Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 53

Minutes of the Fifty-Third Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Friday, May 25, 1945, 9:05 a.m.

San Francisco, May 25, 1945, 9:05 a.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (36) present at meeting.]

It was announced that the Secretary had returned from Washington and would join the Delegation later. In his absence Senator Connally called the meeting to order at 9:05 a.m.

Yalta Voting Formula

The Chairman announced that Mr. Pasvolsky had requested an executive session to consider a proposed 4-Power statement interpreting the Yalta voting formula. However, Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that it would not be necessary to ask anyone to leave the meeting, and Senator Connally declared that all members present would be permitted to remain but that the meeting should be considered an executive session nonetheless.

Mr. Pasvolsky reported that it would be necessary for the Delegation to consider this draft statement for possible presentation by the Big Four. At this point, Miss Fosdick distributed the draft statement of May 25, 1945 to the members of the Delegation.⁹²

Senator Connally inquired whether the Delegation had ever taken a position on the voting arrangements. [At this time, 9:08 a.m., Secretary Stettinius and Senator Vandenberg arrived amid general applause.]⁹³

Mr. Pasvolsky replied to Senator Connally’s question, that the delegation had decided to stand on the Yalta agreement.

Secretary Stettinius announced that he would not take the chair because he would have to leave shortly to make a phone call to Washington. He indicated that he would report to the Delegation on his conversations in Washington with the President and Mr. Hull. He asked who was scheduled to attend the Big Five meeting and Mr. Baynor replied that Senators Connally and Vandenberg, Commander Stassen, Dean Gildersleeve and some of the advisers would attend the meeting. The Secretary asked what the subject for discussion was to be and Mr. Dunn replied that the British wanted to discuss the relation of various international organizations to thp world organization with specific reference to the place of the I.L.O. in the world picture. Senator Connally remarked that he had had a telegram on this subject from Senator Elbert Thomas.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Mr. Sandifer read through the proposed Big Four statement and asked that comments be reserved until the end. Mr. Sandifer read the document, paragraph by paragraph, and upon his conclusion Senator Vandenberg remarked that the document was “the ablest possible defense for an indefensible” situation, and Representative Eaton agreed that Mr. Pasvolsky had done a fine job. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that it had been a joint undertaking. The British had written part of the document. The French had asked that this be a 4-Power document since they were embarrassed at having to reverse their decision, but Mr. Pasvolsky declared the French would support this statement. The Committee had worked until one o’clock this morning, with Mr. Armstrong and Dr. Bowman present, as well as other people from time to time, including Gladwyn Jebb of the British Delegation.

Commander Stassen remarked that in order to maintain consistency with this document it would be logical to withdraw the exception established concerning the power of parties to a dispute to veto Section A. Mr. Dulles agreed and said this was especially true in view of the phraseology appearing in the last sentence on Page 2 where it was declared that “it would be absurd for some dispute—not only affecting the peace and security of the world in general, but also of direct interest to one of the five members having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security—to be dealt with without regard to, or even over the objection of, that member.” If this were true, he asked, why should a permanent member, party to a dispute, not have a veto over Section A as well as Section B? Commander Stassen remarked that this exception to the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council had been the chief interest of President Roosevelt and that the phraseology in this statement was a ridiculous contradiction.

Secretary Stettinius asked Mr. Pasvolsky whether he had reported to the Delegation on his talk with Ambassador Gromyko which Mr. Pasvolsky was to have had shortly after the Secretary left for Washington. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that this paper represented the view of the Russian Delegation. Secretary Stettinius asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Russians would support this paper and Commander Stassen interjected that the Russians undoubtedly would support it “enthusiastically”.

Mr. Pasvolsky conceded that Mr. Dulles’ point was a good one but Mr. Pasvolsky did not think there was an inconsistency involved. Obviously, he said, a power involved in a dispute should not be allowed to vote on questions involving the initial stages of the Organization’s handling of the matter. If a state is not involved in a dispute initially the problem is whether it could accept a situation where it might be involved in the dispute against its consent.

