RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 3 (Parts I and II)

Minutes of the Third Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments (Part I), Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 12, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (12); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (4); France (3); and the International Secretariat (1).]

At the request to Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Hiss made a statement concerning the procedure of the Committees.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Stettinius said that the main problem which the group had been assembled to consider was that of regional arrangements. He said that the United States Delegation had studied the amendment put forward by the French and taking the French language as a basis they had drawn up a new draft. The text of the French amendment referred to by Mr. Stettinius is as follows, and has been put forward by the French as an amendment to Chapter VI, Section C, Paragraph 1: “Should the Council not succeed in reaching a decision, the members of the Organization reserve to themselves the right to act as they may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and justice”. (Doc. 2, g/7 (o)).83 He would hand the text of the draft prepared by the United States Delegation to those present for their confidential information.

He proceeded to read the text as follows which would be a new Paragraph 12 of Chapter VIII, Section B: “Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and should aggression occur by any state against any member state, such member state possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right to take such measures for self-defense against armed attack shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all of them. The taking of such measures [Page 692]shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether this affected the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 jointly proposed by the four powers.84 Mr. Stettinius said definitely that it was not intended to affect the amendment.

Mr. Eden immediately expressed an intense dislike for the draft. He said that it was clearly of Latin American origin. It would result in regionalism of the worst kind. The draft made him very unhappy and he would be frank to say he did not like it a bit.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he would like time to study the draft.

Ambassador Bonnet inquired where it was proposed to put this provision. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that it was intended to be a new paragraph in Chapter VIII, Section B.

Mr. Eden said that no one had been able to define aggression in thirty years. He said that if such a provision as this were included in the Charter he would not be able to sign it. It would make it a Latin American document. He inquired what was wrong with the French amendment. He could not see why the French amendment did not take care of the situation with which the United States draft was intended to deal.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that the British had brought forward an amendment proposing a recognition of special treaties. Mr. Eden rejoined that these treaties were limited in time and scope and that they were directed against preventing renewed aggression by the enemy states.

Mr. Stettinius asked that Senators Connally and Vandenberg comment upon this matter from the viewpoint of the United States Senate.

Senator Connally referred to the long history of the Monroe Doctrine dating back to the days of Canning. He said that as a practical matter what happened in this Hemisphere had not actually been a cause of world wars. If the countries in this Hemisphere adopt an agreement for resistance this attack against aggression question would not affect the world organization.

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The Senator emphasized that self defense is an inherent right. If we are attacked, we can act. We have a right to resist. After we have acted, then we would be obligated to report to the world Organization. With respect to the question of ratification of the Charter of the world Organization by the Senate everybody knows the importance which the Senate attaches to the Monroe Doctrine and to the recent application of this Doctrine in the Act of Chapultepec.

Mr. Eden remarked that he had not come here for the purpose of signing a regional agreement. If what was wanted was a Latin American regional arrangement that was all right with him but he would have nothing to do with it.

Senator Connally referred to the Franco-Russian and the Anglo-Russian treaties and said that we had agreed in the amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, which we had jointly sponsored, to recognize these treaties and to accept them for approval by the Security Council. He did not see why in return the other sponsoring governments were not willing to recognize our special problem in this Hemisphere.

Senator Vandenberg said that in his view this matter was on all fours with the Russian request for an amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 excepting the Russian treaties from control by the Security Council. He recognized that Russia could not afford to give up reliance on these treaties until the world Organization had demonstrated its capacity to guarantee security. On the other hand how could the American Republics be expected to give up the guarantee of security which they had in the Inter-American System until the world Organization had demonstrated its ability to maintain security. The two situations were in his opinion on all fours and there was no justification for denying recognition to the special needs of Latin American countries and of the United States in this Hemisphere.

Mr. Stassen said he thought it was important to recognize that there were three stages in the development of world security. The first has to do with peaceful methods of settlement. In this area no one questioned the propriety of emphasis on regional action for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The second is the matter of enforcement. What sanctions shall be applied, and how. The world Organization should have complete and exclusive jurisdiction with respect to determination and enforcement. The third relates to action in the event of the absence or failure of enforcement. He said that the right of self defense must be reserved to meet such a situation. In Europe this has been done through the exception allowed with respect to the treaties against the enemy states. So in this hemisphere the Charter of the world Organization cannot take away the right of self defense. Recognition must be given to the right of joint action in [Page 694]self defense. This three stage situation is recognized in the draft proposed by the United States.

