RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five
Min 3 (Parts I and II)
Minutes of the Third Five-Power Informal Consultative
Meeting on Proposed Amendments (Part I),
Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 12, 1945,
2:30 p.m.
San Francisco, May 12, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
[Informal Notes]
[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of
delegations of the United States (12); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union
(4); France (3); and the International Secretariat (1).]
At the request to Mr. Stettinius,
Mr. Hiss
made a statement concerning the procedure of the Committees.
. . . . . . .
Mr. Stettinius
said that the main problem which the group had been assembled to
consider was that of regional arrangements. He said that the United
States Delegation had studied the amendment put forward by the French
and taking the French language as a basis they had drawn up a new draft.
The text of the French amendment referred to by Mr. Stettinius is as follows, and has been
put forward by the French as an amendment to Chapter VI, Section C,
Paragraph 1: “Should the Council not succeed in reaching a decision, the
members of the Organization reserve to themselves the right to act as
they may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and
justice”. (Doc. 2, g/7 (o)).83 He would hand the text of
the draft prepared by the United States Delegation to those present for
their confidential information.
He proceeded to read the text as follows which would be a new Paragraph
12 of Chapter VIII, Section B: “Should the Security Council not succeed
in preventing aggression, and should aggression occur by any state
against any member state, such member state possesses the inherent right
to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right to take such
measures for self-defense against armed attack shall also apply to
understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to
consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all of
them. The taking of such measures
[Page 692]
shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such
action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”
Ambassador Gromyko
inquired whether this affected the amendment to Chapter VIII,
Section C, Paragraph 2 jointly proposed by the four powers.84
Mr. Stettinius
said definitely that it was not intended to affect the
amendment.
Mr. Eden
immediately expressed an intense dislike for the draft. He said
that it was clearly of Latin American origin. It would result in
regionalism of the worst kind. The draft made him very unhappy and he
would be frank to say he did not like it a bit.
Ambassador Gromyko
said that he would like time to study the draft.
Ambassador Bonnet
inquired where it was proposed to put this provision. Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that it was intended to be a new paragraph in Chapter
VIII, Section B.
Mr. Eden
said that no one had been able to define aggression in thirty
years. He said that if such a provision as this were included in the
Charter he would not be able to sign it. It would make it a Latin
American document. He inquired what was wrong with the French amendment.
He could not see why the French amendment did not take care of the
situation with which the United States draft was intended to deal.
Senator Vandenberg
remarked that the British had brought forward an amendment
proposing a recognition of special treaties. Mr.
Eden
rejoined that these treaties were limited in time and scope and
that they were directed against preventing renewed aggression by the
enemy states.
Mr. Stettinius
asked that Senators Connally
and Vandenberg comment upon this
matter from the viewpoint of the United States Senate.
Senator Connally
referred to the long history of the Monroe Doctrine dating back to
the days of Canning. He said that as a practical
matter what happened in this Hemisphere had not actually been a cause of
world wars. If the countries in this Hemisphere adopt an agreement for
resistance this attack against aggression question would not affect the
world organization.
[Page 693]
The Senator emphasized that self defense is an
inherent right. If we are attacked, we can act. We have a right to
resist. After we have acted, then we would be obligated to report to the
world Organization. With respect to the question of ratification of the
Charter of the world Organization by the Senate everybody knows the
importance which the Senate attaches to the Monroe Doctrine and to the
recent application of this Doctrine in the Act of Chapultepec.
Mr. Eden
remarked that he had not come here for the purpose of signing a
regional agreement. If what was wanted was a Latin American regional
arrangement that was all right with him but he would have nothing to do
with it.
Senator Connally
referred to the Franco-Russian and the Anglo-Russian treaties and
said that we had agreed in the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C,
Paragraph 2, which we had jointly sponsored, to recognize these treaties
and to accept them for approval by the Security Council. He did not see
why in return the other sponsoring governments were not willing to
recognize our special problem in this Hemisphere.
