RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: U.S. Cr. Min. 39

Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Tuesday, May 15, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (31) present at meeting.]

The meeting was opened by the Secretary at 9:00 a.m.

Procedure for Establishing Position of Delegation on Major Issues

The Secretary announced that Mr. Pasvolsky had said that we must take a position in the Delegation on about thirty open questions.…

Mr. Dulles asked whether it would not be well for the Technical Experts to make a brief report to the Delegation with their recommendations which could then be discussed. Mr. Pasvolsky favored presenting arguments orally, particularly since he wanted to give the Delegation a survey of the arguments advanced in the meeting of the five. The Secretary asked that a memorandum be circulated in addition to oral comments. He hoped that it would be possible to go over all the material in the three scheduled meetings.

Continuation of Discussion of Regional Problem

The Secretary proposed a procedure for handling the regional question under which the Latin American Republics would receive:

The text of Chapter VIII, Section B, new paragraph 12 (US Und 10, May 15, 19455);
The text of the Proposed Redraft of Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 3 (US Und 11, May 15, 19456);
A proposal that “encourage” in Chapter VIII, Section C,7 be strengthened, with the technical advisers preparing an actual draft for recommendation to the Latin American governments; and
A statement by the President calling for a conference of foreign ministers of the Latin American countries, September or October next, [Page 720] for the negotiation of a treaty to give permanence to the undertakings of the Act of Chapultepec (Statement by President, May 15, 1945, US Und 128).

Mr. Bloom questioned whether with so many other treaties coming up it was wise to make a statement at this particular moment regarding the negotiation of a treaty to implement the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Dulles indicated that the problem was that the Latin American countries were not interested in any academic statement but were concerned to know whether we were going ahead with the negotiation of a treaty on a permanent basis. Mr. Bloom indicated that he had no objection to the basic idea but that he questioned the wisdom of bringing up at this time a matter still far in the future. Mr. Dulles stated that this statement by the President was relevant now. It was the price we had to pay for omitting reference to the Act of Chapultepec in the document. Mr. Rockefeller thought it might be possible simply to announce during the Conference that an Inter-American Conference would be held in the fall. The Secretary questioned whether this was the proper time to mention such a Conference. Senator Vandenberg stated that the truth of the matter was that the South Americans would not go home without mention of the Act of Chapultepec in the Charter or a statement that we would implement the Act of Chapultepec. Since we could not specifically mention the Act of Chapultepec in the Charter without becoming involved in the enumeration of other regional groups, including the Pan Arab League, and since this was impossible, the only answer was to go ahead with a promise to implement the Act of Chapultepec.

Mr. Bloom questioned why the matter had to be brought up during the Conference. Senator Vandenberg replied that it was necessary in order to have the Latin Americans come along. Mr. Bowman proposed that a statement might be made just at the close of the Conference.

Senator Vandenberg said he had gotten into the state of mind when he would like to see us quit rewriting every draft as a result of every little protest, establish our point of view and announce it. The Secretary commented that the position of the Delegation on the problem now before it had changed twice since he last saw the papers. Senator Vandenberg expressed disapproval at having meetings of Advisers called to revise drafts agreed to by the Delegation. The Secretary indicated that he was getting quite discouraged at the difficulties of reaching agreement on this question.

Senator Connally asked whether he could raise a point concerning the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section B, new paragraph 12. He [Page 721] questioned how this amendment should be handled in Committee 4 of Commission III where the Delegates worked along without dramatics, without color, without anything but sweat!

Mr. Pasvolsky proposed that since the subject was already under discussion in Committee 4 the discussion should continue there. A decision could be reached there that the best way to handle this question would be in Committee 3. A recommendation could then be passed by Committee 4 that this paragraph be added to Section B. If Committee 3 was satisfied with the language then they could recommend it for the Charter. If not satisfied, a joint subcommittee could be set up to iron out the differences.