Commander Stassen pointed out that this statement involved the position that Sections A and B of Chapter VIII were inseparable, whereas the President had succeeded at Yalta in separating the two parts of the Chapter. Mr. Dulles agreed with Commander Stassen that this draft had the effect of reuniting the two sections. Commander Stassen went on to point out that the draft said in effect that the Organization should never take action on a dispute unless the states members were willing eventually to use force. This was not necessarily so because it would be possible for all the states concerned to recommend unanimously that a dispute be settled by judicial means but he declared it would be impossible to guarantee unanimity all the way through the various stages leading up to the use of force. This he declared was a brilliantly conceived statement but it served only to emphasize the impossibility of the United States’ position in defending the Yalta voting arrangements.

Senator Connally asked what course of action the United States could take—would it be possible to change the Yalta agreement? Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the United States could take any position it desired. Commander Stassen suggested that we attempt to accept the position taken by Sir Alexander Cadogan that peaceful settlement be made a procedural matter. Senator Connally declared that the United States Delegation had not been in unanimous agreement as to the advisability of this course. Mr. Dulles inquired whether the Delegation wanted the United States to be placed in the position of having to use force without having adequate opportunity to examine the possibilities and make its own choice. Mr. Dulles thought that this was a bad paper because it was an attempt to justify logically something which was logically indefensible. He went on to suggest that any statement made should emphasize the chronological sequence whereby unanimity had been required under the League of Nations and progress had been made in the Charter of the proposed organization although perfection had not yet been reached. Mr. Dulles was strongly opposed to any attempt to justify the existing formula logically in this draft statement. He said even the initiation of an investigation by the Organization would seem to obligate all the parties to go all the way to the end process, the use of force. Senator Vandenberg remarked that it was like the person who would not go to a doctor unless he was ready for the undertaker.

Commander Stassen maintained that there was great benefit to be derived from getting at all the facts in a situation. It was necessary, he said, to get the facts out first, after which each nation could decide for itself whether it wanted to take further action. At this point, Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that through inadvertence a phrase had been left out of the sentence referred to by Mr. Dulles previously. After the last word of the sentence as it appeared, should be added: “unless it is itself a party to a dispute.” Senator Vandenberg declared that although this met part of Mr. Dulles’ objection it did not improve the logic of the entire statement.

Senator Connally declared that emphasis should be laid on the fact that this provision for unanimity among the great powers in the imposition of force went beyond the requirements of the League of Nations for complete unanimity. Mr. Dulles remarked that there was no reason to consider the Organization from the hypothesis that the permanent members were going to exercise their veto power arbitrarily. Mr. Dulles observed that it would be morally indefensible for any state in a minority of one to block investigation of a dispute by the United Nations. He did not think this was likely to occur but he said we must not give a state good grounds for blocking an investigation. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that the proposed statement would do exactly that for the implication was there that the moment the members of the Organization voted to investigate a situation they would accept a moral obligation to follow the matter through and fight. Mr. Dulles said we should attempt to disassociate peaceful procedures for handling a dispute from the use of force. We should, he thought, establish a moral obligation on the part of the members of the Organization to get at the facts in any situation likely to lead to dispute. Senator Connally remarked that in all probability unless a very unusual situation arose no state would take on itself the responsibility for blocking investigation by the Organization. Mr. Dulles agreed that this was true unless the statement under consideration were to be adopted. Senator Connally declared that he was on the Committee dealing with this problem and Wanted to reflect the calm decision of the Delegation. Representative Bloom declared that he wanted additional information from Mr. Pasvolsky on the points that Mr. Dulles had made and Senator Connally asked Mr. Pasvolsky to elaborate.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he could imagine a situation where a permanent member of the Security Council might, for legitimate reasons of its own, want to block an investigation by the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky could also imagine a ten to one vote against that power. Imagine the position of that power, he asked the Delegation. The pressure not to use the veto power lightly, he thought, would be increased by the proposition under consideration. Moral pressure—the isolation of a great power unless it was prepared to make adequate explanation for its position—was thought by Mr. Pasvolsky to be the most effective force in the hands of the Organization. This, he declared, was not an original argument but was first presented by a distinguished South American diplomat. Mr. Pasvolsky went on to say that the Delegation must also consider the possibility of the Security Council being forced into action against the desires of the permanent members of the Council by a group of smaller states whose responsibilities would not be nearly so large as the responsibilities of the permanent members. There was, he declared, one integrated function of maintaining peace, despite the fact that this could be carried out by a series of steps each seeming innocuous in itself. Each step, he declared, could be brushed aside by the interested powers until the procedure had advanced beyond the stage where it involved no responsibility to use force. Furthermore, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, a distinction must be drawn between states parties to a dispute, and those not parties. A party to a dispute he declared must accept a different position from all other states, even if the world as a whole was not ready for coercive action. Such a state should be prepared to face the moral opprobrium of the world as a whole. However, if not a party to a dispute a state should not be forced to face this pressure and should be free to make its decisions according to its interests.