Senator Vandenberg
said that in his view this matter was on all fours with the
Russian request for an amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2
excepting the Russian treaties from control by the Security Council. He
recognized that Russia could not afford to give up reliance on these
treaties until the world Organization had demonstrated its capacity to
guarantee security. On the other hand how could the American Republics
be expected to give up the guarantee of security which they had in the
Inter-American System until the world Organization had demonstrated its
ability to maintain security. The two situations were in his opinion on
all fours and there was no justification for denying recognition to the
special needs of Latin American countries and of the United States in
this Hemisphere.
Mr. Stassen
said he thought it was important to recognize that there were
three stages in the development of world security. The first has to do
with peaceful methods of settlement. In this area no one questioned the
propriety of emphasis on regional action for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. The second is the matter of enforcement. What sanctions shall
be applied, and how. The world Organization should have complete and
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to determination and enforcement.
The third relates to action in the event of the absence or failure of
enforcement. He said that the right of self defense must be reserved to
meet such a situation. In Europe this has been done through the
exception allowed with respect to the treaties against the enemy states.
So in this hemisphere the Charter of the world Organization cannot take
away the right of self defense. Recognition must be given to the right
of joint action in
[Page 694]
self
defense. This three stage situation is recognized in the draft proposed
by the United States.
Ambassador Koo
said that one or two points were not clear to him. As he
understood it the aggression to which reference is made in this draft is
not limited either in time or scope. The second point was as to whether
the conditional clause in the first sentence, “Should the Security
Council not succeed in preventing aggression” is applicable to the
second sentence. The second sentence provides “The right to take such
measures for self defense against armed attack which also apply to
understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to
consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all of
them”.
Mr. Stassen
said that the right of collective or group action only comes into
operation in the event of an armed attack.
Senator Connally
repeated that he thought that the United States proposal was not
greatly at variance with the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet
treaties. Under these treaties, as in the case of the Act of Chapultepec
an attack against one is treated as an attack against all parties to the
agreement. In both cases the treaties were aimed at resistance to armed
aggression. The United States draft enlarges the scope but not the
principle of the exception already agreed upon with respect to Chapter
VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.
Mr. Bidault
said that because of his limited knowledge of English he had not
been able to follow the discussions closely. Some of the shading and
nuances of meaning might have escaped him. He thought however, that his
thinking ran along the lines of Mr. Stassen’s. That is, there are three steps in security.
First, there is an immediate reliance on group or regional agreements;
next comes the world Organization; finally, when the world Organization
has proved itself to be effective regional agreements can be modified or
dropped. In the meantime such agreements or arrangements must be
maintained for immediate action in case of danger. Mr. Bidault
said that his reaction was not like that of Mr. Eden. However, he wanted time to think
over this text.
Ambassador Gromyko
inquired whether this represented a formal proposal on the part of
the United States. Mr. Stetttnius
said that it did not, that it was offered entirely informally for
consultation and discussion.
Ambassador Gromyko
inquired further whether this draft was based on a proposal from
the American Republics. Mr. Stettinius
said that this was not the case but that it represented rather an
attempt on the part of Technicians on the United States Delegation to
meet the views of the various interested parties on this question.
[Page 695]
Ambassador Gromyko
said that it was his understanding that the Latin American states
had asked for the right of independent action. That is action without
approval of the Security Council. This might well result in a series of
regional organizations acting independently of the Council; one for
Latin America, one for Europe and others elsewhere. These regional
organizations would act independently and only report to the Security
Council. They would not be subject to its control.
Senator Vandenberg
emphasized that our purpose was the very reverse of this. As soon
as the world Organization proves its effectiveness in guaranteeing
security, we would accept the jurisdiction of the Security Council as
exclusive.
Ambassador Gromyko
said that this point was covered in connection with the amendment
proposed for Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. There was an
important difference in that amendment in that these treaties were
limited in application to the enemy countries and they would only
continue in effect until the functions provided in them were transferred
to the world Organization by consent of the parties in the draft
proposed by the United States. On the contrary, in the United States
draft there was no time limit to the exception proposed.
Senator Vandenberg
said that he would be happy to accept the same formula as to time
action [limit?] as that contained in Chapter
VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.
Mr. Eden
pointed out that the two situations were entirely different in
this respect and that such a time limit would not be appropriate. Senator Vandenberg
rejoined that we proposed action only when the world Organization
has failed to maintain peace and security.