The Secretary asked Mr. Rockefeller what had taken place in the discussion with Mr. Padilla after he had left. Mr. Rockefeller replied that he had not gone to the discussion, feeling that it would be more gracious for him to stay out of the way. He added, however, that the Latin American Ministers had indicated their agreement in general with the proposals made as long as something could be worked out that would preserve the best in the Inter-American System. On the other hand they did not wish to jeopardize the world organization. While not losing what is of value to us in this hemisphere they wished to act within the framework of the international organization.

The Secretary asked why Mr. Padilla had urged the change of the word “encourage” to “support”. The Secretary added that he had said this after the Secretary had pointed out the phrase “collective” would be interpreted to include action under the Act of Chapultepec and that this would be made clear in a Senate resolution. The Secretary indicated that it was most embarrassing to have the Latin Americans speak out the way they did. Mr. Rockefeller explained that the difficulty was that the Latin Americans felt that our promises might be carried out or they might not be carried out. They were concerned whether the Secretary was speaking for the President and whether he was voicing the foreign policy of this government. They had some doubt as to our sincerity.

The Secretary protested that of course the Secretary of State and the President could only speak for a limited time … Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the Latin Americans had faith in the last war but that we dropped them and left them out in the cold. This, he said, had created a bitter reaction which he felt had something to do with the growth in Latin America of sympathy with the German position.

The Secretary indicated that his reaction to an announcement of calling a meeting of the Latin American Republics four months from the end of the Conference was not good. He was afraid that such an announcement, if the Conference was still going on, would be an unpleasant [Page 722] shock, like pouring a bottle of cold water down everybody’s neck. The interpretation would be given to this announcement that we were calling a special conference for this hemisphere because we had no faith in the organization.

Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the Secretary might be going a bit far. We have always talked about integration of the Act of Chapultepec with the General Organization. We could not do this at Mexico City and we recognized there that final integration could only take place after the Conference here. He thought we could announce the conference in such a way that it would be clear that we were quite properly putting the finishing touches on the integration of the Western Hemisphere with the General Organization.

Mr. Rockefeller suggested that Mr. Padilla might write the Secretary a note prior to his departure from the Conference stating that the Secretary had agreed to calling such a Conference. The Secretary replied that our main problem was a political one to get the Charter through the Senate. He expressed fear that all this talk about hemispheric isolationism would build up a lack of trust in the world movement. In the last week he felt that emphasis had been taken off the world movement and directed towards hemispheric isolation. Lots of people were getting worried and at his last meeting with the Consultants the Secretary stated that there had been some very pointed statements. Mr. Rockefeller stated that he was only interested in promoting a policy that would be to the best interest of the United States. He was acting on the assumption that unless we operated with a solid group in this hemisphere we could not do what we wanted to do on the world front. The Secretary said he thought that some of us had lost our perspective and that we ought to be perfectly sure where we stood on this issue. It was significant he said to have Latin American representatives openly say that they had lost faith in the general organization, a statement made by the spokesman and backed up by at least two other speeches.

Senator Connally asked whether the Latin Americans would be reassured if they were promised that an invitation would be issued. Mr. Rockefeller thought the matter could be handled so as not to jeopardize the general organization and that this was the basic approach. The Secretary thought that some way should be worked out whereby invitations to the conference to implement the Act of Chapultepec could be issued after the Conference.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that we were now involved in details on the periphery of a basic problem. We want a solid hemisphere and we want an effective general organization. Our problem is to prevent the lesser from interfering with the effectiveness of the greater. He stated that the question of negotiating a permanent treaty on the basis of the Act of Chapultepec was one which President Truman [Page 723] would have to decide. When that decision was made then the secondary problem of timing could be considered. The problem was to be sure of our own policy. If we had an assured policy so that it was absolutely certain that ultimately we would support the negotiation of a treaty, then the fact that some Latin American representatives would have to go home somewhat uncertain as to how their people would react, would be unimportant. He proposed that in any event we should not go further from the standpoint of the Charter than the Vandenberg-Eden draft. On this we could take our stand while leaving the other problem to the President, it being one of highest national policy.