Mr. Eaton asked what the situation would be if two great powers became parties to a dispute since neither would be able to vote on the action of the Organization. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that one of the fundamental premises of the Organization was that the great powers would have to remain in substantial agreement if the Organization were not to break down completely. Senator Vandenberg asked how a state having a permanent seat could be exposed to the moral conscience of the world? Mr. Pasvolsky replied that a state which was in the wrong could not prevent a vote from being taken. In such a case a statistical vote could be as important as a formal motion. The purpose of a vote he declared was not so much to expose a state to the moral pressure of the world, which could be accomplished in other ways, but rather to determine whether the states members of the Organization were willing to accept their responsibilities. This was the basis on which the entire Organization had been founded. If some of the attention which had been devoted to the question of voting arrangements had been devoted to other aspects of the question the situation might have been different. As it was, Mr. Pasvolsky declared, we were lost in an argument which was not as important as those considerations which had not received so much attention. This statement he declared attempted to bring into the open some of the relationships involved and presented both sides of the question.

Mr. Rockefeller remarked that he was interested in what Mr. Pasvolsky had said and he thought that Mr. Pasvolsky got down to a rather basic question. The essence of the Organization was force he said but the experience of recent years had proved that military force is only one phase in a dispute. If we intend to maintain peace and security we cannot place our reliance on military force. Aggression could occur by means of penetration in various forms. These matters he thought could be best dealt with by investigation and peaceful settlement in various forms. This he thought was an unsound paper and Mr. Rockefeller added that in his opinion the President had made a brilliant distinction at Yalta in separating peaceful methods of settlement from the use of force.

Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he wanted to say a few words in defense of President Roosevelt. The President he declared had taken the view at Yalta that a party to a dispute should not vote on matters covered by Section A of Chapter VIII. He realized that it would have been logical to prevent parties to a dispute from voting on any matters connected with the dispute. However, President Roosevelt had been forced to draw this distinction between Sections A and B because he was aware that no country would have accepted any greater restriction on the right to vote on parties to disputes. The United States, Mr. Pasvolsky said, would not have accepted a greater restriction but, he went on, the President had it clear in his mind that the only point at issue was whether a party to a dispute should have a vote only in Section B or throughout the Chapter. It was a question of accepting the lesser of two evils. President Roosevelt however had never been in doubt as to the connection between the two sections of the Chapter. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that the Chinese representative had been greatly impressed by the way Commander Stassen had shown the continuity between the two sections. The procedure started in Section A, he said, could be stopped anywhere along the line but only at the risk of the Organization not carrying out its obligation. If we are going to build an organization different from the League of Nations we must understand the implications of each stage in the settlement of disputes. The distinction between the two sections was made only because it was possible to get the various parties concerned to agree on that solution.

Commander Stassen urged that arbitrary action by any permanent member would be harmful whether an organization were established or not. He did not think that arbitrary action should be justified in the Four-Power statement. A party to a dispute he declared must face the moral pressure of the world. A permanent member cannot avoid facing the moral force of humanity because of the restriction placed on the exercise of the veto power by parties to a dispute but one state could prevent other nations from undergoing the pressure of world public opinion. Commander Stassen made a plea that no state be exempted from this pressure.