Mr. Stassen
pointed out that the United States draft would not give the
regional organization freedom of action. It is not as broad as the
treaty formula in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. Under that
formula the parties to the treaties could take enforcement action
against the enemy states. Under the United States draft there is no
right of enforcement. There is only the right of action in self defense
against armed attack.
Mr. Eden
wanted to know why a proposal had been made that was so far
removed from the concept and purpose of the Anglo-Soviet and the
Franco-Soviet treaties. He emphasized that the entire concept which had
been in prospect in calling this Conference was that of world
Organization. Did we want a world Organization, recognizing the
existence of some treaties and agreements or did we want a concept of
regional organization topped by a world Organization with very limited
powers. The four powers had tried in the previous formula (Chapter VIII,
Section C, Paragraph 2) to protect the concept of world Organization.
This had been done very carefully by
[Page 696]
imposing a specific time limit on the continuation
of the treaties in question.
On the contrary, embodying in the Charter a draft of the character
brought forward by the United States could only have the effect of
encouraging groups of states everywhere to enter into regional
arrangements and organizations. The whole concept of world Organization
would thus be undermined. This was what worried him and he could not for
a minute accept a concept so alt variance with the purpose for which the
San Francisco Conference had been called.
Senator Vandenberg
inquired of Mr. Eden how he
thought the United States and the other American Republics were to meet
the need with which they were very definitely confronted. Mr. Eden
said that he saw the difficulty which existed. He had thought that
the French formula would meet the situation satisfactorily. He was
intensely afraid of any formula which draws attention to regional
organization. Regionalism is the thing which frightened him.
Senator Vandenberg
said that he totally agreed with the need for world Organization
but at the same time he thought it was essential to protect the special
needs of the United States and the other American Republics in this
Hemisphere.
Mr. Stettinius
said again that the draft put forward by the United States was
informal and for study among the five powers.
Senator Vandenberg
asked if it would be possible to meet again before Mr. Eden left. Mr.
Eden
said that he would like very much to do so.
Mr. Pasvolsky
said that he wished to bring to the attention of the group a draft
which had been prepared in the Committee of Five on Chapter V, Section
B, Paragraph 1. He pointed out first that it made a distinction between
recommendation relative to principles of cooperation from [and?] principles relative to maintenance of peace
and security. The present paragraph would be broken into two paragraphs,
the first relating to principles of cooperation and the second to
principles of the maintenance of peace and security. There was no doubt
of the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations upon the
first. In the second place with reference to Assembly action on actual
questions, it was suggested that the existing limitation on the power of
the Assembly be modified to the extent of authorizing it to call
attention of the Security Council to the situations. In the third place
the Committee had adopted to rewrite the last sentence of the paragraph
in a more precise form. It had taken the Australian amendment86 and adapted it. The whole draft was
in accord with the Dumbarton Oaks concept of the General Assembly in
acting while the Council was dealing with a dispute. Mr. Pasvolsky
[Page 697]
said that the language of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been somewhat ambiguous and had caused a
misunderstanding as to what the Assembly could do while the Security
Council has a case under consideration.
Mr. Jebb
said that he had not had time to show Mr. Eden the draft to which Mr. Pasvolsky referred. He had presented it
briefly and in broad terms to a meeting of the British Delegation. Mr. Stettinius
agreed that consideration of the draft should be postponed.
Ambassador Gromyko
inquired whether the formula would meet the desires of the other
countries. Mr. Pasvolsky
said that it was intended to do so. For this reason the revision
had been based on the Australian amendment. With the new text there
would be no doubt of the meaning of the provision and of the
circumstances in which the General Assembly might make
recommendations.
Ambassador Gromyko
said that he thought the idea was the same in both texts. He
wondered whether the proposed change actually improves the situation and
meets the desires of other delegations. Mr.
Pasvolsky
thought that it did.
Mr. Stettinius
again suggested that further study be given to this provision and
that it might be considered again early next week.
Mr. Eden
said that he was leaving tomorrow morning and suggested that a
meeting be held yet this evening to consider further the regional
question precipitated by the United States draft. It was agreed that
another meeting should be held at six o’clock.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr.