The Secretary reported that he would have to meet with the Latin American representatives at 2:30. He asked whether the Delegation was willing to adopt the suggestion in the memorandum to the President.9 Senator Vandenberg stated that he was in agreement with Mr. Stassen that the fundamental question of the future of Chapultepec was none of our business. He pointed out that the Latin Americans want to know whether, we are going to keep our promise in the Act of Chapultepec. This was not a question on which the Delegation could pass. It was up to the President of the United States as the chief foreign political [policy?] officer to decide.

Mr. Armstrong indicated that one way of handling the matter would be to hold a press conference at which proper questions were planted. In answer to these questions the Secretary could go on record that nothing in the Act of Chapultepec collided with the General Organization and that the implementation of the Act of Chapultepec would take place at a Conference in the near future.

Senator Vandenberg urged the Secretary personally to take charge of this whole matter as the first adviser to the President on foreign policy and to make plain our policy regarding the Act of Chapultepec. He felt it was time to stop quibbling and to make a decision. He urged that whatever we decided upon we then do without further delay.

Admiral Willson pointed out that there will be other arrangements to be made following the negotiation of the Charter. It might be possible to mention the Act of Chapultepec in conjunction with these other arrangements. Incidental mention could be made of the implemention of the Act of Chapultepec to carry out the purposes of the Organization. In this way he felt the curse could be taken off the emphasis on regionalism. Mr. Rockefeller thought this was a good idea.

Mr. Hackworth thought the curse could be taken off if it was said that the Charter contemplates regional organizations and agencies [Page 724] on the one hand and that the Act of Chapultepec on the other hand itself provides for integration with the General Organization. We could then say that a meeting would be called to bring the Act of Chapultepec into harmony with the General Organization. The Secretary thought there might be some value in the suggestion and asked the advice of General Embick. General Embick thought there was some value in this approach believing that what the Latin Americans wanted was to have a meeting at which a treaty could be prepared.

Senator Connally asked whether the Latin Americans would turn down our compromise altogether unless they had this assurance by the President. Senator Vandenberg replied in the negative indicating that they had not asked for this proposal. The Secretary indicated that he was not in favor of the draft memorandum as it stood. Mr. Rockefeller explained that when he had proposed the omission of reference to the Act of Chapultepec the necessity had been created of searching for an alternative to satisfy the Latin Americans. In looking for this alternative this memorandum had been worked out.

Senator Connally pointed out that the Charter envisages regional organizations that could have plenty of authority. The only thing is that enforcement action would have to be approved by the Security Council. Senator Vandenberg noted that the Latin Americans wanted to have a regional organization that could take enforcement action without approval. The Secretary stated that this was impossible.

Mr. Stassen moved the first three items of the Secretary’s recommendation, a, b, and c and urged that a vote be taken. The Secretary polled the Delegation and all agreed to the motion. Senator Vandenberg pointed out that these items alone would not work as we would have to provide the Latin Americans with something to go home with in the way of a word of assurance to their peoples.

Mr. Rockefeller stated that, once the policy was settled, he and Mr. Dunn would prepare and bring back to the Delegation a proposal to implement that policy.

The Secretary said he was opposed to the President proclaiming during the San Francisco Conference that a meeting of the hemisphere would be called. Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally agreed that this would overdo the matter and The Secretary pointed out that there was already a lot of damage to repair.

Senator Connally asked whether the Latin Americans really trusted us. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the language of the Act of Chapultepec to the effect that the governments of the American Republics should consider the conclusion of a treaty raised the question whether this Government was now favorable to or looked with disfavor on such a treaty. Mr. Rockefeller explained that the [Page 725] question was in the minds of the Latin Americans whether the changed circumstances since Mexico City have affected our decision. Doubt was raised in their mind by our position to exempt the European treaties directed against enemy states. Senator Connally advocated that we hold to our position.