Ambassador Koo said that one or two points were not clear to him. As he understood it the aggression to which reference is made in this draft is not limited either in time or scope. The second point was as to whether the conditional clause in the first sentence, “Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression” is applicable to the second sentence. The second sentence provides “The right to take such measures for self defense against armed attack which also apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all of them”.

Mr. Stassen said that the right of collective or group action only comes into operation in the event of an armed attack.

Senator Connally repeated that he thought that the United States proposal was not greatly at variance with the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet treaties. Under these treaties, as in the case of the Act of Chapultepec an attack against one is treated as an attack against all parties to the agreement. In both cases the treaties were aimed at resistance to armed aggression. The United States draft enlarges the scope but not the principle of the exception already agreed upon with respect to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.

Mr. Bidault said that because of his limited knowledge of English he had not been able to follow the discussions closely. Some of the shading and nuances of meaning might have escaped him. He thought however, that his thinking ran along the lines of Mr. Stassen’s. That is, there are three steps in security. First, there is an immediate reliance on group or regional agreements; next comes the world Organization; finally, when the world Organization has proved itself to be effective regional agreements can be modified or dropped. In the meantime such agreements or arrangements must be maintained for immediate action in case of danger. Mr. Bidault said that his reaction was not like that of Mr. Eden. However, he wanted time to think over this text.

Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether this represented a formal proposal on the part of the United States. Mr. Stetttnius said that it did not, that it was offered entirely informally for consultation and discussion.

Ambassador Gromyko inquired further whether this draft was based on a proposal from the American Republics. Mr. Stettinius said that this was not the case but that it represented rather an attempt on the part of Technicians on the United States Delegation to meet the views of the various interested parties on this question.

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Ambassador Gromyko said that it was his understanding that the Latin American states had asked for the right of independent action. That is action without approval of the Security Council. This might well result in a series of regional organizations acting independently of the Council; one for Latin America, one for Europe and others elsewhere. These regional organizations would act independently and only report to the Security Council. They would not be subject to its control.

Senator Vandenberg emphasized that our purpose was the very reverse of this. As soon as the world Organization proves its effectiveness in guaranteeing security, we would accept the jurisdiction of the Security Council as exclusive.

Ambassador Gromyko said that this point was covered in connection with the amendment proposed for Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. There was an important difference in that amendment in that these treaties were limited in application to the enemy countries and they would only continue in effect until the functions provided in them were transferred to the world Organization by consent of the parties in the draft proposed by the United States. On the contrary, in the United States draft there was no time limit to the exception proposed.

Senator Vandenberg said that he would be happy to accept the same formula as to time action [limit?] as that contained in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the two situations were entirely different in this respect and that such a time limit would not be appropriate. Senator Vandenberg rejoined that we proposed action only when the world Organization has failed to maintain peace and security.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that the United States draft would not give the regional organization freedom of action. It is not as broad as the treaty formula in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2. Under that formula the parties to the treaties could take enforcement action against the enemy states. Under the United States draft there is no right of enforcement. There is only the right of action in self defense against armed attack.

Mr. Eden wanted to know why a proposal had been made that was so far removed from the concept and purpose of the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet treaties. He emphasized that the entire concept which had been in prospect in calling this Conference was that of world Organization. Did we want a world Organization, recognizing the existence of some treaties and agreements or did we want a concept of regional organization topped by a world Organization with very limited powers. The four powers had tried in the previous formula (Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2) to protect the concept of world Organization. This had been done very carefully by [Page 696]imposing a specific time limit on the continuation of the treaties in question.

On the contrary, embodying in the Charter a draft of the character brought forward by the United States could only have the effect of encouraging groups of states everywhere to enter into regional arrangements and organizations. The whole concept of world Organization would thus be undermined. This was what worried him and he could not for a minute accept a concept so alt variance with the purpose for which the San Francisco Conference had been called.

Senator Vandenberg inquired of Mr. Eden how he thought the United States and the other American Republics were to meet the need with which they were very definitely confronted. Mr. Eden said that he saw the difficulty which existed. He had thought that the French formula would meet the situation satisfactorily. He was intensely afraid of any formula which draws attention to regional organization. Regionalism is the thing which frightened him.

Senator Vandenberg said that he totally agreed with the need for world Organization but at the same time he thought it was essential to protect the special needs of the United States and the other American Republics in this Hemisphere.

Mr. Stettinius said again that the draft put forward by the United States was informal and for study among the five powers.