Butler and Mr. Jebb remained in the Penthouse after the representatives
of the other countries had left and a discussion [was] undertaken of the
United States draft with a view to adjusting it in a manner to make it
acceptable to the United Kingdom Delegation for the United States.*
Senator Connally, Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Stassen, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Warren, Mr. Raynor, Mr. Hartley and Mr. Sandifer participated in the discussion.
Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius were present at the
beginning of this discussion and returned shortly before the meeting
reconvened at six o’clock.
Mr. Eden
was in a more conciliatory mood at the beginning of the
intervening meeting. He said that he expected that basis could be found
on which the United States and the United Kingdom could agree.
Mr. Dulles
emphasized that the United States did not want to encourage
regionalism.
[Page 698]
Mr. Eden
remarked that God knows we were as well aware as he as to how the
world would react to a provision which was as potentially regional in
character as the draft which the United States had produced in the
meeting just adjourned. He said that he had no objection whatever to the
desire of the Senators to safeguard properly the right of action through
the Inter-American System.
Mr. Stettinius
expressed his deep regret at the way things had gone. He said that
it had been intended that Mr. Dunn should see Sir
Alexander before the meeting at 2:30 and show him the
draft. There had been an unfortunate slip on this. The pressure of time
had made it impossible for Mr. Dunn to get together with Sir Alexander, consequently the United Kingdom
Delegation had very unfortunately not had an opportunity to see the
draft before the meeting began.
[Annex 1]
Memorandum by Mr. Robert W. Hartley of the United States
Delegation of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, Saturday,
May 12, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
| Present: |
United States—Secretary of State Stettinius, and Delegates,
Advisers and Experts of the United States Delegation |
|
United Kingdom—Foreign Minister Eden, and members of the Delegation,
Technical Advisers and Experts. |
Subject: United States Proposal on Regional
Arrangements and the Right of Self-Defense.
This conversation was held immediately following the adjournment of
the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Five.
In opening the discussion, The Secretary of
State said that he wished to make clear to Mr. Eden that there had been no thought
on the part of the United States Delegation in presenting its
amendment on regional arrangements and self-defense (See Annex
A87) of
trying to impair the effectiveness of the proposed international
organization. However, he said, the United States Delegation was
faced with a very practical problem. There was the internal problem
in the United States of trying to put a treaty through the Senate,
and unless some method was worked out by which the Inter-American
System was interlocked into the world organization without
impairment of that System, there was a good possibility that the
treaty could not be approved. At this point, Senator Vandenberg
said it was
[Page 699]
not only
a question in the United States alone, but also a question of
approval of the world organization by the other twenty American
republics.
Mr. Eden
stated that he was quite happy to accept the French amendment
(See Annex B88) in
this matter and thought that it would be sufficient.
Sir Alexander Cadogan
then said that as a result of his study of the French
amendment and the United States proposal (Annex A) he would like to
suggest another way of handling the situation, by replacing the
proposed United States amendment to Chapter VIII, Section B by the
following:
“Should a breach of the peace arise out of a dispute or
situation still under consideration by the Security Council
or shall a sudden and unforeseen breach of the peace occur,
any member state has the right to take measures of
self-defense. If the Security Council should be unable to
take a decision on the measures to be undertaken to restore
the situation, the members of the organization reserve to
themselves the right to take such action as they shall
consider necessary for the maintenance of right and
justice.”
After a brief study of this document, The
Secretary pointed out that its provisions did not specify
that the self-defense measures to be taken could be taken either
individually or collectively.
Sir Alexander
replied that, in his opinion, such a specification of
that right was unnecessary; all that was necessary, he said, was to
assert the right without stating that it was to be exercised either
individually or collectively. It was perfectly clear, he said, that
if the Security Council were unable to act, the right of
self-defense was perfectly open to an individual state, which state
could exercise that right individually or in combination with other
states.
Mr. Stassen, in commenting upon the new British
text as proposed by Sir
Alexander, pointed out that it had some of the
defects of the proposed French amendment in that it opened very
widely the field for the exercise of the right of self-defense.
Mr. Pasvolsky, in commenting upon the new
British draft, compared it with the proposed United States text
(Annex A) and pointed out that under the United States proposal, the
Security Council would be given full opportunity to act.