The Secretary asked what had happened to account for the lack of faith of our Latin American friends in the General Organization. Mr. Rockefeller replied that he personally had stood for nothing but what was in the interest of the United States. He favored only what was to our interests. The Secretary asked whether he would also be willing to say that the world organization was a matter of primary interest to us. Mr. Rockefeller said he did believe that a world organization was essential for our interests. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Rockefeller could get our Southern friends to say this. Mr. Rockefeller replied in the affirmative noting that recently seven of those countries had voted against their own instructions.

Mr. Dunn explained that three events had affected the attitude of the Latin Americans; one, the decisions taken at Yalta, two, hard sledding with the Soviet Union after they got to the Conference and three, the special exemptions for European treaties. These events disturbed them and raised the question of our own confidence in the Inter-American System. Mr. Dunn felt that there was no question but what the Latin American representatives would prefer to have full faith in the General Organization.

The Secretary reported that Mr. Savage had just talked to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hull had expressed the opinion that if we cannot check the tendency towards regional and national self protection the international organization will gradually fade away. Senator Vandenberg pointed out that he had consistently stressed global unity. The Secretary added that he had done this also. Senator Vandenberg replied that it was more significant that he had done it since he was the “old isolationist”!

Mr. Hackworth asked for one moment to present his opinion. He suggested the possibility of having Mr. Padilla as President of the Mexican Conference10 write to the Secretary asking him how it was now intended to implement the provision in the Act of Chapultepec, that it should be integrated with the General Organization. He suggested that the Secretary could then reply to Mr. Padilla that we intend to carry out the policy agreed to, and accordingly, a conference would be called in the near future. Mr. Rockefeller thought this was not a bad idea and Senator Vandenberg and The Secretary indicated a favorable reaction.

[Page 726]

Provision for the Guarantee of Territorial Integrity

Miss Gildersleeve introduced the question whether the Delegation would agree to the inclusion in the Chapter on Principles of a statement regarding the preservation against external aggression of the territorial integrity and political independence of members. She pointed out that some such provision would mean an enormous amount to the small nations who want specific mention of this principle in order to feel more secure. She asked for instructions on our position, in view of the New Zealand amendment11 which was being heavily pushed. Mr. Notter pointed out that we were in a difficult spot. We interpret sovereign equality as embodying the principle of respect for territorial integrity. We consider the principle implicit so that it is difficult to answer the question why we object to spelling it out.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the Australian amendment12 to Paragraph 4 was not too bad on this point in as much as it did not involve a guarantee of territorial integrity. This amendment read: “All members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any member or state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

Senator Vandenberg was afraid that this principle in any form would result in the freezing of Russian boundaries achieved by conquest. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the Soviet Union was actually opposed to the inclusion of this principle. Mr. Dulles noted that the Soviet Union had not yet completed its conquests.

Dean Gildersleeve indicated that it was extremely difficult in the committee to take a firm stand against the demands of the smaller states in this matter. Mr. Notter pointed out that it might be well to develop a formula under which respect for external aggression against territorial integrity [would be safeguarded rather than territorial integrity]13 in general.

Dean Gildersleeve said she had a number of other items to raise including the question whether any reference should be made to respect for treaties or to an obligation on members to refrain from intervention, and the problem of enumerating human rights in the Charter. The Secretary asked whether decisions on the first question raised by Dean Gildersleeve could be held off. Mr. Notter suggested that it could be held off a day or two. Mr. Sandifer pointed out that at the meeting at four o’clock with the principal [Page 727] advisers and technical experts in Room 462,14 the questions raised by Miss Gildersleeve would be considered in order to bring recommendations on them to the Delegation.

Membership in the Organization

Mr. Eaton noted that Committee 1, Commission II15 had adopted the following draft texts on membership:

“Members of the Organization are the signatories of the Charter whose ratification has become effective in accordance with Chapter XI.”

“Membership of the Organization is open to all peace-loving states which in the judgment of the Organization are able and ready to accept and carry out the obligations contained in the Charter.”

Mr. Eaton pointed out that the problem was now up in the Subcommittee of II/1 whether there should be a withdrawal provision. He noted that it was the unanimous opinion of the members of the Subcommittee that members of the Organization should not have the right to withdraw. Mr. Sandifer noted that the United States was not represented on this Subcommittee. Mr. Eaton replied that our position was still reserved on this question.