Mr. Notter remarked that the discussion thus far had considered the problem as a whole but this was not the negotiating problem. The opposition he declared had been attacking veto power over Section A. The draft statement he thought had a fundamental weakness which showed up in Paragraph 5. In this paragraph, he said, the Council was injected into a dispute and a chain of circumstances was declared to follow. Mr. Notter thought the Security Council would already be involved and the chain of circumstances would follow only when the stage of investigation was reached. The Council is injected into a dispute when it hears the complaint of any party. It is only after an investigation has been conducted that the Security Council makes its first decision. The Organization would merely be establishing the facts of the situation up to and including the stage of investigation.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Pasvolsky was proceeding on the theory that it would be impossible to get a change in the Yalta formula. Mr. Pasvolsky said the Big Four powers were supporting Yalta on the basis outlined in the draft before the Delegation. He pointed out that China, the only country which had benefited by the use of the power of investigation under the League, was of the opinion that investigation was one of the most potent weapons the new Organization might have. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that he was forced to give great weight to their position. Furthermore, he declared, the Yalta formula was not being altered, it was merely being interpreted. The chief question was to determine which matters could be called procedural. Mr. Armstrong declared it was a question of getting half a loaf or no bread.

Mr. Rockefeller asked whether it was not true that the British had given an interpretation which the Delegation thought it might be able to accept. China and France he thought had eased themselves out and had apologized for having to support the formula as it existed. Mr. Dunn questioned this and Mr. Blaisdell remarked that Ambassador Koo did not speak directly on the point and had supported the existing formula without any specific reference to Section A. Senator Connally remarked that it had been obvious that some of Sir Alexander Cadogan’s associates did not agree with the position he had taken. Cadogan had agreed that under Section A, Paragraph 1, the veto would apply when it came to any definite action by the Organization. Mr. Blaisdell remarked that the crux of the situation lay in this paragraph. Did the Organization incur a duty or did it have discretion to investigate any dispute? If the Organization incurred a duty there was no need for a vote. However, Senator Connally expressed the view that the use of the word “empowered” implied discretion on the part of the Security Council.

At this point Mr. Dunn suggested that the situation might be clarified if the order of paragraphs were to be changed to establish a clear order of procedure. Under his rearrangement paragraph 2 of the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would come first with the addition of the words “for consideration and discussion”. The original paragraph 3 would follow. This paragraph provided that the parties to a dispute could choose the means of settlement. Greater obligation would be implied in the Four-Power amendment establishing a new paragraph 1 which according to Mr. Dunn’s plan would follow after the old paragraph 3. The new paragraph 1 empowered the Security Council to make recommendations to the parties to a dispute upon their request. The original paragraph 1 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would be next because it implied still greater obligation inasmuch as it empowered the Security Council to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction. A political decision would be necessary only at this point. Mr. Dunn urged that his proposal would not require any change in the proposals agreed upon among the four powers at Dumbarton Oaks but by rearranging the order of the paragraphs it would permit voluntary discussion of disputes without the imposition of any obligation. Mr. Wilcox remarked that in this new order everything up through paragraph 3 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would be exempted from the veto provision.

Mr. Dunn remarked that the phrase “call upon” in paragraph 3 was not of sufficient importance to merit unanimity. Senator Connally declared that the chief importance of paragraph 3 was the assumption of an obligation by the parties to any dispute. He observed that the adoption of the British amendment as it stands would meet the point at issue. Mr. Dunn however stated that paragraph 3 had already been adopted by the Big Four and suggested that it be placed in the third position under his rearrangement.