Mr. Eden, in meeting these preliminary criticisms,
said that the draft prepared by Sir
Alexander was only a suggestion and that he thought
it might be well to allow the technical experts “to have a go at it”
in order to try to clear any obscure points.
As a general comment, The Secretary pointed
out that what was of most concern to the United States Delegation
was that the United
[Page 700]
States
should have full opportunity to act in the event of an attack on
Latin America. Mr. Eden
replied that it was his concern that not only the United
States Should have such a right to defend itself against such an
indirect attack, but that the United Kingdom should have the same
right. In this connection, he cited the position of Great Britain in
the event of an attack on Turkey by Bulgaria, the latter acting
perhaps at the instigation of the Soviet Union. He said that if such
an attack occurred, Great Britain, as a matter of self-defense of
the Empire, wished to have the opportunity to act at once.
Sir Alexander Cadogan
pointed out that under the new British text, action could be taken
in a breach of the peace without too close a definition of the
circumstances under which that action should be taken. He made the
point that he wanted the Security Council to have the chance both to
act and to examine the case. Also, he said he found the United
States draft faulty in that it left open the problem of defining the
aggressor state.
Mr. Dulles
stated that the United States proposal attempted to define
aggression in terms of “armed attack” and in this way it was hoped
to avoid the problem of trying to define aggression as such.
Sir Alexander
reiterated his feeling that the Security Council should
have the opportunity to determine the circumstances of an armed
attack without trying to write any such close definition into the
provisions.
Mr. Dulles
said that it was not only a question of the Security Council
having the opportunity to act, but it was the question of the United
States carrying forward within the new world organization its
traditional policy of the Monroe Doctrine as expanded and further
defined in modern times; that the United States now regards an
attack on any one of the American Republics as an attack upon the
United States, and in that event the United States wished to
exercise collectively its right of self-defense.
Sir Alexander
countered this with the example of two American
Republics fighting each other, and pointed out that it was his
desire to give the Security Council a chance to act in such
circumstances; that it was not just a question of providing against
an attack against the Western Hemisphere.
Mr. Rockefeller
said that one of the matters of concern to the United States
Delegation was the attempt to avoid the misuse of the veto power in
the Security Council by which the Security Council would be
powerless to act, in the event of an attack on any one of the
American Republics, because of the veto of one of the permanent
members of the Council. He also pointed out that the inclusion in
the Charter of some language along the lines of the proposed United
States amendment would be of great psychological value, bearing as
it would upon the feeling of security of the other American
republics and their willingness and desire to participate in a world
organization.
[Page 701]
Mr. Eden
said that this psychological effect of the United States
proposal was precisely the one which he most feared. He said that in
Europe it would open up wide the field for regional arrangements
undertaken without the approval of the Security Council. In such an
event, he said that the question raised by the proposal became,
indeed, a very vital one, and that his apprehension as to the
inclusion of anything along the lines proposed by the United States
was based on the highest world politics. Mr.
Eden
spoke very eloquently of his fears in this connection,
stressing repeatedly his view that any provision of this kind would
raise some very crucial problems in forming the proposed world
organization.
Mr. Dulles
said that he did not think it was a question of the American
Republics alone and their participation in the world organization
that was involved, but that it was also the question of the
tradition of the Monroe Doctrine in United States foreign
policy.
The Secretary then pointed out that in the
Covenant of the League of Nations there had been a special provision
exempting the application of the Covenant to the policy of the
Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, the Secretary said, in view of Mr.
Eden’s strong views in
this matter, he thought that it might be well to attempt a new draft
of a provision which would incorporate both the American and the
British text.
At this point Mr. Rockefeller
stressed the fact that it was to the interest of the United
States, and of the world organization as well, that there should be
a strong system of Western Hemisphere defense. He said that such a
system, if properly integrated into the world organization, would be
almost indispensable to the successful functioning of that
organization, and he cited the resources and manpower that would be
available from the other American Republics.
Mr. Eden
said that, speaking quite frankly, he was not impressed by the
military contribution such as the other American Republics might
make to the world organization at this time.
