Delegation.

Mr. Paul-Boncour said that the French Delegation had accepted the Four-Power amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraphs before the United States formula on collective self-defense had been approved.⁷⁰ He thought the latter formula satisfied those who wish regional action in emergency situations before the Security Council had had an opportunity to take a decision. With respect to action under mutual assistance treaties, France wanted it understood that the parties to such treaties could take preventive action as well as the repressive action covered by the United States formula.

Lord Halifax accepted the French text subject to minor points of drafting which he did not believe would cause difficulties. Ambassador Gromyko said that the French amendment was acceptable to the Russian Delegation. He thought it was a good draft and saw no reason for changes of style. He specifically considered that the final sentence of the French proposal was an improvement over the previous amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky said that a draft containing the old and new language was available. Lord Halifax inquired as to which text the Soviet Delegation approved and Ambassador Gromyko replied that the Russian Delegation approved the text as distributed with the exception of the second “enforcement” in the latter part of the second sentence.

At this point a typewritten text brought to the meeting by the French Delegation was read.^* Since this draft differed from the mimeographed draft of the May 23rd prepared by the American Delegation, the question was raised as to which of the two drafts was approved by the Russian Delegation. Ambassador Gromyko made it clear that he approved the mimeographed draft of May 23rd without the second “enforcement” in the second sentence.

Senator Vandenberg inquired if the Soviet objective would not be fully covered by the substitution of the word “request” for the word “consent” in the original Four-Power amendment. Ambassador Gromyko said that the Russian Delegation preferred the French formula and Senator Vandenberg explained that the United States Delegation was reluctant to change the original Four-Power amendment; that it sympathizes with the French desire, if this can be achieved without opening the language to substantive changes, and again inquired if France would be satisfied with the one change he had suggested. Mr. Paul-Boncour insisted that the French Delegation desired to have it clearly brought out that preventive action without order authorization of the Security Council is permissible under treaties of mutual assistance, particularly since the United States formula on collective self-defense covers only repression of aggression. Lord Halifax was not clear as to the manner in which the original Four-Power amendment fails to give satisfaction to the French. He thought that the French idea of prevention was implicit in the original text. Ambassador Koo agreed with this view and agreed also with the French Delegate that the concept of collective self-defense applies only to armed attack. He supported Senator Vandenberg in thinking that the change he suggested should satisfy the French Delegation since it made it clear that termination of automatic action Under the treaties would be left entirely to the decision of the parties to the said treaties.

Mr. Paul-Boncour insisted on the explicit inclusion of the idea of preventive action and thought perhaps the text might be further improved by beginning with that idea; with some such language as “The Security Council each time it has to prevent aggression”, et cetera.; Ambassador Koo thought that the translation of the French “prevenir” as “prevention of further aggression” might meet the French idea. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that the idea was to prevent an act of aggression, not to prevent further aggression and Senator Vandenberg suggested that in that case the word “further” could be dropped. Mr. Paul-Boncour inquired why, if there was agreement that the text applies to the prevention of aggression, there was objection to the French proposal; there was no apparent disagreement on substance. Lord Halifax saw little or no difference in the two drafts and stated that the Delegation of the United Kingdom would accept either the original Four-Power amendment or the French proposal as read by the Russian Ambassador provided Senator Vandenberg would yield on the one change he had suggested. Senator Vandenberg said that on this question the Delegation of the United States would have to be consulted as a whole since it was opposed to any major language change. He thought that the original text with the change of the one word would meet everything desired by the French. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that he could not accept the suggestion since he was bound by the instructions of his Government and Ambassador Gromyko insisted that the Russian Delegation considered the French language much better. Ambassador Koo expressed a preference for Senator Vandenberg’s proposal and Senator Vandenberg suggested that the French Delegation might wish to inquire of its Government whether the proposed change was acceptable. The Chair thereupon inquired if Russia would accept Senator Vandenberg’s proposed change, if this was agreeable to the French, since the change was already accepted by the other three powers. Mr. Paul-Boncour thought the French Government would stand by its original proposal and The Chair inquired why he anticipated this attitude since the French were in fact receiving everything they requested except for the one small change.

The Russian Delegate Sobolev explained that the question in the Committee of Five had beeen whether the alliance treaties would disappear after the Organization takes over. He said that the new French text makes it clear that regional arrangements, in this case the mutual alliance treaties, will continue after that event if the parties to the treaties so desired and that the only change would be the termination of the automatic phase.

The Chairman appealed for a spirit of tolerance and stressed that the Delegates should not permit their minds to freeze on this issue. He stressed that he felt sure that a new language could be worked out if either of the two texts were not acceptable. Mr. Paul-Boncour declared that the French Delegation was moved by a sincere desire to agree on an acceptable text but that it felt bound by its instructions. The Chair suggested that he impress upon the French Government that the Delegation should be permitted some flexibility so that a satisfactory solution could be worked out on a give-and-take basis.

The meeeting was adjourned at 1:00 o’clock.

68. Proposed change in Sponsoring Governments’ amendment to chapter VIII, section C, paragraph 2 (U.S. Gen. 167) not printed; this text was prepared in the 18th meeting of the Five-Power Deputies, May 23.
69. Not printed.
70. Doc. 576, III/4/9, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, p. 680.
71. The draft referred to was another English translation from the French, May 23, 1945 draft. There were actually no substantive but only translation differences. [Footnote in the original.]