Senator Vandenberg asked if it would be possible to meet again before Mr. Eden left. Mr. Eden said that he would like very much to do so.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that he wished to bring to the attention of the group a draft which had been prepared in the Committee of Five on Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 1. He pointed out first that it made a distinction between recommendation relative to principles of cooperation from [and?] principles relative to maintenance of peace and security. The present paragraph would be broken into two paragraphs, the first relating to principles of cooperation and the second to principles of the maintenance of peace and security. There was no doubt of the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations upon the first. In the second place with reference to Assembly action on actual questions, it was suggested that the existing limitation on the power of the Assembly be modified to the extent of authorizing it to call attention of the Security Council to the situations. In the third place the Committee had adopted to rewrite the last sentence of the paragraph in a more precise form. It had taken the Australian amendment86 and adapted it. The whole draft was in accord with the Dumbarton Oaks concept of the General Assembly in acting while the Council was dealing with a dispute. Mr. Pasvolsky [Page 697]said that the language of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been somewhat ambiguous and had caused a misunderstanding as to what the Assembly could do while the Security Council has a case under consideration.

Mr. Jebb said that he had not had time to show Mr. Eden the draft to which Mr. Pasvolsky referred. He had presented it briefly and in broad terms to a meeting of the British Delegation. Mr. Stettinius agreed that consideration of the draft should be postponed.

Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether the formula would meet the desires of the other countries. Mr. Pasvolsky said that it was intended to do so. For this reason the revision had been based on the Australian amendment. With the new text there would be no doubt of the meaning of the provision and of the circumstances in which the General Assembly might make recommendations.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought the idea was the same in both texts. He wondered whether the proposed change actually improves the situation and meets the desires of other delegations. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that it did.

Mr. Stettinius again suggested that further study be given to this provision and that it might be considered again early next week.

Mr. Eden said that he was leaving tomorrow morning and suggested that a meeting be held yet this evening to consider further the regional question precipitated by the United States draft. It was agreed that another meeting should be held at six o’clock.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Butler and Mr. Jebb remained in the Penthouse after the representatives of the other countries had left and a discussion [was] undertaken of the United States draft with a view to adjusting it in a manner to make it acceptable to the United Kingdom Delegation for the United States.*

Senator Connally, Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Stassen, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Warren, Mr. Raynor, Mr. Hartley and Mr. Sandifer participated in the discussion.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius were present at the beginning of this discussion and returned shortly before the meeting reconvened at six o’clock.

Mr. Eden was in a more conciliatory mood at the beginning of the intervening meeting. He said that he expected that basis could be found on which the United States and the United Kingdom could agree.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that the United States did not want to encourage regionalism.

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Mr. Eden remarked that God knows we were as well aware as he as to how the world would react to a provision which was as potentially regional in character as the draft which the United States had produced in the meeting just adjourned. He said that he had no objection whatever to the desire of the Senators to safeguard properly the right of action through the Inter-American System.

Mr. Stettinius expressed his deep regret at the way things had gone. He said that it had been intended that Mr. Dunn should see Sir Alexander before the meeting at 2:30 and show him the draft. There had been an unfortunate slip on this. The pressure of time had made it impossible for Mr. Dunn to get together with Sir Alexander, consequently the United Kingdom Delegation had very unfortunately not had an opportunity to see the draft before the meeting began.

[Annex 1]

Memorandum by Mr. Robert W. Hartley of the United States Delegation of a Conversation Held at San Francisco, Saturday, May 12, 1945, 3:30 p.m.

Present: United States—Secretary of State Stettinius, and Delegates, Advisers and Experts of the United States Delegation
United Kingdom—Foreign Minister Eden, and members of the Delegation, Technical Advisers and Experts.

Subject: United States Proposal on Regional Arrangements and the Right of Self-Defense.

This conversation was held immediately following the adjournment of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Five.

In opening the discussion, The Secretary of State said that he wished to make clear to Mr. Eden that there had been no thought on the part of the United States Delegation in presenting its amendment on regional arrangements and self-defense (See Annex A87) of trying to impair the effectiveness of the proposed international organization. However, he said, the United States Delegation was faced with a very practical problem. There was the internal problem in the United States of trying to put a treaty through the Senate, and unless some method was worked out by which the Inter-American System was interlocked into the world organization without impairment of that System, there was a good possibility that the treaty could not be approved. At this point, Senator Vandenberg said it was [Page 699]not only a question in the United States alone, but also a question of approval of the world organization by the other twenty American republics.