Senator Connally
then advanced the suggestion that it might be well to take the
Four-Power amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2,
dealing with enforcement measures under regional arrangements, and
add to that an exception for the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Eden
then recalled that this particular Four-Power amendment had a
time limit to it and that that would not seem to meet the issue.
Senator Vandenberg
suggested that it might be well to put into the charter at
some point an exemption for measures taken under the Act of
Chapultepec. Mr. Stassen
then said that in his view such an exception for the Act of
Chapultepec would be going too far; that what he wished to see was
any such exception limited only to defensive action.
[Page 702]
Senator Vandenberg
then proposed an additional wording to the Four-Power
Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2, somewhat along
the following lines (underscoring indicates additional words
proposed):
“The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. But no enforcement action should be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council with the exception of
measures against enemy states in this war provided for
pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2, or, in regional
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy
on the part of such states, until such time as the
Organization may by consent of the Governments concerned, be
charged with the responsibility for preventing further
aggression by a state now at war with the United Nations,
and with the exception of measures
taken in self-defense against armed attack in accordance
with Part I, paragraph 3 in the Act of Chapultepec,
until such time as the Organization may, by the consent
of the states concerned, be charged with this
function.”
Following a very brief discussion of this newest proposal by Senator
Vandenberg, Mr. Jebb
said that still he thought that the French amendment was
better because the freedom of action under it was greater. Mr. Pasvolsky
said that it was his principal criticism of the French
amendment. It was “wide open”; it enabled complete freedom of action
by a state, and in acting under it a state could legally wreck the
proposed international organization. Mr.
Pasvolsky
then called attention to the fact that the text originally
proposed by the United States (See Annex A) arose out of the
inherent right of self-defense and that it was this residual right
of self-defense which was to be protected under the wording of the
original United States amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky
said that the original United States amendment would be
limited to armed attack and would thus limit freedom of action which
states could take, so that it was not as “open” an amendment as
might appear at first glance.
In answer to Mr. Pasvolsky’s
point, Mr. Eden
cited again the specific case of the position of Great Britain
in the event of a Bulgarian attack upon Turkey, and the Soviet
Union’s vetoing measures by the Security Council. Under such
circumstances, he said he wanted Great Britain to be free to act and
to take such measures as it might deem necessary for its
self-defense in the Middle East.
In arguing the case for the original United States amendment (Annex
A), Mr. Pasvolsky
pointed out that the good features of it were that it placed
the major powers on their good behavior; that the bad features were
that in the event of a veto in the Security Council, member states
were free to act. He said that it would be impossible to permit
complete freedom of action without smashing
[Page 703]
the entire international organization; if such
an event were to be avoided, it would be better to limit the right
of self-defense along the lines of the United States proposal.
Mr. Eden
said that, in his judgment, the United States proposal could
not apply in the case of an attack upon Turkey such as he cited, and
that the United Kingdom could not—acting under the United States
proposal—come to the aid of Turkey in self-defense. Mr. Pasvolsky
then inquired as to what other basis the United States had had
for acting under the Lend-Lease Act.89
The Secretary made clear that he was
sympathetic to the position taken by the United Kingdom, but that at
the moment both Delegations faced the very practical problem of
finding a formula which would satisfy the American Republics and
which would, at the same time, avoid impairing the efficiency of a
world-wide international organization. Mr.
Dulles
said, that in his view, Mr. Eden wanted to go further in his proposal than the
United States did and that if he understood correctly, Mr. Eden disliked the United States
proposal because of its limitations on the right of self-defense.
Mr. Stassen
stated that with a proviso such as suggested by the British
draft, the international organization would fail before it started;
that the British amendment could not be written into the Charter
without destroying the Organization in advance.
The Secretary said that he thought it
might be well to try to bring the discussion to a focus by asking
the Delegations to prepare a new draft upon the basis of the British
amendment and the United States proposal. There followed a brief
discussion of the advisability of attempting such a redraft. In this
discussion, Mr. Pasvolsky
made the point that if it were to be decided to give all
member states complete freedom of action when the organization
failed to take appropriate measures, then why should the British
proposal be concerned with what the arrangements would be in the
event that such action had to be taken by the member states. Mr. Eden
replied that the French amendment was better in this respect
by not specifying in detail what arrangements would follow. Mr. Pasvolsky
disagreed, stating that in his view the United States draft
provided for this contingency in a much better fashion.