At this point Mr. Bloom stated that he would soon have to attend the meeting of Committee II/1 and he wondered whether the Delegation would care to interrupt this discussion to give him instructions. However it was agreed that it might be more profitable to continue on the question of voting and The Chairman asked if Mr. Pasvolsky would develop the issues more fully. He declared that in a meeting he had had with Mr. Pasvolsky the previous evening the latter had justified the Yalta agreement on the grounds that it was favorable to the United States. The right of veto, Mr. Pasvolsky had pointed out, was equally applicable to the United States. Commander Stassen replied that this was a logical argument not to have a Security Council at all. The argument was contradictory to the aims of the Organization. According to this position the Organization must not touch a dispute at all because its members might become involved in enforcement proceedings. The basis of the Organization, Commander Stassen thought, was that if you assumed jurisdiction over a dispute in its early stages it could best be handled without the use of force. The motto was “let the facts be known”. The lack of publicity for the facts and actual conditions during the Hitler regime had made possible his successful aggrandizement. Commander Stassen urged that since the agreement could not be justified the Delegation should go on record as stating that what we had achieved was as far as we were able to go. He urged that the United States not forfeit its moral situation in the eyes of the world and he added that he did not think the American public favored the maintenance of the unanimity rule with respect to Section A. In fact he thought the 90% of our public was opposed to this position. Representative Eaton said the same attitude would apply to investigation because it would make possible a situation where the use of force might be necessary. He declared that the alimentary canal was the only part of our citizenship that worked.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that since this was largely a military question the military representatives ought to express their views. Senator Vandenberg did not agree that this was essentially a military question; he thought that the Organization had been founded on the belief that the use of force was only a small part of procedures for the settlement of disputes. This paper he thought destroyed that concept. Representative Bloom agreed but thought that the military members of the committee should express their opinions anyhow. Admiral Hepburn stressed two points:

(1) it would be impossible to undertake enforcement action against a big power; and

(2) the security provisions were based on military action. If the Security Council is to be effective trust must be placed in the integrity of its members.

For these reasons he thought that the Yalta agreement was satisfactory as it stood and he would not favor trying to impose a provision for unanimity with respect to Section A.

General Embick declared that the existing power situation was such that a dispute among the Big Four would cause the Organization to break up. He thought the decision on the question of unanimity was a political matter and Senator Vandenberg agreed with him heartily. Commander Stassen asked if he was correct in summing up the military position to be that we must maintain the veto with respect to matters involving force and that anything beyond this was a matter for political decision.

Mr. Rockefeller said that he thought Mr. Dunn had touched on an interesting point in his discussion. In cases where non-military penetration was serious enough to give rise to trouble the individual parties might hesitate to place the question before the Security Council if they were not certain of the action the Council would take. Senator Connally said he did not see how the Security Council could decline to investigate. He thought that we must trust the discretion of the Council and must adopt the approach that unless the four or five big powers maintain unanimity the Organization would blow up. Admiral Hepburn declared that he wanted to emphasize that theory. If a dispute were laid before the Security Council and that body were earnest in its desire to maintain peace, no rule of unanimity could block the settlement of the dispute without the use of force.

Mr. Dulles declared that in his view any paper agreed upon by the Four Powers ought to be of such a nature as to make it more difficult for states to exercise a veto acting in self-interest. The line should be, he said, that it was impossible, in the existing state of the world, to advance beyond the position that had been achieved but he thought we should assure the small states that they had nothing to fear and to explain that it was not to be expected that the exercise of a veto would be the normal procedure. This paper, he reiterated, defends an indefensible system and justified the veto because the initiation of action might lead to war. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that it was to our interest to make it morally difficult for any nation to veto action in the earlier stages of the machinery established. Senator Connally asked whether it would not be possible to insert a paragraph in the document expressing the belief that the use of the veto power would not be frequent.

Mr. Armstrong asked Mr. Dulles whether he would eare to comment on Mr. Dunn’s suggestion for a rearrangement of the order of the paragraphs. Mr. Dulles replied that the rearrangement suggested would be beneficial because it would bring into clearer relief the steps that could be taken. He pointed out that if the veto power were to apply to paragraph 1 of Section A, the psychological effect would be such as to cause people to expect the veto power to apply throughout the Section.