Mr. Eden stated that he was quite happy to accept the French amendment (See Annex B88) in this matter and thought that it would be sufficient.

Sir Alexander Cadogan then said that as a result of his study of the French amendment and the United States proposal (Annex A) he would like to suggest another way of handling the situation, by replacing the proposed United States amendment to Chapter VIII, Section B by the following:

“Should a breach of the peace arise out of a dispute or situation still under consideration by the Security Council or shall a sudden and unforeseen breach of the peace occur, any member state has the right to take measures of self-defense. If the Security Council should be unable to take a decision on the measures to be undertaken to restore the situation, the members of the organization reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.”

After a brief study of this document, The Secretary pointed out that its provisions did not specify that the self-defense measures to be taken could be taken either individually or collectively. Sir Alexander replied that, in his opinion, such a specification of that right was unnecessary; all that was necessary, he said, was to assert the right without stating that it was to be exercised either individually or collectively. It was perfectly clear, he said, that if the Security Council were unable to act, the right of self-defense was perfectly open to an individual state, which state could exercise that right individually or in combination with other states.

Mr. Stassen , in commenting upon the new British text as proposed by Sir Alexander, pointed out that it had some of the defects of the proposed French amendment in that it opened very widely the field for the exercise of the right of self-defense.

Mr. Pasvolsky , in commenting upon the new British draft, compared it with the proposed United States text (Annex A) and pointed out that under the United States proposal, the Security Council would be given full opportunity to act.

Mr. Eden , in meeting these preliminary criticisms, said that the draft prepared by Sir Alexander was only a suggestion and that he thought it might be well to allow the technical experts “to have a go at it” in order to try to clear any obscure points.

As a general comment, The Secretary pointed out that what was of most concern to the United States Delegation was that the United [Page 700]States should have full opportunity to act in the event of an attack on Latin America. Mr. Eden replied that it was his concern that not only the United States Should have such a right to defend itself against such an indirect attack, but that the United Kingdom should have the same right. In this connection, he cited the position of Great Britain in the event of an attack on Turkey by Bulgaria, the latter acting perhaps at the instigation of the Soviet Union. He said that if such an attack occurred, Great Britain, as a matter of self-defense of the Empire, wished to have the opportunity to act at once.

Sir Alexander Cadogan pointed out that under the new British text, action could be taken in a breach of the peace without too close a definition of the circumstances under which that action should be taken. He made the point that he wanted the Security Council to have the chance both to act and to examine the case. Also, he said he found the United States draft faulty in that it left open the problem of defining the aggressor state.

Mr. Dulles stated that the United States proposal attempted to define aggression in terms of “armed attack” and in this way it was hoped to avoid the problem of trying to define aggression as such. Sir Alexander reiterated his feeling that the Security Council should have the opportunity to determine the circumstances of an armed attack without trying to write any such close definition into the provisions.

Mr. Dulles said that it was not only a question of the Security Council having the opportunity to act, but it was the question of the United States carrying forward within the new world organization its traditional policy of the Monroe Doctrine as expanded and further defined in modern times; that the United States now regards an attack on any one of the American Republics as an attack upon the United States, and in that event the United States wished to exercise collectively its right of self-defense. Sir Alexander countered this with the example of two American Republics fighting each other, and pointed out that it was his desire to give the Security Council a chance to act in such circumstances; that it was not just a question of providing against an attack against the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Rockefeller said that one of the matters of concern to the United States Delegation was the attempt to avoid the misuse of the veto power in the Security Council by which the Security Council would be powerless to act, in the event of an attack on any one of the American Republics, because of the veto of one of the permanent members of the Council. He also pointed out that the inclusion in the Charter of some language along the lines of the proposed United States amendment would be of great psychological value, bearing as it would upon the feeling of security of the other American republics and their willingness and desire to participate in a world organization.

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Mr. Eden said that this psychological effect of the United States proposal was precisely the one which he most feared. He said that in Europe it would open up wide the field for regional arrangements undertaken without the approval of the Security Council. In such an event, he said that the question raised by the proposal became, indeed, a very vital one, and that his apprehension as to the inclusion of anything along the lines proposed by the United States was based on the highest world politics. Mr. Eden spoke very eloquently of his fears in this connection, stressing repeatedly his view that any provision of this kind would raise some very crucial problems in forming the proposed world organization.