The Secretary asked Mr. Sandifer whether we had not already made a decision in the Delegation on this question. Mr. Sandifer replied that we had not reached a final decision but had agreed that we would consider our position on the matter of withdrawal in connection with any proposal for withdrawal made at the Conference. He added that while no proposal for withdrawal had been made Uruguay had proposed an amendment under which no members of the Organization would be permitted to withdraw.16 Mr. Bloom pointed out that in fact a state withdrew if it defaulted on its contributions for two years and he thought this could be used as an argument against claims for a provision on withdrawal. Senator Vandenberg thought this was a poor substitute for withdrawal. Mr. Bloom said he was not proposing a substitute and that he did not favor withdrawal. Senator Vandenberg said he wanted a provision for withdrawal. It was agreed that further discussion of this matter would take place at the evening meeting.

New Zealand and Canadian Amendments of Enforcement Procedures

Mr. Hickerson pointed out that Mackenzie King had expressed the view that he could not return to Canada and secure the ratification of the Charter unless some sort of language was inserted by which [Page 728] states contributing forces to the Organization would be consulted when they were used. He noted that the British were sympathetic to this proposal and that Mr. Jebb had made a modified Canadian proposal17 which was before the Committee as Chapter VIII, Section B (US Gen 103). Senator Connally noted that the New Zealand amendment18 was now up, calling for Assembly approval by a majority vote of all Council decisions for enforcement except where urgency is indicated. Senator Vandenberg, The Secretary and Mr. Dunn suggested that this proposal should be voted down. Senator Connally thought it would be a bad thing to accept the Canadian proposal to invite states in as voting members of the Council. He was afraid this would disturb the balance of a Security Council of eleven members. Mr. Eaton pointed that the Canadian problem was a political one at home.

Senator Vandenberg suggested that each member state had control over the conditions under which it would supply forces by means of the agreement under which forces would be supplied. Mr. Hickerson thought it would be unsatisfactory to place a mandatory obligation upon the Security Council to invite in other states since this would greatly slow up the procedure. The Secretary suggested that if anyone providing facilities for enforcement action could also come in and ask for a vote the situation would shortly get out of hand. Senator Connally pointed out that this matter would be pressed by the Canadians. Mr. Hickerson noted that the only small country speaking on our side was Norway.19 He added that the vote would be taken today20 on the New Zealand amendment. The Secretary asked for the views of the Military Advisers. Mr. Gates indicated his opposition to the Canadian proposal as well as to the New Zealand proposal, as did General Embick.

Mr. Dulles said we should not altogether ignore Canada’s political problem and that we should not be too arbitrary in this matter. Senator Connally indicated that he had no objection to states that were contributing forces being called in for consultation but that he did oppose their being called in as members of the Council.

Admiral Willson commented that he had talked recently with a member of the Soviet Delegation who had reminded him that we had opposed the international police force on the grounds that our system would actually be more effective. Now the Soviet Delegate found, what he had suspected earlier, that our system was not going to be very effective and wondered whether we should not give power to an international police force. Mr. Dulles pointed out that in any [Page 729] event the main burden of enforcement action would presumably rest on the major powers. Mr. Armstrong noted, however, that we have emphasized the necessity of provision of forces and facilities by the smaller states.

The Secretary asked if any other Adviser wished to speak on this question. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that Canada had a good point in stressing that consultation was necessary in order to assure effective operations by the Military Staff Committee. He would suggest that we oppose the particular method brought forward by the Canadians for handling this problem, but that we search for some formula to help Mackenzie King in facing the Canadian people.