Also from this discussion arose Mr. Eden’s point that self-defense in modern Europe was
a difficult term to define, and that attempts to specify in the
Charter those conditions under which such self-defense measures
could be taken would raise many difficult issues.
Mr. Dulles
made the suggestion that a new redraft might be attempted,
taking part of the newest British text and the proposal made by
Senator Vandenberg to add
additional language to Chapter
[Page 704]
VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. The Secretary said that he thought it
might be well if such a redraft were attempted, and then he raised
the question as to whether the British Delegation could accept a
reference in such a redraft to the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Eden
and
Sir Alexander
indicated that they would rather not have such a direct
reference but would prefer to have more general language. Mr. Eden
especially made the point that if a reference to the Act of
Chapultepec appeared in the document, this would precipitate
additional requests for the inclusion of references to the Arab
League, etc. Mr. Eden
inquired as to whether the Latin American Republics
specifically wanted an inclusion in the Charter of a reference to
the Act of Chapultepec as proposed in the United States amendment.
The Secretary informed him that the
Delegations of the American Republics had not yet been shown the
amendment and, therefore, he could not reply to Mr. Eden’s question.
Meanwhile, Mr. Jebb
had been developing a new draft of a proposed text and
accordingly he suggested a new paragraph 12, Section B, Chapter VIII
along the following lines:
“Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the right of
self-defense against armed attack, either individual or
collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to
take the necessary measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Measures taken in the
exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem
necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”
The Secretary said that he felt that a
draft based on Mr. Jebb’s
proposal could well be developed by six o’clock when the five
Foreign Ministers were to meet again. Senator
Vandenberg,
however, expressed some doubts as to whether such a statement would
be acceptable without a specific reference in it to the Act of
Chapultepec. Mr. Rockefeller
also said that such a specific reference would have a
tremendous effect.
Mr. Eden
suggested that the technical experts be permitted to redraft
something based upon the discussions that had been held and
suggested that he and the Secretary meet again at 5:45 p.m. for a
fifteen-minute review of the draft prior to the meeting of the five
Ministers at six o’clock. This was agreed to and the conversations
formally ended at 4:30 p.m.
(Note: Subsequently, working together
during the next hour, the technical experts of the British and
United States Delegations worked out a new draft shown in Annex
C90.)
[Page 705]
[Annex 2]
Minutes of Informal Drafting Session, by Mr.
Robert W. Hartley
With the return of Mr. Eden and
Mr. Stettinius the following
draft91
prepared during the interval was considered:
“Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of
self-defense, either individual or collective, in the event
that the Security Council has failed to maintain
international peace and security and an armed attack against
a member state has occurred. Measures taken in the exercise
of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
Security”.
It was suggested by the United States that in addition to this
provision a specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec be inserted
in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 1. Mr.
Dulles
had prepared the following draft for this purpose:
“Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of
regional arrangements or agencies or
collective arrangements like that contemplated by the
Act of Chapultepec for dealing with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the purposes and principles of the
Organization. The Security Council should encourage
settlement of local disputes through such regional
arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the
initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the
Security Council.”
Mr. Eden
found the general draft acceptable, but he objected to the
proposal to make a reference to the Act of Chapultepec in Chapter
VIII, Section C, Paragraph 1. Senator Vandenberg
insisted on including a reference to the Act of Chapultepec.
He said that a Senate reservation would be necessary if this were
not done. Mr. Eden
said he would have no objection to such a reservation.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired whether he should say at the beginning of the meeting
at six o’clock that this was a joint draft. Mr.
Eden
thought that it could be said that we had agreed on this as
far as it goes.
It was agreed that Mr. Eden
should present the draft and should say that he and his colleagues
had been trying to work something out which might be acceptable as a
basis for discussion. They had worked out this draft and had just
had time to show it to Mr. Stettinius.
Mr. Stettinius would say that we had had a chance to
look at the draft briefly and that we liked it so far as it goes. He
thought progress
[Page 706]
had been
made and he was well pleased. He would say however that we must find
some way to include the Act of Chapultepec.