Mr. Dulles said that he did not think it was a question of the American Republics alone and their participation in the world organization that was involved, but that it was also the question of the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine in United States foreign policy.

The Secretary then pointed out that in the Covenant of the League of Nations there had been a special provision exempting the application of the Covenant to the policy of the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, the Secretary said, in view of Mr. Eden’s strong views in this matter, he thought that it might be well to attempt a new draft of a provision which would incorporate both the American and the British text.

At this point Mr. Rockefeller stressed the fact that it was to the interest of the United States, and of the world organization as well, that there should be a strong system of Western Hemisphere defense. He said that such a system, if properly integrated into the world organization, would be almost indispensable to the successful functioning of that organization, and he cited the resources and manpower that would be available from the other American Republics.

Mr. Eden said that, speaking quite frankly, he was not impressed by the military contribution such as the other American Republics might make to the world organization at this time.

Senator Connally then advanced the suggestion that it might be well to take the Four-Power amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2, dealing with enforcement measures under regional arrangements, and add to that an exception for the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Eden then recalled that this particular Four-Power amendment had a time limit to it and that that would not seem to meet the issue.

Senator Vandenberg suggested that it might be well to put into the charter at some point an exemption for measures taken under the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Stassen then said that in his view such an exception for the Act of Chapultepec would be going too far; that what he wished to see was any such exception limited only to defensive action.

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Senator Vandenberg then proposed an additional wording to the Four-Power Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2, somewhat along the following lines (underscoring indicates additional words proposed):

“The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against enemy states in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2, or, in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such states, until such time as the Organization may by consent of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by a state now at war with the United Nations, and with the exception of measures taken in self-defense against armed attack in accordance with Part I, paragraph 3 in the Act of Chapultepec, until such time as the Organization may, by the consent of the states concerned, be charged with this function.”

Following a very brief discussion of this newest proposal by Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Jebb said that still he thought that the French amendment was better because the freedom of action under it was greater. Mr. Pasvolsky said that it was his principal criticism of the French amendment. It was “wide open”; it enabled complete freedom of action by a state, and in acting under it a state could legally wreck the proposed international organization. Mr. Pasvolsky then called attention to the fact that the text originally proposed by the United States (See Annex A) arose out of the inherent right of self-defense and that it was this residual right of self-defense which was to be protected under the wording of the original United States amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the original United States amendment would be limited to armed attack and would thus limit freedom of action which states could take, so that it was not as “open” an amendment as might appear at first glance.

In answer to Mr. Pasvolsky’s point, Mr. Eden cited again the specific case of the position of Great Britain in the event of a Bulgarian attack upon Turkey, and the Soviet Union’s vetoing measures by the Security Council. Under such circumstances, he said he wanted Great Britain to be free to act and to take such measures as it might deem necessary for its self-defense in the Middle East.

In arguing the case for the original United States amendment (Annex A), Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the good features of it were that it placed the major powers on their good behavior; that the bad features were that in the event of a veto in the Security Council, member states were free to act. He said that it would be impossible to permit complete freedom of action without smashing [Page 703]the entire international organization; if such an event were to be avoided, it would be better to limit the right of self-defense along the lines of the United States proposal.

Mr. Eden said that, in his judgment, the United States proposal could not apply in the case of an attack upon Turkey such as he cited, and that the United Kingdom could not—acting under the United States proposal—come to the aid of Turkey in self-defense. Mr. Pasvolsky then inquired as to what other basis the United States had had for acting under the Lend-Lease Act.89

The Secretary made clear that he was sympathetic to the position taken by the United Kingdom, but that at the moment both Delegations faced the very practical problem of finding a formula which would satisfy the American Republics and which would, at the same time, avoid impairing the efficiency of a world-wide international organization. Mr. Dulles said, that in his view, Mr. Eden wanted to go further in his proposal than the United States did and that if he understood correctly, Mr. Eden disliked the United States proposal because of its limitations on the right of self-defense. Mr. Stassen stated that with a proviso such as suggested by the British draft, the international organization would fail before it started; that the British amendment could not be written into the Charter without destroying the Organization in advance.

The Secretary said that he thought it might be well to try to bring the discussion to a focus by asking the Delegations to prepare a new draft upon the basis of the British amendment and the United States proposal. There followed a brief discussion of the advisability of attempting such a redraft. In this discussion, Mr. Pasvolsky made the point that if it were to be decided to give all member states complete freedom of action when the organization failed to take appropriate measures, then why should the British proposal be concerned with what the arrangements would be in the event that such action had to be taken by the member states. Mr. Eden replied that the French amendment was better in this respect by not specifying in detail what arrangements would follow. Mr. Pasvolsky disagreed, stating that in his view the United States draft provided for this contingency in a much better fashion.