Senator Connally proposed that we vote against the Canadian proposal and consult further on a possible modification of it. Mr. Hickerson suggested that the question might well be referred to a subcommittee. Mr. Pasvolsky thought we should express sympathy for the idea of finding a formula that would satisfy the Canadians. Mr. Hickerson said he had already expressed this attitude to the Canadians. Mr. Pasvolsky thought it should be stated on the record in the Committee. The Secretary indicated that Mr. Hiss had assured him that no voting would take place in the committees that day on substantive subjects and, that he did not think this matter would come up for a vote. Mr. Stassen and Senator Vandenberg indicated that as far as they knew certain important matters were going to come up for a vote that day, after all.

Security Powers of the General Assembly

Senator Vandenberg indicated that a decision was imminent on the power of the General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Mr. Pasvolsky offered a proposed Redraft of Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 1, US Gen 104, May 15, 1945,21 worked out in the Subcommittee of Five. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that this draft was generally satisfactory to the British, the Chinese, the Russians and the French. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the first paragraph was divided into two and that, words proposed by one of the Latin countries had been adopted in the first paragraph. He thought on the whole, with the added last sentence, the draft was clearly improved. He thought the last sentence spelled out in clear language the right of the General Assembly to be informed on all matters before the Security Council. This sentence, he said, was proposed by the British. Senator Vandenberg thought the draft was splendid and suggested that he be allowed to introduce it in his Committee. Mr. Pasvolsky said it was important to assure endorsement of our position by the other powers when this draft was introduced. He said he would raise the question of final approval [Page 730] of the draft in the Committee of Five immediately after this meeting and let Senator Vandenberg know whether he could go ahead with the assurance of the endorsement of the other four powers. He assured Senator Vandenberg that he would inform him by one o’clock. General approval was given to the draft as proposed by Mr. Pasvolsky.

Voting Procedure in the Conference22

. . . . . . .

Draft Reply Concerning Freedom of Communication

Brief consideration was given to the adequacy of a Draft Reply to Letter of May 1 from Certain Publishers, Educators, Writers, and Churchmen Concerning Freedom of Communication, United States Gen 102.23.…

Pictures of the Delegation

. . . . . . .

The meeting was adjourned by the Secretary at 10:35 a.m.

  1. U.S. Und. 10, May 15, not printed; for text released to the press on May 20, see Department of State Bulletin, May 27, 1945, p. 950.
  2. U.S. Und. 11, May 15, not printed; reference is made to section A, paragraph 3 of chapter VIII; for text released to the press on May 20, see ibid., p. 949.
  3. For text of May 15 draft of chapter VIII, section C, paragraph 1, see minutes of meeting of the United States delegation, May 20, 12 noon, p. 813.
  4. U.S. Und. 12, not printed; for statement by the Secretary of State on this subject, which was released to the press in San Francisco on May 15, see Department of State Bulletin, May 20, 1945, p. 930.
  5. Draft memorandum for the President, May 8, not printed; for previous discussion, see minutes of meeting of United States delegation, May 8, 5 p.m., p. 641.
  6. Ezequiel Padilla, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, served as permanent President of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February 21–March 8, 1945.
  7. Doc. 2, G/14(f), May 2, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 486.
  8. Doc. 2, G/14(1), May 5, ibid., p. 543.
  9. Bracketed insertion on basis of draft report.
  10. No record of this meeting found in Department files.
  11. See summary report of sixth meeting of Committee I/2, May 14, 5:20 p.m., Doc. 314, I/2/17, May 15, UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 36.
  12. Doc. 2, G/7(a) (1), May 5, ibid., vol. 3, p. 36.
  13. Doc. 2, G/14(t), May 6, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, pp. 590–591; also Doc. 231, III/3/9, May 11, ibid., vol. 12, p. 297.
  14. Doc. 2, G/14(f), May 2, ibid., p. 488.
  15. Doc. 2, G/7 (n), (May 4, 1945), ibid., vol. 3, pp. 358 and 361.
  16. Doc. 355, III/3/17, May 16, ibid. vol. 12, p. 326.
  17. Not printed.
  18. With reference to memorandum on voting procedure, see Doc. 147, EX/8, May 8, UNCIO Documents, vol. 5, p. 430.
  19. U.S. Gen. 102, not printed.