Commander Stassen remarked that discussion of a dispute would certainly be permitted without the opportunity of veto. He asked whether this would include listening to the arguments of a party which made a complaint and Mr. Pasvolsky replied that all such matters would come under the category of procedural questions. One of the members of the Delegation remarked that the general impression was that this was not true and urged that Mr. Dunn’s suggestions be accepted in order to clarify the situation. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that this end might be accomplished by putting all questions not subject to the unanimity rule in a procedural section. Commander Stassen asked whether the action of the Security Council in calling on parties to settle disputes would be considered a procedural matter. Mr. Pasvolsky voiced the opinion that this was a debatable question and that there was a good argument for exempting it from the unanimity requirement.

Mr. Dunn remarked that this sentence in paragraph 3 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been the only Russian contribution to the Security section of the document. Mr. Pasvolsky declared that the committee of Five was in the process of attempting to define “procedure”. Commander Stassen urged that the sentence empowering the Security Council to call upon parties to settle their disputes did not involve the merits of any situation but merely focused the attention of the world. It should therefore be procedural and should occupy an early position in the rearranged version suggestion by Mr. Dunn.

Commander Stassen urged that the emphasis of the Delegation on the word “investigate” be dropped in view of the fact that this word seemed to raise doubts in the minds of some of the other governments. In the trusteeship Committee there had been a great deal of opposition to the use of this word. Nobody appeared to favor it except the United States. To the Russians he said it appeared to imply “liquidation”.

Senator Connally asked whether the other members of the Big Four took the position that a decision by the Security Council to “investigate” a dispute was an assumption of jurisdiction. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that since this was definitely a political step the answer was Yes. It involved a problem of choosing the appropriate time. The investigation of a dispute too early in its development might aggravate the situation. This was, he declared, an important decision.

Mr. Hackworth remarked that whether or not we could get the other parties to change their minds we were parties to several treaties, one with a good many of the Latin-American countries signed in 1923.⁹⁴ and another with Great Britain concerning Canada signed in 1929.⁹⁵ which provided for investigation and for the establishment of commissions for that purpose. Mr. Hackworth wanted to know whether the voting arrangements provided for in the Charter would interfere with the Inter-American agreements. He assumed not. He wondered, however, whether the Council could step in on a regional dispute. Mr. Hackworth also pointed out that we had permanent commissions in our domestic life for the purpose of investigation disputes as they arose. This all pointed, he declared, to the fact that we must bear in mind that the traditional policy of the United States has been to shed the light of day upon disputes. If we should have to submit to the position that any state can block an investigation should the United States make a statement to the effect that it favored, or at least was not opposed to, the right of the Organization to investigate any dispute? Mr. Hackworth agreed with other members of the committee that the American people would be disappointed if a provision were adopted which would allow any state to block investigation by the Organization and he voiced the opinion that thought should be given to the possibility of making some sort of statement establishing the United States’position.

Mr. Pasvolsky announced that there was soon to be a meeting of a sub-committee of the Big Five and he asked what his instructions were. Commander Stassen declared that the paper as presented was not acceptable to him. Mr. Pasvolsky asked what he was to do. Senator Connally asked whether it would be possible to change the word “empowered” in paragraph 1 of Section A and Commander Stassen remarked that the use of the word “authorized” had been under consideration because “empowered” was too big a word for this situation. Senator Connally asked whether paragraph 1 did not constitute a moral obligation to investigate each case of dispute.

Mr. Dulles said that he favored Mr. Dunn’s proposed rearrangement of the paragraphs in order to meet Mr. Hackworth’s objection. Commander Stassen suggested that the advisers to the Delegation prepare a statement of the proposed interpretation of the United States on the Yalta voting formula and also a draft of the new order of Section A as proposed by Mr. Dunn, for the purpose of negotiating with the other powers. Representative Eaton asked how the Delegation wanted to instruct Mr. Pasvolsky. Was it opposed to the statement, he asked? Dean Gildersleeve declared that the Delegation was opposed in its present form. Senator Connally seconded Commander Stassen’s motion for a draft of Mr. Dunn’s proposed rearrangement. Mr. Pasvolsky asked whether the Delegation wished the section on investigation to be exempted from the exception to the unanimity clause. Commander Stassen replied that he did not favor this and would support the adoption of any language in place of investigation.