Also from this discussion arose Mr. Eden’s point that self-defense in modern Europe was a difficult term to define, and that attempts to specify in the Charter those conditions under which such self-defense measures could be taken would raise many difficult issues.

Mr. Dulles made the suggestion that a new redraft might be attempted, taking part of the newest British text and the proposal made by Senator Vandenberg to add additional language to Chapter [Page 704]VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. The Secretary said that he thought it might be well if such a redraft were attempted, and then he raised the question as to whether the British Delegation could accept a reference in such a redraft to the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Eden and Sir Alexander indicated that they would rather not have such a direct reference but would prefer to have more general language. Mr. Eden especially made the point that if a reference to the Act of Chapultepec appeared in the document, this would precipitate additional requests for the inclusion of references to the Arab League, etc. Mr. Eden inquired as to whether the Latin American Republics specifically wanted an inclusion in the Charter of a reference to the Act of Chapultepec as proposed in the United States amendment. The Secretary informed him that the Delegations of the American Republics had not yet been shown the amendment and, therefore, he could not reply to Mr. Eden’s question.

Meanwhile, Mr. Jebb had been developing a new draft of a proposed text and accordingly he suggested a new paragraph 12, Section B, Chapter VIII along the following lines:

“Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the right of self-defense against armed attack, either individual or collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

The Secretary said that he felt that a draft based on Mr. Jebb’s proposal could well be developed by six o’clock when the five Foreign Ministers were to meet again. Senator Vandenberg , however, expressed some doubts as to whether such a statement would be acceptable without a specific reference in it to the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Rockefeller also said that such a specific reference would have a tremendous effect.

Mr. Eden suggested that the technical experts be permitted to redraft something based upon the discussions that had been held and suggested that he and the Secretary meet again at 5:45 p.m. for a fifteen-minute review of the draft prior to the meeting of the five Ministers at six o’clock. This was agreed to and the conversations formally ended at 4:30 p.m.

(Note: Subsequently, working together during the next hour, the technical experts of the British and United States Delegations worked out a new draft shown in Annex C90.)

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[Annex 2]

Minutes of Informal Drafting Session, by Mr. Robert W. Hartley

With the return of Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius the following draft91 prepared during the interval was considered:

“Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, in the event that the Security Council has failed to maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state has occurred. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and Security”.

It was suggested by the United States that in addition to this provision a specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec be inserted in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 1. Mr. Dulles had prepared the following draft for this purpose:

“Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies or collective arrangements like that contemplated by the Act of Chapultepec for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.”

Mr. Eden found the general draft acceptable, but he objected to the proposal to make a reference to the Act of Chapultepec in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 1. Senator Vandenberg insisted on including a reference to the Act of Chapultepec. He said that a Senate reservation would be necessary if this were not done. Mr. Eden said he would have no objection to such a reservation.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether he should say at the beginning of the meeting at six o’clock that this was a joint draft. Mr. Eden thought that it could be said that we had agreed on this as far as it goes.

It was agreed that Mr. Eden should present the draft and should say that he and his colleagues had been trying to work something out which might be acceptable as a basis for discussion. They had worked out this draft and had just had time to show it to Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Stettinius would say that we had had a chance to look at the draft briefly and that we liked it so far as it goes. He thought progress [Page 706]had been made and he was well pleased. He would say however that we must find some way to include the Act of Chapultepec.

  1. Doc. 2, G/7(o), March 21, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 385.
  2. Doc. 2, G/29(a), May 11, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 629.
  3. Doc. 2, G/14(1), May 5, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 552 (No. 28).
  4. Minutes of this discussion as recorded by Mr. Hartley are annexed. [Footnote in the original; see memorandum of conversation, printed as annex 1 to these minutes.]
  5. Annex A not printed; for text of proposed amendment, see ante, p. 691, last paragraph.
  6. Annex B not printed; see ante, p. 691, paragraph beginning, “Mr. Stettinius said”.
  7. For text of the “Act to Promote the Defense of the United States”, approved March 11, 1941, see 55 Stat. 31.
  8. For text, see first quoted paragraph of minutes of informal drafting session, printed as annex 2, below.
  9. Draft prepared for a new paragraph 12 at the end of section B, chapter VIII.