Mr. Hickerson suggested the use of the phraseology on the order of “authorized to make a formal investigation”. Mr. Johnson urged something like “the Security Council shall discuss and consider any situation likely to endanger the peace and shall have authority to investigate …”

Mr. Dulles proposed “power independently to investigate the facts …”

Commander Stassen proposed that the advisers decide on this question and prepare suitable language and rearrangement order.

Mr. Armstrong suggested that it would be preferable to rearrange the existing provisions rather than change the wording and Commander Stassen agreed but insisted that “investigate” be replaced.

Representative Eaton declared that as a member of Congress he strongly favored the deletion of the word “investigate” because that was supposed to be a Congressional monopoly.

Senator Connally remarked that the only course available to Mr. Pasvolsky was to stall for time.

Full Employment

Dean Gildersleeve reported that in the meeting of Committee II/3 the previous day⁹⁷ she had withdrawn the United States amendment on full employment and had proposed entering in the formal record a statement of the United States’ position to the effect that this Government understood that the “domestic jurisdiction” clause was applicable to the section dealing with full employment. This proposal had been accepted unanimously by the Committee and had been roundly applauded.

Australian Amendment

Dean Gildersleeve reported that the wording of the Australian amendment to Chapter IX, Section A, paragraph 1 was still before Committee II/3 (see document US Gen 174⁹⁸). The Australian amendment read as follows:

“All members pledge themselves to take separate and joint action and to cooperate with the Organization and with each other to achieve these purposes.”

Dean Gildersleeve expressed the opinion that the other members of the Committee would not be inclined to accept the United States’ objection because of the action of this Government in holding up consideration of paragraph 1. Senator Connally indicated that he favored the Australian amendment. Commander Stassen praised Dean Gildersleeve for her work in the Committee and declared that Dean Gildersleeve had been put in a difficult situation by the numerous demands of the various members of the Committee. Commander Stassen declared that he was opposed to a pledge of this nature at this juncture and asked whether this wording was originally proposed as an Australian amendment or whether it had been added during the discussion in the Committee. Dean Gildersleeve replied that the amendment had been submitted originally. She herself preferred phraseology such as, “all members undertake to cooperate with each other and with the Organization to achieve these purposes.”

Commander Stassen voiced the opinion that this Committee should be “set back on its heels” because of the extreme position it had been taking. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that it was frightening to observe what the members of the Committee expected in the way of results. What actually would have to take years, she said, the Committee seemed to think would be accomplished in months. The Greeks, for example, seemed to feel that their internal reconstruction could be accomplished with the aid of the Organization in a very short time. She said this development was alarming and would be difficult to hold in check.

Relation of I.L.O. to Organization

Dean Gildersleeve indicated that the British had evidenced a desire to discuss the relation of the I.L.O. to the world organization at the Big Five meeting later in the day. Dean Gildersleeve said that she would attend that meeting. She reported that there were indications that the French wanted to have a statement read into the record of Committee II/3 going on record as favoring future educational cooperation and supporting a possible conference on this subject.⁹⁹ The Secretariat had ruled that such a statement would be in order. In view of this fact, Dean Gildersleeve asked whether the United States, could not make a statement of a similar nature on the subject of opium control. Senator Vandenberg agreed heartily with this suggestion. Dean Gildersleeve asked further whether the United States could not in this way state its support for future incorporation of the International Labor Organization into the World organization. Mr. Dulles remarked if we were to initiate a policy of making statements of this nature, the committees would be inundated by a flood of suck proposals. One of the members asked whether these statements would be made in plenary session and the reply was that the French declaration would be made in the Committee and our statement on opium as well. It was remarked that introduction of such measures in the plenary sessions could be controlled very easily. Commander Stassen remarked that the Chinese and Canadians had evidenced interest in a statement on opium. Mr. Dulles suggested that our statement indicate that the word “health” could be interpreted as including opium control.

Juridical Question

Mr. Hackworth asked if he could have the attention of the committee to consider a question which had arisen the previous day. The Egyptian Delegate, chairman of Committee IV/2,¹ had indicated that the Charter should not include a provision to eliminate treaties inconsistent with it but that a statement should be made that the Charter overrides all inconsistent obligations and obligating the parties to the Charter not to enter into such agreements in the future.² He supported this proposal by indicating that he thought it would have important moral consequences and cited the fact that Article XX of the Covenant of the League of Nations³ had included such a provision. Mr. Dulles asked who would decide whether an obligation was inconsistent with the terms of the Charter and Mr. Hackworth replied that that was a troublesome question. Mr. Dulles asked further whether anyone would have a veto over a treaty concluded. Mr. Hackworth said that there would eventually have to be a decision made with either the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the World Court, making the final decision. Senator Connally said that in his view such a statement would be unnecessary because all states are bound by the terms of the Charter and thus would be unable to adhere to an obligation inconsistent with it. Mr. Hackworth indicated that he was in agreement and maintained the view that the statement would not improve the situation at all. However, he remarked once again that the Egyptian Delegate had emphasized the moral value of such a declaration.

Senator Connally asked if there was any support for this position of the Egyptian Delegate and Mr. Hackworth replied that he did not know. Commander Stassen cautioned that careful study should be given to the Egyptian amendments because of the sudden intrusion into the limelight of the Arab League. At the previous night’s trusteeship Committee meeting⁴ for example, he said, representatives of the Arab League had introduced a number of amendments to the draft chapter “in the name of confusion” but there was really no confusion at all. It was, Commander Stassen declared, part of a careful scheme to exclude Jewish immigration into Palestine and to provide for other special Arab situations. Dean Gildersleeve remarked it would be very wise to get the Arab League “hitched to the United States” rather than to the Soviet Union and Senator Vandenberg remarked that they would have to get a rich uncle. Commander Stassen indicated that he had been aware of this necessity and that at the trusteeship meeting, after defeating the Arabs on four successive motions, he made a speech declaring that he was not opposed to the substance of the amendments but was opposed only to their consideration at that juncture. Commander Stassen remarked that all existing rights had been safeguarded and that the United States Delegation had opposed the Zionist proposals as well as the anti-Jewish Arab League amendments. Dean Gildersleeve commented that she understood that the Eussians were reputed to have told the Arab League that they had a formula which would solve the Palestinian problem.

Mr. Hackworth asked the Delegation what he should say to the Egyptian Delegate, Mr. Pasha [Badawi]. Senator Connally indicated opposition to the Egyptian proposals as did Commander Stassen and Representative Eaton. Dean Gildersleeve asked whether any definite wording had been proposed and Mr. Hackworth replied Pasha had suggested the wording of the League Covenant.

Dean Gildersleeve asked whether there was any objection to that and Mr. Hackworth replied that it did not appear to be necessary because it would not achieve any worthwhile results. However, Mr. Hackworth pointed out once more that Mr. Pasha had emphasized the moral value of such a statement. Dean Gildersleev agreed that it might have a moral effect but Mr. Hackworth declared that it would not make any difference.

The meeting was adjourned at 10:40 a.m.

92. Not printed.
93. Brackets; appear in the original.
94. For convention between the United States and Central American Republics for the establishment of international commissions of inquiry, signed at Washington February 7, 1923, see Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. i, p. 321; for treaty between the United States and other American Republics to avoid or prevent conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago, May 3, 1923, see ibid., p. 308.
95. Reference is apparently to a treaty between the United States and Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington, January 11, 1909; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 532.
97. Doc. 567, II/3/27, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 83.
98. Recommendations on Basic Issues, Committee II/3 (US Gen 174), not printed.
99. Doc. 579, II/3/28, May 25, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p.94.
1. Abdel Hamid Pasha Badawi.
2. Doc. 2, G/7(q) (1) May 5, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 463. Record of meeting of Subcommittee A of Commission IV, Committee 2, May 24, 10:47 a.m., not printed.
3. In this connection, see WD 165, IV/2/A/6, June 4, ibid., vol. 13, p. 805.
4. Doc. 580, II/4/24, May 26, UNCIO Documents, vol. 10, p. 485.